Abstract
Western democracies experience profound conflicts that induce concerns about polarization and social cohesion. Yet although conflicts are a core feature of democracies, the forms, functions, and dynamics of democratic conflicts have rarely been subject of political theory. This paper aims at furthering our understanding of democratic conflicts. It analyzes the theory of conflict in Mouffe's agonistic pluralism, confronts it with sociological conflict theory, and presents concrete points of departure for a more comprehensive theory of democratic conflicts. The paper, thus, contributes to two lines of research: (1) Regarding agonistic theories, the paper shows that agonistic pluralism fails to provide a convincing theory of conflict since it underestimates the mechanisms and effects of conflict dynamics (e.g. intergroup cohesion, intragroup conflict, domination, and escalation) and fails to account for the variety of conflict interactions. Proponents of agonistic pluralism should therefore invest more into clarifying their core concept. (2) For a general account of democratic conflicts, the paper proposes to pursue interdisciplinary research on the cognitive concepts shaping conflict interactions, the linked practices of conflict regulation, and the processual dynamics of conflicts.
Introduction
Western democracies currently experience intense conflicts that spur concerns about polarization and social cohesion. Recent crises incited strong disagreements about migration, the distribution of wealth, climate action, or gender diversity. Additionally, the pandemic has led to massive conflicts about the appropriate response on both the personal level (e.g. intra-family conflicts) and the political level (e.g. compulsory vaccination). Responding to the spread and intensification of conflicts, social science can offer insights into the topics at hand, but it could also address the forms, functions, and dynamics of conflicts in modern democracies.
Although conflicts are often considered a central feature of democracies, their forms and dynamics have rarely been analyzed in democratic theory, with the exception of some efforts in the 1990s (Dubiel, 1998; Hirschman, 1994). In contrast to democratic theory, sociological conflict theory has been dealing with conflicts in modern societies on a regular basis since Georg Simmel. From the 1950s to the 1970s, academic careers were built on conflict theory, as the biographies of Lewis Coser, Ralf Dahrendorf, or Randall Collins illustrate. However, explicit theories of modern conflicts vanished soon after that, as Joas and Knöbl (2009: 196) observed: “Indeed, from the 1970s, hardly any younger sociologists championed conflict theory as a theoretical approach in its own right” (emphasis removed; see also Benard and Doan, 2011).
The decline of sociological conflict theory has multiple reasons. Besides deficiencies of particular approaches, the decline is mainly rooted in the social transformations of the 1970s, including, among others, the rise of post-industrial economies, the pluralization of lifestyles, and the rise of new policy issues such as environmentalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2011; Kaelble, 2011; Reckwitz, 2020; Wirsching, 2011). Subsequently, Parson's theory of social systems lost its dominant position in social theory, which deprived conflict theorists of their foremost opponent. In light of the diversity of social change and the rise of new theories such as poststructuralism, the epistemological premises of conflict theory appeared outdated in terms of both their theoretical tools (e.g. classes) and social development (Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 196–197). In consequence, sociological conflict theory re-oriented, developing from a general theory of modern society into an analytical approach to violence and war phenomena. While conflict theory turned into “peace and conflict studies,” core insights of conflict theory also diffused into other areas of sociological research such as urban studies or social movements studies (Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 189–193).
In democratic theory, a somewhat inverse development has taken place since the 1970s. Observing the success of new social movements and in contact with poststructuralist theories, “agonistic” democratic theories became popular because they put conflicts centerstage. Criticizing theories of rational deliberation for their ignorance of conflict, agonistic democratic theories argue for the inevitability of conflict and stress the benefits of agonistic conflicts for democratic societies. Their fierce defense of conflicts has opened up new perspectives in many subdisciplines, for instance in political planning (Kühn, 2021; McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019), international peace studies (Maddison, 2017), urban studies (van Leeuwen, 2015), and—of course—political and social theory (Wenman, 2013; Westphal, 2019; White, 2021).
In this article, I ask what theory of conflict is at the bottom of agonistic theories and whether this theory suffices to understand democratic conflicts. To do so, I analyze Chantal Mouffe's agonistic pluralism. Among agonistic theories, it is arguably the most influential one in terms of academic and political impact. Mouffe's work is usually the point of reference when disciplines beyond political theory engage with agonistic arguments (see above), and it directly inspired political movements such as Podemos (Errejón and Mouffe, 2016). Agonistic pluralism is also most pronounced in acknowledging conflicts. In contrast to Connolly's or Tully's agonistic theories, for instance, it does not require conditions of critical self-reflection or mutual concession-making, but rather develops its argument from the fact of conflict and its potential to escalate into antagonistic struggles (Westphal, 2019). Impact and theoretical design therefore suggest to start with agonistic pluralism in order to evaluate available theories of democratic conflict.
Put strongly, I argue that despite the fact that agonistic pluralism founds democratic theory on conflict, it fails to present a solid theory of conflict. On the one hand, Mouffe does not even offer a systematic account of democratic conflicts. This is why I performed a keyword-in-context analysis, tracing any mention of the term “conflict*” in her major theoretical works in order to reconstruct her assumptions about the characteristics of conflict. This benevolent reconstruction, on the other hand, exposes that Mouffe's implicit theory of conflict does not manage to keep up with the state of knowledge in sociological conflict theory. Conflict theory shows that the dynamics of democratic conflicts are much more complex and ambivalent than agonistic pluralism currently brings to account. In particular, it fails (1) to explain the rise of cohesion between conflicting groups, (2) to analyze the dynamics of escalation, homogenization, and hierarchization, and (3) to grasp the variety of conflict modes in democratic societies.
The argument contributes to two lines of research. Firstly, it analyzes the concept of conflict in agonistic pluralism in a systematic manner, which—as far as I can see—has not been done yet. On the rare occasion that Mouffe's concept of conflict has been a topic in the vast literature on agonistic pluralism, scholars already criticized the lack of clarity when Mouffe distinguishes agonism from antagonism (Erman, 2009; Kühn, 2021; Menga, 2017). A systematic analysis of Mouffe's understanding of conflicts and their dynamics, however, unveils more shortcomings that affect the analytical and normative plausibility of agonistic pluralism. Put bluntly, Mouffe's theory runs into an impasse because she founds democratic theory on conflict without having a convincing theory of conflict. Proponents of agonistic theories should therefore give much more attention to their core concept.
Secondly, the paper contributes to developing an account of democratic conflicts that is needed in light of current social developments. It provides starting points from which to substantiate and differentiate our understanding of democratic conflicts. Confronting agonistic democratic theories with sociological conflict theory highlights systematic deficits that may serve as concrete points of departure for future research that could look into the cognitive concepts, practices, and processual dynamics of democratic conflict. Moreover, the paper also highlights the synergies of an interdisciplinary approach that combines traditions of social science research that have barely taken notice of each other's attempts to understand conflicts.
The paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part, I offer a benevolent reconstruction of Mouffe's theory of conflict. I start with a brief remark on the historical conditionality of Mouffe's approach, discuss the relevance of conflict for democracy, and analyze the dimensions of conflict dynamics in her theory. In the second part, I offer a critical perspective that elaborates on the deficiencies of Mouffe's theory of conflict named above. In the conclusion, I discuss how these insights offer systematic points of departure for future research that aims to better understand democratic conflicts.
Reconstruction: “Conflict” in Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism
Before Mouffe set off to develop her democratic theory, her grasp of conflict was formed by the historical context of the 1970s and a profound critique of the Marxist understanding of social conflicts. Indeed, the insufficient understanding of “the nature of the forces in conflict” in the Marxist tradition provides one of the starting points for the theoretical and political reorientation of Hegemony & Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 1).
In particular, there are three main elements of Marxist conflict theory that Mouffe and Laclau rejected. Firstly, they refused the idea of a privileged actor of social conflict in both forms its general conceptualization as classes and its concrete manifestation as working class (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 2, 56–57, 152, 159). Secondly, they repudiated the Marxist philosophy of history, which argued that the working class can overcome permanent conflict to build a harmonious, “reconciled society” (Mouffe, 2018: 3). In contrast, Mouffe and Laclau assumed that conflict is ineradicable and argued that the concrete struggles for hegemony are contingent: “[t]here is therefore nothing inevitable or natural in the different struggles against power” (1985: 152; Mouffe, 2013: 79). In consequence, Mouffe and Laclau also did not share the idea of a principal conflict that is embedded in the Marxist narrative and proposed that social theory must accept the idea of conflict plurality (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 152, 159–160).
This argument is influenced by significant experiences of the 1970s and 1980s, in particular the rise of social movements and the debate about the authoritarian failures of Marxism. On the one hand, Mouffe and Laclau stressed that “the new forms of social conflict” are the main point of reference for them, since they “imply an extension of social conflictuality” that holds “the potential […] for an advance towards more free, democratic and egalitarian societies” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 1, see also 86–87, 159). 1 In consequence, they developed a general argument theorizing the plurality of conflicts for social hegemony and a more specific, political argument that favors a radical democracy to realize the progressive potential of social movements.
On the other hand, both these moves were a direct response to the devastating experiences with ‘real existing socialism’ that also troubled many of their contemporaries. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 1) became aware of an authoritarian tendency of the Marxist idea of a reconciled society when they observed what was happening “from Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’etat, from Kabul to […] Vietnam and Cambodia.” In the French intellectual debate familiar to Mouffe, these experiences and further reports such as Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago gave rise to a heated debate about “anti-totalitarianism,” and many former Marxists turned towards liberal traditions to formulate a new political position, for instance by re-reading Tocqueville (Audier, 2007; Chabal, 2015, 2016; Duong, 2017; Rosenblum, 2016; Stewart, 2015). 2
In line with this heterogeneous turn to liberalism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 176) argued that the “task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but […] to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy” (emphasis removed). Mouffe's agonistic pluralism, then, is the result of rethinking liberal democracy from a pluralist point of view. But when developing her democratic theory, she argues that the “demise of Marxism” should not result in “the illusion that we can finally dispense with the notion of antagonism” (Mouffe, 1993: 2).
Hence, the significance of Mouffe's proposal is that it retains the Marxist focus on social conflict. Declaring social conflict as a constitutive element of liberal democracies became a major selling point of her theory, distinguishing it from other approaches such as Habermas’ or Rawls’ political liberalism (Wenman, 2013: 28–29). But what is the post-Marxist theory of conflict that grounds Mouffe's theory of democracy? Coding “conflict*” throughout her monographs, three major characteristics of social conflict emerge: (1) a social ontology of conflict, (2) a strong affectivity of conflict, and (3) its identity-building function.
Agonistic pluralism builds on a social ontology of conflict (Menga, 2017; Rosa, 2019), that is, it assumes that conflicts are an ineradicable phenomenon of any society: “negativity is constitutive and can never be overcome” (Mouffe, 2013: 130). 3 Thus, Mouffe's social ontology does not rest on contingency that could develop either into consent or conflict. In contrast, she assumes that conflicts are a given constituent of any society. Potential counterevidence cannot disprove this assumption: While adversaries may cease to disagree or reach a compromise, “that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated”, Mouffe argues (2009: 102). Rather, compromise or consent operates on a different level. They are effects of hegemonic formations that temporarily mask the inherent contestability of the social order. But at the bottom of any hegemonic formation, there is conflict (Mouffe, 2013: 79).
Beyond this socio-ontological assumption, Mouffe characterizes conflicts by two further features, affectivity and identity building. She argues that conflicts mobilize emotions, which strengthen the inner cohesion of groups and create collective identities. Affectivity and identity building are interdependent features of conflicts: Conflicting camps make competing offers for identification, but identification itself is only possible through passion (Mouffe, 2005: 25, 2013: 96, 139). At the same time, this affectivity emerges only when we distinguish an “us” from an imagined “them”. 4 Collective identity is possible only through the difference to a “constitutive outside” (e.g. Mouffe, 2009: 12–13; Mouffe, 2005: 15). Consensus depends on dissensus and exclusion (Mouffe, 2005: 73).
Understanding the dynamics of conflict is crucial for Mouffe's agonistic theory of democracy because she derives two major arguments from it, the normative quality argument and the stability argument. The first argument aims at the normative quality of liberal democracy. Mouffe states that the outstanding accomplishment of modern liberal democracy “lies in the recognition and the legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it through the imposition of an authoritarian order” (Mouffe, 2009: 113). While politics always “aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity” (Mouffe, 2009: 101), the distinctive feature of democratic politics is not overcoming the us/them distinction, since it allows for the creation of political communities in the first place; rather, in contrast to authoritarian politics, democratic politics establishes unity and collective identity in such a way that it complies with pluralism, diversity, and, thus, conflict (see also Mouffe, 1993: 8, 2009: 56). The quality of liberal democracy therefore declines when it fails to provide arenas to voice and fight over conflicting beliefs (Mouffe, 2009: 15, 104).
According to Mouffe, contemporary political thought has mostly failed to acknowledge conflict and, in turn, to explain and guide how liberal democracies can manage the “democratic paradox” to create unity while upholding pluralism and diversity. Agonistic pluralism argues that liberal democracies do so by transforming “enemies” into “adversaries” (Mouffe, 2005: 22), which changes their relationship from an “antagonistic struggle” for life and death into an agonistic conflict (Mouffe, 2009: 117). The major difference is that agonistic relationships acknowledge the legitimacy of the adversary because both “have a shared adhesion to […] liberal democracy” (Mouffe, 2009: 102). This “conflictual consensus” about the “institutions of liberal democracy” and its “ethico-political values” is at the heart of agonistic democratic theory because it is at the heart of liberal democracy (Mouffe, 2013: 8). While adversaries should fight fiercely over the right interpretation of liberty and equality, their acceptance of this conflict is exactly what makes modern liberal democracy “valuable” (Mouffe, 2009: 15, also 104).
The second line of argument continues this thought by focusing on the stability of democracies. Mouffe's stability argument states that democracies can only sustain themselves if the conflict is alive and built into democratic institutions: “A democratic society requires a debate about possible alternatives and it must provide political forms of collective identification around clearly differentiated democratic positions” (Mouffe, 2005: 31). In line with conflict theory, Mouffe stresses the “integrative role” of conflict (Mouffe, 2005: 31), which leads her to demand the institutionalization of conflicts to stabilize democracies.
On the one hand, institutionalized conflicts secure pluralism and prevent the political order from autocratic closure, because institutionalization guarantees that competing interpretations of the liberal democratic project can always be articulated. On the other hand, institutionalizing conflicts also prevents the citizens from drifting towards autocratic political programs, because conflicts offer multiple options for passionate identification with democratic projects and groups (Mouffe, 2013: 8). If the political order lacks “agonistic channels for the expression of conflicts,” latent conflicts will take an antagonistic form that mobilizes emotions and identities in a way that threatens liberal democracy (Mouffe, 2005: 69). According to Mouffe (2005: 69–83), the rise of right-wing populism and the rise of terrorism are phenomena that result from a lack of agonistic conflict within liberal democracies.
Mouffe's powerful arguments highlight the normative and empirical significance of conflicts in democracies. Nonetheless, many scholars have pointed out that Mouffe is notoriously weak in actually proposing agonistic institutions (Lowndes and Paxton, 2018; Rzepka and Straßenberger, 2014: 230–232; Volk, 2021; Wallaschek, 2017: 9–13; Westphal, 2019). Indeed, the keyword-in-context analysis supports this critique. Mostly, Mouffe argues that the “left/right opposition is the way in which legitimate conflict is given form and institutionalized. If this framework does not exist or is weakened, the process of transformation of antagonism into agonism is hindered, and this can have dire consequences for democracy” (Mouffe, 2009: 117; see e.g. 2005: 119). However, scholars have pointed out that this binary opposition of left and right is at odds with the project of pluralizing political conflicts (Straßenberger, 2016; Michelsen, 2022). Moreover, what kind of institutions realize agonistic conflict best is unclear. Mouffe usually refers to representative institutions, in particular to parliaments and parties (e.g. 1993: 5, 2013: 123–127), but she fails to explain how exactly these institutions would have to change in order to fulfill their agonistic potential.
While these critiques of the agonistic approach have merit and inspired a debate about agonistic institutions, the next chapter offers a different critique. It argues that Mouffe's understanding of conflict falls short of what social science knows about the dynamics of democratic conflicts. In consequence, the case for agonistic democracy is weakened and our grasp of conflicts in democracies remains insufficient. Democratic theory, especially democratic theory that puts conflict centerstage, needs to appreciate the complexity of conflict and draw on research insights from multiple disciplines.
Critique: Shortcomings of the agonistic theory of conflict
The reconstruction showed that at the bottom of Mouffe's agonistic theory is an implicit theory of conflict. It revolves around three main characteristics, that is, a social ontology of conflict, affectivity, and identity building. Understanding conflict that way allowed Mouffe to develop a powerful theory of democracy that highlights the empirical ubiquity and the normative relevance of conflicts in liberal democracies. It sets agonistic pluralism apart from other contemporary theories of democracy and makes it the salient option to understand current democratic conflicts, for instance about right-wing populism or migration (e.g. Kazharski, 2019; Schwiertz, 2021).
At the same time, the powerful arguments of Mouffe's agonistic pluralism are only convincing if its assumptions about the dynamics of conflict hold true and if these assumptions do not neglect important processes that might challenge the analytical and normative conclusions drawn from them. In the following, I will argue that at crucial points agonistic pluralism fails to acknowledge the complexity of conflict dynamics as it has been highlighted in sociological conflict theory. In this tradition, the dynamics of affectivity and identity building are a standard theme since Georg Simmel (1904a, 1904b). When arguing that conflicts mobilize emotions and fuel identity building within social groups, Mouffe concurs with the sociological conflict theory, although she does not refer to it (Collins, 1981; Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1904a). However, Mouffe's account remains underdeveloped regarding the ambivalence and variety of conflict dynamics indicated by conflict theory.
In the following sections, I focus on three major issues. First, I argue that Mouffe's account of conflict dynamics neglects to explain the emergence of intergroup cohesion from conflict, leaving a gap in her own argument that might be filled by incorporating sociological arguments. Then, I show that her treatment of intragroup dynamics is insufficient as well, because it underestimates that the very dynamics of affectivity and identity building do not only facilitate in-group cohesion but also in-group conflict, in-group domination, and, in consequence, conflict escalation. Finally, I argue that agonist pluralism underestimates the variety of conflicts and their diverging effects.
Critique I: Explaining association by dissociation
Mouffe's implicit theory of conflict pays prime attention to cohesion within conflicting groups (intragroup cohesion), since she considers group identification to be a major factor of democratic integration. In comparison, agonistic pluralism takes little interest in how conflicts generate cohesion between conflicting groups (intergroup cohesion). This, however, is of relevance for her democratic theory because it renders Mouffe unable to explain how the “conflictual consensus” among adversaries actually emerges (Erman, 2009: 1044). The conflictual consensus is crucial for the functioning of liberal democracy and for Mouffe's argument about the integrative role of conflict. But while the “conflictual consensus” assumes intergroup cohesion, Mouffe does not explain how it arises. I argue that conflict theory provides convincing explanations for multiple processes that give rise to a conflictual consensus.
Classical conflict theory stressed the interplay of association and dissociation in social conflicts. For instance, Simmel (1904a) argued that a conflict is a specific form of sociability (“Vergesellschaftung”) precisely because it intertwines dissociation with association. He found that the “opposition is an integrating component of the relationship itself” (p. 493); in other words, “the very act of entering into conflict with an antagonist establishes relations where none may have existed before” (Coser, 1956: 115). Beyond this basic relationship, Simmel argued, a multi-level process unfolds in which individuals form groups and the conflicts among groups lead to larger groups (Bonacker, 1996: 57). But while this process allows the formation of large social groups, the potential for conflict within these groups rises simultaneously. Modern societies then find specific forms of conflict, such as legal disputes and economic competition. According to Simmel (1904a: 507–511), these institutions of modern societies channel the dissociative elements of conflict into a regulated form that stabilizes social associations, for instance by taming emotions and reducing the personal components in conflicts.
Simmel's discussion of conflict dynamics has been highly instructive for conflict sociology. Lewis Coser (1956: 115), for instance, introduced Simmel's idea that “conflict binds antagonists” into functionalist theorizing. Following Simmel, he stressed that conflict can strengthen social integration because it initializes contact with a stranger and creates knowledge about the unknown other, which often results in setting up regulated interactions guided by commonly acknowledged rules (Coser, 1956: 115–117). Coser (1957), then, added another path that creates latent cohesion among adversaries when arguing that conflict stipulates social innovations. It is therefore useful that “modern Western institutional structure allows room for freedom of conflict” (p. 199), so that it can adopt new institutional arrangements, social norms, or economic innovations that have been uncovered in social conflicts. While conflicts can be destructive, many conflicts help organize social change and thereby stabilize the social system (for a similar argument, see Luhmann, 1995: 357–404).
A different approach explaining the emergence of intergroup cohesion is by focusing on rituals, role-taking, and symbolic incorporation. Expanding systems theory by drawing on symbolic interactionism and cognitive psychology, Niklas Luhmann argued that procedures dealing with conflicts (such as trials or elections) mostly do not achieve “real consensus” or “communitarian harmony” (Luhmann, 1983: 119; my transl.). Rather, they involve participants and observers in ceremonial work of role-taking and symbolic representation that restructure cognitive expectations and behavior in a way that achieves general acceptance (Luhmann, 1983: 114–120). In consequence, conflicts can create cohesion in the social dimension despite failing to achieve consensus in the fact dimension.
Processual arguments, such as Luhmann's, in general, argue that emotions and cognitive expectations are mobilized and re-stabilized in the course of conflict interactions. Such arguments have been put forward by other theorists, too. Richard Sennett, for instance, argued for a “process view of community” (Sennett, 1999: 143). In contrast to communitarian ideas of communities, Sennett proposes that conflicts can create a sense of commonality even though the conflict parties do not solve their disagreement and do not share an identity. Building on Simmel and Coser, he argues that people in conflict get to know their counterparts and learn to understand their beliefs and actions. If this is successful, conflicts create a bond between “people who have separate or conflicting interests, who do not feel good about each other, […] or who simply do not understand one another. […] This is the challenge of all conflict management” (Sennett, 2013: 6). Rather than elaborating a formal model of conflict dynamics, Sennett’s (2013) work on cooperation set out to trace historical practices of conflict management that might fulfill the intergroup cohesion condition. 5
My argument here is not that sociological conflict theories offer unproblematic frameworks, nor that agonistic pluralism should adopt them without scrutinizing their implications. 6 Rather, I argue that Mouffe does not explain the associative effects of dissociative conflicts, although she needs to do so to substantiate the emergence and stability of a “conflictual consensus.” While the “conflictual consensus” acknowledges the co-presence of association and dissociation, Mouffe sometimes even strictly distinguishes two diverging approaches to politics, an associative and a dissociative one: Whereas the “associative view” focuses on “liberty and acting in concert,” the dissociative view sees politics “as the field of conflict and antagonism” (Mouffe, 2018: 87). Of course, Mouffe fails to uphold the exclusive alignment of conflict with dissociation: “while in conflict, they [the adversaries] see themselves as belonging to the same political association [!], as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place” (Mouffe, 2005: 20).
As the quote shows, association and dissociation are clearly linked, not just in conflict theory but also in agonistic pluralism. While agonistic pluralism certainly could share many of the above arguments, Mouffe has yet to explicate the emergence of intergroup cohesion. Democratic cohesion and consensus beyond one group are assumed but not explained. Interpreting Mouffe, Tambakaki (2011: 580) argued that a “common practice” constitutes and consolidates a democratic “way of living” beyond disagreements. This line of argument is already close to processual approaches. It illustrates potential intersections but also highlights that conflict theory currently offers a better, more detailed account of such common practice and its effects.
In short, conflict theory provides multiple viable arguments on how conflicts interweave association and dissociation between groups. It offers theoretical tools to clarify Mouffe's argument and substantiate the “conflictual consensus” concept, explaining the rise of intergroup association from conflict dynamics. On the other hand, it also challenges agonistic theory, for instance when observing that conflicts often integrate adversaries simply by absorbing, consuming, and exhausting their “antagonistic” energy (Collins 2004; Luhmann 1983; Pruitt and Kim, 1994). Conflicts, in fact, achieve integration not only by emancipation but also by depletion. Incorporating such perspectives and answering questions that arise from them would greatly enhance our understanding of democratic conflicts.
Critique II: The ambivalence of conflict dynamics
The first critique argued that Mouffe fails to explain the emergence of the conflictual consensus because she does not offer an account of how intergroup cohesion emerges from conflict dynamics, that is, of the mechanisms that yield cohesion among adversaries. Mouffe's account of conflict dynamics remains underdeveloped. Another indicator of that is that Mouffe's treatment of how conflict dynamics yield highly ambivalent results is unsatisfying as well.
To be sure, Mouffe is not blind to the ambivalence of conflicts. Two main aspects are embedded in the ‘DNA’ of agonistic pluralism as elaborated in my reconstruction: On the one hand, and following Schmitt's intensity model, Mouffe stresses that any conflict has the potential of turning from a tamed struggle into a “war between enemies” (Mouffe, 2009: 31) that would threaten liberal democracy. On the other hand, building on poststructuralism, Mouffe highlights that any construction of identity is only feasible by means of exclusion. Potential or actual exclusion may then be the source of new conflicts, especially if excluded actors manage to build a new hegemonic project, which, of course, includes building a new identity (Mouffe, 2009: 33).
However, Mouffe's attendance to the ambivalence of conflict dynamics does not reach beyond these arguments. She does not provide accounts of how exactly processes of intragroup cohesion valued by Mouffe can also escalate conflicts to a degree disapproved by agonistic pluralism. Nor does she engage with how exactly the dynamics of affectivity and identification generating intragroup cohesion also result first in internal conflicts and then in hierarchization, centralization, and a continued search for internal enemies. Insufficient attention to these mechanisms dampens the theory's potential to analyze democratic conflicts and it dodges some pressing normative questions.
Conflict theories, on the other hand, have always stressed how the same mechanisms that lead to in-group cohesion also tend to silence in-group conflicts and escalate conflicts. Simmel (1904a, 1904b) already argued that individuals aggregating into groups increases the potential for internal conflicts, due to (a) the rise in group heterogeneity and (b) the group's search for a common identity. Thus, the potential for in-group conflict becomes even larger when multiple groups come together to form new alliances (Bonacker, 1996: 57). In conflict situations, groups or alliances therefore often resort to strengthening their inner cohesion (Collins, 2012; Simmel, 1904b: 679–680). Mouffe (1993: 70, 2009: 53–55), too, demands that hegemonic projects construct an affective and uniting identity to gain clout in conflict and to unfold the integrative power of conflicts. 7 Strengthening inner cohesion, for instance, by forming a unifying identity, however, would need strategies to govern or silence inner conflicts (Benard and Doan, 2011: 192–193; Simmel, 1904b: 676). These strategies and their consequences should be considered.
As many conflict theories point out, groups in conflict are prone to demonstrate intolerance and even hostility towards conflicting opinions within their own community (Collins, 2012: 7–9; Coser, 1956: 97–100; Pickett et al., 2002; Simmel, 1904a: 521, 1904b: 676–680). They often develop stark hierarchical structures and employ active practices of homogenization (Benard and Doan, 2011: 192–193; Bonacker, 1996: 57). Furthermore, processes of intragroup cohesion and intergroup hostility re-enforce each other, creating a vicious circle (e.g. Collins, 2012; Pruitt and Kim, 1994: 101–120): As conflict induces processes of in-group centralization and homogenization, less committed, neutral and deviant members of the community are driven out, raising the overall hostility against the adversary. Escalating hostility and tactics, then, often results in raising the inner cohesion (homogenization, hostility) of the adversary, which further escalates and hardens the conflict, and so on. In such a circle, the intensity and extensity of a conflict increase, including the readiness to believe allegations and use heavier tactics.
Such tendencies have led some scholars such as Richard Sennett to openly defy communal solidarity (1992: 265–266, 308–312, 2013: 297). In his perspective, thinking of politics from the perspective of (multiple) united communities that have homogenous identities and moral standards is rather dangerous. In such communities, he argues, autocratic structures are more likely and group members themselves will exert social control to create homogeneity, for instance by excluding, silencing, or even killing dissenters. Reminding his readers of the Jacobin tradition, he stated this “version of fraternity leads to fratricide” (Sennett, 1992: 266).
Agonistic pluralism mostly fails to address these issues, since it does not (yet) provide an analysis of how these mechanisms and processes unfold, nor does it discuss the normative issues that emerge from them. For instance: How far can processes of exclusion, domination, and homogenization advance until they become intolerable according to agonistic democratic theory? What are safeguards against authoritarian structures inside a political movement? And how do or can liberal democracies manage to allow for intense agonistic conflicts while also avoiding escalation dynamics in and between conflict parties? 8
Mouffe's lack of concreteness and caution in this regard is surprising. The critique of Marxism in the 1970s and 1980s that provides the context of Mouffe's early theory has often targeted this exact point, condemning Marxist groups and parties for their practices of domination and homogenization (e.g. Foucault, 1994: II, 157–158, III, 398). What is more, recent research on populism insisted on the authoritarian tendencies in multiple populist movements from the left. This should be of major significance for Mouffe's plea for a left populism, as de la Torre (2019) pointed out. A failure to address these questions in more detail, thus, is highly problematic for Mouffe's general democratic theory as for her more political proposals. 9
My critique, therefore, is twofold. On the one hand, I think it is analytically desirable to provide a more comprehensive account of conflict dynamics if democratic theory puts conflict centerstage. Only by means of such more exhaustive accounts, we will also be able to understand current issues in democratic conflicts such as polarization (Deitelhoff and Schmelzle, 2022). Here, conflict theory is ahead of agonistic pluralism, even though a range of contributions on the mechanisms, processes, and potential counter-mechanism in conflict precedes Mouffe's continuing work. On the other hand, more exhaustive accounts also raise questions regarding normative democratic theory, especially if a democratic theory argues to harness the integrative power of conflict. I do not want to insinuate that these questions are answered easily. And to be sure, conflict theory, too, lacks a precise understanding of the mediators that condition the occurrence, form, and intensity of centralization and/or homogenization (see e.g. Benard and Doan, 2011: 215–216; McClelland, 2014). However, building a democratic theory on conflict without addressing even well-known aspects of conflict dynamics in more detail hampers its normative and analytical plausibility.
Note, however, that the ambivalence of conflict dynamics does not undermine the productivity argument. Most conflict theories nevertheless hold on to the productivity argument. Mouffe's democratic theory is highly instructive in reminding us that conflicts are an unavoidable and potentially productive part of democracy, fostering its stability and quality. Democratic theories that only rely on solidarity, harmony, or consensus will therefore fall short of democratic reality. Agonistic pluralism also has a general sense of potential pitfalls of democratic conflicts, but it fails to elaborate on them in analytical and normative terms. The task of democratic theory is to unpack the conditions of conflict productivity and account for the paradoxes and diversity of conflict trajectories.
Critique III: The varieties of conflict
The agonistic theory distinguishes two modes of conflict: agonism and antagonism. Agonism is a less intense mode of antagonistic struggle. And whereas agonistic conflicts are beneficial for democracies, antagonistic conflicts should be avoided through the institutionalization of legitimate conflicts. As much as this distinction is core to Mouffe's entire theory, it has been subject to criticism. Besides its intellectual inclination to Schmitt that is considered problematic by some scholars (e.g. Menga, 2017), at least three major systematic deficiencies of her distinction can be pointed out.
For one, Mouffe does not explain where agonism ends and antagonism begins (Erman, 2009: 1047–1048; Menga, 2017). Mouffe does not undertake any attempt to clarify the threshold between both modes of conflict. In consequence, it is not feasible to say what kind of practices or what level of intensity falls within the range of legitimate agonistic conflict—and respectively, what exactly falls below it (and is not even an agonistic conflict) or exceeds it (and constitutes an antagonism). In consequence, secondly, the question arises as to who decides where to draw the line between legitimate agonistic conflict and illegitimate antagonistic conflicts. This is relevant from a theoretical perspective as well as in political practice, since governments and activists might have rather different responses. 10 And finally, many scholars criticized that Mouffe does not offer an account of how exactly the transformation from antagonism to agonistic conflicts takes place (Erman, 2009: 1048; Kühn, 2021: 147).
If those critiques already amount to a systematic problem with the distinction of agonism and antagonism, another aspect is crucial that has not been pointed out by the literature: Mouffe knows a vast range of conflict modes, but her theory of conflict is not able to appreciate these modes of conflict nor does it provide the means to evaluate them in light of the norm of agonistic conflicts because the thresholds that constitute agonistic conflicts remain in the dark.
Coding the conflict key in Mouffe's monographs reveals that she uses different terms to signal different modes of conflict. By far the most common term is “struggle,” other terms are “confrontation,” “negotiation,” or “competition.” Often, Mouffe also attributes sentiments to these modes of conflict, thus providing normative judgments. While “struggle” and “confrontation” usually have affirmative sentiments, “competition,” “dialogue,” and (of course) “deliberation” have negative sentiments, whereas “negotiation” is sometimes attributed with positive (e.g. Mouffe, 2009: 5, 45), sometimes with negative judgment (e.g. Mouffe, 2005: 20, 2009: 111). The reason for rejecting certain modes of conflict usually amounts to saying that this kind of interaction would not contain an antagonistic element, that it is no “real confrontation” (Mouffe, 2005: 52, 2013: 9). 11 The problem with this argument is twofold.
(1) As we just saw, Mouffe does not offer criteria that would allow anyone to determine (even vaguely) if and why a given interaction qualifies as agonistic conflict. Even Mouffe herself is not consistent. She rejects some modes of conflict at one point, only to approve of them elsewhere. Negotiations, for instance, are sometimes taunted as “mere negotiations” that do not contain any antagonistic element (Mouffe, 2005: 20), while also being valued as an essential element of liberal democracies: “liberal-democratic politics consists, in fact, in the constant process of negotiation and renegotiation” (Mouffe, 2009: 45). This kind of ambivalence has also been highlighted by Menga (2017: 544–545) who collected a number of instructive quotes on Mouffe's use of “agonistic conflict.” He shows that Mouffe uses different versions of agonistic conflicts, a “harder,” more “antagonistic” one when criticizing other approaches for not taking conflict seriously and a much “milder” one when characterizing her own approach.
Hence, the label of “agonist conflict” is assigned arbitrarily. In the end, it is Mouffe who decides about what or who receives the appreciated label. Since “agonistic conflict” is an empty signifier, Mouffe can use the label strategically to accuse other theories of a failure to “really” acknowledge conflict. While this accusation might be obvious vis-a-vis rational-liberal theories (Habermas, Rawls) and globalization theories (Beck, Giddens), Mouffe directs the same accusation towards poststructuralists and—most importantly—other political theories that value conflict, ranging from Hannah Arendt and Bonnie Honig to William Connolly (e.g. Mouffe, 2013: 9–15, 2005: 9, 131). But without specifying the threshold of what qualifies as agonistic conflict, Mouffe's argument for agonistic pluralism is significantly depleted, first because it lacks clarity and then because it instrumentalizes this lack of clarity.
(2) The failure to specify criteria of evaluation also results in a failure to include the empirical variety of conflict into agonistic democratic theory. It is hard to justify why agonistic pluralism does not regard conflict interactions such as competitions, negotiations, or legal disputes as “real” conflicts, whereas conflict theories would definitely do so, some of them even by evoking the semantics of antagonism (e.g. Simmel, 1904a, 1904b; Coser, 1956).
Mouffe fails to engage with this tradition and its insights into the variety of institutionalized conflicts. One might argue that her focus lies elsewhere than with the differentiation of conflict in modern societies. Rather, her primary goal is to defy any idea of eradicating antagonistic conflicts in democracies. In doing so, she draws on Carl Schmitt's intensity model of politics allows her to highlight that any conflict can turn into an antagonistic confrontation regardless of where it originates. This, however, does not explain why, or according to what criteria, Mouffe calls some tamed conflicts “real” conflicts, while discriminating against other tamed conflicts that are equally widespread in modern democracies and equally far-reaching in their potential to transform social hegemonies.
Moreover, there are at least two aspects why failing to account for the variety of conflict modes in modern democracy is unfortunate for a democratic theory of conflict (agonistic or not). Firstly, a variety of conflict modes implies a variety of different emotions and conflict dynamics. This is relevant for the productivity argument, since the contribution to mobilizing and stabilizing the democratic framework may vary. As research from social psychology and communication science has pointed out, the framing and perception of a conflict—is it a game, a fight, a negotiation, a debate?—already induce diverging orientations of conflict actors (Coleman et al., 2012; Dewulf et al., 2009; Rogan, 2006). In consequence, they also influence the outcome of conflicts, including what conflict actors and observers deem legitimate “democratic” strategies, identities, or values (Dubiel, 1998; Hirschman, 1994).
Analyzing competing framings of democratic conflicts and their political implications would therefore enhance our understanding of both the dynamics of democratic conflicts in general and the current debate about polarization in particular. For instance, current framings of conflicts may contribute to fostering affective polarization even where issue polarization tends to be weak (as in Germany, for instance; see Lux et al., 2021). Moreover, social scientists also provide frames of polarization, for example, by diagnosing a binary split of society into “winners” and “losers” of modernization or “cosmopolitans” and “communitarians” (e.g. Teney et al., 2014; van Hootegem et al., 2021; de Wilde et al., 2019). Researchers should therefore reflect and control for the effects of their own concepts and narratives (August, 2021a).
Secondly, accounting for the varieties of conflict is also relevant because democracy might depend on a combination of diverging modes of conflict, for instance providing spaces for dialogue-oriented conflicts (e.g. citizens’ assemblies, parliamentary committees) as well as for fight-oriented conflicts (e.g. strikes). The combination of conflict modes is an empirical question (do all democracies provide arenas for a variety of conflict modes?), but could also substantiate a stability argument (for sustaining themselves, democracies depend upon having a variety of conflict modes) or help building a normative argument (the quality of democracies rises with their ability to provide room for a variety of conflicts, for instance, because it fosters opportunities to exercise freedom or because it strengthens the equality of participation since citizens with diverging sets of competencies and preferences find ways to voice opinions). 12
The variety and combination of conflict modes, thus, speaks to Mouffe's general argument. It highlights its potential but also its lack of elaboration. Rather than discussing the implications of differentiated conflict modes for the stability and quality of democracies, Mouffe's agonistic pluralism only accepts one “real” form of conflict. Not specifying what makes a “real” agonistic conflict, however, results in an inability to specify limits, institutions, and practices. Therefore, the failure to specify her own distinction and to engage with the variety of conflicts can be considered a major reason for her lack of institutional proposals. It makes her theory of conflict insufficient from an external as well as from an immanent perspective, at least in its current state.
Conclusion
Western democracies currently experience profound conflicts that induce concerns about polarization, social cohesion, and the stability of democracies in general. In democratic theory, agonistic theories stress the role of conflicts in liberal democracies. Chantal Mouffe's theory of agonistic democracy has gained massive influence for defending political conflicts as crucial for the stability and quality of democracies. In this paper, I reconstructed the underlying theory of conflict and discussed the validity and quality of Mouffe's arguments, drawing on the sociological tradition of conflict theory. Based on this evaluation, I highlighted opportunities to further our understanding of democratic conflicts.
In sum, I argued that agonistic democratic theory provides strong arguments for the inevitable and often beneficial role of conflict in democracies, but at the same time it fails to provide a convincing theory of democratic conflict itself. On the one hand, Mouffe does not offer a systematic account of democratic conflicts. This is a major impediment since she founds her democratic theory on conflict without explicating the concept of conflict. On the other hand, reconstructing Mouffe's implicit theory of conflict is feasible. But then it becomes obvious that her understanding of conflict does not keep up with sociological conflict theory, especially regarding the mechanisms of conflict dynamics and the variety of democratic conflicts. Both, however, are of significance for the descriptive and normative arguments put forward by agonistic pluralism.
These findings have implications for further research on agonistic theory and for furthering our understanding of democratic conflicts in general. If agonistic theories want to substantiate their claims about the crucial role of conflict in stabilizing and improving democracies, they will have to work toward a more robust theory of conflict. This entails reconstructive and constructive efforts. Firstly, further research needs to reconstruct and compare the theories of conflict held by other agonistic democratic theories, such as James Tully's or William Connolly's. Secondly, proponents of agonistic theories will have to import the results of sociological conflict theory and recent efforts in social psychology in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of conflicts to ground their democratic theory.
Despite the somewhat disappointing results regarding agonistic pluralism, we can draw inspiration for future engagements with democratic conflicts from the confrontation of agonistic pluralism and sociological conflict theory. In my view, the argument discovered at least four starting points for further empirical and theoretical research:
An integrative approach: As should be obvious from the above discussion, it would be immensely fruitful to advance research on democratic conflicts by integrating insights from conflict sociology, social psychology, political theory, communication studies, and history, including the history of ideas. In matters of democratic conflict dynamics and historical practices of conflict management, these disciplines have barely taken notice of each other. Critical conceptual analysis: Further research should invest more efforts into analyzing the social framing of conflicts. They serve social actors as interpretive lenses, encouraging, among others, diverging emotions, evaluations, and strategies. The task includes to trace concepts that induce a mode of conflict (e.g. fight, polarization) and to look into their links to specific traditions of political thought, their institutionalization in democracies, and their distribution over social groups, regions, or time. This endeavor means to take the interpretations of actors in conflict seriously. But it also entails that social scientist themselves reflect on their own concepts and narratives of conflict (August, 2021a). Practices of conflict regulation: Agonistic pluralism is particularly weak when asked to put forward concrete examples of institutionalizing conflicts. Yet, in conflicts of any kind, there are practices of conflict regulation. For instance, diplomacy has been rather inventive, using cocktail parties and unsigned pieces of paper to mediate conflicts (Sennett, 2013: 238–239). Tracing the diverse attempts to institutionalizing and regulating conflict might help to advance our understanding of how democracies can deal with them, as it uncovers multiple, perhaps forgotten options and their viability in recent attempts. Even beyond democratic institutions, management strategies such as design thinking could offer further empirical material that helps to analyze competing mindsets and their conflict practices. Processes and mechanisms of conflicts: When conflicts unfold, not only concepts of conflict and their practices matter, but also time and timing. Some sociological conflict theories are interested in how the unfolding, process of conflict itself results in certain outcomes, and how temporal rhythms in the conflict contribute to it. Moreover, a series of conflicts can develop path dependencies, as social psychology pointed out. Thus, for understanding conflict dynamics, the processual perspective should be explored more systematically. Such an approach would fit the rise of processual methodologies in political science and sociology, such as process tracing, social mechanisms, and processual sociology, offering new perspectives in terms of empirical research and theorizing (e.g. Abbott, 2016; Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Hoebel and Knöbl, 2019; Kuhlmann and Nullmeier, 2022; McAdam et al., 2003).
Summing up the identified points of departure, we could work towards a theory of democratic conflicts by building on interdisciplinary research to assess the cognitive concepts, linked social practices, and the process dynamics of conflicts. Substantiating and expanding existing democratic theory with such insights will help to better analyze and evaluate current conflicts.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Cord Schmelzle, Grit Straßenberger, Manon Westphal, and the reviewers for their very useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. I am also grateful for the feedback I received at the Greifswald agonistic theory workshop and the Center for Political Practices and Orders colloquium.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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