Abstract
Although correctional institutions are supposed to be strong partners in de-radicalization and disengagement from violence, prisons have historically played an instrumental role in many radical organizations, enabling recruitment of new followers. Recent examples from Europe and the Middle East demonstrate that prisons frequently facilitate the spread of Islamist ideology by providing inmates a platform to forge alliances, exchange experience and recruit potential attackers. Because policies regarding management of terrorism-related offenders can either mitigate or exacerbate the risks of prison radicalization, it is important to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. This article examines strategies for dealing with Islamism in prisons worldwide (dispersal, containment and mixed approach), focusing on best practices, and assesses the United Kingdom’s experiment of ‘separation centres’ from the point of view of its potential to tackle the spread of Islamism in prisons.
Introduction: Prisons as ‘terror academies’
The concern about prisons contributing to the spread of extremism and the nexus between convictions and terrorism have been mentioned repeatedly by academics and practitioners as one of the most pressing security issues that requires an immediate policy response (Basra et al., 2016; Brandon, 2009; Hamm, 2013; Silke, 2014). Prisons have played an instrumental role in the narratives of many radical political organizations in the 20th century, including Irish Republicans, German Marxists and Egyptian Islamists (Soufan, 2016). Additionally, prison radicalization poses threats with regard to enhancing the structure and recruitment pools of criminal networks. In the Soviet Union, Gulags enabled the development of a unique criminal subculture that generated ‘thieves in law’, or a special rank of violent, elite criminals who vetted and recruited future cadres for their gangs in high-security jails. 1 Some of the most powerful Brazilian criminal groups, such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital 2 in Sao Paulo and the Comando Vermelho 3 in Rio de Janeiro, originated in prisons (Mulcahy et al., 2013).
It is important to clarify some of the terminology used throughout this article. The inevitable problem in studying prison radicalization is that there are many working definitions of this phenomenon, and a clear consensus of what constitutes core elements of a radicalized behaviour is yet to be reached. In this study, radicalization is understood as a process by which an individual or a group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social and religious ideas and aspirations, including the need to use violence to achieve political change. For the purposes of this article, which looks at the UK example of a separation policy, extremism is defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2015: para. 7). Although the broad nature of the UK government’s definition of extremism included in the Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales is subject to academic debate, this definition was nevertheless chosen for the study because it allows me to situate the analysis of a new regime for terrorism-related offenders in its political context. Furthermore, the UK government’s definition is the most commonly used among the interviewees recruited for the primary study, hence its use was also instrumental in terms of facilitating a constructive dialogue and avoiding confusion.
Following the above-mentioned definition, the process of prisoner radicalization can be a ‘double-edged sword’ (Hamm, 2013: 1), capable of triggering both positive and negative results – some prison radicals, including Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi, achieved great heights of public service as leaders of national liberal movements and prominent government officials. However, in the context of Islamism, prisons are known as ‘universities of terror’, as exemplified by recent examples of the biographies of jihadists. In the Middle East, prisons have proved to be formative in the development of extremism from an organizational and logistical perspective, providing a platform for inmate encounters and collaboration. One of the most telling examples is how Camp Bucca, a prison maintained by the USA in Iraq from 2003 until 2009, contributed to networking between two different groups of inmates. The detention of a large number of jihadists and ex-Ba’athists 4 during the Iraqi insurgency resulted in opportunities for the two groups to forge alliances and exchange experiences, including combat doctrine. The Ba’athists brought military skills, discipline, excellent training and a network of experienced bureaucrats that other radical organizations lacked (Barrett, 2014), and this symbiotic relationship contributed to the first military achievements of ISIS. Although the administration did successfully separate the inmates along sectarian lines to avoid tensions, they failed to separate the extremist Sunni inmates from the moderate Sunnis, and this situation created a breeding ground for extremism. 5
A significant number of the Islamic State’s senior members passed at some point through either Saddam’s prisons or the US-run Camp Bucca, known as the ‘Academy’ among extremists (Soufan, 2016). However, it was not the first time prison would galvanize a jihadist movement. In the 1980s, imprisonment in Mubarak’s Egypt strengthened future terrorist leaders, such as al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was arrested following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Soufan, 2016). Although al-Zawahiri was a committed jihadist before his arrest, his experience in prison made his determination more clear, and he became more convinced of the need to use violence for political change (Soufan, 2016). Besides empowering already committed extremists, some prison regimes exacerbate the issue of radicalization by mixing different categories of inmates. In Lebanon, prisoners are not categorized according to their criminal records, and minor offenders have repeatedly been jailed in the Roumieh prison together with perpetrators who have committed serious crimes, including terrorism (Lebanese Center for Human Rights, n.d.). According to Penal Reform International (2015), lack of classification of prisoners and lack of separation of pre-trial and convicted prisoners are factors that intensify the issue of radicalization.
Although both prison and probation are supposed to be strong partners in de-radicalization and resettlement, instead of promoting disengagement from violence, these systems frequently facilitate extremism. Considering that the above-mentioned strategies of housing terrorism-related offenders in the Middle East have failed to decrease the risks of prison radicalization, but rather are exacerbating the issue and providing extremists with a common platform and learning tools, an important question to pose is whether the separation strategy could produce better results in terms of the management of extremists.
In the UK, following the inquiry into the spread of Islamism in prisons published in 2016, the government announced plans to crack down on the spread of radical ideology among incarcerated people by creating three ‘separation centres’ that would house the most subversive Islamists. As of January 2018, HMP Frankland near Durham had been created (Hill, 2018), and it is the first time the UK government has practised the policy of separating terrorism-related offenders. At the same time, most of the mass media coverage of the new approach has been negative, drawing attention to its human rights criticism and comparing the units to Guantanamo Bay (Parveen, 2017). Currently, a more balanced and nuanced evaluation of the containment policy is absent from the public discourse in the UK. This article aims at filling this gap by examining strategies for dealing with Islamism in prisons worldwide and assessing the UK experiment from the point of view of its potential to tackle the spread of radicalization in prisons.
Strategies for dealing with extremism in prisons
Experts identify three main policies for dealing with violent or non-violent extremists in prisons: containment, dispersal or a mixed approach (Williams, 2016). This article relies on an examination of strategies for dealing with extremism-related offenders in custody implemented in 10 countries that face the danger of the spread of Islamism in prisons. It is important to assess the strengths and weaknesses of these regimes before discussing the UK context and the experiment of ‘separation centres’ because evaluation of best practices helps us to better understand the conditions under which this policy will be successful in the UK.
As shown by Table 1, dispersal is the most common strategy of dealing with terrorism-related offenders, and it is practised in most of the countries worldwide, including Australia, Belgium, France, Germany and Russia. According to this approach, terrorism-related offenders are placed among the mainstream prison population. Although inmates who could have potentially been radicalized may warrant special treatment, the same regime is applied to both terrorism-related offenders and regular prisoners. As a result, terrorism-related individuals are not subject to stigma and do not benefit from a status of ‘martyr’ that separate units might create. There is also the possibility that radicalized individuals might change their views through interactions with the mainstream prisoner population. The policy of dispersal requires fewer staff and fewer resources, and could be beneficial from the financial point view, taking into account the staffing and resourcing crisis observed in many countries worldwide.
Management of terrorism-related offenders worldwide: Policies.
At the same time, this policy poses significant risks of prisoner radicalization, and the danger that violent extremist offenders will exert influence over others. Moreover, they could also be influenced by criminal gangs, perpetuating the nexus between terrorism and organized crime. As discussed in the introduction, Middle Eastern countries tend to follow the dispersal method, separating prisoners only according to sectarian lines and not according to the crimes committed. The key strength associated with the dispersal method is the ability of the prison system to dilute the extremist prisoners’ disruptive influence by dispersing them. However, the general units usually lack staff who are specially trained to understand the threat of violent extremism and are equipped with the knowledge and ability to recognize and address vulnerabilities (Williams, 2016); the latter disadvantage was pointed out several times during the interviews conducted for this study.
In comparison with dispersal, containment is a more expensive and less common regime of housing inmates. Those suspected of being able to radicalize others are placed in separate units that benefit from previously trained staff. It is expected that the inmates will be measured against particular criteria to enter the separate units and are monitored closely. This approach prevents terrorism-related offenders from exerting their influence and potentially recruiting people who are not involved in politically motivated violence. The Netherlands is one of the few states able to successfully house its entire prison population in two high-security prison facilities (Vught and Rotterdam). Spain has a different approach to ETA prisoners and Islamist extremists, applying dispersal to the former and containment to the latter (Dolz Ortega, 2017). Israel also practises a full separation approach, making a clear distinction between ‘criminal’ and ‘security’ prisoners (Ganor and Falk, 2013). One of the Australian states (New South Wales) has so far implemented this policy in its maximum-security Goulburn prison (Hunt, 2017).
The following disadvantages are usually cited as possible outcomes of the containment policy: (1) it could be a source of elevated status for convicted people, portraying them as ‘dangerous others’ (Drake, 2011); (2) the policy could strengthen social bonds between inmates, reinforcing their ideological beliefs and commitment to the cause; (3) it could influence society’s perceptions about unfair treatment and discrimination in prisons (Williams, 2016). In addition, the separation approach treats all terrorism-related offenders as equal in degree and severity of risk, despite a range of offences (for example, non-violent or violent extremism). 6
The mixed approach is a combination of the two strategies carried out on the basis of a risk assessment. Although this strategy offers more flexibility with regard to the placement of individuals, it does not set out a precise list of criteria for an inmate to be considered for placement in the specialist unit. The USA follows a mixed approach of dealing with terrorism-related offenders: the most dangerous individuals are held in maximum-security prisons (for example, Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid, Dzhokar Tsarnaev and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab are incarcerated in the ADX facility in Colorado), whereas the rest are spread out across the country (Fairfield and Wallace, 2016). The UK has recently followed this example, introducing ‘separation centres’ in 2017 for the most dangerous and actively proselytizing inmates, and this article aims at examining the UK approach.
Methodology
This study is based on a comparative criminal justice methodology. There is a rich tradition of scholarship in the area of comparative penology in social sciences and law. Contextualizing justice arrangements designed for terrorism-related offenders helps researchers to acquire specific knowledge about how cultural settings and legal traditions shape counter-terrorism responses. Comparative criminal justice also helps to generate insights into the efficacy of various policy initiatives on tackling extremism in prisons. Cavadino and Dignan (2006) argue that, despite a great diversity of cultural, political and legal indicators that exist cross-nationally, it is essential to understand the international dimensions of punishment. Pakes (2015) points out theoretical as well as practical incentives to the comparative study of criminal justice, as globalization and notable changes in legislation make comparisons more relevant.
The first stage of data collection involved a systematic review of the prison regimes in the above-mentioned countries. Both primary and secondary sources were reviewed, including academic articles, governmental reports, criminal justice strategies and risk assessments. The literature review at the first stage focused on the examination of different penal strategies with regard to housing extremism-related offenders: containment, dispersal and a mixed approach. The following countries that face the risks of the spread of Islamism in prisons were reviewed: the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, France, Germany, Russia and Israel. The second step of data collection relied on gathering information about the UK imprisonment of terrorism-related offenders and the new policy of separation centres. This step of data collection, in addition to a review of existing literature, is based on interviews with academics and practitioners, including forensic psychologists and the Joint Extremism Unit at Her Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS), about the management of terrorist-related offenders and the current challenges that the prison and probation system is facing.
The recruitment of prison staff for research can often be more complicated than getting access to prisoners themselves. Crawley and Sparks (2005) argued that arranging interviews with prison staff is fraught with difficulties because the regime, time constraints and low staffing levels inhibit the process. Despite the difficulties of access, I carried out a total of 12 interviews during September 2017 – February 2018 with the goal of acquiring information on how extremist offenders are managed in the prison system, what rehabilitation programmes are used and under what conditions, and what criteria are used to assess the risks they represent. Although the original questions revolved around both Islamist and far-right extremist ideologies, most attention was dedicated to the Islamism-related offenders because they currently represent a higher threat for the criminal justice system. All the interviews were semi-structured. This format was selected because of the sensitive nature of the subject, and it allowed the interviewees to raise their own concerns and point out certain issues regarding prison radicalization, probation and post-release. The interviewees were recruited using ‘snowball sampling’. The sampling process originally generated five interviews, but additional interviewees were arranged after the research process had commenced. In most of the cases, audio-recording was not allowed or not welcome during interviews, and the main topics raised by the participants were noted and written up in detail later by me.
All the interviews revolved around the main research question of this article: in what circumstances will the policy of separation of terrorism-related offenders be effective from the point of view of mitigating prison recruitment and radicalization threats? Because separating extremists in prisons is a very recent policy in the UK, introduced in 2017, no quantitative or qualitative data are available regarding its results. Therefore, this article examines the best practices of managing extremists in prisons in the above-mentioned countries with the objective of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of ‘separation’ and assessing in what circumstances the policy would be successful in the UK.
The operational dynamics of prison radicalization: Push and pull factors
Individuals are usually more receptive to religious ideologies at times when their self-identity is questioned, and prisons are environments conducive to searching for a new identity, trust and hope. Because radical preachers capitalize on the vulnerabilities and marginalization usually prevalent in prisons and exploit many socioeconomic and racial grievances, inmates are particularly susceptible to the fundamentalist rhetoric in the correctional institutions. When examining the process of spreading extremist ideology in prisons, it is important to consider push, pull and facilitating factors that contribute to radicalization.
Concerning push factors, prison conditions, including infrastructure, policies, procedures and staff–prisoner relationships, can play a significant role in increasing or mitigating the radicalization risks. Institutionalized penal crises observed in many Western countries result in a situation where prisons suffer from a chronic crisis of legitimacy, being viewed by incarcerated individuals as ineffective in controlling crime, inefficient and inhumane (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). A shortage of prison resources, poor facilities, overcrowding and lack of access to adequate health care, as well as long periods of time in pre-trial detention, can also contribute to a context in which radicalization flourishes (Penal Reform International, 2015).
Whereas recruitment of full-time prison officers in England and Wales increased by only 9 percent between 2000 and 2006, the prison population grew during the same period by 24 percent (The Howard League for Penal Reform, 2009). The combination of fewer prison officers, fewer cells and more prisoners has created a severely understaffed and overcrowded prison system (The Howard League for Prison Reform, 2014), with many prisoners being the ‘product of profound social breakdown’ (The Centre for Social Justice, 2009). Skarbek (2016) argues that understaffing and the crisis of resources under some conditions result in a situation where prisoners revert to extralegal governance institutions such as male gangs in California, Bolivia or Brazil. Understaffing in England and Wales has been linked to suicides in custody (The Howard League for Prison Reform, 2014) as well as increases in incidences of self-harm and attacks against staff, and might have affected the ability or willingness of prison officers to tackle the spread of extremism.
As prison conditions deteriorate, faith becomes more important for incarcerated individuals. Liebling and Arnold (2012) argue that faith identity plays a complex role in prisoner conflict, because some of the serious violent incidents observed during their ethnographic research were related to faith or ideological disputes. Comparing their results with a similar research project carried out in the same prison in 1998–9, the authors concluded that prison had become a more tense environment, with higher levels of mistrust and fear among staff and prisoners. A new population mix, including younger and minority ethnic inmates, was disrupting established hierarchies, rendering a prison environment more complex. Muslim prisoners had a more pronounced ‘collective identity’ and felt more ‘oppositional’ or distrusting of staff in comparison with non-Muslim prisoners (Liebling and Arnold, 2012).
Although understaffing experienced by the prisons of England and Wales is a serious concern that could potentially aggravate already existing legitimate grievances shared among prisoners, the lack of specialized training and understanding of how to recognize the signs of radicalization by prison staff could also lead to the spread of extremism. Furthermore, certain internal policies such as allowing extremist literature in the prison cells and the fear of staff being called racist have previously been pointed out as barriers to having a holistic strategy to tackle prison radicalization (HM Ministry of Justice, 2016).
In a similar vein, sentences perceived as punitive and unjust contribute to the push factors of radicalization and generate additional grievances. New sentencing practices in the UK (for example, criminalizing the ‘glorification’ of terrorism and other non-violent acts) prompted changes in the dynamics of the relationships between prisoners, one of which was a higher threat and fear of violence (Liebling and Arnold, 2012). Violence and gang culture in prisons are another push factor. Inmates in high-security prisons in the UK have reported concerns for their safety, and prisoners have been converting to Islam for their own protection against growing gang-related violence (HM Ministry of Justice, 2016).
Concerning pull factors, embracing radical Islamist ideology could be appealing for inmates who seek confidence, esteem, membership and belonging. Moreover, conversion to Islam is known as a protection-seeking strategy and a means of gaining more material benefits, such as better food during Ramadan or more time out of cells during serving time (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2010). Embracing Islam in prison demonstrates another way of exerting power by individuals who would like to be regarded as leaders and who tend to show their power in a violent way, justifying it by faith (Liebling and Arnold, 2012).
Besides push and pull factors, it is important to take note of facilitating factors that help recruit individuals. Charismatic radical preachers become facilitating agents who capitalize on both push and pull factors, exerting a controlling influence over both Muslim and non-Muslim populations. There have recently been reports that Michael Adebolajo, one of the Lee Rigby killers who was given a whole-life sentence, may have helped convert inmates to Islam and has been exerting a considerable influence on other prisoners as a ‘charismatic’ person (Simpson, 2017). Abdullah el-Faisal, a radical preacher deported from Britain to Jamaica, also had an important influence on some inmates while he was in custody, including a former prisoner who went to Yemen after his release hoping to participate in a suicide mission (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 2012).
Criminals and terrorist recruitment
As evidenced by the recent terrorist attacks and foiled plots discussed below, criminals have successfully become a pool for terrorist recruitment, and people with a criminal record could be an easier target for extremist recruiters because, unlike people who have not been involved in crime before, those with a criminal record do not require the period of conditioning or grooming that would normally be needed to overcome their inhibitions about breaking the law (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Lloyd and Dean’s research reveals that the involvement of criminals in the al-Qaeda-influenced extremist organizations appears to be opportunistic and self-serving, and they do not always share the same belief systems or religiosity with other radicalized individuals. Basra et al. (2016), having examined the crime–terror nexus among European foreign fighters, also confirm that the jihadist narrative is well aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and terrorist groups are increasingly relying on the pool of people previously convicted or involved in common criminality.
Before his conversion to radical Islam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian petty criminal and a future leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, served time in prison for sexual assault and drug possession. Recent examples from Europe also show that there is a strong link between convictions and radicalization. Abdelbaki Es Satty, a Moroccan imam at the Ripoll mosque in Catalonia who was instrumental in radicalizing the Barcelona attackers, had previously served time in jail for drug trafficking. He met several al-Qaeda members during his imprisonment, including Rachid Aglif, who was serving an 18-year sentence for his part in the 2004 Madrid train bombing. This encounter is believed to have been a pivotal moment in the development of Es Satty’s radical ideas (Dunleavy, 2017).
Khaled Masood who drove a car across Westminster Bridge towards Parliament in the UK in March 2017, injuring 50 people and killing 4, has an extensive criminal record, having been convicted three times since he was 18. In 2000, he was imprisoned for two years for a violent knife attack, and he converted to Islam and started using a new name in jail (Mendick and Allen, 2017). Masood was later sent back to prison for another six months for possession of an offensive weapon (Mendick and Allen, 2017).
Anis Amri, a failed asylum seeker who murdered 12 people when he drove a truck into a Christmas market in Berlin, had previously been accused of armed robbery back in his home country of Tunisia. He had a history of dealing drugs in Europe and travelling throughout the EU using multiple identity documents under different aliases after his asylum application was rejected (Europol, 2017: 20), and he was sentenced to a four-year prison term (but released in 2015) for starting a fire in a refugee centre (Huggler, 2016). Indeed, although ideology has a part to play in radicalizing and motivating terrorists, the opportunity to engage in criminal violence for its own sake appears to be just as significant a draw (Soufan, 2016).
Amedy Coulibaly, a Malian Frenchman who was responsible for the Montrouge shooting that resulted in killing a police officer and for a kosher supermarket siege in which he killed four hostages had previously been convicted at least five times for robbery and drug trafficking since the age of 17. Coming from a family that did not practise a radical version of Islam, he was exposed to the jihadists’ ideology for the first time while serving time in the Fleury-Mérogis jail, where he was influenced by top al-Qaeda operative Djamel Beghal, an Algerian Frenchman who had been convicted for a plot to destroy the US embassy in Paris (Callimachi and Yardley, 2015). The two managed to communicate and build networks in jail, despite Beghal’s solitary confinement, by passing messages to each other’s cells and speaking through open windows. Coulibaly and Beghal stayed in touch after their release while the latter was under house arrest in a hotel in Murat. As evidenced by photos, Coulibaly was practising the use of weapons at that time. 7
Chérif Kouachi, one of the brothers behind the Charlie Hebdo massacre, was arrested in January 2005 when he was about to join the jihad against US troops in Iraq, and it was the prison environment of Fleury-Mérogis that offered him an opportunity to build contacts and meet like-minded individuals. In prison, Kouachi became acquainted with Amedy Coulibaly, who had by then been convicted for armed robberies, and with Djamel Beghal. An investigation into their lives shows that Kouachi was also mentored by Beghal, and the two men remained close after being released from prison (Rayner and Barrett, 2015). Gilles Kepel argues that the Fleury-Mérogis prison served as a relay between the ‘second’ and ‘third’ generations of jihadists, or between al-Qaeda’s largely defeated pyramidal organization and the network-based system (Kepel, 2017: 157). Moreover, Kouachi was reported in a French television video to have said he was radicalized by the self-taught preacher Farid Benyettou, who was jailed alongside him (Channel 4, 2015).
Radicalization is a continuous process that involves multiple channels and processes, and, although in some cases it is difficult to find firm evidence that certain individuals did radicalize in jails, it is clear that the prison environment provided them with more opportunities for networking and identity seeking. Prisons offer an offender convergence setting (Felson, 2006) that facilitates crime structure and continuity and helps set the stage for criminal acts. As exemplified by notorious examples such as Camp Bucca in Iraq, prisons represent recurrent settings where criminal cooperation can grow as extremists use their conviction to find accomplices and acquire the information needed for planning another attack. Felson (2006) argues that offender convergence settings allow criminal cooperation to persist even when the particular people vary, and removing or reducing such settings can have a major impact on crime. The idea of separating prisoners and disrupting or limiting their outreach activities has a similar rationale at its core.
Radicalization in prisons in the UK context: From IRA to Islamism
The IRA: Previous experience with separation of prisoners
The UK has a long history of grappling with the particular problem of detaining individuals involved in ethno-political and religious violence and subsequent radicalization in prison. In the wake of the Easter Rising in 1916, the UK authorities used the wartime Defence of the Realm Regulations to detain 3500 individuals suspected of involvement in Irish Republicanism, and around 2000 detainees were transferred to internment camps (Townshend, 1999). Many of these individuals had no involvement in the Rising, but in the camps they eventually came under the influence of those who had participated (Townshend, 1999).
Unlike in Scottish, Welsh and English prisons, general segregation of paramilitary prisoners from the remainder of the prison population was adopted in the 1970s and 1980s as one of the measures in Northern Ireland. Although segregation was a key demand by paramilitary prisoners at that time, in retrospect this policy is viewed as having been a failure, primarily because separation provided them with a barrier against informants, thereby facilitating disruptions of prison routine and even escape attempts (Murray, 2014). The Maze Prison, one of the historic incarceration facilities for Irish paramilitaries located on the outskirts of Lisburn in Northern Ireland, is usually cited as an example of segregationist policies that did not work from the point of view of security because the separation provided paramilitary prisoners with the opportunity to take control of certain areas and run them as private enclaves (House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2004).
Despite this negative experience, the government decided to introduce separation again at HMP Maghaberry in 2003. Following a number of protests mounted by prisoners, the Steele Review commissioned by the government concluded that a degree of separation was required within HMP Maghaberry 8 to protect paramilitaries of opposing factions from each other, and to protect the ‘ordinary’ prisoners from the paramilitaries as a group. As a result, loyalist and republican paramilitaries were transferred into a special regime of a highly controlled prison within prison (House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2004). This decision was largely unwelcome by the prison’s staff who were sceptical about the separation’s potential to result in improved safety for prisoners or staff. It was feared that the paramilitaries would seek to take control of the separated areas as they had previously done at Maze Prison (House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2004). Currently, Maghaberry Prison houses 50 dissident republican prisoners, 31 of whom are aligned to the New IRA, and the remainder are linked to the Continuity IRA (McDonald, 2015). These two factions are opposed to the peace process and support the continuation of armed struggle. At the same time, recent changes did not directly improve safety or prisoners’ well-being (National Preventive Mechanism, 2015), although this could be a result of a resourcing and staff crisis rather than the strategy of managing extremist prisoners.
In addition to the threats posed by the IRA, the increase in legislative scope and security responses in the wake of the 7 July 2005 London bombings (7/7) led to a significant increase in arrests and conviction rates for terrorist offences. According to the Home Office, the number of people arrested for terrorism-related offences in Britain rose by 58 percent to a record high of 412 in 2017 (Travis, 2018). As of the end of 2017, there were 224 prisoners convicted for terrorism-related offences in jails in Britain at the end of 2017 – an increase of 24 percent compared with the previous year (Travis, 2018). 9 Current trends suggest that the number of prisoners guilty of offences relating to terrorism and extremism (for example, returning foreign fighters) is likely to increase, as authorities grapple with how to convict and prosecute returnees from the caliphate. Around 850 British nationals are among the foreign fighters affiliated with ISIS in the Middle East, and almost half of them have returned and might be facing prosecution (BBC, 2017). 10 Another concern would be individuals who repeatedly place or use extremism-related content online, and the laws on Internet regulations might be tightened in the future to include penalties of up to 15 years for those who repeatedly view extremist content online (Home Office, 2017).
Current challenges to and achievements of the UK’s approach
More recently, Ian Acheson’s independent review, commissioned by the Secretary of Justice Michael Gove in 2015, found evidence that Islamist extremism was a growing problem within prisons in the UK, and a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy is required to monitor and counter it (HM Ministry of Justice, 2016). The report concluded that Islamist ideology in prisons could be threatening in various ways, including Muslim gang culture and the consequent violence; charismatic prisoners acting as self-styled ‘emirs’ and exerting a controlling and radicalizing influence on Muslim inmates; aggressive encouragement of conversions to Islam; the availability of educational materials promoting Islamist extremism; exploitation of staff’s fear of being labelled racist; and so on (HM Ministry of Justice, 2016).
The above-mentioned review recommended giving consideration to containment of known extremists within dedicated specialist units. In an attempt to crack down on Islamist radicalization behind bars, the government has recently announced plans to create specialist units within the high-security estate: HMP Frankland near Durham, HMP Full Sutton near York and HMP Woodhill in Milton Keynes (HM Ministry of Justice, 2017). The Prison (Amendment) Rules 2017, SI 2017/560, which are linked to the special offences in the legislation, allow for a special separation regime for extremist prisoners (Hill, 2018: 7). Three separation centres are expected to hold up to 28 of the most subversive offenders, including Michael Adebolajo and Anjem Choudary, and the main idea is to ‘allow greater separation and specialized management of extremists who pose the highest risk to other prisoners’ (HM Ministry of Justice, 2017). Prisoners can be placed in separation centres if they are involved in planning terrorism or are considered to pose a risk to national security. Furthermore, those who are spreading views that might encourage or influence others to commit terrorism crimes, or anyone whose views are being used in a way that undermines good order and security in prisons, may also be placed in one of the centres (HM Ministry of Justice, 2017).
Most of the mass media coverage of the UK experiment with regard to tackling radicalization in prisons has been negative and has focused on drawing parallels between the UK separation centres and Guantanamo Bay, labelling the centres as ‘jihadi jails’ that restrict individual liberties and produce more grievances (Farmer, 2017; Parveen, 2017). It was also pointed out that isolation is counterproductive because it could potentially give an elevated status to the most dangerous extremists, as happened in Northern Ireland where Republicans and Loyalists were housed in different blocks (Parveen, 2017). The general perception of the containment policy circulated by mass media channels and by some politicians is that separation will potentially intensify the problem, creating ‘jihad universities’ (Selby, 2017). However, what constitutes the basis for the decision-making behind the process of managing terrorism-related offenders in custody?
The decisions regarding separation are made by the government, and the prisoners considered are those who pose a ‘national security risk’ (Interview No. 3). 11 Although the specific criteria to select people to be placed in the separation units have not been made public by the Ministry of Justice, the new arrangement has been designed for ‘the highest risk terrorists and radicalisers’ aiming at preventing them from spreading extremist messaging (HM Ministry of Justice and National Offender Management Service, 2016). It is believed that these centres help safeguard the mainstream prison population by excluding ‘the most subversive, unrepentant and ideologically-motivated individuals from the prison environment’ and limiting their potential influence on other inmates (Interview No. 1). 12
Separation is meant to be carried out on the basis of an offender’s intention to subvert the state and foment a terrorist attack either alone or via influencing others. In the UK, unlike in some countries reviewed during the first part of the data collection for this article, one of the most important goals of the penal system is to reduce the risk of reoffending, and the concern about preventing recidivism rates is at the core of how convicted people’s cases are managed. The conclusions about the dangers posed by extremist offenders are made on the basis of specially developed risk assessments designed by forensic psychologists. Extremist Risk Guidance (ERG) 22+ is among the tools enabling prison officers to determine the risk potential of an extremist in custody.
Risk assessment and terrorism-related offenders
ERG 22+ is a conceptual framework for assessing offenders based on 22 cognitive and behavioural factors theoretically associated with extremism. The assessment is carried out post-conviction. It has become embedded in offender management systems since 2011, including informing approaches in the ‘pre-criminal space’ within the Channel programme, a confidential, voluntary multi-agency safeguarding programme that supports people who are vulnerable to radicalization (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Before this methodology was developed, those convicted under terrorist legislation were considered by officials of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) 13 to be at higher risk of serious harm by virtue of their offence alone, making it difficult to make judgements about other factors that could contribute to their risk levels (Lloyd and Dean, 2015). Any risk assessment includes the challenging task of negotiating consent and cooperation with offenders, but this process is essential on admission because it can be the foundation for important decisions about the security risks an individual poses and possible rehabilitation interventions.
ERG 22+ takes around 35 hours to complete and consists of three clusters: engagement, intent and capability. The term ‘engagement’ is used to refer to the process by which individuals become involved with an extremist ideology or cause. The term ‘intent’ is used to describe the mindset associated with a readiness to perform or contribute to an extremist offence. The last segment, ‘capability’, calculates the capacity for carrying out acts of terrorism. The profiles vary among individuals convicted under terrorist legislation, which means that there are people who have a clear intention to offend, which can be deduced from their actions, whereas others are not willing to contribute to acts of violence (Lloyd and Dean, 2015).
The ERG is completed on all extremist offenders by a psychologist or a probation officer, ideally with the cooperation of the offender, who provides written consent. Prisoners’ cooperation is sought and the benefits are explained in terms of them not being disadvantaged in relation to other offenders by missing out on assessment and intervention that could assist them to make different decisions about their future, which would be reflected in their parole reports. The process of undergoing risk assessment is consensual, and there is evidence that the majority of extremists collaborate with the assessment panel. 14 However, experts from the Joint Extremism Unit at HMPPS have recently expressed a concern that there is a noticeable trend of extremist-related offenders not engaging with the ERG 22+ process. 15 This decision is often influenced by peer groups and reflects a general scepticism about the state making an assessment about them. There is also a perception that a positive risk assessment will not impact on how they will be managed in custody. In the absence of the offender’s cooperation, the ERG is completed from records of the case. These are scrutinized alongside other reports by a sentence management board. Collateral information (for example, prosecution papers, trial materials, evidence of offending) may be used for making a decision about the risks the offender poses. Although some open-source information may be considered as a contributing factor in assessments, experts are wary that these data could be flawed in terms of their validity and should be used with caution. 16
Besides a refusal to cooperate with forensic psychologists and probation officers, there is an increasing trend 17 of extremist offenders receiving shorter sentences (12–18 months) for non-violent offences, such as Twitter activity classified as glorification of terrorism under the Terrorism Act, 2000. 18 These sentences are considered too short for the completion of ERG 22+, because risk assessment is to be carried out only after an offender has been convicted and sentenced. Moreover, al-Qaeda-inspired ideology in the wake of 7/7 did not attract many young people and the risk assessment was initially tested on older offenders. Nowadays, more ISIS-inspired young people (under 25 years old) enter the prison system, 19 and ERG 22+ needs to be reviewed to reflect these demographic changes.
Conclusion
In Western Europe and North America, most countries house only a handful of terrorism-related offenders. However, even a small number of terrorism-related prisoners in the correctional system can have a powerful effect on other inmates in terms of adopting radical beliefs. Besides radicalization’s under-reported nature, the difficulty of claims about radicalization in prisons has to do with the fact that radicalization is a multifaceted, continuous process influenced by various channels of communication and social actors. At the same time, prisons that house extremists open new channels of communication and new political perspectives for offenders convicted of non-ideological crimes. Extremists successfully use these channels, capitalizing on existing grievances and circumstances. The policy of separation recently introduced in the UK aims to break this vicious circle by segregating the most dangerous terrorism-related offenders and disrupting the dynamics of violence.
The comparative analysis undertaken in this study demonstrates that, although dispersal is the most common way of housing terrorism-related offenders, at least a partial regime of separation has already been implemented by most of the states that face the danger of Islamism. Therefore, this policy should not be dismissed without understanding the goals and objectives of the management of extremism-related offenders. If decreasing the risk of prison radicalization defines effectiveness, the regime of separation prevents extremist individuals in custody from learning from one another, planning terrorist acts and building networks. While addressing the prevailing criticism of the containment policy in the UK, it is important to understand the differences between ethno-political and religious terrorism, particularly its Islamist context. It is counterproductive to draw parallels between the practice of separation of Islamism-related offenders and IRA paramilitaries because these two groups operate in very different social contexts and are characterized by different goals, motives and recruitment strategies.
Currently, a more balanced and nuanced evaluation of the containment policy is absent from the academic and practitioners’ discourse in the UK. Although there is a risk that a new intervention will generate additional safety concerns, this article argues that separating the most dangerous and subversive terrorism-related offenders either in isolation or in small groups has the potential to make a considerable contribution to the prevention of radicalization in prisons. However, it is crucial to develop a comprehensive policy framework that takes into account the recent dynamics of radicalization threats.
Clear policy framework
The successful management of terrorism-related offenders in prisons requires a policy framework based on the clear understanding of the aims of the implemented policies. Defining the aims of the policies is crucial because these will determine how successful the new policies are, including the separation centres. The policy-makers will first need to define whether the ultimate goal of separation is ‘disengagement’ (giving up violent ideology) or ‘desistance’ (cessation of offending), and this will inevitably depend on the individual profiles of the offenders.
Differentiation within separation units
Differentiation within separation centres is essential for ensuring the effectiveness of individualized programme treatments. The population of convicted offenders is not homogeneous, and there should not be a single, uniform approach. Besides differing by social background, age, level of training and contact with terrorist organizations, prisoners differ by the sentences received. There should be a clear demarcation line between individuals who are serving indeterminate sentences and those who have a scheduled release date, because these factors will influence the objectives of de-radicalization programmes applied to them.
Addressing new trends: Gender, age, motivations, and length of custodial sentences
The increasing trend of shorter sentences for extremist offenders creates a challenge for the management of terrorism-related offenders and aggravates the already existing issue of prison radicalization by creating more grievances linked to the perceived injustice of the criminal justice system. From the point of view of disengagement and potential reintegration, more alternative options should be considered instead of custodial sentences as a means of preventing extremists from spreading Islamism in prisons.
Whereas al-Qaeda-inspired ideology did not attract many young people, there is an increasing trend of young offenders (under 25) to be convicted and prosecuted, which was not fully considered when testing the risk assessment tools used in the UK. This new trend should be reviewed and addressed. Moreover, the factors included in the current risk assessment did not take into account female participation in Islamist terrorism and were not gender-sensitive. It is important that the risk assessment criteria are updated in order to reflect and adequately tackle current demographics, and that both the gender and the age aspects are factored in.
Finally, although there is an ongoing debate in the UK regarding the criminal justice strategies that should be applied to returning foreign fighters, it is crucial to consider what strategy could be an appropriate response for those returnees who will be prosecuted and will enter UK correctional institutions. Wrong placement might exacerbate the risks posed by prison radicalization.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.