Abstract
This book is a collection of original articles on the pervasive idea in liberal political philosophy that the state should be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens. In what is now becoming common practice when addressing the idea of political neutrality, the book discusses the competing liberal approach to political morality – political perfectionism – and at quite some length too. All contributors are veterans of the debate between these opposing approaches, making for an advanced and well-informed read.
The book is divided into two parts. Part I addresses general questions about the interpretation, justification and realisation of political neutrality. Part II takes on more specific questions regarding neutrality’s relationship with other political ideas such as pluralism, public reason and democracy. There are three broad questions unifying the two parts: (1) Is neutrality desirable? (2) Is neutrality possible? (3) Is the divide between neutrality and perfectionism as great as many believe? Across the two parts, the editors succeed in presenting a varied and balanced assessment of these questions. Perhaps in keeping with the idea of neutrality, the book neither presents an overt, unified response to these questions, nor is there a concluding chapter to guide the reader to a particular conclusion.
The questions are not new in the debate on political neutrality, but this collection does not – for the most part – rehearse previous responses found elsewhere. For example, in Part I, Simon Clarke seeks to revive the idea of consequential neutrality, which has long been dismissed by theorists of most persuasions. And in Part II, Christine Sypnowich delivers what is perhaps the book’s most original and ambitious essay, defending a specific kind of perfectionism that engages with several other debates in political philosophy, including egalitarianism, responsibility and well-being.
Given the brevity and narrow focus of the majority of the essays, the book – including its introductory chapter – is not for newcomers to the debate on political neutrality. There are at least three other collections of essays on political neutrality that serve this purpose better. But the book is, after all, a re-evaluation of an already well-established principle in liberal political philosophy, and so rightly aims at delivering concentrated, novel insights. Those well-versed in the field of political morality should find that the essays are grounded in familiar issues, but still advance the general debate on neutrality, and perfectionism.