Conducting the Study of Geopolitics: Three Approaches

Sicker: Recalling the Classics

At the beginning of Geography and Politics Among Nations, Martin Sicker (2010) declares the purposes and general assumptions of the book. He prefers an explanatory rather than a prescriptive role for geopolitics and favours geopolitical thinking and reasoning over the study of geopolitical thought. The author considers realism and idealism to be persistent general approaches to international affairs in the United States and discerns advantages and weaknesses of both. Thus, as might be interpreted, Sicker does not subordinate himself to one arbitrarily chosen theoretical orientation. Because another declared goal is to present an adequate narrative instead of deconstructing ‘pseudo-stories’, it might appear that Sicker does not approve of critical geopolitics. Specifically, Sicker intends to conduct

geopolitics in its more proper and useful sense as an analytical approach to examining the problems of foreign policy, without any attempt at being prescriptive with regard to any particular policy course, a restraint shown by few contemporary analysts of foreign affairs (p. 6).

Unfortunately, the author himself also adopts the current political tendencies of his US- and Israel-centred perspective by calling al-Qa’eda ‘the monster’ (p. 74), by emphasising the extraordinary threat posed by Iran, and by accusing Iran of ‘fomenting a medieval-style “clash of civilisations” ’ (p. 13). Simultaneously, Sicker alleges that ‘Israel has little reason to believe that UN assurances are either meaningful or reliable’ (p. 145), without reflecting whether other neighbouring actors, including Iran, might feel jeopardised by another US-led invasion. Furthermore, the author calls Israel ‘America’s only reliable ally in the region’ (p. 16), without attempting to justify this statement or to polemicise with its critics, who have advanced the counter-thesis regarding the pro-Israel lobby that strongly affects US foreign policy (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006).

It is difficult to estimate how effectively the book achieves its purposes without analysing its methodological basis. Geography and Politics Among Nations evokes some classical geopolitical works with its merits essentially enriched by additional endeavours. Consequently, Sicker often strengthens his arguments by quoting classics, such as Nicholas Spykman, Hans Weigert, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and numerous other American and European scholars. Interestingly, the author denies the universalism of geopolitical concepts, noting that while even the natural environment changes over centuries, social domains transform much more quickly, thus limiting or negating the usefulness of geopolitical ideas from particular eras. The intellectual contribution of the book is strengthened by a multitude of historical examples, some of which are uncommon for political scientists, such as Japan’s plan to invade Korea and China in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The book proceeds in three steps: first, identifying some domains of geopolitical interest; second, considering the relationships and causality in those particular areas; and third, presenting examples of these co-relations. This order and the approach as a whole could provoke critical discussion, but this concern is minor. What really decreases the value of Sicker’s work is the absence of methodological rigour. First, the book includes at least one incomplete typology. While studying the consequences of two configurations (shapes) of territories (compact and long-narrow) on states’ power, stability and vulnerability to external attack, Sicker fails to consider the scattered and insular shapes that characterise several dozen contemporary states. Second, a more general reservation applies to Sicker’s use of examples regarding their unequal length and exclusive focus on historic cases. Third, Sicker explains some issues by drawing from the Bible instead of from monographs whose information is based on a variety of historical sources. Fourth and of least concern, the work contains some over-detailed explanations that clearly exceed the domain of geopolitics, such as the book’s explication of the religious foundations of Islamic jihad.

In contrast, some of the book’s theses may inspire in-depth discussion among scholars, such as the one on the relative persistence of foreign policy caused by constant geographic factors. This thesis does not fit with Harvey Starr’s theoretical concept that geographic features support both conflicting and co-operative interactions among actors and that they thereby cannot independently bring political stability. Additionally, it is necessary to acknowledge the modifying role of technological progress. Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to find a better conceptualisation of Sicker’s thesis. Drawing from the philosophy of time, the concept of cycles could be used. According to such a theoretical perspective, geographic features shape foreign policy by limiting it only over the long run. Over short- and medium-term periods, governments may choose policies that serve their ideological preferences or personal ambitions. However, geographic variables such as distance, neighbourhood, length of borders, and access to open seas eventually compel policy-makers to return to abandoned policies. At that point, new ideas and new people in power may again aim to alter the state’s conduct. The same pattern of explanation is equally plausible when one replaces geographic factors with economic ones, particularly in the era of growing capitalist expansion. Such theoretical perspectives could be applied to explain some states’ foreign policies, unless we presume that each state is unique and theoretical framing is thereby useless.

Starr: The Behaviouralist Approach to Geopolitics

The declared purpose of Harvey Starr’s (2013) On Geopolitics is to introduce the reader, particularly students, to the geopolitical problematique. Thus, it fulfils the criteria of a handbook rather than a monograph. Starr considers how explaining spatial phenomena, such as territory or borders, could be applied to shed additional light on IR. The key categories described in the initial parts of the text are space and place. However, the latter remains ambiguous – the author evokes three separate meanings – locality, locale and sense of place – with only the first fitting his opportunity/willingness concept. It appears that both space and place have some explanatory power in Starr’s reasoning; nevertheless, their presence in the book primarily appears to be necessary to bring the intellectual contribution of geopolitics closer. Still, they are valuable if the reader remembers the introductory task of the book. Although On Geopolitics contains some older intellectual concepts, the most interesting of them were seldom introduced in handbooks. One example is Ronald Abler, John Adams and Peter Gould’s typology acknowledging distance as (1) absolute space counted in kilometres, (2) relative space measured by how much time is required to reach some location, (3) the amount of money needed to reach a location, and (4) the number of social contacts made available by reaching a particular location (pp. 22–29). The latter could be valuable for studying spatial divisions of ethnicity, religion and other surroundings based on strong collective identity. Such a typology appears useful, particularly for teaching, because it highlights the significance of space in various aspects of human life. However, Starr also adds his own theoretical scheme of the relationship between the salience of borders and the probability of conflict as a result of his earlier empirical research. On the whole, the author fulfils the declared objectives. Nonetheless, the absence of critical geopolitics, as discussed in the next paragraphs, raises doubts as to whether readers would be fully introduced to all areas of geopolitical interests.

Starr repeatedly recalls Harold and Margaret Sprout’s methodological postulates. Indeed, Starr seems to be inspired by those famous scholars; this is reflected in his approval of geographic possibilism, which in turn leads to emphasising the dynamic context of geographic space. These assumptions strengthen the validity of quantitative methods. Applying GIS data as independent variables opens the door for causal research on international conflicts and regional cooperation, and the crowning achievement of this work is a GIS-based study of borders, alliances and conflicts. As is usual in handbooks, much of the reasoning is composed of findings from Starr’s earlier publications, including some from the 1970s. Nevertheless, On Geopolitics cannot be strictly categorised as either neoclassical or critical geopolitics. It falls within a distinct branch whose deep origins are identifiable with behaviouralism in the social sciences by avoiding valuation, focussing on conduct instead of discourse, and applying measureable, and thus comparable GIS data. The clear difference is Starr’s reluctance to claim ‘scientific objectivity’ in his work, albeit other key assumptions remain.

If we compare Starr’s book with other publications that draw on geopolitics, it seems that it differs methodologically and diverges in its substance. The notable advantage of this approach is its ability to be introduced in various contexts – Starr devotes much attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but one could easily imagine the same method being applied to South America or East Asia. Such a methodology might be inspiring. However, knowing that geopolitics is multifaceted, one might ask about other paths of scholarly inquiry. Starr seems attached to statistical techniques for conducting causal-probabilistic analysis. Replacing quantification would be possible by applying contextual analysis; however, On Geopolitics does not contain any study of discourse or context, and therefore, the reader cannot discover much about the representational and interpretative aspects of geopolitics ¹ by reading the book. This confirms the difficulty of using postmodern approaches for ‘positivist’ scholars – and certainly the opposite direction is also problematic. Indeed, the high coherence of the work is maintained due to indifference towards critical approaches.

Guzzini: Interpretivist Analysis of European Geopolitics

The objectives of Stefano Guzzini’s book are stated expressis verbis in the beginning: some European countries have experienced an observable revival of geopolitics in the form of publications, institutions and so on, and others have not. The purpose of his book is to explain why this has happened. Guzzini, the editor and author of five of the 11 chapters, logically assumes that the most practical and plausible explanation would arise through organising case studies from a few countries that have experienced the revival and a few that have not. Accordingly, the initial part of The Return of Geopolitics in Europe (2013) contains key assumptions and something resembling a path of inquiry for the other authors of the book. This establishes the integrity of the six case studies and the entire monograph ² and thereby eschews a common mistake in many collective works in which each author takes a different approach. Importantly, Guzzini presents the main thesis and independent variable of the book in the title. The countries that experience foreign policy identity crises are willing to strive for geopolitical discourse to resolve the crisis: Who are we? For what and in what way shall we act? What is our perception of security? For all of the case studies in the text, Guzzini indicates other supporting variables, such as a materialist tradition in a particular country, expert institutions interested in developing materialist/realist ideas, and policy-makers’ rhetoric. The purpose of the work seems to be achieved: the thesis is clearly explicated, and the constituting link of the variables is convincingly demonstrated in the text. Clearly, the quantity of case studies is limited for practical reasons, and it would be unreasonable to criticise the authors for that.

Guzzini and his team’s perspective – which has been called interpretivist, constructivist or critical – attempts to catch complex phenomena. This approach responds to Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s criticism of early critical studies as being focussed on pure discourse (Tuathail, 1996: 183). Guzzini et al. consider institutions, publications’ popularity, the context of political rivalry, and personal engagement in public activity or political patronage. Thus, their study follows Tuathail’s postulates for critical geopolitics, which, according to its founders, should be responsible for discovering the relationship between power and knowledge as revealed in discursive practices in which spaces and actors are characterised or even ‘produced’ (Tuathail, 1996: 185). What appears to be distinct in this work is the lack of emphasis on global and US hegemony as the key area of critical study. At the end of the book, Guzzini develops two social mechanisms that should establish a final contribution to the study of geopolitical discourse in contemporary Europe. The issue consists of introducing separate factors for consecutive stages of the given process. Nevertheless, Guzzini reveals consciousness of the limits of his explanation by admitting that the existence of peace research institutes is both the cause and the effect of political culture in the given countries. The interdependence of some variables partially discredits the plausibility of the explanation. What feels unsatisfactory to the reader is that the factors comprising Guzzini’s concepts make effects somehow probable, following the logic of ‘how possible?’ The advantage, though, is clear: these factors reflect social, unaccountable phenomena that otherwise would remain unexplored.

Guzzini et al. openly narrowed the substance of their analysis – spatially, temporally and by restricting themselves to ‘neoclassical’ discursive geopolitics only – and accordingly, narrowed the methodology. The result increases the drawbacks of their study because it leaves the scholar with more questions than answers. As mentioned above, the strong coherence of the book is mainly due to the consistent application of Guzzini’s path of inquiry by the other authors. The entire work might be useful for developing the interpretivist approach. The process models of social mechanisms from the final chapter could be creatively applied by other scholars, for instance, to study the ongoing state (or change?) of the culture of anarchy in East Asia. ‘Geopolitics’ need not be the essence of such an interpretivist study, which could be conducted under the label of IR.

Discussion: The State of Past and Contemporary Geopolitics

The comments above addressing the goals and methods of these three books indicate that they share little except for the notion of ‘geopolitics’ in their titles. They differ in their purpose, methodology, style, and structure of reasoning. Thus, questions arise: why is geopolitics as a domain so ambiguous? Why does such a simple notion lead to discrepant areas of study? In the beginning of each of the three works, some attention is paid to the essence of geopolitics. Guzzini prepared a separate chapter about the history of geopolitical thought, concluding by defining ‘neoclassical geopolitics’ by linking the subject matter with geographic factors, ‘realism with a military and nationalist gaze’, and some kind of determinism in the form of ‘objective necessities’ (p. 43). Sicker also devotes considerable attention to the substance of geopolitics by critically reviewing classical and contemporary definitions. Meanwhile, Starr avoids defining geopolitics, and paradoxically, I would question whether this is not the better method for presenting the geopolitical domain in terms of the connection between geography and IR. With this approach, the reader could struggle to explain what geopolitics is, but perhaps it is time to recognise that geopolitics as such remains ambiguous – no definition comes close to embracing its semantic ‘richness’ (Dalby and Tuathail, 1996: 451; Murphy et al., 2004: 626–628; Tuathail, 1996: 17, 63–64). Attempts to define geopolitics sooner or later lead to projecting (in the way of ‘what geopolitics is for me’), the definitional mistake of narrowing or a lack of precision. Guzzini et al., to some extent, succeed in avoiding these mistakes by defining only one type of geopolitics, namely, neoclassical geopolitics. Still, the definition recalls imprecise categories such as ‘certain physical and human geographic factors’ or the ‘strategic view’ (p. 43). Simultaneously, Guzzini criticises Saul Cohen for a vague definition of geopolitics (p. 36). The lack of scholarly precision is not a precondition of the problem – the scope of geopolitics as such is vague, and any attempts at theorising it will lead to inevitable definitional mistakes.

Even within a specific type of geopolitics, the leading contributors and followers substantially disagree with one another by stressing different key categories. Dalby (2010) notes a lack of consensus about the interests of critical geopolitics and, moreover, about how to use it as an integrated method (p. 280). The compromise consists of calling it a ‘constellation’ by linking various critical perspectives on the relationship between political power and geographic knowledge (Dalby and Tuathail, 1996: 451). Additionally, Dalby (2010) pays attention to the ethical foundations of critical geopolitics, mainly the evil of war (pp. 282–283), which may also stir up controversy. Guzzini’s edited book seems to be based only implicitly on those foundations.

The reader discovers further ambiguities by rethinking Guzzini’s allegation that geopolitics is a ‘more materialist and militarist wing’ of realism (p. 219). At least two case studies (Estonia and Russia) embrace geopolitics using ideas and culture as determining factors of geopolitical reasoning and perhaps even as its essence. Resting on cultural factors leads to inconsistency with the ‘materialist culture’ of the country, which is treated by Guzzini as a supporting variable to his explanation of how neoclassical geopolitics is used as a remedy for foreign identity crises. Why should materialist culture build an ideational base for geopolitics? Or why, despite the materialist culture, do Russian geopoliticians devote so much attention to the ideational? Perhaps the issue of Russian geopolitics should be interpreted in a slightly different way. At the very beginning, Eurasianism, which established the geopolitical tradition for Russia, combined various aspects of human life, eventually including physical geography, history, customs, ideas, and the political. Its ideational basis originated from the sacred praxis of tsarist Russia, which was used for its legitimisation. The neoclassical geopolitics of post-Soviet Russia nolens volens derives from earlier traditions. Perhaps the materialist as such is not needed for the revival of geopolitics at all?

The alleged militarism of geopolitics also leads to explanatory trouble. Intuitively, one might agree with Guzzini’s claim. There are many intellectuals involved in geopolitical studies who belong to the military or used to study at military academies (Murphy et al., 2004: 622; Tuathail, 1996: 16–17). Even Sicker’s book, with its long sections focussed on potential and existing armed conflicts, confirms neoclassical geopolitics’ alleged interest in military force. However, Guzzini’s thesis lacks well-built arguments. Why, when arguing for some policies and against others, is the use of factors of physical or human geography practically combined with militarism? After reading Guzzini’s book this problem remains unsolved. Future research on geopolitics in Europe will not lack interesting questions.

The authors of the reviewed books associate geopolitics with determinism in a critical and even accusing manner. Let me start with polemics against the alleged determinism of early geopolitics from Starr ³ (pp. 38, 155) and pre-war German geopolitics from Sicker (pp. 3, 58). ⁴ If these earlier geopolitics-oriented scholars were determinists, they should have concluded their studies on political phenomena by applying environmental issues not only as variables but also as key determining factors. This popular interpretation has been challenged by careful studies (Bassin, 1987) and should have been abandoned long ago. Although some important geopoliticians, such as Halford Mackinder, James Fairgrieve or Nicholas Spykman, did not avoid a determinist line of thinking, ⁵ many others used geographic features mainly to strengthen their ideological and political assumptions and were usually well aware of the constraints of environmental factors. Friedrich Ratzel, whose works have been commonly assigned to geographic determinism, also emphasised the significance of free will, the economic and social organisation of the state, and faith and spirit in opposition to materialism (Halas, 2014: 13–14). A similar concern regards the alleged determinism of race- and Volk-oriented Nazi geopolitics. One of the most important arguments for Germany’s expansion used by Karl Haushofer (1934) referred to the strength and will of both the Führer and the Germans (p. 29). Consider also the early French approaches to geopolitics; it was the French who introduced the notion of geographic possibilism. The opposition between the alleged early determinism of geopolitics and modern possibilism, invented by Harold and Margaret Sprout, according to Starr’s line of reasoning, is misleading. In practical terms, the difference between determinism and possibilism is more a matter of different emphases than of opposing conclusions, and both intellectual positions are equally likely to be encountered in the first half of the twentieth century as well as today.

Because German classical geopolitics still stirs up controversy, it is worth discussing its reception in post-Cold War Germany as analysed in Andreas Behnke’s chapter of The Return of Geopolitics in Europe. The author notes the attempts to de-contextualise classical geopolitics and separate it from Nazism (pp. 104–107). Simultaneously, he overlooks at least one work (Hipler, 1996) that alleges quite the contrary: that the entire ideology of Nazism, including the myth of the Führer, biological nationalism, extraordinary belligerence and even some forms of anti-Semitism, were acquired by Hitler through Karl Haushofer’s influence mainly via Rudolf Heß’s intermediary role. Needless to say, such a work, based among others on studying the Haushofer family’s private correspondence, although partially speculative, poses a challenge for those scholars who conducted a methodologically similar inquiry of that era but came to the opposite conclusion (Heske, 1987; Jacobsen, 1979; Murphy, 1997). Here it is obligatory to mention that the landscape of reinterpretations of classical geopolitics in Germany in the post-unification decade is more multifaceted than Behnke presents.

In summary, all three of the reviewed books address geopolitical issues. However, each does so in a different way. Sicker’s (2010) Geography and Politics Among Nations may serve as an introduction to the issue for those who are new to the study of geopolitics because it indicates various spatial-political co-relations and enriches the subject with numerous examples. Starr’s work resembles a handbook, or rather an overview, because it contains quintessential features such as a description of geopolitics as a domain and a summarised explication of previously established analytical categories, including space and place, and repetition of the author’s research on borders, conflicts and regional co-operation. Guzzini’s edited book fulfils the criteria of a monograph, with introductory assumptions, theories, and case studies and concluding with altered theories. However, greater knowledge of terminology is required of the reader; therefore, the work is recommended for more advanced students of the domain. Although none of the books provides a complete picture of geopolitics or avoids methodological weaknesses and notional imprecision, all three might be welcome in the academic world. Further, Starr’s and Guzzini’s works would be of special interest in Europe: On Geopolitics because the Continent still lacks a convincing application of causal-quantitative methods in the study of geopolitics ⁶ and The Return of Geopolitics in Europe because it addresses ourselves and our elites – the scholars and practitioners of geopolitics.