Abstract
Geraint Hughes’ book presents a concise re-assessment of the Wilson government’s approach to preserving East–West détente and improving Anglo-Soviet relations from 1964 to 1970. Shifting away from the themes of British decolonisation and her ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States, both of which have hitherto dominated scholarly explorations of Britain’s international policy in this era, the author places the Cold War at the centre of his study. Principally, Hughes contends that Harold Wilson has been unfairly labelled as a pandering, pro-American poodle. Regardless of his penchant for ‘magpie diplomacy’ (p. 172), his somewhat superficial understanding of the dynamics of the East–West struggle, and his vast overestimation of his own powers as diplomatic mediator between the two superpowers (p. 63), Wilson did pursue his own relationship with Moscow (independent of Washington). Moreover, his policy of encouraging links with the Soviet bloc – particularly in the realms of trade, investment and culture – was well ahead of its time, setting the precedent for the West in the following decade.
Harold Wilson’s Cold War begins with a whistle-stop tour of British Cold War policy from 1945 to 1964, providing valuable historical context and exhibiting continuities in policy with the Wilson era. Advancing in a broadly chronological fashion, chapter 2 goes on to unpack the Prime Minister’s belief that Britain had a unique international role to play as a bridge-builder between West and East. Chapter 3 covers the Labour government’s Vietnam policy, together with an analysis of how it impacted upon British diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, whereas chapter 4 outlines British Cold War strategy and defence policy from 1964 to 1968. Throughout, the author emphasises how ad hoc (and often muddled) this facet of British foreign policy truly was. Moreover, he also stresses how numerous factors – both financial and strategic – beyond the government’s control led to the ‘ending’ of Britain’s world role (p. 111).
Moving on, chapter 5 evaluates four crucial aspects in Anglo-Soviet relations during 1966–1968: détente, international and commercial trade, rapprochement and the increase in espionage activity. To Hughes it was this last factor, in tandem with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August–September 1968 – discussed in the final chapter – that caused a noticeable (if not complete) cooling in Whitehall’s attitude towards relations with Moscow.
Overall, Hughes book offers a detailed and insightful contribution to our understanding, not only of the Labour government’s foreign policy but also of Britain’s shifting inter-national circumstance in the 1960s. Although it could certainly have benefited from consulting primary material from within Soviet archives, it still provides a valuable overview for students and scholars of British foreign, defence and security policy alike.