Abstract
By the mid-2000s, and as Russia had recovered from its post-Soviet Union domestic crisis, so did its global ambitions. Particularly, the Middle East is back on its radar screen. Interestingly, Moscow has restored political ties with its former allies, such as Syria and Egypt, brought Turkey back to its camp, engaged in a cautious dialog with Israel, maintained a cooperative but complex relationship with Iran and promoted trade with energy-rich countries such as Algeria and the Gulf States. In a radical reversal of the old, rigid Soviet ideological alliances and rivalries, Russia engages simultaneously in relations with conflicting sides to preserve its interests in the region. So, how did Russia manage to do the trick and mastermind its return to the geopolitical top table of the Middle East?
In ‘What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East?’, Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, does not directly answer the question in the book’s title, but rather he delves into the historical ties between Russia and the Middle East region since the times of the Tsars. On a deeper level, he examines the interstate relations that emerged over time regarding conflict of interests, economic opportunities and a series of regional/international upheavals. In this concise, lucid account, Trenin argues that Russia’s return as a major independent geopolitical player to the global stage, and specifically to the Middle East, does not aim at ‘displacing America from the region [The Middle East]’ (p. 63). This coming back, most obviously through the Syrian ground, is distinctly connected to Moscow’s discontent with the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. In this regard, Trenin asserts that the Kremlin abhors the revolutionary movements that swept several countries in the Middle East, especially after the humiliating death of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi by the Western coalition (France, Britain and the United States). Russia deems these revolutions as a direct threat to its internal stability and regional interests. Moreover, Trenin implies that possible influence on Russia’s Sunni minority of extremist groups, such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Al Nusra, provides several justifications for the Russian military engagement.
This book, which is made up of four chapters, is not organized chronologically but thematically. After a brief but instructive and informative historical overview, the author presents his analysis of Moscow’s involvement with/in the Middle East in three key areas: ‘War’, ‘Diplomacy’ and ‘Trade’ (pp. 9–10). Chapter 1, titled ‘History’, sheds light on the historical interactions between the Old Russian Empire and the nations of today’s Middle East. From the marriage of Moscow’s Grand Duke Ivan to the niece of the Byzantine Emperor and the demise of the Byzantine Empire, Moscow ‘began to imagine itself as the political and spiritual heir to Constantinople’ (p. 12). Moreover, major global upheavals and events, such as the Arab–Israeli wars, the Iranian Revolution, the Afghan War, the dissolution of the USSR, the 9/11 attacks, the Arab Spring and ultimately the Syrian Civil War, are analysed and assessed from the perspective of the Kremlin and its interstate relations with the United States, European powers and regional key players in the Middle East. Although Trenin does not provide a detailed historical account of Kremlin’s involvement in the region, this chapter can be considered a succinct introduction to Russian–Middle East relations.
The second chapter, titled ‘War’, examines the ongoing Russian military intervention in Syria and its (geo) political outcomes. As Russia stepped into the Syrian conflict in 2015, Trenin asserts that Russia’s military engagement constitutes a ‘very different kind of warfare’ (p. 54). While being ‘an expeditionary’ and ‘predominantly air war’, this intervention allowed the Russian army to ‘combat-test new weapons systems’ (p. 70). Putin’s military intervention in Syria triggered a fundamental shift in Western perceptions of Russia. Specifically, the United States has begun viewing Russia not as a competitor, but as an equal partner both politically, through the joint sponsorship of the Geneva reconciliation process, and militarily, through joint strikes against Islamic State targets (p. 63). While Trenin successfully argues that, in the wake of the Syrian campaign, Moscow emerged as a key player capable of dealing with conflicting countries and groups, his argument falls short of persuading the reader of how Russia can capitalize on those assets to ‘sometimes bring [these groups] together as a public good’ (p. 86). Realistically, the ability to talk to all belligerent parties in conflict does not translate automatically into efficient mediation, especially when Moscow is short of the various forms of leverage needed to prompt concessions from warring factions.
The third chapter, titled ‘Diplomacy’, sheds light on the astute pragmatism in Russia’s engagement with Middle Eastern actors, on the diplomatic and commercial levels. Through ‘mini case studies’ that underscore Kremlin’s ‘double-dating’ of players with hostile relations, such as Turkey/the Kurds or Iran/ Gulf Cooperation Council, Trenin concludes that ‘Russia has recently transformed itself into a paragon of pragmatism’ (p. 112). He deems the Russian approach as successful and argues that Moscow seeks to straddle the sensitive divides of the Middle East by forming relationships with opposing parties based on overlapping interests (p. 112). Trenin clarifies his point by providing several examples of Russia’s diplomatic politics: the Arab–Israeli conflict, Israel–Syria, Iran–Israel and Iran–Turkey relations, as well as Libya, Egypt and the Gulf States, specifically during and after the Cold War and the Arab Spring.
Chapter 4, ‘Trade’, is the last chapter and it delineates Russia’s trade potential. This includes exporting weapons, oil, nuclear energy, grain and the tourist industry. Since the Cold War, Russia has supplied arms to numerous Middle Eastern countries (Syria and Egypt), which were hostile to the western block (France, Britain and the United States). These arms deals were closely linked to Russia’s ‘strategic considerations and ideology’ (p. 116). In the case of energy trade, although there is no exchange since many Middle Eastern countries are rich in natural gas and oil, Russia had to consistently broker with Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members agreements related to regulating supply to the world markets, as well as setting up convenient prices for oil (p. 125). Grain exports, tourism and construction of nuclear power stations – especially in Jordan, Egypt, Iran and Turkey – represent other sectors of cooperation and dealings with the Middle East.
To summarize, although this book is informative in its analysis of Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, it could have been more critical regarding the growing Russian presence and leverage in the region. Overall, the book highlights the various Russian endeavours to gain a foothold in the region through conflict resolution, diplomacy, trade, arms sales and tourism. By resorting to brief and concise cases studies, Trenin manages to provide readers with a clear image of Russia–Middle East relations. This book is highly recommended for new students of International Relations, Political Science and anyone interested in becoming informed about Russia’s new strategy in the Middle East. Since Russia views this region as a critical geopolitical neighbourhood, the Kremlin hopes to create a ‘post-West system of international relations’ (Owen et al., 2018: 300) that is no longer dominated by the United States, and in which Washington will show Moscow the respect that it deserves.
