De-/Re-Whitening Russianness: A Liminal Space of White Privileges Represented in Non-Summit

Interrupting White Marginality: Dialectical Forces of Whiteness in Global Contexts

Critical whiteness scholars have construed white as a fluid and flexible racial and ethnic grouping since the construction of whiteness involves dissonance (Jacobson 1999). Critical whiteness studies relies on the concept of heterogeneity of white identities to explain the existence of specific marginal white groups that have been politically and culturally distanced or excluded from hegemonic whiteness. Irish, Italians, and Ukrainians, for instance, were historically considered marginal whites in North America (Ignatiev 2012) through attributions of supposedly inferior cultural characteristics and/or political differences, which marked these identities differently from the dominant white American identity (Satzewich 2000). This marginalization of whiteness can be seen as cultural narratives that mark certain white identities as less white compared to hegemonic whiteness.

Postcolonial scholars have considered whiteness as a privileged cultural and political positionality that has been naturalized, normalized, and admired (Shome 2019; Young 2012). Under postcolonial globalization, whiteness consists of structural practice, knowledge, and discourses that invest and produce global white privilege, gained and sustained through imperialism and colonialism (Ono 2009). Within a postcolonial power configuration, the privileged spheres of global whiteness, with its capitalist excess and ideological advantages, are not easily shared with bodies from the Global South (Shome 2019). In countries where a non-white and non-Western population is the majority, therefore, differences among white identities may be less apparent given their overall privilege. Instead, a mix of marginal and hegemonic white identities contribute various channels of whiteness that carry the dominant ideology of advancement, modernization, and cosmopolitanism that is never shared with people of color and indigenous bodies.

Postcolonial processes of upholding white dominance need to be locally contextualized since whiteness is interpreted as partly a local phenomenon, complexly embedded in the historical, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions of a country (Frankenberg 1997). For instance, Asante (2016) invokes the term “glocalized whiteness” (p.90) to investigate local narratives in postcolonial Ghana of normalizing and naturalizing white domination. Skin bleaching in Ghana is not explicitly communicated through the desire to become white, but is locally constructed through narratives of social mobility, beauty, and attraction. Nonetheless, white supremacist ideology remains to be reproduced through local narratives that devalue dark skin and ascribe specific privileges to people with light skin in Ghana.

Furthermore, Steyn (2005) emphasizes that whiteness is upheld through a process of re-bonding, in which white identities may differ and separate in certain instances but ultimately come together to safeguard the privileged position of whiteness. Examining white South Africans, Steyn (2004, 2005) highlights the diasporic, so marginal, positionality of white South Africans to reveal how they utilize their diasporic link to be part of mainstream global whiteness. The sense of belonging to global whiteness remains ingrained within white South Africans, serving as a constant reminder of the privileges associated with being lighter-skinned Westerners in South Africa. Hence, as the author argues, whiteness should be construed in the dialectical tension between a unified and disconnected white power, swinging from one end to another to retain its power in the era of postcolonial globalization.

Congruent with postcolonial whiteness scholars, I situate representations of Russianness in Non-Summit within this dialectical relation between a globally unified and a locally differentiated white power to unpack a new rhetorical process of normalizing white privilege in a Korean, that is, a specifically non-Western, context. Here I construe whiteness as a rhetorical territory that is historically and ideologically contingent on social location (Nakayama and Krizek 1995), and consider Korea’s regionally specific, historical, social, and ideological conditions and processes (Asante 2016; Shome 2000), which are interrogated to investigate multiple rhetorical practices of becoming white in Korea.

Although Korea is not comparable to postcolonial states in Africa since Korea did not emerge historically as a colony of white imperial power, adopting the postcolonial critique of whiteness to the Korean context is viable. This is because the postcolonial critique has value in dismantling contemporary manifestations of economic, political, and cultural domination that persist through the ongoing global reliance of the colonized countries on their colonizers to forge neocolonial links between nations (Bhatt et al. 2010).

The US Americanness and Russianness in the Post-Cold War South Korea

To better explain US Americanness and Russianness in this paper, I discuss US militarization and Post-Cold War politics as pivotal contexts in constructing cultural and ideological norms of whiteness in South Korea. Although the US formally occupied the Southern half of the Korean peninsula for only three years (1945–1948), it has developed and maintained a neocolonial relationship through an imposed military presence and immense cultural and political influences (Oh 2015). The US, through its military and cultural economy, has exported and solidified its racialized order and influence in South Korea during this time (Kim 2006).

US whiteness has been integral to the hierarchical system of US dominance and supremacy over South Korea and has functioned as an effective neocolonial ideology in South Korea. Specifically, militarized white masculinity has normalized white, heterosexual, and masculine identities as natural, positive, and desirable. Intersecting with locally inflected ideologies of deep-seated colorism and a long-lasting historical yearning for Western modernization in South Korea, US whiteness has been represented through culturally idealized forms of white masculinity that valorize the color white and its association with the US (Ahn 2015).

The Korean War provided the moment at which the US physically and ideologically developed its domination by setting up an anti-communist government following World War II (Cho 2008). The Korean War was a direct military conflict between North and South Korea, but also an ideological and geopolitical clash between the communist forces of the Soviet Union and China against US-led anti-communist forces (Armstrong 2003). Afterward, the Korean peninsula became a forefront of tension in military and ideological conflicts between the Soviet Union and the US. Under the heavy neocolonial influence of the US, anti-communist regimes were reinforced and sustained by the South Korean military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s (Shin 2017). During this time, South Korean popular media was deployed to emphasize anti-communist messages and themes through distorted images of North Korea and the Soviet Union (Jun 2019).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, bilateral dialogs ensued, and relations between South Korea and Russia slowly resumed. From the South Korean government’s view, Russia maintained a critical geopolitical position because Russia interplayed with both North and South Korea (Lee and Bradshaw 1997). South Korea’s hope to develop closer economic ties with Russia was motivated by political considerations aimed at holding communist and pro-North Korean power in check. The bilateral relationship between the two countries is thus a strategic partnership to expand economic cooperation and promote Northern-oriented diplomacy (Zakharova 2019).

The public’s perception of Russia has also been influenced by South Korea’s national rigor for economic development around the globe. As Kim (2019) examines, South Koreans have accepted Russia as an important partner in economic and political terms, recognizing Russia’s national status as an advanced/developed country. Despite some changes in the portrayal of Russia, the negative tone toward the country is still present, particularly when conservative news media depict Russia as a nation overshadowed by the Soviet Union in South Korea (Chung 2021). In this context, US militarization is a critical context for understanding the positionality of Russianness in Korea, as a post-Cold War anti-communist ideology has played a key role in framing the Korean public’s perception of Russia. However, social understandings of Russianness are not fixed, but rather changing over time as Russia becomes an economically and geopolitically strategic resource for Korea’s national development.

The combination of US militarization and national aspiration for economic development in Korea establishes the backdrop for the rhetorical constructions of hegemonic whiteness in Korea. Particularly, in Korean media such as Non-Summit, the cultural and ideological currency of US whiteness continues to be found through the representations of professional, educated, and cosmopolitan white Western male bodies as transnationally competent neoliberal subjects (Sohn 2015). However, mirroring the evolving perspectives of Russia and Russianness in Korea, the construction and operation of whiteness in Non-Summit are not homogeneous or uniform. Considering US whiteness and anti-communist sentiment in Korea, I thus examine the rhetorical construction of Russianness in Non-Summit as a television media case to illuminate how the production and distribution of white ascendency involve heterogeneous and sometimes divergent processes.

Russianness’ Antagonistic Stance Against the US Americanness

At a glance, a Russian panelist’s white-presenting body contributes to marking Non-Summit as a media space with overt white visibility. However, even though the Russian representative presents white visibility phenotypically, Russianness is not normalized as US-Americanness is in the show due to differences in the representation of the Russian vis-à-vis the US panelist. This differentiated position of Russianness brings representational tension into the discussion, constructs Russianness as opposite and menacing to US Americanness, and finally separates Russianness from the Western values that US Americanness presents in the show.

The Russian panelist (Ilya Belyakov) holds an oppositional position with respect to the US panelist (Tyler Rasch) throughout several episodes (20, 28–52, 100, and 101) of the first season in which Belyakov serves as a main panelist. Belyakov’s comments against the US are blunt and set an explicit confrontation between the two countries in the show. In episode 46, Rasch opens the discussion by advocating for the protection of hate speech as part of freedom of speech, highlighting the strict standard of free speech upheld in the US. Interrupting Rasch’s speech, Belyakov counters Rasch’s argument by stating that unconditional freedom of speech in the US is not right and should not be upheld if it impinges upon the freedom and well-being of others. Using extreme expressions like “absolutely not” or “never, no,” Belyakov argues that the definition of freedom in the US lacks limitations and serves to harm instead of protecting people. This stance is explicitly against the US ideological cover of freedom of speech, revealing Belyakov’s portrayal of anti-US sentiment and creating a dialogical conflict between Russian and US American identity within the show.

The tension reaches its peak in episodes 100 and 101, where Belyakov names Rasch as a rival and challenges Rasch’s privileged representation as an intelligent debater. Belyakov says, “Rasch uses much jargon when he speaks, but he is not that good at debating,” and simultaneously, a subtitle appears next to Belyakov’s name: “Ilya Belyakov, a Tyler sniper,” and another subtitle pops up: “Very interesting—Let’s fight!” The background sound of the scene is composed of overlapping, enthusiastic reactions from the panelists and Korean hosts, similar to the excitement of an audience at a martial arts event. The appearance of subtitles in this scene needs careful attention since, in Korea’s entertainment television industry, subtitles are not limited to repeating what is being said on air, but also directly intervening and communicating a producer-designed message in the show (Jung 2016). Subtitles are inserted by subtitle writers and program producers to stimulate and enhance viewer interest (Jung 2016). This scene thus confirms that Non-Summit is deliberately designed to be contentious for entertainment purposes, and the humor often involves inciting or exaggerating the debates and disagreements between the panelists (Lee 2019). In this sense, the scene above exemplifies how Non-Summit brings in an entertaining tension between the two panelists, framing their conversations as a “fight,” and thereby articulating Russianness as a threatening opponent to US Americanness.

This oppositional framing counters what is ordinarily a positive presentation of white Westerners on the show. Eydam (2020) analyzes the institutionalization of white Westerners as desirable foreigners in Non-Summit, especially through the scripting of the show. To please the Korean audience and raise the viewing rates, production crews design the show to display white Westerners as para-Koreans who conduct “happy talk” about Korean multiculturalism (Eydam 2020, 262). When Belyakov’s critical comments about Rasch turn him into a fighter/sniper/killer instead of merely a competitor/rival/debater, Belyakov’s identification as a desirable foreigner or a para-Korean comes into doubt. Meanwhile, considering Rasch’s position as a successful, professional, and fluent participant in the show, the subtitle framing Belyakov as a “Tyler sniper” distances him, and with him Russianness, from enjoying white Western advantages structured by production crews.

Belyakov’s opposing stance toward Rasch ultimately leads to the criticism and satire of Russia’s global power in the show. This criticism appears when panelists address issues of Russian media disinformation, such as the propagation of false information about international relations between Russia and Ukraine. In episode 100, the Korean hosts invite Belyakov and Rasch, as rivals, to participate in a one-on-one debate about international peace to determine who is the best debater in the show. In this short debate, Belyakov claims that the US instigated the tension between Russia and Ukraine. Belyakov’s assertion is met with skepticism and distrust by other panelists, who question the credibility of media resources he cited, and ultimately dismiss his opinion. First, Belyakov critiques the US for aggravating the situation in Syria by not taking enough action to end the Syrian Civil War. To counterargue, Rasch brings up the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and asks Belyakov’s opinion. Belyakov again blames the US for the antagonistic relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Right after, a Ghanaian panelist asks Belyakov, “Where did you get that kind of information?” and an Egyptian panelist immediately answers back, “From Russia Today!” Other panelists burst into laughter, making fun of Belyakov’s claim as the debate ended.

When constructed as opposite to US Americanness, Russianness takes a liminal space of white privilege, where Russianness bluntly critiques US culture and power, but is also denounced when its criticism against the US is deemed to go too far to be considered by other panelists. The direct ridicule of Belyakov’s perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict by other panelists undermines the discursive connection between white-presenting bodies and privilege in Korea. When Russianness takes the liminal position, the full membership or investment in whiteness of Russianness thus seems to be denied or challenged in part, within the context of white Western superiority pervasive in Non-Summit.

However, the dominance of white supremacy persists when US American whiteness is reinforced by contrasting depictions of non-hegemonic whites (a Russian white) and when US American whiteness disassociates itself discursively from it (Chidester 2012). US Americanness secures its position of power as culturally idealized masculinity in Korea, while central characterizations of Russianness are consumed as a joke to reinscribe rhetoric of US American superiority in the show. By extension, Korea’s neocolonial contract with the US also remains unchallenged in the exchange of anti-US discursive tension Russianness brings into the show.

Representational Intimacy Between Russianness and Chineseness

Given the historical context of the military and ideological conflicts between the Soviet Union and the US last in Korea, the differentiated position of Russianness to US Americanness in Non-Summit is not surprising to find. Building on the previous discussion, in this section I illustrate another de-whitening process through which Russian whiteness is articulated with suspicion. This process takes place by positioning Russianness as aligned with communist values and Chineseness, ⁵ which is often signified in the show as a nationalist, patriarchal, stubborn, and isolated Asian identity portrayed through the character of Chinese panelist (Yu’an Zhang) in Non-Summit.

In Non-Summit Russianness is often grouped with Chineseness in remarks concerning communist societies. In episode 20, when Belyakov first appears in the show, the Korean host describes the relationship between Russia and China as an “exclusive” and “only” friendship in international contexts. The central basis for associating Russia and China lies in discussions regarding equality, opportunity, and hierarchy in communist countries. In episode 30, particularly, Zhang and Belyakov are seated together as they discuss a shared perspective that a communist government does not prioritize an equal distribution of social production, but rather emphasizes equal opportunities for resources. Russia and China are linked as well by recognition of comparable challenges faced by their form of government. In episode 49, Belyakov places both China and Russia together in the lower ranks regarding constitutional governance and civic consciousness in global contexts. Belyakov remarks, “The Russian government enacts laws, but Russians do not follow the laws, and China might have the same issue as Russia,” as Zhang nods in agreement, while no other panelists offer additional comments. In this scene, there is no entertaining debate between the two panelists regarding the validity of Belyakov’s comment. In episode 30, furthermore, Belyakov and Zhang agree that social hierarchy and inequality could well worsen in communist countries. At the end of this talk, Belyakov concludes that class conflict may be prevalent in communist countries like Russia and China, but this is only because absolute fairness and equity are never achievable in any society. This comment is also not discussed further by other panelists and was evaluated as an excellent and critical comment by the Korean host.

The representational connection between Russianness and Chineseness in the show may evoke associations among Koreans with regard to regional and international strategic relations involving Russia, China, and North Korea. This is because it is commonly believed among Koreans that China and Russia are North Korean allies due to their shared political and ideological systems (Ji 2001). The representation of Russianness in association with Chineseness positions it further away from the locally informed US American ideology that is shaped by post-Cold War cultural politics and in opposition to communist values in Korea. Notably, when Belyakov and Zhang talk about the dark sides of maintaining equality, justice, and civic engagement in communist societies, the implied assumption is that Korean society and culture benefit under US capitalist regimes and its association with global capitalism and neoliberalism (Kang 2018). By discursively invalidating communism, Non-Summit inoculates Russianness from Western capitalist regimes by refuting Russianness as the desired whiteness. Although Belyakov takes a key role in exposing economic and political failure in communist societies, his participation in discussing communism with Zhang makes him distinct from white Western panelists from the US or Western Europe in the show.

The demotion of Russians from bona fide whiteness in Non-Summit has a historical underpinning since Russianness has long been under suspicion by Western whites in global contexts (Diatlova 2019). Eastern Europeans and Russians historically have been depicted as people from underdeveloped, impoverished, and failed post-Socialist societies in relation to Western Europeans (Krivonos 2018). The show leverages this view but through locally specific contexts of Korea’s anti-communism. When Russianness is depicted in proximity to communism, it does not communicate meanings of modernity, advancement, and cosmopolitanism that have been historically coded and embodied through white Western liberal masculinity in Korea (Kim 2006). Instead, Russianness’ liminal position is reinforced since it does not share ideological similarities with other white Westerners and stands out as different in the show.

However, Belyakov also keeps a rhetorical distance from Zhang through his frequent critiques of the Chinese government, people, and culture in Non-Summit. In episode 20, Belyakov criticizes environmental problems in China and even explicitly states, “I personally do not like China.” Other panelists and Korean hosts do not hesitate to show their excitement over Belyakov’s blunt critique of China. Similarly, in episode 33, when Belyakov describes Chinese tourists as out of control compared to US tourists, other panelists burst into laughter, demonstrating a basic agreement with Belyakov’s comment. These scenes suggest that the representational connection between Russianness and Chineseness is not stable or fixed. The communist alliance between Russianness and Chineseness, then, fluctuates depending on the topics of discussion, specific situations, and how the show portrays and utilizes it. In this case, the shifting relationship between the two illustrates the de-whitening of Russianness that happens when it takes an ideological position that cannot be compatible with white Western values constructed in Korea.

Re-whitening Russianness as a Part of Global Whiteness

So far, I have illustrated the liminal position of Russianness, which at times is constructed through a rhetoric of suspicious or undesirable whiteness in Non-Summit. Through an in-depth reading of scenes from episode 46, in this last section, I elaborate on a re-whitening process through a rhetoric of whiteness in which Russianness as a non-threatening identity can fit into the category of white. In particular, Belyakov’s use of white talk ⁶ (Steyn 2004) is emphasized as strategic rhetoric implicated in his comments about non-white immigrant bodies in Russia. Based on it, I argue that Belyakov’s visible white body does not entirely strip him of global white privilege, which white presenting panelists share in Non-Summit.

In episode 46, othered groups are described and explicitly placed in opposition to white, Western, or heterosexual identities, which in turn reinforces the normative position of hegemonic masculinity in Korean society and the world. The episode takes the form of a debate, and at the beginning, five different groups are referred to as groups considered targets of hatred in the episode: blacks, immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals. People with darker-skinned bodies are particularly singled out as targets of hatred by panelists. For example, the depiction of Philippine immigrants as a target of discrimination in Japan can be observed, along with the discrimination against African Americans in the US. In his comment, Belyakov refers to Central Asian immigrants saying, “Russians hate immigrants from Central Asian countries because they are culturally different from Russians, and they cause domestic conflicts and commit crimes in Russia.” The Korean host’s follow-up question is not naturally induced from Belyakov’s previous remark: “Is there a social perception that Central Asian immigrants take away Russians’ jobs?” Belyakov answers, “Yes, that is a very common thought to have in Russia. For instance, one of the immigrants killed a white Russian couple (emphasized by the author), and other Russians who were severely offended by Central Asian immigrants attacked their living places and beat them, not only the murderers but also all other immigrants, for revenge.” The response by Belyakov is about crime, not jobs, so it does not respond to the question posed. The short conversation ends without further questions or explanations being requested by other panelists or Korean hosts.

Seemingly, Belyakov’s comment appears to be neutral, offering a critical opinion on the prevalence of hatred in Russia and its detrimental effects. However, in depicting the scene where Central Asian immigrants attacked and robbed Russians, Belyakov explicitly identifies Russians as “white” and frames them in opposition to darker-skinned immigrants from Central Asia. Belyakov’s comment about crime and conflict caused by Central Asian immigrants is racially charged, as he pits white Russians against non-white Central Asians. The follow-up question, by juxtaposition, suggests immigrants with darker bodies are said to interrupt the domestic economy by taking domestic occupations in Russia. By providing this context, the attack on Central Asian immigrants by white Russians is presented as an excessive act of revenge, which masks the underlying discrimination against them deeply embedded in Russian society.

During this talk, Belyakov is free to participate in a conversation demonstrating white privilege, one that allows white or lighter-skinned bodies to distance themselves from the stereotypical representation of non-white dark-skinned immigrants. This echoes Krivonos’s (2018) claim that Russia has acquired the white, racialized characteristics of being civilized and advanced, while people from Central Asia are racialized as colored and inferior. By defining Russia’s racial identity as white and distancing Russian whiteness from Central Asian immigrants, Belyakov rhetorically maintains the privileged position of a white-centered racial hierarchy. While Russianness does not necessarily embody a fully white ideological privilege offering cultural and social capital in Korea, it can be brought back into the white fold of such privilege when Belyakov draws a clear line between white and non-white Russians in discussions about hate crimes, victims, and global inequity.

Additionally, Belyakov’s white talk is enhanced because it invokes the ethnocentric language of othering immigrant workers in Korea tied to Korean ethnic nationalism. In Korea ethnic nationalism is based on a mythical notion of a homogeneous Korean race and ethnicity that contribute to the construction of Koreanness. However, the racial landscape in Korea has begun to diversify with an increasing number of foreigners, especially migrant workers from developing countries in the region of South and Southeast Asian countries (Kim and So 2018). Despite the fact that immigrant workers are accepted to work in 3D (difficult, dangerous, and dirty) industries to replace ethnic Koreans (Park 2014), these workers have faced discrimination and exclusion in Korean society. This is partially due to perceived racial and ethnic differences considered to be deviant from Korean cultural norms, and therefore undesirable (Kim and So 2018). Through his comment about Central Asian immigrants, Belyakov thus demarcates ethnocentric “us” from immigrant “others,” which is successfully translated through the norm of ethnocentrism in Korean society. In this sense, Belyakov’s white talk, based on the local racialized understanding of ethnic others, can be considered a rhetorically strategic means of whitening in the way ethnonationalism may be linked to a race-conscious global postcoloniality (Baker 2018).

The dynamics of Belyakov’s re-whitening process throughout the discussion are further complicated by rhetorical processes of de-whitening enacted by Belyakov. This occurs within a discussion where there emerge rhetorical strategies of political correctness, that is, the displayed performance of social responsibility and anti-racism without actual involvement in the lived experiences of marginalized groups (Díaz 2020), a rhetorical practice associated with whiteness. It ostensibly positions white Western bodies as historical assailants or contributors to inequality but does so without understanding or conviction (Jacobs 2017). The rhetoric of political correctness is employed by Rasch and other white panelists from Western European countries but challenged by Belyakov. Explicitly sharing common complaints criticizing racism, xenophobia, and other forms of social discrimination in their countries, white Western European panelists take part in utilizing the regretful, shameful, repentant, and progressive rhetoric of political correctness in episode 46. For example, Rasch highlights the importance of education to reduce and eradicate discrimination and hatred in society. However, disagreeing, Belyakov insists that social enlightenment does not change the discriminatory nature of human beings. By opposing the insincere rhetoric of political correctness, Belyakov fails to perform advanced social awareness like white Western panelists and demurs from participating in a re-whitening process. When white Western panelists reterritorialize the rhetoric of the white fold through their comments on social awareness and justice, Russianness remains a suspicious form of whiteness with limited symbolic and ideological resources, oscillating a spectrum of re-whitening and de-whitening.

Conclusion

Critical whiteness studies scholars consider historical and cultural contexts “to complicate and problematize unitary and homogenized concepts of whiteness” since white is not a simple, self-defined racial category (Pugliese 2002, 149). The consideration of differentiations within whiteness has been emphasized to complicate the white racial category interrupting hegemonic white supremacy; critical whiteness scholars have examined differences among white ethnic identities in Western countries and claim that not all whites hold the same level of privilege and power.

The analysis of Russianness and US Americanness constructed in Non-Summit suggests that Russianness can temporarily hold a rhetorically-marginal space where Western white power maintains dominance by distancing itself from Russianness through the exercise of a Russian de-whitening (hence pejorative) rhetoric in Non-Summit. The de-whitening process is especially visible when Russianness is either rhetorically contrasted to US Americanness, or associated with Chineseness, which is marked as a non-white and a non-privileged group in the show. However, when Russianness, the liminal subject, itself marks a clear distance from non-white identities through white talk (Steyn 2004), rhetorically participating in global white privilege, the liminal white Russian subject can pass as an authentic white subject, sustaining a global racial white-dominant hierarchy in a rhetorical moment of re-whitening (Lambert 2001).

Through these findings, I argue that membership in global whiteness is not a fixed, homogenous status of privilege, but it can, however, be sustained and reinforced by demarcating who can be invited as white and who cannot (Moon 2016). These findings aid in understanding the rhetorical operation of whiteness in non-Western contexts by unmasking a strategic manner in which the assumptions and the taken-for-granted-ness of white racial privilege are insidiously reproduced and perpetuated in Korea.

The liminal construction of Russianness in Non-Summit supports this paper’s fundamental topic, the existence of white marginality in postcolonial globalization. This point is supported by demonstrating how losing privilege does not completely keep Russianness from the re-whitening process in which non-white Western identities participate. The deprivation of ideological privilege linked to the liminal status of Russianness does not necessarily function to denounce a felt sense of white dominance and supremacy. Whether Russianness is located within or outside the rhetorical territories of whiteness in any given context, it can nurture a passing status by performing global whiteness. A basic global white dominance remains strong, even as it operates subtly through a dialectical process involving the shaping and reshaping of white privilege and positionality.

In an era of globalization marked by population migrations and cultural exchanges, it becomes imperative to examine the privileges of global whiteness, with its dynamic articulations of a Westernized, privileged white ethnicity. Shifting population majorities and other challenges to the white power structure have placed whiteness in crisis and have helped to establish a fluid power hierarchy among white identities, where some whitened ethnicities and nationalities become temporarily marginalized from full whiteness. However, processes of re-whitening, where groups in non-Western countries are used to reproduce the ideology of white supremacy in heterogeneous ways, serve to reassert whiteness. These are important to monitor so as not to ignore the resilient global power and privileges of being white around the globe. It is thus crucial to investigate, reveal, and critique strategic ways of reproducing and sustaining global whiteness that appears through representations of seemingly marginal white bodies in non-Western countries.