Community Neighboring Norms and the Prevalence and Management of Private Neighbor Problems

Abstract

Neighbor relations are informal social ties that constitute part of everyday urban life. While the benefits of neighborliness are well established, less is known about the manifestation of private neighbor nuisances. Specifically, research examining the influence of community social contexts on the propensity for neighbor nuisances and the resolution of nuisance issues through informal pathways remains limited. Drawing on a stratified sample of over 4,000 residents living in 147 communities, we conducted multilevel regression analyses to examine the impact of individual-level neighboring behavior and community-level norms of neighboring on the likelihood of (1) individuals experiencing neighbor nuisances, and (2) individuals responding to neighbor nuisances informally. We found that community-level neighborliness and structural characteristics were associated with the likelihood of experiencing private neighbor nuisance issues as opposed to individual-level neighboring behaviors. Individual-level social ties in the community and neighboring were significantly associated with individual responses to neighbor nuisance issues.

Keywords

neighboring informal social control collective efficacy

Neighbor relations are informal social ties that constitute part of everyday life for virtually all members of contemporary urban societies (Ruonavaara 2021). Ubiquitous and omnipresent, a neighbor can be an asset in an emergency, but problems between neighbors can quickly become a major issue if left unaddressed. Urban neighbors are unique from other social ties in the local community (Raban 1974) because they occur through the accident of propinquity alone (Painter 2012). Aside from incidental interaction, this propinquity may afford other unintended consequences, including the sharing of private activities, behaviors, noises, and odors, such that maintaining good neighbor relations requires negotiation, tolerance, and a delicate balance between friendliness and “being there when needed” on the one hand, and respecting each other’s privacy, on the other (Crow, Allan, and Summers 2002). Defined as “a positive and committed relationship constructed between neighbors” (Bulmer 1986:21), neighborliness is associated with a range of positive individual- and community-level outcomes (Y.-C. Kim and Kang 2010; Prezza et al. 2001; Unger and Wandersman 1985). Yet not all neighbor relations are neighborly. The capacity for neighbors to be viewed as a source of nuisance or annoyance or to exhibit “unneighborly” behavior has also been documented (Cheshire and Fitzgerald 2015; Nieuwenhuis, Völker, and Flap 2013; Stokoe 2006). Indeed, research by Cheshire and Fitzgerald (2015) in the city of Brisbane, Australia, found that 64 percent of urban residents experience some form of neighbor problem ranging from low-level private nuisances such as fencing disputes and overhanging trees to criminal behavior in the form of damage to property, abuse, and physical harm. Drawing on this research it appears that the experience of private nuisance neighbor problems, in particular, is not uncommon, thus it is important to understand the extent to which individual characteristics and neighborhood contexts can influence the prosocial management of these private nuisance problems when they do occur.

Patterns of neighborly behavior are informal, dynamic, and vary between individuals and across local neighborhoods. Individual characteristics such as age (Kelly 2014), gender (Campbell and Lee 1992), and residential tenure (Mollenhorst, Volker, and Schutjens 2009) have been shown to be influential. At the neighborhood level, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and population density are important predictors of residents being more likely to encounter problems with neighbors (Cheshire and Fitzgerald 2015), as are features of the built environment such as smaller lot sizes and the absence of green space between dwellings (Skjaeveland and Garling 1997).

Less is known on the effects of community social processes that are endogenous to the neighborhood, meaning they arise from the compositional effects of the resident population rather than from the neighborhood itself (Galster 2012). Such processes include the presence of collective social norms that encourage social cohesion and reciprocated trust that can facilitate neighborly behavior. They also include the presence of informal social control mechanisms that might be deployed when problems do arise to assist neighbors in resolving them through informal over-the-fence conversations rather than resorting to third-party intervention. At the neighborhood level, social cohesion and trust, coupled with willingness to reinforce shared behavioral norms, are referred to as collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Collective efficacy describes the capacity for a community to informally control low-level disorder, such as litter and graffiti, and prevent crime in the neighborhood by activating social ties to develop a shared understanding of how people should behave and reciprocated trust that other residents will intervene in the case of infractions (Sampson et al. 1997). Research has established the benefits of collective efficacy for managing and preventing general community problems, but limited research applies this framework to examine neighbor nuisance problems. Private nuisance problems with neighbors differ from community problems such as graffiti or public drinking because they often occur as a result of private homemaking practices that spill out from one domestic space into another to cause offense. While public graffiti can be a shared experience across the community, this is not necessarily the case for a nuisance neighbor where problems arise between an individual or dyadic relational pair. Yet, community-level norms that support informal management of neighbor problems are likely to influence the management of those problems given they also emerge within the neighborhood context. Furthermore, it is likely that individual neighboring behaviors that demonstrate social cohesion, proactive neighboring, and the informal resolution of neighbor problems will serve to reinforce norms that support collective efficacy to maintain broader community functioning.

Despite the lack of empirical evidence on the influence of community social processes on the prevalence of neighborly or unneighborly behavior, or indeed on the management of the latter, there is good reason to suggest that social cohesion, reciprocated trust, and informal social control mechanisms, at the neighborhood level, might have a positive influence on maintaining residential harmony by encouraging neighbors to avoid escalating private nuisance problems to formal regulatory processes. Researchers have long demonstrated that social cohesion and reciprocated trust provide a foundation to establish shared values and proactive neighboring norms (Kornhauser 1978; Warner 2007) by providing a mechanism for communication and articulation of shared values and pathways through which problems can be informally managed (Kornhauser 1978). Research also shows that social connections within the local community can shape attitudes and behaviors around neighboring by exposing individuals to community norms and values that support informal social control (Dekker 2007; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Lelieveldt 2004; Mesch and Manor 1998). A study conducted on neighbor noise complaints found that having a preestablished relationship with a neighbor reduced the likelihood of experiencing their behaviors as annoying and increased the propensity for problems to be resolved informally when they did arise (see also, Hughes, Karn, and Lickiss 1994; MORI 2003).

It seems intuitive that getting to know one’s neighbors and establishing relations of trust and reciprocity will create fewer neighbor tensions and facilitate the smooth resolution of private nuisance problems when they do arise. Yet, there remains insufficient evidence to indicate either the effectiveness of this advice for achieving good neighborly relations or the extent to which it holds across various neighborhood contexts that differ in relation to collective efficacy and shared neighboring norms. The aim of this article is to empirically examine these dual propositions using data from a longitudinal survey of over 4,000 respondents residing in 147 urban communities in Brisbane, Australia. Specifically, we examine the impact of individual-level contact with neighbors and neighborhood-level perceptions of neighboring norms in the residential community on the likelihood of: (1) individuals experiencing private nuisance problems from a neighbor, and (2) individuals’ responses to those problems. In the next section, we set the scene by outlining current research on the norms and practices of neighboring in its both positive and negative forms before providing a conceptual overview on the expected contribution of community social processes to the effective management of neighborly relations. We then present our research methodology and results before outlining the significance of our findings.

The Virtues of Good Neighbors and the Management of Nuisance Neighbors

Neighbors are households living in close physical proximity to one another in the context of their everyday private, residential lives (Stokoe 2006). Neither complete strangers nor drawn together through common interest, neighbors are bound by propinquity rather than affect. Given their close proximity, neighbors affect us in good and bad ways, even when we hardly know them. Contemporary, advanced Western middle-class norms around the management of neighbor relations in the face of residential nearness rest on the maintenance of social distance and the expectation that neighbors will respect each other’s privacy and show polite indifference for any forms of “public intimacy” that are inadvertently revealed by the people next door (Stokoe 2006). Yet, somewhat paradoxically, neighbors are also required to be friendly and helpful, such that they might exchange greetings in the street or over the fence and perform time-urgent favors and “watch-and-ward” functions for one another (Laurier, Whyte, and Buckner 2002; Litwak and Szelenyi 1969; Richards 1990). Good neighbors are therefore expected to be there when needed, but never to the extent that they become intrusive or nosy (Baker 2013; Crow et al. 2002). Indeed, interactive and supportive neighboring, manifesting in convivial expressions of interest toward neighbors and a readiness to help in times of need, can quickly tip into an intrusive, nosy style of over-neighboring that disturbs norms of privacy when expectations are not carefully negotiated and balanced (Harris and Gale 2004:10).

The benefits associated with neighborly relations extend beyond practical needs such as respect for privacy and time-urgent favors (Laurier et al. 2002). Evidence shows good relations with neighbors contribute to well-being by enhancing feelings of safety and security and improving life satisfaction (Beard et al. 2009; J. Kim 2010; Schwirian and Schwirian 1993; B. A. Shaw 2005; Taniguchi and Potter 2016). Good neighbors can also enhance neighborhood satisfaction (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Mesch and Manor 1998; Parkes, Kearns, and Atkinson 2002), and foster a broader sense of social connectedness by facilitating community ties (Guest et al. 2006) and generating local social capital (McCabe 2012). Proactive neighboring can also contribute to collective efficacy in the broader neighborhood by reinforcing neighboring norms that support social cohesion and willingness to informally manage problems.

While the benefits of neighborliness are well established (Schwirian and Schwirian 1993; Taniguchi and Potter 2016), less is known about the consequences of absent or antagonist neighbor relations. Absent neighbor relations do not necessarily imply problematic expressions of neighboring if a lack of contact between neighbors is accompanied by latent expectations that neighbors can be called upon for help, even if they are not known to each other (Laurier et al. 2002). But when those latent, positive dispositions are lacking and replaced by a complete disregard for neighbors or outright antagonism, feelings of distrust can arise which may impede the informal resolution of neighbor problems. Likewise, poor neighbor relations manifesting in annoying or nuisance behaviors can trigger disputes and arguments and potentially escalate to criminal behavior involving damage to property, threats, intimidation, and physical assault (Cheshire and Fitzgerald 2015). In one of the few existing studies to examine unneighborly behavior, Cheshire and Fitzgerald (2015) found that 47 percent of residents who experienced a minor neighbor nuisance described how the issue escalated into a more serious incident of antisocial or criminal behavior.

Community Collective Efficacy, Neighboring Norms, and Individual Neighbor Behaviors

These norms and expectations of neighboring are rarely articulated formally, although recent years have seen the rise of Good Neighbor Agreements in the social housing sector or private residential estates which tie neighbors to sublegal and civil codes around acceptable neighbor behavior relating to noise, pets, and the appropriate conduct of visitors (Cheshire and Buglar 2016). In the absence of these formal agreements, the generalized expectations of neighboring are sufficiently embedded to act as “rules that provide organizational features to neighboring” (Laurier et al. 2002:353). While normatively dominant, these moral codes of neighboring are not fixed but remain influenced by individual and community factors that are spatially, socially, and historically contingent. At the local level, individuals may draw on collective norms and behaviors apparent in the community to inform their own behavior, their tolerance of behavior exhibited by their neighbors, and appropriate ways to respond to problems when they arise (Burrell 2016; Power 2014). While most local neighboring norms are informal and not enforceable (Crow et al. 2002), neighbors living in communities where collective efficacy is higher will benefit from a stronger sense of collective social norms that support establishing ties with neighbors and willingness to informally address neighborhood problems (Wickes et al. 2017). Individuals with more social connections in the community may have greater exposure to local collective norms and therefore greater awareness of established expectations with regard to neighboring (Kouvo and Haverinen 2017). In turn, a greater awareness of expected behavior is associated with greater capacity for proactive, informal responses to problems, like neighbor nuisance issues (Kouvo and Haverinen 2017; Reynald 2010).

Collective social norms that support neighborliness, shared behavioral expectations, and informal social control develop more readily in structurally organized, stable communities (Coleman 1990; Sampson et al. 1997). Studies show that residents living in neighborhoods characterized by residential diversity, population density, high rental tenure, and concentrated disadvantage have an increased likelihood of experiencing nuisance neighbors (Cheshire, Fitzgerald, and Liu 2018). This is because these neighborhood characteristics are associated with fewer opportunities for the development of social cohesion, increased resource strain, and higher boundary porosity due to poor physical design and the absence of space between dwellings to facilitate noise attenuation. Neighborhoods undergoing transitions, such as increased densification and/or gentrification, also experience higher levels of neighbor nuisance complaints (Baker 2013; Cheshire et al. 2018; Power 2014; Thomas, Walton, and Lamb 2011). One explanation for this is that the coalescence of lifestyle differences among residents make establishing and maintaining good relations more difficult. A second explanation relates to the influence of neighborhood structural characteristics on informal social control and neighboring norms in the local community (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson et al. 1997).

Residents living in homogenous, stable neighborhoods with higher levels of home ownership and more open space tend to engage more with neighbors than residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods with high population transience (Farrell, Aubry, and Coulombe 2004; Guest and Wierzbicki 1999; Skjaeveland and Garling 1997; Tolsma, van der Meer, and Gesthuizen 2009; Unger and Wandersman 1982). Social disorganization theory (C. Shaw and McKay 1942) and its contemporary reformulations (Sampson et al. 1997) posit that neighborhood structural characteristics such as residential diversity, mobility, and concentrated disadvantage influence neighbor relations by undermining residents’ capacity to form social ties and develop collective efficacy (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Cheshire et al. 2018; Sampson et al. 1997). Collective efficacy develops in socially cohesive communities where residents agree on acceptable behaviors and are willing to intervene to reinforce the behavioral norms. Studies show that in neighborhoods where collective efficacy is higher, crime and disorder are lower (Sampson et al. 1997).

Community Social Processes and Un-neighborliness

The propensity to experience private nuisance issues from a neighbor, and for those issues to escalate into criminal behavior, also appears to be influenced by both individual characteristics and community social processes (Guest and Wierzbicki 1999; Liu et al. 2019). However, evidence on the association between community social processes and individual management of annoying neighbor behaviors is much more limited. Two studies have examined the association between individual neighbor relations, community social cohesion, and neighborliness empirically (MORI 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al. 2013). The findings demonstrate that both individuals’ social relationships and neighborhood-level cohesion play a significant role in shaping the likelihood of experiencing neighbor problems and typical responses to such problems. The first study, a noise survey conducted in the United Kingdom (MORI 2003), reveals that when individual relations with the offending neighbor are poor, neighbors are twice as likely to experience noise arising from a neighbor’s dwelling as a nuisance than when neighbors are known or liked. The research also shows that people are more likely to complain to police or the council about a neighbor’s noise when relations are poor but will complain directly to the neighbor concerned when neighbors are liked. Individuals living in neighborhoods where social cohesion is stronger are also less likely to experience neighbor nuisance from noise and more likely to respond by directly speaking with the neighbor. A second study examined neighbor relations in the Netherlands (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2013) and found that when residents perceive lower conflict and higher informal social control in the local community, they report fewer negative neighbor relations and greater capacity to deal with nuisance issues informally when they do arise.

While most studies find that neighborliness at the individual level and community social cohesion will (1) reduce the likelihood that one finds neighbors annoying or bothersome in the first place, and (2) facilitate the informal resolution of any problems that do arise, Baumgartner (1988) suggests that a lack of social cohesion and connectedness can also lead to strife-free neighbor relations. In her ethnographic study of a U.S. neighborhood, Baumgartner found that when neighbors were weakly integrated, grievances were rarely raised; instead, neighbors chose to tolerate annoyances or deploy polite strategies of avoidance, maintaining the peace through superficial forms of sociality and inaction. While this strategy may provide benefits to the individual, when this behavior is widespread at the community level it can lead to collective norms that discourage social cohesion and over time inhibit the development of collective efficacy. Baumgartner (1988) herself noted this possibility, arguing that “if people in such places cannot be bothered to take action against those who offend them or to engage in conflicts, neither can they be bothered to help those in need” (Baumgartner 1988:132).

To date, discussions on neighboring in its both positive and negative forms have taken place in isolation of one another and, in large part, separate from the collective efficacy and neighborhood norms literature. As such, our current understanding of the relationship between established neighbor relations, the incidence and management of private nuisance problems among neighbors, and the community social contexts in which they occur remains incomplete. In what follows, we address this knowledge gap by bringing together measures of individual neighbor contact, community social ties, and community-level neighborliness, alongside indicators of private nuisance neighbor experiences and responses, to examine whether and under what conditions neighborliness (in the form of contact with neighbors) has a positive or negative impact on everyday experiences of private nuisance neighbor problems. Drawing on a stratified dataset comprising over 4,000 respondents residing across 147 communities, we conduct multilevel regression analyses to empirically investigate individual and community factors associated with the likelihood of (1) experiencing private nuisance problems, and (2) responding to a neighbor problem informally. Drawing on social disorganization and collective efficacy theories (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson et al. 1997; C. Shaw and McKay 1942) alongside literatures on neighboring and neighbor problems (Cheshire et al. 2018; Liu, Wang, and Cheshire 2021), we propose five hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who have more contact with their neighbors will be less likely to experience private nuisance problems with neighbors.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals living in communities where shared behavioral norms support proactive neighboring will be less likely to experience private nuisance problems with neighbors.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who have more contact with their neighbors will be less likely to experience private nuisance problems with neighbors when they also reside in a community where norms support proactive neighboring. This association will not be significant for individuals living in communities where norms do not support proactive neighboring.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who have more contact with their neighbors will be more likely to respond to any private nuisance problems with neighbors informally.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals living in communities where shared norms support proactive neighboring will be more likely to respond to any private nuisance problems with neighbors informally.

Data and Methods

The Australian Community Capacity Study

The current study focuses on neighboring in Brisbane, Australia. Brisbane is the state capital of Queensland with a population of approximately 2.06 million at the time of data collection and a total area of 5,950 km² (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Brisbane is one of the fastest growing areas in Australia with census data indicating an 11.5 percent increase in population in the five years prior to data collection (2006–2011; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Brisbane comprises a total of 401 neighborhoods that vary in terms of area and population size. Like all cities, nuisance and community problems are not distributed evenly or randomly across Brisbane with some neighborhoods experiencing higher levels of problems than others (Liu et al. 2019).

To conduct the analyses, we draw on survey data from Wave 4 of the Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS). The ACCS is a longitudinal survey of urban communities in Brisbane that seeks to understand the individual and collective social processes associated with spatial variations in neighboring, community well-being, crime, and disorder over time. Wave 4 of the ACCS was completed in 2012. Respondents (N = 4,132 comprising 2,528 longitudinal and 1,676 top-up participants¹) comprised a stratified randomly selected sample of individuals over the age of 18 residing in one of 147 randomly selected suburbs in the Brisbane Statistical Division. A nested, randomized sampling approach was used in addition to weighted suburb-level sampling quotas to ensure neighborhood measures are ecologically valid. The overall consent and completion rate was 46.27 percent (for further information, see Mazerolle et al. 2012; Wickes et al. 2015). This rate represents the number of interviews completed proportional to the number of in-scope contacts. Wave 4 of the ACCS comprises respondents from the previous three waves of the survey in addition to a top-up sample of respondents randomly selected in Wave 4. To maintain an ecologically reliable sample size across all 147 neighborhoods, at each Wave of the ACCS, the cohort was topped up with an additional random sample of participants. In this study we use the term neighborhoods to refer to suburbs in the ACCS sample.

Dependent Variable

Our key variable of interest is experience of neighbor nuisance problems. Our measure of nuisance is drawn from the ACCS. Participants were asked whether they had experienced any one of 11 problems with a neighbor; seven of these were related to private nuisance issues and four were criminal or antisocial behaviors (Cheshire and Fitzgerald 2015). Here, we focus only on private nuisance problems with neighbors. We compute a single dichotomous variable where a score of one indicates that a participant reported experiencing any one of the seven nuisance problems with a neighbor. These included problems involving: noise; domestic animals; boundaries (e.g., fences or trees); odors, including smoke; unsightly or messy property; parking; and illegal or unsafe structures. We have outlined the frequency of each neighbor nuisance problem separately in Table 1.

Table 1.

Summary Statistics.

Variables	% or M	n or SD	Minimum	Maximum
Individual level (n = 4,029)
Age	53.36	15.01	18	91
Gender
Male (0)	40.36	1,626
Female (1)	59.64	2,403
% married	66.72	2,688
% home owners	87.86	3,540
% speak language other than English	6.18	249
Number of friends in the local area	4.29	2.51	1	7
Contact with neighbors
None (0)	19.09	769
Once (1)	14.99	604
Twice (2)	17.15	691
Three times or more (3)	48.77	1,965
Experienced neighbor nuisance problem	60.48	2,437
Type of nuisance problems experienced:
Noise	34.55	1,392
Domestic animals	21.49	866
Boundary issues	18.54	747
Odors (including smoke)	13.65	550
Messy properties	18.91	762
Parking	17.50	705
Illegal or unsafe structures	3.03	122
Complaint against you in the past (total n = 2,437)	10.23	249
Responses to neighbor nuisance problems (total n = 2,437):
Discussed with neighbor (0)	25.52	622
Did nothing (1)	31.19	760
Contacted a third party (2)	37.34	910
Initiated legal action (3)	5.95	145
If took NO action in response to a problem, why? (total n = 825)
The problem stopped	13.82	114
The problem wasn’t serious enough	39.76	328
I would prefer to keep the peace	21.33	176
The authorities would not do anything anyway	10.18	84
Fear retaliation	3.52	29
I didn’t know what to do	4.24	35
It’s not my business to get involved	5.33	44
I didn’t have the resources (time, money, etc.)	1.82	15
Community level (n = 147)
Neighborliness	2.82	0.23	2.33	3.56
Population density (persons per km²)	10.20	8.91	0.100	34.75
Language diversity	0.28	0.17	0.06	0.72
Residential instability (% households renting)	26.61	13.67	2.36	57.42
Disadvantage (% low-income households)	22.16	9.34	6.96	46.41
Logged total crime rate (per 1,000 population)	5.09	0.82	2.78	7.44

In the second stage of the analyses, we examine individual responses to neighbor nuisance problems. The dependent variable in this analysis is also computed from the ACCS data. Participants who indicated they had experienced a problem with their neighbor were asked a follow-up question regarding their response to the problem. Participants were asked whether or not they had responded to the problem in any of the following ways: (1) did nothing; (2) discussed the problem with their neighbor; (3) contacted a third party, such as the police, local council, landlord, or social service; and (4) instigated legal action. In any cases where an individual participant recorded multiple responses, the lowest intensity measure was included; therefore, this measure is indicative of the initial, lowest order response taken by the participant in response to the problem. We use the lowest order response as this is most likely to reflect the participants’ initial, normative action when a problem first arises prior to escalation that may occur due to a noncooperative neighboring party.

Independent Variables: Individual Level

Individual level

Our first key independent variable at the individual level measures contact with neighbors. Specifically, ACCS participants are asked to report how many times in the previous week they had contact with their neighbor. Response options included: (1) no contact, (2) once, (3) twice, and (4) three or more times.

The second key independent variable provides an indicator of the individuals’ social attachments in the broader local area. Specifically, this question asks respondents to report the number of close friends and family living in their residential community. Social ties in the local community may enhance an individual’s exposure to community norms, perceived self- and collective efficacy, and therefore the likelihood of an individual having contact with their neighbor and/or enacting informal mechanisms in response to neighbor problems (Reynald 2010; Wickes et al. 2017).

In Stage 2 of the analyses, we also include a dichotomous variable to indicate previous experience of being the subject of a neighbor complaint (0 = no; 1 = yes). We include this variable to control for the impact that direct experience of being the target of a complaint may have on how an individual manages future problems they are subject to.

Individual demographic characteristics

We control for individual demographic characteristics known to be associated with neighboring (Skjaeveland and Garling 1997) and neighbor problems (Mendez et al. 2021). Age is a continuous variable. Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female), marital status (0 = not married; 1 = married), home ownership (0 = renting; 1 = home owner), and language spoken at home (0 = English only; 1 = other language) are dichotomous variables.

Independent Variables: Community Level

Neighborliness

Our key independent variable at the community level is perceived neighborliness. We computed a scale comprising three items from the ACCS to capture respondents’ perceptions of neighborliness. The scale comprises items that are identical to those used in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods and other well-established community-based studies (Earls et al. 1994; Sampson et al. 1997). ACCS respondents were asked how often people in their local community: (1) do favors for one another, (2) visit each other’s homes or on the street, and (3) ask each other advice about personal things. Responses were on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from never to very often. Each participant is assigned a score to represent their residential neighborhood. This score is the mean score of all participants living in their residential neighborhood. As the ACCS sampling strategy follows a stratified design, this measure is ecologically valid and represents perceived neighborliness (norms of proactive neighboring) at the community level. This measure captures the extent to which residents perceive norms of neighboring in their community as collectively efficacious.²

Neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics

We control for neighborhood sociodemographic and structural characteristics known to be associated with social disorganization and community problems. Drawing from the 2011 Australian Bureau of Statistics census data, we spatially integrate variables to account for neighborhood disadvantage, ethnic diversity, residential instability, and population density. Disadvantage is the percentage of total households in the neighborhood earning less than $800 per week. Ethnic heterogeneity is captured using a measure of language diversity. In Australia, where the majority of the overseas-born population have migrated from Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking countries, language is a more meaningful indicator of diversity than country of birth (Wickes et al. 2013). To capture the amount of variation of language within each neighborhood, we use the Blau index:

1 - \sum^{} p_{i}^{2},

where p is the proportion of the total group who are members of a given category i. Values of the Blau index range between 0 and 1, with lower values representing homogeneity and higher values indicating heterogeneity (Blau 1977).³ Residential instability is the percentage of total households in the neighborhood that is renting. As instability has been shown to undermine the development of social ties and norms of intervention, we expected that greater residential instability would be associated with lower levels of perceived neighborliness at the community level. Population density is computed as total number of persons residing in a community divided by the total area in square kilometers.

Crime rate

We also control for community-level total crime rate as an objective measure of actual crime and disorder problems in the local area. These data were provided by the Queensland Police Service and represent the total number of offenses per 1,000 residents in the community. We use the log-normalized variable in the models. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1.

Analytic Strategy

Our analyses proceed in two stages. First, we estimate multilevel logistic regression models to examine factors associated with the likelihood of an individual experiencing private nuisance problems with their neighbor. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examine the influence of individual-level neighbor contact and broader local area social attachments in addition to community-level perceptions of neighborliness. We also tested Hypothesis 3 that the association between individual neighboring behavior and experience of private nuisance neighbor problems is contingent on community-level perceptions of neighboring by computing a second model that included an interaction term between individuals’ contact with their neighbor and community-level neighboring. As the interaction term was not significant and the model fit statistics demonstrated it was less robust than Model 1, we do not report the results here. We used the xtlogit command in Stata Version 16.0 to estimate the prediction equation for a random intercept multilevel logistic regression model for individual and community characteristics to account for clustering within communities. Tests for multicollinearity revealed all variance inflation factors were below two and correlations were not problematic. As the coefficients are not intuitively meaningful, we refer to the odds ratios (ORs) in the discussion of the results.

In Stage 2 of the analyses, to test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression model to examine factors associated with specific responses to private nuisance neighbor problems. In Stage 2 of the analyses, we use a subsample of participants who reported experiencing at least one private nuisance problem with their neighbor (n = 2,437). The reference category for the analyses is “discussed the problem with the neighbor.” Results are reported as ORs and can be interpreted as the likelihood of a particular response compared with the reference response of “discussed with the neighbor.” All analyses were conducted in Stata 16.0 (StataCorp 2015).

Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of the variables of interest. Model results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. As reported in Table 1, our sample has an average age of 53.36 years and 60 percent of participants are female. Approximately, 60 percent of participants (n = 2,347) had experienced a neighbor nuisance problem. Of those who experienced a neighbor nuisance problem more than one-third (31.19 percent, n = 760) did nothing to respond. The most commonly reported reason for not responding to a nuisance problem was that the problem was not serious enough (39.76 percent, n = 328).

Table 2.

Logistic Regression Predicting Neighbor Nuisance Problems.

	Model 1: Individual factors		Model 2: Community characteristics
Variables	OR	SE	OR	SE
Individual level
Age	0.987	0.002***	0.987	0.002***
Gender (ref: male)	1.109	0.075	1.100	0.075
Married (ref: no)	1.024	0.077	1.064	0.082
Home owner (ref: no)	1.099	0.132	1.189	0.144
Non-English speaker (ref: no)	0.752	0.107*	0.751	0.106*
Number of friends in the local area	0.991	0.014	0.996	0.014
Contact with neighbors (ref: no contact)
Once	1.075	0.131	1.092	0.133
Twice	0.878	0.101	0.887	0.102
Three or more times	0.866	0.078	0.861	0.078
Community level
Neighborliness			0.659	0.130*
Population density			1.007	0.006
Language diversity			0.479	0.157*
% renting			1.017	0.006**
% low-income households			1.001	0.005
Total crime rate			0.953	0.069
Constant	3.00	5.192**	7.799	5.197**
sigma_u	0.303	0.062	0.200	0.062
Rho	0.027	0.010	0.012	0.007
Wald χ²	52.58***		86.20***
Pseudo-log-likelihood	−2,671.57		−2,654.06
AIC	5,365.15		5,342.12

Note. n = 4,029; N = 147. Standard errors robust and adjusted for clustering within neighborhoods. OR = odds ratio; AIC = Akaike’s information criteria.

p-Values for two-tailed tests:*

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 3.

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Reference Category “Discussed the Problem with Neighbor.”

	Did nothing		Contacted third party (e.g., local council, police, landlord)		Initiated legal action
Variables	RRR	SE	RRR	SE	RRR	SE
Individual level
Age	1.005	0.004	1.006	0.004	1.008	0.007
Gender (ref: male)	1.086	0.118	1.062	0.112	1.289	0.254
Married (ref: no)	0.719	0.090**	0.880	0.109	0.768	0.158
Home owner (ref: no)	0.858	0.140	0.908	0.139	0.880	0.299
Non-English speaker (ref: no)	1.123	0.242	0.621	0.137*	0.826	0.330
Number of friends in the local area	0.955	0.022*	0.995	0.023	1.015	0.045
Contact with neighbors (ref: no contact)
Once	1.175	0.218	0.922	0.174	1.387	0.421
Twice	0.881	0.178	0.879	0.168	1.059	0.306
Three or more times	0.644	0.093**	0.895	0.127	0.791	0.214
Complaint made against you in the past (ref: no)	0.944	0.177	0.880	0.160	2.762	0.701***
Community level
Neighborliness	0.622	0.189	0.485	0.159*	1.683	1.080
Population density	0.990	0.007	0.992	0.007	1.007	0.014
Language diversity	0.720	0.294	1.023	0.447	0.541	0.508
% renting	1.009	0.007	1.015	0.007*	1.016	0.013
% low-income households	1.009	0.009	1.019	0.009*	1.016	0.014
Total crime rate	1.013	0.132	0.935	0.097	1.034	0.203
Constant	5.240	5.939	7.055	8.731	0.014	0.032
Wald χ²	170.64***
Pseudo-log-likelihood	−2,967.86
Pseudo R²	2.4%
Akaike’s information criteria (51)	6,037.71

Note. n = 2,437, N = 147 (this analysis includes only Australian Community Capacity Study participants who had experienced a nuisance problem with a neighbor); Standard errors robust and adjusted for clustering within neighborhoods. RRR = relative risk ratio.

p-Values for two-tailed tests:*

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 2 presents the results of two logistic regression models examining factors associated with the likelihood of experiencing private nuisance problems from a neighbor. The results show that younger residents (OR = 0.987, p < .001) and those who speak English (OR = 0.751, p < .05) are more likely to encounter private nuisance problems with a neighbor than older and non-English speaking residents, respectively. There was no evidence that an individual’s frequency of contact with their neighbor or social ties in the community influence their likelihood of experiencing a neighbor’s conduct as a nuisance. However, the odds of experiencing a private nuisance problem with a neighbor are significantly greater for individuals living in communities where neighborliness is lower (OR = 0.659, p < .05). Living in a community characterized by low language diversity (OR = 0.479, p < .05) or high percentage of renting households is also associated with a greater likelihood of experiencing private nuisance problems from a neighbor.

While public policy advice suggests that it is optimal for individuals to discuss problems with their neighbors in the first instance, this does not always occur. In Stage 2 of the analyses, we focus on the subsample of participants who reported experiencing a private nuisance problem with their neighbor (n = 2,437) and examine factors associated with individual responses to nuisance. The reference category is “discussed the problem with the neighbor.” The results of Model 3 show that compared with individuals who discussed the nuisance problem with their neighbor, those who did nothing in response to the problem were less likely to be married (RRR = 0.719, p < .01) and had fewer social ties in the local community (RRR = 0.955, p < .05). They were also significantly less likely to report having frequent contact with their neighbor (RRR = 0.644, p < .01).

Compared with individuals who discussed the problem with their neighbor, those who contacted a third party were more likely to speak English (RRR = 0.621, p < .05). Living in a community where neighborliness is lower also increased the odds of an individual calling a third-party service in response to a private nuisance problem, rather than discussing the problem with their neighbor (RRR = 0.485, p < .05). Living in a community with more low-income households (OR = 1.019, p < .05) or a greater percentage of renting households (OR = 1.015, p < .05) was also associated with a greater likelihood of contacting a third party in response to a problem when compared with discussing the problem with the neighbor.

Only one factor was significantly associated with an increased likelihood of seeking legal action in response to a private nuisance problem when compared with discussing the problem with the neighbor. Individuals who reported a complaint had previously been made against them were 1.76 times more likely to seek legal action when compared with discussing the problem with the neighbor (RRR = 2.76, p < .001).

Discussion

Establishing and maintaining good relations with neighbors requires tolerance and negotiation due to proximity and border porosity that may afford the accidental sharing of intimacies or private-realm behaviors such as noises and odors (Stokoe 2006). Despite the ubiquity of neighbor relations (we all have neighbors) and the benefits of maintaining good neighbor relations, scholarship examining the community social contexts of problems with neighbors has remained limited. In this study we conducted multilevel regression analyses to examine the impact of individual-level neighbor contact and community-level norms of neighboring on the likelihood of: (1) individuals experiencing private nuisance problems at the hands of a neighbor, and (2) individuals responding to problems informally when they did arise. Our study produced five key findings that extend previous knowledge regarding neighbor relations and the experience of neighbor problems.

First, we found that having more contact with neighbors was not associated with the likelihood of experiencing private nuisance neighbor problems (Hypothesis 1). There was also no evidence that the influence of individual-level contact with neighbors on the likelihood of experiencing private nuisance problems was moderated by ecologically measured neighboring norms (Hypothesis 3). The conventional advice from municipal councils, the police, and community legal centers on managing neighbor problems is to “get to know your neighbors.” Our research interrogates this advice, finding that while knowing one’s neighbors appears not to reduce the likelihood of experiencing them as bothersome or annoying, it is important in how we respond. In terms of the former observation, our findings do not directly accord with those of the MORI survey on neighbor noise, which found that neighbors are less likely to find each other’s noise bothersome when they are known to each other. One explanation for the divergence in findings is our focus on the frequency of contact with neighbors rather than the quality of the relationship. While 49 percent of respondents reported contact with neighbors three or more times in the past week, this tells us nothing about the nature of that contact, including whether it was civil and harmonious or fraught with tension. Further, the kinds of neighbor nuisances reported here are relatively low-level and constitute what Emerson (2015:537) calls “everyday troubles”: fleeting troubles that in many instances are quickly resolved and come to nothing. “Troubles” are an inherent feature of any social and interactive order, including among people that we do not know well, but whose private lives play out in close physical proximity to our own. Even if we know and like our neighbors, this does not preclude the possibility that we still find their conduct occasionally annoying. Thus, many people may indeed experience these minor neighbor nuisance problems but what matters is how we respond to them.

Second, our results demonstrate that the level of neighboring at the neighborhood level does influence the likelihood of individuals’ experiencing private nuisance problems from their neighbors (Hypothesis 2). Our results support a broader focus on neighborhood-wide sociality and neighboring norms as most influential for preventing low-level nuisance neighbor problems. We found that individuals living in communities where collective norms support “good,” “collectively efficacious” neighboring were less likely to experience nuisance problems with their adjacent neighbor. This finding is consistent with the MORI (2003) study on neighborhood noise, as well as with Nieuwenhuis and colleagues’ (2013) examination of the experience of neighbor nuisance in the Netherlands. The result emphasizes the importance of strong community norms for demonstrating what behaviors should be tolerated and what behaviors constitute legitimate problems (Michaux, Groenen, and Uzieblo 2015).

Our third key finding relates to how perceived neighbor nuisances are managed and resolved (Hypothesis 5). Consistent with the findings above, we found that individuals living in neighborhoods where norms of neighboring support social cohesion and informal social control, that is collective efficacy, were more likely to seek informal resolution to private nuisance issues than to rely on a third party for moderation. These findings align with the large body of research elucidating neighborhood effects and the importance of collective values and social norms of informal social control for shaping individuals’ responses to community nuisance and disorder issues (Gearhart and Joseph 2019; Hipp and Wickes 2018; Warner 2014; Wickes et al. 2017). An unambiguous understanding of shared values and collective norms about acceptable forms of behavior can support informal responses to problems and a willingness for individuals to manage community or neighbor nuisance issues without third-party moderation or formal regulation (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Reynald 2009, 2010; Sampson et al. 1997). When considering our findings in the context of this broader literature, they highlight interdependencies between dyadic neighboring and community-level neighboring norms, such that the practice of neighboring at the individual level is both influenced by, and visibly reinforces, community collective efficacy and norms of neighboring. Our results also draw attention to the parallels between requirements for informal responses to individual neighbor problems and community disorder problems by demonstrating that the likelihood of informally responding to private nuisance problems enacted by a neighbor is contingent on social relations and norms at the community level, as well as perceived norms that support proactive neighboring that is collective efficacy operating in the context of neighbor nuisance issues.

Fourth, and related, while individual contact with neighbors and/or the presence of local social ties were not associated with the propensity to experience neighbors as annoying, both are associated with individuals’ responses to neighbor private nuisance problems (Hypothesis 4). Individuals who lacked social ties in the local community and did not have contact with their neighbor were more likely to report doing nothing about nuisance issues. Indeed, approximately one-third of participants who experienced a private nuisance problem responded to the issue with complete inaction. It is reasonable that individuals may elect to avoid conflict or make small adjustments to their own lives (such as closing windows to avoid neighbor noise) rather than raise a complaint with an offending neighbor. As Baumgartner (1988) reports, avoidance of neighbor conflict helps generate an atmosphere of civility that residents may be unwilling to disrupt through complaint and conflict. Yet this does not account for why the propensity to do nothing in response to a complaint is more prevalent among those who do not know their neighbors. One obvious explanation is that not knowing one’s neighbors generates feelings of fear and mistrust, particularly around their likely response to receiving a complaint, no matter how legitimate or polite that complaint might be. More structural explanations of collective efficacy locate the association between neighbor contact, social ties, and inaction in low levels of investment among those individuals to improve their current neighbor situation or the community in which they reside. From this perspective, raising one’s concerns with an offending neighbor is an expression of custodianship, or caring about the community, rather than an indication of intolerance. Alternatively, it may be that individuals with few social ties in the local community and little contact with their neighbors are unaware of the collective norms of neighboring in the area and therefore lack the capacity or confidence to take informal action in regard to the nuisance problem. Research demonstrates that individuals are less likely to intervene in community problems when they have fewer social ties and are less attached to the community because they have less exposure to it and are less aware of community social norms regarding acceptable behaviors. When individuals are unsure of acceptable behaviors they lack the confidence to enact informal responses for fear that other community members will not respond similarly to the situation (Reynald 2010). In the case of neighbor problems, complete inaction may be problematic because tensions may build over time if the problem is left unresolved. Furthermore, if left unchecked, poor neighboring behaviors are likely to generate absent or even hostile neighbor relations which, in turn, will negatively influence community norms of neighboring and send a signal to others that this behavior is acceptable in the community (Ross and Mirowsky 2009; Skogan 1987).

On the other hand, inaction signals tolerance and a clear understanding of behavioral norms that allow individuals to engage in domestic activities, such as playing music or having pets, in their private spaces even if proximate neighbors find them mildly irritating. Indeed, in the face of close physical proximity between residential dwellings, the spillover of domestic lives from one dwelling to another may be tolerated as an inevitable part of residential life and that unreasonably complaining about them is actually another form of unneighborly behavior. Given that almost 40 percent of participants who responded to a neighbor private nuisance problem with inaction cited their reason for not responding as “the issue was not serious enough,” it is reasonable to suggest that inaction may have been an appropriate response and in line with neighborhood norms. Baumgartner presented similar findings, indicating that ignoring or avoiding neighbor nuisances was common among residents in the distinctly middle-class suburb she examined. While there is not the space here to discern whether inaction is now a widespread response across a range of neighborhood types, nuisance types, and severity, future research might consider how entrenched middle-class values of neighboring and responses to neighbor problems are becoming.

Finally, we found residents who have previously been the subject of a formal neighbor complaint are more likely to respond to a nuisance problem by engaging in legal action rather than discussing the problem with the neighbor. This suggests that formally reporting a neighbor for low-level nuisance issues has negative consequences, both for the relationship between the neighbors concerned (via an erosion of trust) (Warner 2007) and for how subsequent neighbor problems are managed. Our finding that resorting to legalistic modes of neighboring for managing nuisance issues is more prevalent among those who have previously been the object of a formal neighbor complaint highlights the importance of both social cohesion through norms of neighboring actions at the community level and perceived trust that others will also respond to problems informally for encouraging informal responses to neighbor nuisance issues. In their original conceptualization of collective efficacy theory, Sampson and colleagues (1997) emphasized the dual roles of reciprocated trust and social cohesion among residents in activating residents’ willingness to respond informally to community problems. They note that cohesive communities have greater consensus in terms of behavioral expectations and shared values that facilitate reciprocated trust and, in turn, a willingness to intervene to achieve the best outcome for the collective community (Sampson et al. 1997). Our research shows that when trust that others will respond to issues informally has been violated, an individual will no longer engage in informal responses themselves. So while perceived collective efficacy at the community level can influence management of private neighbor nuisance issues, direct individual experiences may play a greater role.

Our findings highlight the important association between neighborliness at the community level and individuals’ experiences of a distinct set of (private nuisance) neighbor problems and responses to them. We note the limitations of the study around generalizability given the relative class, racial and ethnic homogeneity of Brisbane suburbs, and their low levels of crime and disorder when compared with neighborhoods in other settings. We also note the potential for participant bias in reporting of the neighbor nuisance problems. The experience of nuisance is subjective, as we have suggested, in that some individuals might accept neighbor noise, for example, as an inevitable and acceptable feature of neighborhood life, whereas others experience it as an intolerable nuisance. Similarly, while some individuals may perceive high levels of neighboring in their community because they personally engage with other residents, other participants in the same neighborhood may perceive neighboring to be low. Finally, we note that our data are cross-sectional and were collected in 2012, almost a decade ago. While it would seem that the norms and expectations of neighboring have not fundamentally changed in the last 20 years (cf. Crow et al. 2002), an important avenue for future research is to examine how the experience and management of neighbor problems may change in the future, particularly in the wake of COVID-19 restrictions where lockdowns reportedly brought neighbors closer together as they relied upon one another to meet their essential needs. A longitudinal research design is required to accurately draw inferences about the directions of associations highlighted in the results and investigate the potential reciprocal relationship between individual neighboring behaviors and community-level collective efficacy and neighboring norms. This will help to inform decisions on whether to prioritize individual neighbor interventions such as mediation services or instead instigate broad community engagement activities to minimize the likelihood of neighbors, and their everyday domestic lives, becoming a nuisance.

Despite these limitations, our research demonstrates that while different styles of neighboring might characterize individual, adjacent neighbor relations, norms of neighboring at the neighborhood level also influence experiences of nuisance. Our study adds insight into the importance of community social processes and the presence of established norms of neighborliness that provide cues to all residents on what might constitute a legitimate nuisance and how best to manage it. We demonstrate that in communities where prosocial norms of neighboring prevail, individuals are more likely to identify and acknowledge that some problems are too minor to be acted upon and when they do respond to a private nuisance problems, that response tends to be informal.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research on which this article is based is funded by an Australian Research Council grant (DP 150100457) “Unneighbourliness: the nature, forms and outcomes of problems between neighbours” (2015–2017). Renee Zahnow is currently supported by an ARC DECRA fellowship (DE200100359).

ORCID iD

Renee Zahnow

Notes

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