Radicalization and Transformative Learning: Explored Through Honneth’s Recognition Theory

The Plan

This paper shall, following a personal background statement:

(1) Explore briefly models of radicalization from studies undertaken following 9/11 highlighting the 3N model of radicalization developed by Kruglanski’s research;

Background

Transformative learning has been explored in educational contexts and among relatively accessible individuals and groups (Taylor, 2007). Radicalization provides challenging contexts for TL (see Melacarne & Fabbri, 2023). I recall here a number of autobiographical events that are points of departure for exploring TL in the context of radicalization. They underline the role of experience in building and developing theory that Hannah Arendt (2018) understood;

No matter how abstract our theories may sound or how consistent our arguments may appear, there are incidents and stories behind them which at least for ourselves, contain in a nutshell the full meaning of whatever we have to say. (p. 200)

During the 1990s, I organized state-funded adult education programs in Dundalk on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Following a move to Maynooth University, I was invited back to Dundalk to research, arbitrate work-place disputes, and resolve conflicts during political protests. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and/or Sinn Fein (its political wing) were always involved. The IRA is accepted as an example of a radicalized group (Horgan, 2005; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Orsini, 2023). With funding from the American Program for Peace and Reconciliation, we researched the learning needs of a working-class border community (Connolly & Fleming, 1997). Violence in families, on the streets, along with political violence was a common experience. The research concluded that “violence is the ‘social glue’ that maintains control in the community” (Connolly & Fleming, 1997, p. 33). This violence was complicated by violence arising from the Northern Ireland conflict.

Other times, during industrial disputes and a public protest (against the demolition of a community building), I led processes of intervention in Dundalk. I facilitated carefully planned public meetings, sometimes more than 100 participants, were held, and ways forward were discussed. Radicalized members of the community were included. TL theory informed the processes. Those events are capable of narration now, and such risky educational adventures in participatory democracy and TL have been foundational for my writing and teaching since the 1990s. They anticipated Honneth’s theory of recognition (1995), his emancipatory turn (2014a), and confirmed Honneth’s work as applied to TL (Fleming, 2016). There is an urgency to the task of coming to terms with radicalizations today that inspired Mogelson’s (2022) bestseller The Storm is here capturing the imminence of the threat. Mogelson (2022) asserts that social institutions are not solidly bound together today, the storm is real, and comes from radicalized groups bound together by their imagined “apocalypse” (p. 142).

Models of Radicalization and Kruglanski’s 3N Model

Studies of radicalization pre-date 9/11 (Crenshaw, 1981) but there has been a recent expansion of interest in empirical studies of radicalized populations and groups. Adult educators have joined the debate. Antonia Darder (2009) discusses how Muslims have become a perceived problem, resulting in hyper alertness to dangers posed by scapegoating some ethnic groups. Darder (2009) asserts that the “politics of neoliberalism, couched in alarmist anti-terrorist rhetoric, is enacted on the world stage by democracies” (p. 153). Racism, and other ideologies of exclusion, operate to preserve the hegemony of the modern capitalist state. This “strips emancipatory projects of their transformative potential” (Darder, 2009, p. 154) and points to the need for a critical response.

The European Commission Expert Group (2008, p. 7) defines radicalization as “socialization to extremism, which manifests itself in terror.” The US Department of Homeland Security Institute, (2006, p. 2) adopts a similar definition: a “process of adopting an extremist belief system, including willingness to support or use violence as a method to effect social change.” In emerging models of radicalization, there is broad agreement that radicalization is;

a process, not necessarily linear or orderly, by which an individual (or an organization) accepts beliefs and value systems that justify the use of violence against civilians to realize a social change and actively supports it or engages in violent means for political purposes. (Demirden, 2018, p. 4)

Though there is no agreed definition of radicalization, the term designates extremist positions including sometimes, but not necessarily, violent positions often on the far right (Mandel, 2009). Many empirical research projects that have generated models of radicalization find that radicalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Most research identifies grievances as the beginning of radicalization. Moghaddam (2005) describes radicalization as following an incremental process of socialization, like climbing a staircase: a stairway to radicalization. The entry level step includes having a sense of grievance at experiencing unfairness and/or deprivations. The disgruntled climb the steps of the stairs, exploring their options. Radicalization is a process of resocialization according to Sageman’s (2004) research. Radicalization can also be ideological, according to the New York Police Department research by Silber and Bhatt (2007). Horgan’s (2005) research finds radicalization offers the allure of career or financial gain. Wiktorowicz’s (2005) research among British Muslim activists finds that the absolute certainty offered by radicalization motivates those with a cognitive opening for certainties. McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) research the complexity of individual, group, and mass radicalizations emphasizing the complexity of the process of radicalization originating in grievance. In Italy, Della Porta’s (2013) model emphasizes the roles of state repression, over vigorous policing, and the reaction of the state to social movements. Orsini (2023) discovers a “terrorist by vocation” model (2023, p. 87), with a strong cognitive element distinguishing living “off” politics from living “for” politics (p. 87).

The Three Pillars of Radicalization or 3N model of Kruglanski et al. (2019) refers to needs, narratives, and networks (the 3 Ns) as central to radicalization. The “need” refers to “motivational imbalance” that drives the process (2019, pp. 38–41). It is built on a human need to matter, to be someone, and be respected. According to Kruglanski et al. (2019, p. 43) it is a “quest for personal significance” that prompts individuals to make immense self-sacrifices in order to achieve significance. The second N refers to the Narratives that permit violence when it is encapsulated within an ideological framework that provides moral justifications for its use against a specific group of people. This N is similar to research that identifies ideology as a factor in radicalization. Ideologies and narratives support the cognitive gymnastics one must navigate in order to justify violence. People are likely to be motivated to do violent things if they are in the presence of others who think in similar ways. This is the third N referring to Networks. The 3 N model has been tested by Bélanger et al. (2019). Crucially, Kruglanski et al. link the loss of significance explicitly with Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition, confirming the struggle for recognition as an underlying motivation for radicalizations; brought about by economic, social, or political conditions. This model places misrecognition and grievance at the center of the motivations for radicalization.

Radicalization: A Frame of Reference for Transformative Learning

Radicalization describes a frame of reference as understood by TL; created by a combination of individual life history and the collective sets of ideas and values learned from society and culture. Frames of reference are defined by Mezirow as habitual sets of

Expectations that constitute an orienting frame of reference that we use in projecting our symbolic models and that serves as a (usually tacit) belief system for interpreting and evaluating the meaning of experience. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 42)

Frames of reference have two dimensions: habits of mind and points of view. A habit of mind is a “set of assumptions, broad generalizations, predispositions that filter how we interpret the meaning of experience” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 17). Habits of mind can be socio-linguistic (ideologies, social norms, socialization); moral-ethical (conscience); epistemic (learning styles); philosophical (religious views, world view); psychological (personality traits, or types, repressed parental patterns of behavior); or aesthetic. These give coherence to one’s life and are deeply felt. It seems possible to map the models of radicalization onto at least some of these habits of mind; leading me to suggest that habits of mind (in a way that I cannot find in the TL literature), are suggestive of different models of radicalization. For instance, a sociolinguistic habit of mind might be expressed as an ideological model (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Moghaddam’s (2005) socialization model suggests a socio-linguistic habit of mind.

Habits of mind are expressed as points of view. These are comprised of beliefs, feelings, and attitudes influencing how one makes meaning and in turn they direct courses of action. Being racist is a habit of mind that has corresponding points of view that may involve being resentful, fearful, and suspicious of others from different ethnic backgrounds (Mezirow, 2000). The models of radicalization outlined here are frames of reference (habits of mind) with points of view attached, and are, at least theoretically, open to TL.

Because of the closed nature of radicalized frames of reference, I suggest that approaching the prospect of a transformative learning opportunity is particularly challenging for transformative educators. TL relies heavily on a learner experiencing a disorienting dilemma—even one precipitated by educators. Opportunities for such disorienting experiences are rare and not easily found in the radicalized world. Frames of reference are supported by conspiracy theories, and fake news and in addition, one’s emotional attachment to frames of reference makes radicalization challenging for TL.

Honneth: Linking Recognition and Radicalization

Indignations, grievance, guilt, and shame drive social struggles for recognition and Honneth shows that “modern capitalist societies produce social practices, attitudes, or personality structures that result in a pathological distortion of our capacities for reason” (2009, p. vii). The resulting grievances and search for significance motivate radicalizations.

Honneth (1995) brings recognition, rather than the distorted communication of Habermas, to the center of attention. This builds on the critical theory of Habermas and brings it forward so that misrecognition rather than distorted communications are the pathology of this age. Recognition is the precondition for being a person of significance. We owe to each other reciprocal recognition of every person’s equal worth and value.

Honneth’s work links with previous critical theory by integrating the idea that the socio-economic conditions of capitalism make reciprocal relations of recognition impossible. This is the pathology of our age. It hinders personal development. It is an impediment to democracy. Through its ideological critique, aiming to understand injustices, critical theory informs, motivates, and empowers social action. Struggles for recognition are at the center of the demands of many social movements (Honneth, 1995).

Honneth (1995) outlines three domains in which recognition is given and received across the lifespan. The first, developed through relationships of friendship and love, and in families (especially in the parent child relationship), leads to self-confidence. If this essential ingredient of development is not available or a negative message about self-worth is given, or received, then the outcome is a missing element in the personality that may seek and find “expression through negative emotional reactions of shame or anger, offense or contempt” (Honneth, 1995, p. 257). I suggest that this is given expression through indignation or grievance.

Adult relationships can also be infused with recognition and public affirmations of people’s worth are required. These are developmental. This is Honneth’s most insightful contribution. Individuals are then recognized as autonomous persons with rights and abilities to participate in the discussions of social organizations. Legal rights (e.g., civil rights, gender, disability rights, and ethnic rights) institutionalize the recognition that each owes to another as an autonomous person. Policies and laws constitute this second domain in which recognition is symbolized and actualized. Inequality (Honneth, 1995) involves not only the maldistribution of material resources, but also the unfair and unequal distribution of recognition (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). These misrecognitions fuel radicalizations.

The third form of recognition involves relationships of solidarity with others at work and in communities that enhance self-esteem; as when one is “recognized as a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community” (Honneth, 1997, p. 30). The mark of “a decent society” is one where institutions respect everyone and “each can see him - or herself recognized as a member of the human community” (Honneth, 1997, p. 18).

Social change is driven by experiences of inadequate forms of recognition and the resulting internal experiences of (psychic) conflict. The struggle for recognition drives social development when individuals engage in conflict that asserts the recognition they require, but are denied. This is how the social and personal are connected and accounts for how individuals experience injustice and seek justice. The denial of recognition leads to experiences of inferiority and a “crippling feeling of social shame, from which one can be liberated only through active protest and resistance” (Honneth, 1995, p. 121). The resulting loss of dignity, allied with a basic human need for identity, when denied or frustrated, are the actions that “harm the feeling of being socially significant within a concrete community” (Honneth, 1997, p. 27). A lack of recognition motivates protest and social conflict, as people sense injustices have been done.

Misrecognitions can arise from violations of rights that are framed in laws or in cultural norms that ignore or denigrate ways of life. Abuse, insults, ignoring people, as well as forms of disparagement are injustices that undermine identity (Honneth, 1995). Kruglanski et al. (2019) refer to the loss of significance as a driver of radicalizations. When recognition is given, received, or available, freedom is possible. The process of radicalization taps into experiences of misrecognition but omits any ambition toward equality for everybody and any interest in democracy. All three domains in which respect is experienced can also be locations for disrespect, the loss of significance, and the potential for radicalization.

Freedom and Democracy: Honneth and Dewey on Community-Based Reflexivity

In order to realize social freedom, three conditions are required (Honneth, 2014a). Firstly, individuals must be able to view each other’s freedom as a condition for their own. Secondly, there is validity and persuasive power in institutions that enable and enhance mutual recognitions. Members of a free society are defined as free by their ability to “recognize each other as free citizens” (Honneth, 2014a, p. 261). Thirdly, social freedom involves the expectations and obligations of institutions that must be agreed to by all members in reflexive dialogue (Honneth, 2014a). This mutuality is inconsistent with radicalization.

Freedom is inherently social. One cannot be fully free in some individual way alone but only when individual and social emancipations are connected. This has implications for both radicalization and for understanding TL, when emancipatory learning has a social intent. The most important sphere of social freedom is what Honneth (2014a) calls the “We” of democratic will formation. This is where citizens gather to bring matters of concern to public attention so that their will may be enacted through democratic social action. Honneth builds his theory of democracy as a process where democratic interactions enable citizens to make their lives and conditions better through a process of discourse and democratic will formation.

It is of central importance for this study to understand how Honneth (2007) appropriates John Dewey’s concept of democracy that both call a “reflexive form of community co-operation” (Honneth, 2007, p. 220). Honneth relies on Dewey’s idea that “democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself” (Dewey, 1954, p. 148). Democracy is linked to freedom because human autonomy can only be reached in association with others (Honneth, 2007). Honneth’s appropriation of Dewey, involving community-based reflexivity, is the concept that allows Honneth to outline the concept of a critical democracy. With one eye on Dewey and the other on Honneth’s appropriating work (2007), we can now understand radical democracy as a place where the citizen “grasps procedures of democratic will formation as the rational means by which a cooperatively integrated society attempts to solve its own problems” (Honneth, 2007, pp. 220–221). This cooperative pursuit of ends agreed in collaborative discourse becomes Honneth’s concept of radical or critical democracy.

It may help to recall the earlier story of the partisan band from Doctor Zhivago (Pasternak, 1958) and connect it to a similar story told by Dewey, who writes:

A member of a robber band may express his powers in a way consonant with belonging to that group and be directed by the interest common to its members. But he does so only at the cost of repression of those of his potentialities which can be realized only through membership in other groups. (Dewey, 1954, pp. 147–148)

Robber bands, (or partisans—as in Zhivago) can only act through isolating themselves and only relate to those groups that confirm this isolation. In contrast, according to Dewey, a good citizen finds that what they do as part of a political group is both enriching and enriched by participation in family, work, and other organizations, including artistic associations. Referring to the benefits of engaging in the “give and take of experiences” in a community, Dewey asserts that this leads to the possibility of achieving a “fullness of integrated personality” (1954, p. 148), since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord. In this way, they form habits of action that meet the approval of others in a reference group. It is the repression of needs in the robber bands (and in radicalized groups) that prevents freedom. One is reminded of the narratives and networks, in the 3 Ns model described by Kruglanski et al. (2019).

Honneth finds that Dewey has already developed the notion that conjoint living is an expression of the values of fraternity, liberty, and equality. These are the “marks and traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of a community” (Dewey, 1954, p. 149). Dewey has already defined equality in a manner that Honneth would surely describe as recognition. Equality for Dewey (1954) “denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities” (p. 149). Here, Dewey anticipates Honneth and Honneth concurs.

We are biologically programmed for relationship and through evolutionary biology pre-programed for community. Without making more explicit connections between Honneth and Dewey, without going beyond mentioning Honneth’s The I in We (2014b) that alerts us to these links, we note Honneth agreeing with Dewey that “we are made that way” and the “‘we’ is as inevitable as ‘I’” (Dewey, 1954, p. 151). In Honneth’s view “the intelligence of the solution to emerging problems increases to the degree to which all those involved could, without constraint and with equal rights, exchange information and introduce reflections” (Honneth, 1998, p. 772).

In other words, if citizens are to be motivated to engage in the democratic public sphere as co-operating members of a political community—that is, as agents engaged in the activity of deliberating on common affairs and pursuing common goals—they must already understand themselves as having common affairs and common goals; grounded in the social association of individuals. We cannot deny that misrecognitions have profound implications for democracy.

Referring to Honneth’s exchanges with Nancy Fraser (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) it is clear that the material conditions of people are an essential part of the infrastructure of recognition in society. These conversations make a significant contribution to this current study. Borrowing again from Dewey, Honneth (1998, p. 776) claims that a “just form of the division of labor” produces a common consciousness of ourselves as engaged in a co-operating society oriented to the freedom and welfare of all its members. This is the grounding for a shared civic consciousness, one in which we can come to understand ourselves as members of a political community that is oriented to cooperatively solving social problems. In continuing the work of Habermas, this is achieved through engagements in the democratic public sphere. Considering the current level of industrialization, in order for all citizens to take part in democracy there must be in place a form of “pre-political association” that reminds us of the ideal public sphere (Honneth, 1998, p. 775). This may remind us of how adult education is facilitated and practiced.

Freedom and democracy rely on a just economic system. To that extent ... the “great society” must first be a “great community” before democratic procedures can be comprehended generally as a function of cooperative problem solving (Dewey, 1954, p. 142). Therefore, under conditions of complex, industrialized societies, the revival of democratic publics presupposes a reintegration of society that can only consist in the development of a common consciousness for the “prepolitical association” of all citizens. (Honneth, 1998, p. 776). Individuals can only develop a sense of their own significance by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as a person with positive traits and abilities. The degree to which one can achieve this positive relation increases as recognitions increase in a person’s life.

The prospect of basic self-confidence is inherent in the experience of love; the prospect of self-respect, in the experience of legal recognition; and finally the prospect of self- esteem, in the experience of solidarity. (Honneth, 1995, p. 173)

It is a backward step if this community is achieved “by use of force instead of by the method of communication and enlightenment” (Dewey, 1954, p. 154). For Dewey “an obvious requirement is freedom of social enquiry and distribution of its conclusions” (1954, p. 166). Research, discourse, and a vibrant public sphere are all foundations for democracy. Cooperation increases the chances of intelligent solutions and conclusions. Without procedures that are fully democratic “we will be incapable of resolving social difficulties in intelligent ways” (Honneth, 2007, p. 228). Honneth and Dewey converge on their understanding of democracy.

In identifying possible solutions to the exclusions and grievances that prompt (not justify) radicalizations, Honneth proposes circles of “citizens who, on the basis of a jointly experienced concern, share the conviction that they have to turn to the rest of society in order to exercise administrative control over their relevant interaction” (Honneth, 2007, pp. 229–230). It is the task of the state to “secure the social conditions under which all citizens can articulate their interests without constraint and with equal opportunity” (Honneth, 2007, p. 230). This implies that one of the prime locations for the rise of radicalization (and its resolution) may lie with the state; and its current failures and inability to act democratically. Rationality of solutions is in proportion to the degree to which all who are affected are involved in the process of debate. This is almost impossible in modern societies. Members of society, Honneth (2007, p. 231) concludes, must be able to see in advance that;

through their co-operative actions they were pursuing a common goal, in order then to be able to understand the establishment of democratic institutions of self-organization as a means for finding a political solution to their problems of social coordination.

So Honneth’s claim, in endorsing Dewey’s position, is that a just social and economic system acts to produce a common understanding of ourselves as engaged in a co-operating society that is interested and concerned to increase the freedom and welfare of all. Democracy is not only a just and fair discourse, and it must be based on a fully functioning state, and a just society that continually engages in fixing problems through a democratic public sphere. A political and educational response to radicalization involves the individual, the community, and society—including the economy.

As I have suggested, in a world of great inequalities there remains ample room for grievance. But this work by Honneth (and indeed Dewey) proposes the institutionalization of justice, fairness, and solidarity in society, in community, and in all relationships. There is a right to meaningful work and the need to restrict wealth accumulation. The struggles for worker’s rights and a regulated workplace with safety, gender equality, and social welfare have not yet been realized. Honneth, by seeking a broader vision of democracy, involving not just the political sphere but emancipated families and socialized markets (Honneth, 2014a), goes beyond Habermas. The realization of freedom in any of the domains of individual, community, and society, depends on its realization in the others as emancipated families, democratic citizens and ethical markets mutually depend on each other. This paper goes beyond the obvious suggestion that interventions might be made at micro, meso, and macro levels, by clarifying the interdependent and dialectic nature of the interrelationships between the three spheres. The properties of one “cannot be realized without the other two” (Honneth, 2014a, p. 330). This builds on the embodied listening work of Romano et al. (2024) and of Kokkos and Fleming (2024) on the social imagination. People are free when they see others as necessary conditions for their own freedom, experience mutual recognition and, importantly, a “need for completion” by others (Honneth, 2014a, pp. 44–45). Social freedom is different to more individual versions of freedom that are valorized by society and capitalism with its competitive and self-interested values (Fleming, 2016). This integrated vision of freedom that could inform public policy, offers a counter to the radicalizations that respond to legitimate grievance and loss of significance. This version of TL offers at its core an interest in bringing about transformative individual, community, and social change. Learning (and teaching) for the development of the “we” of democratic discourse becomes a vital task for education and a necessary one for transformative learning.

This is important, as understanding radicalization shares with TL a number of areas of interest, such as the motivating influences of social pathologies, an interest in bringing about social change, the importance of ideologies and cognitive openings. But how they diverge is decisive. Traditionally, critical theory is interested in rational critique, procedural views of reason and justice and inclusive deliberative democracy. Radicalizations bring to the table closed, exclusive and imposed versions of reality—certainly not democratic. From Dewey, continuing through Habermas and Honneth there is a consistent opting for what Dewey calls intelligence as a way of bringing about social change; in contrast to force or violent revolution. “The question is whether force or intelligence is to be the method upon which we consistently rely and to whose promotion we devote our energies” (Dewey, 2000, p. 80).

The basic human needs referred to in the 3N model of Kruglanski et al. (2019) include needs that are essential for psychological development, human safety, love, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. Kruglanski et al. (2019, p. 42) explicitly link the quest for significance with Honneth’s struggle for recognition. The implication I draw from this for education involves providing democracy, more of it, and opportunities for significance and recognition, especially through community activities. This paper has identified state, community, and individual dimensions to the responses to radicalizations.

Even among those who are being recruited for a process of radicalization there seems to be an interest that transcends individual lives and has some (distorted) concern for social selves. Whether we like it or not, we are primarily social—and community—beings. The basic need for dignity and self-esteem, so accurately outlined in theoretical terms by both Kruglanski et al. and Honneth, are difficult to overestimate as part of the motivation to become radicalized.

I recall how John Meacham (2022) introduces his biography of Abraham Lincoln—a man not of moral perfection but defined by his struggle to do what was right for his country. Meacham (2022) points to the work of Lincoln as one that illustrates;

That progress comes when Americans recognize that all, and not just some, possess common rights and are due common respect….If the rights of others are sacrosanct, then so are yours. (p. xix)

At this point in our study, nothing captures the task of this moment quite like Lincoln’s words in 1863 at Gettysburg. Lincoln rooted his speech and his vision of America in the Declaration of Independence (rather than the American Constitution) by recalling it as: “Four score and seven years ago…” (Meacham, 2022, p. 312). America, in the Declaration of Independence was “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” (Meacham, 2022, p. 312). The immediate reactions to his address were partisan, as they would be now one suspects. But Lincoln gave voice to an ideal. This paper, though no Gettysburg address, has given full expression to an ideal too. We must now turn to practicalities and compromises; distinguishing “the arc of history” from when and how it “bends toward justice” (Meacham, 2022, p. xx).

Transformative Learning

Struggles for recognition are examples of disorienting dilemmas that involve whether to stay in a world circumscribed by experiences of misrecognition and insignificance or respond to deeply experienced struggles for recognition by addressing perplexities, that in turn prompt learning. The process of TL begins when individuals experience a dilemma that disorients them or that leads to perplexity—when existing frames of reference are experienced as problematic. It motivates the search for new meaning schemes, identities, and self-relation.

TL (Mezirow, 1991) also involves the awareness that one’s problems are shared by others and are not just one’s individual experience. Honneth agrees. The shared nature of individual problems and experiences is not just a useful step toward transformation, but an essential aspect of knowing and understanding problems that trigger transformative learning. Personal problems are necessarily connected to broader social issues and transformative learning becomes personal, communal, and social (Fleming, 2016). The personal is indeed political; the political is personal. Transformative learning necessarily involves making these connections. They are epistemologically connected.

The argument being made here contrasts the process of socialization, ideologies, and transformation offered by radicalization with those offered by TL. Radicalization offers self-destruction, an ideology immune to critique, leading to socialization into a closed world view. TL is inclusive, open to new perspectives, and offers democracy and emancipation through self-transformation, community transformation and social transformation. The recognitions offered by radicalization are instrumental; true recognition is not. There are differences too in the way reason is understood. The procedural view of reason and justice, the understanding of democracy, and freedom are all concepts on which radicalization has contrary views to those of the critical theory tradition and of a transformative vision of learning.

Conclusions

Transformative educators ought to have at their disposal a complex matrix of understanding radicalization on which can be built an equally complex matrix of learning responses (see Romano et al., 2024). No glib, superficial, one-dimensional answers will suffice. No understanding of policy interventions, such as lifelong learning, that are not at least as complex as radicalization will be good enough. But the main elements of an educational response are available in general and also in more specific terms. In general, a redefining of resocialization processes is required; recognition must inspire not only the responses but infuse the entire political, economic, community, social and educational system. Nothing less than the transformation of the economic and social order is required. It was always so. Narrow legal and security responses alone, though essential for public safety and security, will ultimately not work. We might learn from the radicalization process that resocialization, transformation, new ideologies of equality, justice and care are needed; that promise and deliver real freedoms.

Teaching informed by a process of mutual recognition (and listening) between teacher and learner has the potential to strengthen identity development. With the current emphasis on functional learning, competency, and behavioral outcomes in education, and a neo-liberal inspired valorization of markets as the ultimate supplier of all needs, TL takes these ideas seriously. The contribution of intersubjectivity (and community relationships) are important for teaching and learning and are antidotes to dominant models. The motivation to engage in learning becomes less economic, functional and instrumental and more communicative, social and potentially truly transformative and emancipatory; because it is infused with recognition. This is achieved not just by an emphasis on critical reflection but on the always presupposed imperative of recognition.

A democratic discursive society requires the reciprocal recognition provided through work and solidarities. Habermas (1989) implies that (adult) education is part of the system that teaches (steers) the lifeworld but unfortunately, does not easily produce publics engaged in critical debate. Calhoun (1992) alerts us to the “depoliticization of the public sphere and its impoverishment by removal of critical discourse” (p. 24). This is in line with Honneth’s proposal for reforming society, implying that all of society becomes a learning society.

Transformative learning is best supported by interactions that are not only respectful but that explicitly recognize the individual worth of each individual along with their aspirations, and dreams that prompt their struggles for recognition and significance. Transformative education then becomes a learning project with the practical intent of increasing freedom, justice, care, and equality in the spheres of family, law and work. Without mutual recognition, there can be no critical reflection. Recognition needs to be nurtured, carefully and attentively in all the arenas in which it can be delivered. It can be learned. It is learned. It is an antidote to radicalization and the basis of all important learning—especially TL.

Arthur Miller in his plays and other writings explored the tragic feeling evoked in us when loss of dignity threatens identity itself. He frequently puts his audience in the presence of a character who is ready to put his life aside, if necessary, to secure just one thing: his sense of personal dignity. Willy Loman, the salesman in Death of a Salesman (Miller, 2008), expresses the shame (and exhaustion) that he feels at the loss of dignity. His wife Linda expresses a clear sense of the need for recognition when pleading with their sons to show their father respect:

I don’t say he’s a great man. Willy Loman never made a lot of money. His name was never in the paper. He’s not the finest character that ever lived. But he’s a human being, and a terrible thing is happening to him. So, attention must be paid. He’s not to be allowed to fall into his grave like an old dog. Attention, attention must be finally paid to such a person. (Miller, 2008, p. 44)

Whether Doctor Zhivago or Death of a Salesman, or Abraham Lincoln, literature and history are populated with narratives of misrecognition and its consequences. It cannot be beyond our imaginations to respond.

The experiences in Dundalk many years ago seem to be a confident exercise in what TL has to offer. I am surprised that the inclusive nature of the conversations and the commitment to discuss and discuss until agreements are reached is a pre-Honneth way of exercising the liberating potential of recognition. It was, however, not without a reputable ancestry in Dewey and indeed in Freire. It did not solve everything, on those occasions, but much of the peace process in Northern Ireland followed the model of mutual respect and recognition—not an easy process following the killings of a civil war. The arc of history may be long and the hope and task of the educator—the transformative educator—is to “bend that arc toward justice” (Meacham, 2002, p. xx)