From Theory to Practice: A Study of Remotely Managed Localised Humanitarian Action in Syria

Localisation Theory and Practice

The stated goal of the international humanitarian system is to reduce loss of life and suffering, build resilience, prevent conflicts, and promote peace and development (United Nations [UN], n.d.). Yet the system contains inherent contradictions and has long faced growing calls for major reform (Stoddard et al., 2015). At the onset of new crises, the arrival of international relief actors often leaves a “heavy footprint” on affected societies when a large number of foreign staff rapidly enter and a myriad of international NGOs compete to achieve the same goals, leading to duplication of effort (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). This top-down, centralised international aid system that responds to the latest crisis hotspot delivers short-term results, but practitioners and donors increasingly consider it unsustainable, ineffective, and at best neglecting building local capacities whilst at worse corroding pre-existing local capacity (Tanner & Moro, 2016). Furthermore, critics hold that the system is poorly structured and over-centralised, encouraging competition rather than collaboration, and hence incapable of financing or operationally responding to increasing global humanitarian needs (Stoddard et al., 2015).

In part as a response to these critiques and observable defects in international aid system, a growing global movement is calling for locally led humanitarian responses. Humanitarian actors and scholars argue for a paradigm shift in the concept of the system, its standards, and its implementation modalities. The conceptual argument promotes humanitarian aid “as local as possible and only as international as necessary” as an industry best practice (Wall & Hedlund, 2016). Its advocates believe “a locally-led response has the advantage of better access and deeper networks with affected people, a better understanding of the history and cultural and geopolitical specificities of the area and—as local actors are often themselves affected—a personal understanding of what needs to be done” (El Taraboulsi et al., 2016, p. 2).

The concept has an expansive definition, and its use has been associated with varying approaches and activities. Wall and Hedlund (2016) broadly define localisation as “all projects and initiatives that work with local actors.” It includes the engagement of various local parties including local communities and local organisations that respond to the humanitarian needs of their affected population. It takes multiple forms such as increased direct funding of local organisations, the centralisation of aid coordination, and remote management, amongst others (Wall & Hedlund, 2016). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2017) elaborates that “it is a process of recognizing, respecting and strengthening the leadership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations and to prepare national actors for future humanitarian responses.” It therefore requires a shift in power relations between recipients and donors. Donors should transfer to local actors the responsibility to plan, make decisions, monitor resources, and implement projects for recipients (De Geoffroy & Grunewald, 2017, p. 1).

Localisation has proven functional, cost-effective, and, at times, necessary to deliver humanitarian operations. Recent trends show that local people and organisations are almost invariably the first responders at the centre of relief operations. El Taraboulsi et al. (2016) argue that “regional actors, national governments and local communities are becoming more central players in humanitarian action, with an increasing number of countries expanding their capacity to respond without international assistance.” Local organisations have rescued thousands of people after the earthquake in Nepal, set up evacuation centres in response to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu, and operated on the front line of the Syrian conflict (Wall & Hedlund, 2016).

Crisis-affected countries are increasingly resisting and sometimes blocking international humanitarian response in favour of more locally led engagement, which they deem more trustworthy and legitimate (El Taraboulsi et al., 2016). Sudan is a notable example and also India, which initially rejected international assistance following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and Mozambique, which successfully responded to floods in 2007. In addition, “the UN and international NGOs struggled to access affected populations” during the 2011 Kachin internal displacement crisis in Myanmar (cited in El Taraboulsi et al., 2016).

Despite the long-standing discourse and advocacy of leaders in the global humanitarian field, there is an important disconnect between theory and practice (Development Initiatives, 2017). An example of the highly limited movement towards the stated common goal of localisation is that only a fraction of funding directly reaches local NGOs: “local and national responders directly received just two per cent of international humanitarian assistance in 2016. Local and national NGOs combined directly received just 0.3 per cent of total reported international humanitarian assistance” (Development Initiatives, 2017). Funding for localisation still lags far behind the rhetoric. The international humanitarian community has therefore organised initiatives setting out ambitious goals to invest in and prioritise local capacities for emergency response as an essential objective of the international humanitarian system. The 2017 Charter for Change encourages the international humanitarian community to forge true partnerships between local and international systems, whilst the Grand Bargain is an agreement between the largest international donors, which outlines modalities that can increase the amount of aid that reaches beneficiaries (ICVA, 2017, p. 4).

Armed conflict settings necessitate the RML modality to access areas with the most vulnerable and affected populations (Donini & Maxwell, 2013, p. 387). Given the nature and complexity of operating in conflict-affected areas, it is considerably challenging, if not impossible, for international actors to deliver timely humanitarian relief in high-security zones that are restricted by the government or hostile factions and impose security and logistical constraints on international NGO operations. International NGOs therefore collaborate with local actors who are familiar with the culture of the affected population and are accepted by local communities and can therefore access difficult areas to deliver aid (Department for International Development [DFID], 2015, p. 6; Herbert, 2013, p. 2). Once considered a temporary measure and only used as a “last resort,” remote management has recently become a standard or semi-permanent modality adopted in many locations including Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Angola, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Chechnya, and Pakistan (Howe et al., 2015, p. 31). RML allows international humanitarian NGOs to access hard-to-reach areas during conflict, react rapidly to sudden crises, gain greater acceptance by local communities, identify security threats, and quickly determine needs (;Hofman & Pérache, 2014). International NGOs rarely discuss the fact that localisation protects their expatriate staff from the same dangers that local teams face. Deploying expatriate staff to dangerous zones for longer periods incurs high remuneration and insurance costs. That localised approaches largely avoid these high costs is a push factor for the increasing use of localisation. There is a tendency for international remote managers to rely on local implementers without investing in their technical and human capital whilst holding their performance to the international standard. Observation reveals that this is a double standard that serves the financial interests of international NGOs and limits their liability.

Existing literature sheds light on shortcomings including the limited technical, managerial, and administrative capacities of local staff (Tanner & Moro, 2016); inability or unwillingness of local staff and organisations to adhere to international humanitarian standards and principles (Howe et al., 2015, p. 31); local NGOs having weak financial and human capacity to meet the needs of affected populations, especially in protracted conflicts (Tanner & Moro, 2016); poor or non-existent supervision and accountability mechanisms when crises occur in local NGOs; and the struggle of established international NGOs to rapidly scale up their procedures to meet humanitarian needs (Tanner & Moro, 2016). To manage and respond effectively to needs, there is great need to mitigate these obstacles. This is due to the limited resources and inadequate available organisational capacity and expertise (Howe et al., 2015, p. 31).

International NGOs and their staff have several comparative advantages over local NGOs and staff as relief actors. International staff are familiar with humanitarian principles and standards and have professional training, prior work experience, and exposure. In addition, as outsiders, international staff are less prone to being influenced by local dynamics. On the other hand, local actors are the first responders to humanitarian crises, as they are invariable already in the field and aware of the needs. In contrast to temporarily posted international staff, local workers are a permanent fixture and are themselves part of the humanitarian context. They possess a more in-depth and fine-grained understanding of context, are culturally sensitive, speak the local language(s), and can more easily navigate the local environment (Gingerich, 2015, p. 18).

Compelling though this social capital is, international organisations have major concerns about the lack of neutrality and impartiality of local staff (Stoddard et al., 2010, p. 27). Religious, ethnic, and political affiliations and identities in addition to class and power relations play a role in their interactions in the domestic context. Local humanitarian aid workers are frequently alleged to hold preferences and biases towards their sects or social groups (Gingerich, 2015, p. 22; Tsitrinbaum, 2012, pp. 26–27). Family members and local communities often expect that aid delivery should prioritise them, with local organisations tending to operate on social relations and beliefs, prioritising areas where they share a social connection (Schreter & Harmer, 2013, pp. 38–39).

Localisation as Applied in Syria

Now in its ninth year of conflict, Syria remains one of the world’s most severe and complex humanitarian crises. Since violence broke out in March 2011, approximately 13.1 million people in Syria have needed humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, 2018c). There are 5.6 million people in acute need of life-saving humanitarian aid, 6.6 million people internally displaced, 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees in the Middle East and North African region, and some 413,000 people who live in besieged locations (UNOCHA, 2018c). Civilians in Syria continue to face multiple crises in addition to lack of, or ineffective, humanitarian support including protection; socio-economic vulnerabilities; limited access to basic essential services such as water, sanitation and hygiene, and education and health; and limited humanitarian space in which international humanitarian actors can operate. Armed conflict parties exercise de facto control of various areas and checkpoints and have the power to either grant or deny access to aid workers or aid shipments to conflict-affected areas (Analysis for Economic Decisions [ADE] and Urgency Rehabilitation Development [URD], 2016, p. 4; Schlein, 2017). During conflict, humanitarian NGOs often must negotiate access with hostile factions; however, this contact is often perceived by state governments as collaboration with terrorist groups.

When the Syrian state denied international agencies access to Syria or surrounding regions, some international NGOs entered illegally and began delivering relief (Tahhan, 2016)—a violation of humanitarian principles that places practitioners in peril. To do so, they collaborated with civilians or armed nonstate actors who gave them the necessary logistical and technical support in addition to access (Howe et al., 2015, pp. 24–25; Schlein, 2017). These partnerships gave local groups de facto international legitimacy by association (Schlein, 2017). For local NGOs, the desire to receive this perceived legitimacy comes at the high cost of endangering local staff.

Given the high-risk context within Syria, the international community sanctioned cross-border relief operations on the Turkish–Syrian border. The UN Security Council Resolution 2165 allowed UN agencies and humanitarian actors to “use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings” in 2014 to supply relief within Syria (United Nations Security Council, 2014, p. 3). Resolution 2165 stipulates that aid should be transported at four fixed border crossings, the Syrian State be informed but need not consent, and UN monitors must verify that shipments contain only humanitarian aid.

The cross-border operations have supplied approximately a third of net relief to Syrian beneficiaries since 2017 (Ibid.), making it an indispensable method for UN agencies and NGOs to ensure aid reaches those in need (Hayes, 2016, pp. 52–53). However, fast-shifting alliances, strict state policies, and territory held by hostile groups have made it increasingly difficult and risky for international NGOs to reach populations in besieged and restricted areas. There are some shortcomings to this approach: Although localising humanitarian assistance has been relatively successful, especially in the latter years of the conflict, relief has been mainly allocated by local staff based on cultural, tribal, and other allegiances instead of level of need—in direct violation of humanitarian principles. In addition, international organisations have been heavily criticised for endangering the lives of local staff (Donini & Maxwell, 2013).

Syria represents a good case study from which to judge the validity and efficacy of the RML modality for humanitarian relief. The intensity of the conflict and consequent huge scale of humanitarian needs, the proliferation of NGOs and donors, the constantly changing reality on the ground, and shifting geopolitical dynamics all combine to create a difficult context for RML. Syria has thus been selected as a case study based on the theoretical assumption that if RML can succeed in such a challenging context, then there is a greater likelihood of success in a less challenging emergency.

Syria is also an important case study of RML due to the Syrian war leading to a regional crisis and massive remote management response from Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq—making the Syrian response a learning curve for RML in which new approaches and modalities have been trialled in real time. Whilst offering some unique characteristics, the case study also shares similarities with other crisis contexts, for instance, shortcomings in localisation including corruption, allegations of support for terrorist organisations, and the exchange of sex for humanitarian aid.

Findings and Discussion

The interviewees attest to the success of localisation by the sheer volume of relief delivered in Syria, which was overwhelmingly conducted by local staff and local NGOs. Local efforts were indispensable in making relief efforts possible. ² A glimpse of the most recent statistics on life-saving and early recovery aid shows the scale achieved in reaching approximately 13.1 million Syrians in need. In 2017 alone, 12 million health treatments were distributed, 27 million medical interventions were provided, 7.3 million people were provided protection services such as risk mitigation and capacity-building activities, an average of 5.2 million people a month received food aid, and 5 million people received emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) assistance (UNOCHA, 2018b). These statistics are strong process indicators, but they do not necessarily show the impact and outcomes of the relief provided. Findings show that local actors need technical training on monitoring and evaluation methods from remote managers and international NGOs. This monitoring and evaluation training will improve the ability of local staff to evaluate the outcome and long-term impact of activities. Without this key training, local NGOs lack the hard skills to improve project design and implementation.

In light of the successful process indicators shown, the authors discuss challenges that have emerged from key informants that have also been noted in other crisis contexts including Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq where RML is present. In the following section, the authors focus the discussion on the main findings of the key informant interviews. The conclusions of those interviews have been triangulated by recruiting staff from local and international NGOs of different types (community based, religious based, diaspora), NGOs working from inside Syria, from bordering states, and different hierarchical positions within these organisations.

Adherence to International Humanitarian Principles and Standards

Local actors are “sceptical” about humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. ³ As Schenkenberg (2016) asserts, “it is not realistic to expect them to be neutral and independent in the realities they operate in. War, when it occurs in one’s own country, one takes sides or, at least, is perceived to be taking sides.” This is most evident when the other side does not observe the rules of war. In interviews with local staff, it was found that the “White Helmets”—unarmed, voluntary rescue workers in Syria—although neutral, only operated in non-Syrian government–controlled areas. ⁴ One significant emergent finding from the key informant interviews was the outright refusal of local NGO staff to deliver aid to areas and groups they believed had harmed them and their community during the conflict. These staff members sought to justify their unwillingness by arguing that they “already have enough humanitarian aid reaching those areas.” ⁵ Findings show that local humanitarian staff struggle to remain impartial and neutral in conflict scenarios, given that they are also directly affected by the violence. Local staff in Syria face social pressures to favour certain groups and so tend to violate neutrality and impartiality. ⁶ Schreter and Harmer (2013) argue that solidarity and feelings of loyalty to their own people motivated preferential actions by organisations. There were many reasons leading local groups or individuals to not adhere to humanitarian principles including intentional (an active decision to help a particular group only), unconscious (culturally normalised patterns of exclusion), and fear of reprisals. A Syrian country director of a local NGO shared that:

As the country director, I am a community leader and it is difficult for our NGO to provide relief to other groups that are in direct opposition to our community’s political affiliation. I answer to the wishes of my community who would consider it problematic to deliver relief to people we consider [to be] our opposition. I have received training on the principles of impartiality, neutrality but applying the principles would present problems for me and my staff.

Well-established and exacting international humanitarian standards, such as Sphere (Global Humanitarian Standards Partnership, 2016) and the Core Humanitarian Standard, are passed on to local actors (Bloom & Betts, 2013). Local organisations may be familiar with potentially cost-effective and novel solutions to problems; however, these “out of the box” ideas often do not adhere to international humanitarian standards (Bloom & Betts, 2013). Local staff who have received humanitarian standards training have genuinely been attempting to implement them, but many operate under the assumption that humanitarian relief should try to serve the largest number of possible beneficiaries. ¹⁰ For example, in establishing a refugee temporary shelter, a local NGO planned to place different families in the same rooms, in vacant schools, disregarding the beneficiaries’ culture and minimum privacy standards. Similarly, a local NGO violated Sphere standards by settling refugee camps too close to each other, due to lack of knowledge. ¹¹ Local NGOs that are aware of standards face a dilemma in the field regarding whether to respect societal cultural and power dynamics or to follow international standards (Mierop, 2016). Lack of experience, resources, and time may justify nonadherence to quality standards.

Acceptance by Communities

Local actors, unlike international organisations, are often perceived by local communities as more neutral and impartial in polarised conflict situations, which may enable them to access locations and affected communities that governments and international organisations cannot reach (Gingerich, 2015, p. 19). Local aid workers are often the only ones allowed to enter active conflict zones, for instance, local Syrian aid workers who are viewed by affected communities as less threatening, more trustworthy, and independent of foreign agendas. ¹² In support, it is argued that local staff have a sincere desire to alleviate the suffering of their people, which can make them more determined humanitarian responders. ¹³ International NGOs must recruit locals in order to complete needs assessments as affected populations refuse to work with outsiders. ¹⁴ Locals are readily available and on the ground at the onset of the crisis whilst international staff are often unable to work in areas classified as dangerous. International NGOs were reluctant to send foreign staff to Isis-controlled areas even after areas were freed from fighters, for fear that, vacated areas had been booby-trapped and mined, but local organisations swiftly filled the gap and delivered relief. Due to security concerns, the vast majority of relief work during the war was conducted by local NGOs. ¹⁵ Local NGOs have many trustworthy human social networks that international staff may not have access to and that can provide essential updates and warnings on the security situation. ¹⁶

Local Capacity Challenges

Local staff have a competitive advantage over their international counterparts in understanding the context and magnitude of the needs of conflict-affected populations. This was confirmed by a programme manager in a local Syrian humanitarian NGO, who states that local NGOs understand and know the context, needs, and suffering that are happening in real time on the ground and, as such, are more able to design a more impactful response plan. However, he points out that local NGOs must build their capacity. ¹⁷ Supporting local organisations directly can help build the capacity of local staff and subsequently involve them in decision making (DFID, 2015, p. 15). International NGOs do not typically prioritise capacity building in NGOs or individuals; a humanitarian manager for an international NGO adds:

There is a culture within international NGOs of relying on foreign decision makers, and a lack of institutional will to foster and invest in creating genuine local leaders. Capacity building is largely lip service from international NGOs. Local staff are systematically put in support positions, whereas, directors and co-directors of local organisations are foreigners. Local staff remain in supporting positions because they are not given proper or sufficient training by international NGOs to empower them and enable them to take top positions in those organisations.

Confidence in Accountability

International humanitarian actors are generally more accountable to their donors than to their beneficiaries (Gingerich, 2015, p. 20). There are opposing viewpoints on the relationship between localisation of humanitarian aid and accountability, with one position holding that it increases the accountability of local organisations towards donors and others arguing that it weakens the accountability of local organisations to international donors or NGOs (Abdulkadir, 2017). Increased local capacity and physical distance from international systems can lessen the need for local NGOs to report and adhere to international accountability standards and mechanisms (Abdulkadir, 2017). An international manager in Turkey notes weak accountability of local NGOs to international NGOs due to their limited management and technical capacity and the difficult conditions on the ground. Local NGOs have poor accountability to both donors and beneficiaries, forcing international NGOs to hire international monitoring and evaluation staff to fill the gap. ¹⁸ However, other respondents disagree, finding local actors more accountable to beneficiaries. The fact remains that local organisations often lack a comprehensive guideline and evaluation mechanism. The international community’s distrust of local organisations, and the inability of donors to verify needs assessment and evaluation reports conducted by local staff in high-security zones, has led donors to regard such reports as less credible (Donini & Maxwell, 2014, p. 12).

Due to the conflict, Syrian NGOs needed to exponentially increase their services; however, their capacity to monitor and evaluate their operations has not scaled up as fast. Another respondent, by contrast, argues that there are local NGOs with no difficulties in monitoring and evaluating aid. Given that local NGOs are members of local councils and are cognizant of population shifts, they are able to conduct accurate monitoring and evaluation reports. Geo-positioning technology in addition to verification by local staff ensures that deliveries are made as planned and reach targeted beneficiaries. ¹⁹ This allows for triangulation between remote managers, on-the-ground managers, and operations.

However, given increasing institutional corruption and the absence of effective monitoring, donors lack trust in accountability and transparency measures in local organisations and are often reluctant to fund their projects (Howe et al., 2015, p. 34; Schreter & Harmer, 2013, p. 32). It is also argued that local NGOs have weak administrative and financial capacity. ²⁰

Humanitarianism–Development Nexus

The humanitarianism–development nexus should, theoretically, link relief activities to early recovery and eventual sustainable development (De Geoffroy & Grunewald, 2017, p. 7). Yet local actors often lack the human and material capacity and committed long-term funds to undertake early recovery and development initiatives (De Geoffroy & Grunewald, 2017, p. 7); therefore, localisation may weaken the relief to the development nexus, compared to international NGO direct work. A practitioner who finds that Syrian local NGOs lack the institutional knowledge and expertise to manage large-scale early recovery initiatives confirms this. ²¹ The fast-changing dynamics of conflict and lack of security are not conducive to local NGOs planning and prioritising development initiatives. Notably, at the start of the Syrian conflict, local NGOs were exclusively humanitarian but have over the years evolved to incorporate a development focus including projects in agriculture, health, education, and road construction. ²² In contrast, it is argued “the link between relief and development in local NGOs is stronger than that of INGOs because more innovative solutions (agriculture, jobs, and women’s initiatives) can be found given that they are not constrained by donor specifications.” ²³ Local NGOs do have creative development solutions, but they lack the human and financial capacity to successfully implement long-term projects. ²⁴

Tensions Between International and Local

There is a perceived and often real difference in how local staff and their international counterparts are treated and compensated. Salaries and allowances paid to local staff, for instance, are far more modest than those of international staff (Denskus, 2017). The authors find that the markedly lower salary range of local staff for comparable work fuels resentment and prevents real collaboration between local and international actors. A programme manager with an international NGO working inside Syria shared the following:

In Syria, I have seen the important difference in salary between local and international staff. Often times the local staff member is completing similar tasks and has similar responsibilities compared with expatriates but their salary and title is usually one third of their international colleagues. Furthermore, I have often noticed that local staff lack the support to take decisions.

The fundamental organisational model of NGOs is antithetical to, and in competition with, pre-existing community organisations. This is a structural weakness in the global humanitarian system, which almost exclusively respects formalised NGOs as valid humanitarian and development actors. Respondents argued the global long-term impact of humanitarian financing would be far greater if the system as a whole was willing to collaborate with local organic community organisations instead of creating formalised NGOs in their stead. Furthermore, findings validate an argument that the NGO model systematically erodes pre-existing informal social security networks. NGOs are put in direct competition with these social security networks by creating two parallel networks that work towards similar goals but with little collaboration between them.

Recommendations by local staff to international NGOs and donors are often disregarded and considered unreliable or unsound. This is apparent in international response plans, in which local staff conduct needs assessment reports and suggest appropriate budgets, only to be ignored by international NGOs and donors. This behaviour propagates bitterness and frustration amongst local staff who perceive their professional opinion to be discounted by international staff.

Regarding competition for funding, respondents agree that international NGOs have a competitive advantage over local NGOs when applying for funding from pooled funds. Respondents shared that local NGOs are in direct competition with multinational NGOs, which is an unjust system. Several respondents recommended remedying this unjust competition and assuring financing finally reaches local NGOs by creating institutional funds dedicated to local NGOs. This is an interesting proposition that could be a significant step towards realising one of the goals of the Grand Bargain: Twenty-five percent of global relief funding reaches local actors. International NGOs, with their institutional knowledge and capacity, are more likely to be awarded grants. Local NGOs operating in this international funding structure, by contrast, are only catching up to their international counterparts because they lack grant application, writing, language, and administrative skills. One respondent notes that in response to complaints by local NGOs, UNOCHA adjusted the minimum requirements for local NGOs working in Syria.

Another notable feature of localising humanitarian response is the large scale of unpaid local responders and local organisations that work on a voluntary basis. These responders are motivated by their sense of social responsibility to help their affected community in a systematic, coordinated way that has a positive impact (Wall & Hedlund, 2016). The authors’ findings confirm this volunteer phenomenon, where local volunteers and low-paid young staff create a wide network of willing and energetic responders with a diverse skill set, which is an asset to operations. The advantages of localisation, such as access to conflict areas, lower costs, and acceptance by the community, are countered by drawbacks of the modality such as the ethical and legal implications of transferring decision making from international NGOs to RML operations.

Ethical Dilemma

Transfer of Decision Making and Risk

According to Tsitrinbaum (2012, p. 33),

the legal concept of duty of care presumes organisations are responsible for their employees’ well-being and must take practical steps to mitigate foreseeable workplace dangers…. It is accepted by some scholars that technically, duty of care of INGOs does not extend to their implementing partners.

Humanitarian organisations that operate in conflict areas must negotiate with hostile groups to secure access and ensure staff safety, presenting a legal and ethical dilemma for international NGOs, which can be legally held responsible for aiding terrorist groups, and ethical violation of humanitarian principles of impartiality (Steets, Reichhold & Sagmeister, 2012). ²⁶ The authors find that a major challenge facing localisation is that legal and ethical dilemmas are transferred to local NGOs, putting them in the precarious position of being subject to prosecution or loss of credibility. The emphasis on localisation of humanitarian response may allow resources to be channelled to terrorist or criminal organisations (OECD, 2017, p. 15), and local humanitarian groups may be more susceptible to threats and extortion by terrorist or criminal organisations (Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013). One respondent confirms that localisation, particularly concerning small NGOs, increases the risk of humanitarian aid reaching terrorist or criminal groups, observing that larger local NGOs are less likely to associate with such groups, because they must meet OCHA funding requirements. ²⁷

Local NGO staff live in the area and have families who could be coerced by armed groups to cooperate in order to gain access to resources (OECD, 2017, p. 15). In addition, weaker accounting and lower security standards may allow terrorist or armed groups to steal from local humanitarian groups (OECD, 2017, p. 15). An interviewee adds that local cluster-specific organisations are less likely to engage with terrorist and criminal groups. ²⁸ The authors find that local aid workers sometimes perceive engaging with terrorist and criminal groups as the cost of doing business in high-risk conflict areas. One senior aid official offered the example of an NGO sharing a portion of humanitarian packages when they arrive at checkpoints held by such groups, ²⁹ which local staff do not report to their “remote” manager. This is countered by respondents who find that Syrian NGOs do not engage with terrorist or criminal groups, as they are fully aware of the implications of working with them. However, given the de facto power dynamics that favour armed groups, local NGOs realise they need to negotiate arrangements with these powerful groups.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the importance of localisation in general and remote management in particular, in delivering humanitarian aid in conflict situations, examining its application in Syria to show the possible application in conflict-affected contexts. RML has been presented as a necessary modality to provide sufficient relief operations in conflict situations. Relief in Syria has been largely conducted by local actors. The Syrian case study has demonstrated the necessity of collaborating with local actors and organisations, investing in building their capacities, and including them in decision-making and planning processes. Local actors have a comparative advantage over international actors, most importantly: local acceptance, in-depth understanding of the changing context of the conflict and needs of affected populations, access to areas out of reach for international actors, and as first responders on the ground during the onset of emergencies.

A gap exists between the theory and practice of remote management, especially in conflict-affected areas, which this article finds to be resulting from several dynamics including international NGOs having no direct access to beneficiaries; the limited organisational and operational skills of local NGOs; lack of supervision and accountability mechanisms, reinforced by the weak desire of international NGOs to invest in genuine capacity building of local actors; and the unequal treatment of international NGO staff and local staff, especially in terms of pay and security measures. Lessons learned from Syria with regards to remote management are neither new nor unique; similar situations in other countries have dealt with the same challenges addressed in this article. To avoid ineffective and unprincipled localised humanitarian responses in conflict situations, the authors suggest a sea change in the mechanisms and schemes used at global and local levels is necessary. A genuine investment is needed in building the technical capacities of local actors, treating them as equal partners instead of subcontractors, and providing local staff with the necessary security measures.