Assessing the theory of change in national strategies

Abstract

The theory of change links a strategy’s theory about the source of the conflict and the intervention philosophy to the implementation of programs and activities in the field. This paper focuses on strategic assessment at the national level, a step above the operational assessment at the departmental or agency level. The paper first discusses the importance of understanding a strategy’s theory of change and how policymakers at the national level think about the problem and how to intervene. The paper uses counterterrorism and conflict resolution strategy as examples. The author discusses two special challenges: how policymakers frame the desired outcome, and multiple theories. The author argues for strategic assessment officers to discuss a strategy’s theory or theories of change so that policymakers and national-level leaders can better understand how different theories drive their intervention plans and strategies. By improving policymakers’ understanding of their theory of change, and improve the clarity of the desired outcomes, strategic assessment officers can better measure the effectiveness of national-level strategies.

Keywords

Strategic assessment evaluation measures of effectiveness national security terrorism counterterrorism conflict resolution operations assessment theory of change

1. Introduction

An inherent tension exists between national-level strategic plans and assessments of their effectiveness. National strategies are largely political documents written by an administration, often in collaboration with the interagency. In order to conduct an objective assessment of its effectiveness, a strategy needs to contain a clear description of the desired long-term outcome (endstate) and measurable goals. Assessment officers could insist that policymakers provide well-written strategies, but this is probably not going to happen. Instead, it is more likely to fall to the assessment officer to tease out the relationship between a strategy’s desired outcome (or endstate) and the intervention tools selected to solve the problem.

The author bases this discussion on personal experience designing and conducting strategic assessments at the military department and Secretary of Defense levels, as well as recent work at the National Counterterrorism Center. While this paper focuses on the national level, these assessments are not possible without Defense Department operational assessments and program assessments conducted by other federal departments and agencies. All are critical for national-level policymakers to better understand the effectiveness of US national security policy writ large.

2. Evaluating strategies in a complex world

Operational assessment as a term of art is most often associated with military planning at the combatant command or theater level. At the national level, these assessments are sometimes incorporated at the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense level into a Defense Department assessment, which is then considered by the National Security Council along with similar assessments conducted by other federal departments and agencies, the Intelligence Community, outside think tanks, etc. Across the government, assessment is part of the planning process and exists in order to provide an objective measure of the effectiveness of programs and activities against a strategy.¹ Two examples of strategic assessment work in the national security arena are particularly well suited to help describe challenges in measuring the effectiveness of national-level strategy: counterterrorism and conflict resolution.

Practitioners in the national security arena have called for improved evaluation of intervention activities. Crenshaw and Lafree² state in their book, Countering terrorism, “…without being able to judge how effective policies are against terrorism it is impossible to balance overall costs and benefits.” On the other hand, Crenshaw and Lafree² acknowledge that a major challenge in assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies is figuring out what policymakers mean by “counterterrorism.” Furthermore, the authors discuss the difficulty in determining the government’s desired outcome – is it to prevent all terrorism? Without a clearly defined strategic-level outcome, they argue, it is difficult to determine what strategies are best suited to achieving this goal.

Similarly, as part of their search for better conflict resolution techniques, Lederach et al.³ call for more thoughtful evaluation of intervention activities to illuminate what works under which circumstances. At an organizational level, evaluation helps improve business processes (conducting program and activities), but at the strategic level, evaluation helps policymakers understand how and why a conflict intervention approach succeeds or fails.

3. What does success look like? Determining the theory of change

The connection between strategic goals and objectives, and the activities conducted by governmental, non-governmental, and private organizations on the ground is the theory of change. Figure 1 illustrates how the proposed intervention impacts the conflict to produce the desired result.⁴

Figure 1.

The “theory of change.”

The theory of change includes three distinct parts: the conflict theory (problem statement); the theory of intervention (strategic approach); and the hypothesized impact of the strategy on the problem. In essence, a theory of change is, “by doing these activities, we hope to accomplish these goals, which will impact the conflict in this way and bring about the desired change.” Lederach et al.³ explain that the theory of change is how and why a set of activities will bring about the desired change:

Peacebuilding efforts often set goals, such as promoting nonviolent approaches to conflict, reducing intolerance, or encouraging reconciliation. These goals are pursued through activities such as conflict transformation workshops, interreligious dialogues, or inter-ethnic community development projects. But how, specifically, are these activities supposed to achieve these goals? The answer to this question is the program’s theory of change.³

However, as stated above, many strategies do not have a clear theory of change. Therefore, the strategic assessment officer must infer the theory and hypothesis by studying the strategy’s desired outcome, goals, objectives, and selected activities, reviewing analyses of the ongoing conflict, and asking policymakers questions about how well they think the strategy is working.

This paper discusses the elements of the theory of change, and offers examples from counterterrorism and conflict resolution to illustrate them. The questions in Table 1 help determine a strategy’s theory of change. The first two questions focus on the theory of conflict, the next two help to determine the policymaker’s theory of intervention, and the final two explore the theory of change.

Table 1.

Strategic assessment questions for policymakers, planners, and implementers.

Theory of conflict	• What problems does this strategy try to solve, or what issues does the strategy try to address?
	• What in the environment led policymakers to address this issue?
Theory of intervention	• External: How does the strategy propose to solve this problem? What do policymakers expect to achieve in the near and longer term? What are the desired results?
	• Internal: What are the potential barriers or supports that might impact the ability of the strategy to make the change that policymakers hope for? Are there policies or other factors that could affect the implementation of the plan?
Theory of change	• Why will this approach be effective? Why do policymakers believe the plan and activities will work? What is the connection between what they plan to do and why they think this approach will succeed?
	• What evidence do we have that the plan has been implemented? What evidence do we have that the strategy impacted the problem as envisioned?

The following sections explore each of these elements in turn, provide examples of general theories and practical implications, and end with a discussion of special challenges in strategic assessments.

4. What problem are we trying to solve? Determining a conflict theory

Policymakers develop a strategy based on an explicit or implicit theory (or theories) of what drives or mitigates conflict. The strategy’s problem statement contains this conflict theory.⁵ Sometimes the problem statement is based on a methodical, comprehensive assessment of the conflict environment; however, this is not always the case. Plus, even if a strategy is based on a comprehensive conflict assessment, the conflict itself is always changing (sometimes rapidly) over time, sometimes rendering the initial conflict theory (and thus the underlying assumptions of the strategy) obsolete.

Sometimes the lack of a well-articulated theory of conflict reflects the challenge of planning in a complex environment. For example, the national counterterrorism strategies address a symptom (terrorism) that draws from a deep well of local, national, and/or regional political problems and a myriad of different perceptions and beliefs about those problems: economic inequality, perceived social injustices, religious extremism, etc. Nevertheless, a strategic assessment officer should try to uncover the philosophical underpinnings of a strategy in order to understand the purpose of the strategy and, ultimately, whether or not the strategy effectively addresses the problem.

5. Example: counterterrorism strategy

Schroden et al.⁶ reviewed US counterterrorism strategies and identified five basic conflict theories: ideology, root causes, state sponsorship, rational choice, and group dynamics.

These theories are derived from International Relations, which include three broad explanations of why war (or conflict) exists in the world.⁶ Nye⁷ describes these theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.⁸ Broadly speaking, realism focuses the central problem of international politics on war and the use of force among states. Nation-states wage war in pursuit of national interests to give them power over other nation-states. Liberalism, on the other hand, focuses the central problem on a global society that exists in spite of states and posits that social, economic, and ecological interdependence is the main driver of conflict in international politics. In liberalism, conflict arises when these social and environmental structures fail to provide for society.⁷ Finally, constructivism argues that conflict in international politics is driven more by ideas and culture, identity, and beliefs about morality, which change over time.⁷ Constructivists also argue that the perception of disconnects in social norms is as potent a force in conflict as national interests or global economic forces.

As shown in Table 2, the theories of terrorism described by Schroden et al.⁶ (column 1) fit within the three main theories of conflict in International Relations (column 2).

Table 2.

Theories of terrorism and international conflict.

Terrorism theory	International Relations theory	Actors	Goals	Instruments
Ideology	Realism “Balanceof power”	States	Security	Military force
State sponsorship	Realism “Balanceof power”	States	Security	Military force
Root causes	Liberalism“interdependence”	Economic trade, internationalorganizations	Prosperity	Good governance
Rational choice	Liberalism“interdependence”	Economic trade, internationalorganizations	Prosperity	Good governance
Group dynamics	Constructivism “identityand culture”	Individuals and groups	Identity	Activism

The ideology of “jihadism” focuses on rebuilding the international order to include states ruled by religious law, which stands in direct confrontation to the Westphalian order of democratic nation-states. Some existing ideological states, such as Iran, sponsor acts of terrorism to further their interests. At the same time, terrorism theories focused on “root causes” (and rational choice) line up with liberalism: the lack of good governance and jobs results in grievances. A rational choice explanation for terrorism includes the idea that people join terrorist groups for many reasons – not just ideological. In some cases, terrorist groups provide a living wage and care for members’ families. Finally, the terrorism theory of “group dynamics” matches a constructivist explanation of conflict: people join terrorist groups for a sense of belonging and will fight for their group’s identity (religion, language, culture) even before they secure basic needs for their families.

6. How should we solve this problem? Theories of intervention

After policymakers and planners establish their reasoning about the problem, they move to a discussion of what to do about it. As noted in Table 1, intervention plans include a discussion of external factors concerning the best way to solve the problem, as well as internal organizational factors that might support or constrict the plan. Internal factors are not discussed here, but generally include funding, manpower, authorities, and policies.

6.1 Example: counterterrorism

Continuing with the counterterrorism example in Table 2, even though each counterterrorism strategy covers all of these theories to some extent, each national strategy emphasizes the “cause” of terrorism a little differently, and this leads policymakers to consider different solutions. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, written shortly after 9/11, highlights the “group dynamics” theory as a main cause of terrorism.⁹ This constructivist theory argues that people join terrorist groups for a sense of belonging, adventure, and fellowship. Over time, the internal dynamics of the group tie its members together tightly and make it very difficult to break away. Schroden et al.⁶ found that strategies that address this “network” theory of terrorism tend to focus more on employing law enforcement and intelligence operations to break down a group’s cohesion.¹⁰

The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism focused on the more liberal “root causes” theory of terrorism, which highlights social, political, economic, or environmental disparities that may feed discontent, which terrorists exploit to gain followers.^6,11 Policymakers who want to address the root causes of terrorism will use military force sparingly, and instead promote economic development, rule of law, good governance, education, healthcare, etc.⁶

Finally, the 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy emphasizes a more realist theory of ideology as the cause of terrorism (other historical cases include terrorism based on communism and ethno-nationalism): “jihadism” is a fight against the “enemies of Islam,” including the USA, among others.¹² Schroden et al.⁶ found that strategies and plans built on countering ideology tend to rely on military force, and include objectives such as countering extremist ideology, promoting democracy and human rights, and building coalitions against the threat.

Assessment officers should be able to identify the underlying theories in a strategy. Even if the theory is unstated (implicit), a strategy will still favor certain actors, goals, and activities. For example, if policymakers believe the source of terrorism is religious extremist ideology, they likely subscribe to realism as an underlying theory of international conflict. Therefore, the policymakers will likely favor addressing the problem via national, state-level tools. They may propose combatting terrorist ideology at the national level by funding counter-messaging campaigns, supporting moderate religious leaders, and in some cases eliminating individuals. However, if policymakers believe the source of terrorism is weak governance in a fragile state (regardless of religion), then they likely subscribe to a liberal view of international conflict, and they may propose working together with other like-minded nations as well as with the partner nation to help build their governance capacity. This could include training and education for counterterrorism forces, law enforcement, and the justice system (sometimes called “security sector reform”). Finally, if policymakers believe the source of terrorism is based in a search for a group’s identity, then they likely subscribe to a constructivist view of international conflict, and will propose working to raise international awareness of human rights violations and urge offending states to recognize a group’s grievances.

6.2 Example: conflict resolution

The government is not the only actor designing intervention strategies; the conflict resolution field is similarly concerned with resolving deep-rooted, complex conflict. Table 3 outlines the basic intervention theories, or strategic approaches, to conflict resolution and some common associated goals, objectives, and tasks.¹³ All of these interventions tend to fall under liberal or constructivist theories, but the specific intervention strategies include conflict management, resolution, transformation, and prevention.

Table 3.

Conflict resolution strategies to tasks.

Strategy	Goal	Objective	Tasks
Conflict management“peacekeeping”	Create secure space	Maintain peace	Policing or military to contain violence and separate the warring parties.
Conflict resolution“peacemaking”	Create political space	Establish trust	Official negotiations and political agreements on substantive issues.
Conflict transformation“peacebuilding”	Create humanitarianspace	Build capacity	Change social relationships and structural sources of conflict by implementing mechanisms to deal with future conflicts, such as judicial systems, elections.
Conflict prevention	Protect humanitarianspace	Sustain capacity	Human development activities, such as promoting human rights, non-violent conflict resolution, education, healthcare, etc.

Source: author based on Ramsbotham et al.¹³

The goal of conflict management, or “peacekeeping,” is to create a safe space for official talks to begin. Therefore, the main objective is to manage the conflict. A multinational peacekeeping force physically separates the warring parties, monitors them, and reports their compliance with a negotiated cease-fire. The intervention theory is that, by separating the two warring parties, the leaders of each side can concentrate on finding a non-violent political solution to the conflict. This is the foundation for the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Force, established at the end of World War II by the UN Security Council.¹⁴

The goal of conflict resolution, or “peacemaking,” is to create a political space for two sides to talk constructively and resolve the conflict peacefully. Therefore, the main objective of peacemaking is to establish a level of trust between the parties. Traditional conflict resolution activities may focus on coaxing the parties to the negotiating table, confidence building measures such as military observer missions, behind-the-scenes diplomatic activities, leadership retreats, or sending intermediaries. The intervention theory behind conflict resolution is that a neutral third party can work with the warring parties to help them come to a political agreement over the conflict issues. A good example at the international level is the effort of Norway and other countries to broker peace between Israel and Palestine via the Oslo Accords during the mid-1990s.¹⁵

The “peacebuilding” strategy works to transform a conflicted society into a peaceful one. The idea is to transform the relationship between two warring parties by repairing the social structure so that the two parties can resolve their disagreements in a non-violent manner. Therefore, the objective is to build capacity. Activities could include rebuilding or creating a new judiciary system along with local and national police forces, writing a new constitution, establishing a representative government and holding elections, training the military, setting up education and health systems, launching economic infrastructure projects, and developing investment incentives. The intervention theory is that a destructive social system can be made “right” when the international community transfers skills to help build indigenous capability. Then, private citizens, businesses, and non-profit organizations can rebuild the damaged society. A good example of this approach is US and international efforts in Afghanistan.¹⁶

Finally, conflict prevention strategies focus on humanitarian aid and development. The goal of this kind of intervention is to protect humanitarian space and support basic human needs so that a government can improve their political and economic capacity. The objective is to sustain capacity; activities rely on international organizations to strengthen existing national conflict prevention structures, such as education systems or regional economic and health organizations. The intervention theory is that healthy, resilient societies do not go to war with each other (or with themselves) and will work to solve their problems peacefully. This strategy underpins the international development field, where governments fund activities around the world in an effort to prevent some future conflict by working to improve the human condition. A good example of this strategy is reflected in the UN Millennium Development Goals and the subsequent UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, both of which focus on reducing hunger and improving access to education and healthcare across the globe.¹⁷

Again, assessment officers should be able to identify the underlying theories in a strategy and the accompanying theories of intervention. Even if the theory is unstated (implicit), a strategy can be identified by the actors, goals, and activities it emphasizes. By linking the tasks and activities with the goals, and then, by extension, to the theory of intervention, the strategic assessment officer can help policymakers understand the broader context for the strategy. Before discussing the final theory of change, this paper addresses two special challenges, or nuances, found in strategies.

6.3 Special challenge: positive versus negative framing for desired outcomes/endstates

So far, we have focused on theories of conflict and conflict intervention, and how these theories explicitly or implicitly underpin a strategic plan. However, depending on how policymakers frame the desired outcome (positively or negatively), the strategic goals and objectives will flow in a particular way, driving the strategy’s programs and activities. The following examples show how, even though the theoretical underpinnings may be the same, an endstate that is framed negatively or positively will change the personality, or the tenor, of a strategy. Table 4 illustrates the difference between a positive or negative endstate, in spite of the same theory of conflict and the associated intervention theories.

Table 4.

Impact of negative and positive framing for desired outcomes/endstates.

Terrorism theory	International conflicttheory	Goal	Negative endstate: defeat terrorists and their organizations	Positive endstate: individualsand groups address grievances peacefully
Ideology	Realism “balanceof power”	Security	Arrest or eliminate radicalized individuals	Negotiate with moderate representatives of affected groups
State sponsorship	Realism “balanceof power”	Security	Arrest or eliminate radicalized individuals	Negotiate with moderate representatives of affected groups
Root causes	Liberalism“interdependence”	Prosperity	Build capacity of local security forces to eliminate radicalized individuals	Build capacity of local governments to repair social contract between the state and aggrieved individuals and groups
Rational choice	Liberalism“interdependence”	Prosperity
Group dynamics	Constructivism“identityand culture”	Identity	Break cohesion of terrorist groups, eliminate leaders,cut off networks	Develop positive message of support for groups to engage with moderate leaders, reward peaceful activism

6.3.1 Negative endstates

In the case of counterterrorism strategies since 9/11, the desired endstate is often a negative one, such as “defeat terrorists and their organizations” or “disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat…”.^9,11,12 In both examples, the negative endstate, coupled with the theory of conflict, drives the strategic plan in a certain direction. For example, if policymakers identify the terrorist threat as ideological, and believe the source of conflict comes from radicalized individuals within a country, then “defeat terrorists and their organizations” requires arresting or killing individuals. If, however, policymakers believe the terrorist threat comes from “root causes” characterized by a weak governance structure, then “defeat terrorists and their organizations” requires a very different set of capabilities, such as reforming a partner nation’s legal system and highlighting corruption and human rights abuses, as well as creating law enforcement partnerships and building the capacity of security forces.

6.3.2 Positive endstates

Let us take a moment to talk through a positive endstate for a risk averse set of policymakers. In the case of terrorism, instead of “defeat terrorists and their organizations” a positive endstate could be “individuals and groups address grievances peacefully at the local level.” Even if the theory of terrorism focuses on ideology, and comes from radicalized individuals, a positive endstate could lead policymakers to try a different approach, such as negotiation or bargaining with a set of opposition leaders. Likewise, if the terrorist threat is coming from “root causes,” a positive endstate may focus on supporting local peacebuilding organizations or individual peacemakers instead of building the capacity of a partner nation’s security forces. After all, if the state is the source of the “root causes” of terrorism, it does not make much sense to build the capacity of that nation’s security forces.

Assessment officers could suggest that policymakers and planners discuss framing endstates either positively or negatively. The discussion might assist policymakers to make their assumptions clearer, improving the clarity of the desired outcome, and changing what is measured in terms of effectiveness. The policymakers do not have to change their basic theories on the problem or the intervention strategy. However, the assessment will focus on different indicators depending on the way the desired outcome is framed.

7. Special challenge: multiple endstates, multiple theories

In the example of counterterrorism strategies since 9/11, it is common to find two or more sets of desired endstates. For example, the 2003 strategy contains both “defeat terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.” The 2011 strategy contains both “disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat…” and “build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities.” On the one hand, multiple endstates may reflect a dynamic conflict environment with multiple causes of conflict.¹⁸ In the author’s experience, however, it is also likely that multiple desired endstates reflect a lack of understanding of the conflict environment, confusion over the sources of conflict, and disagreement about how to resolve the problem. At best, multiple endstates reflect the complex nature of conflict, and show that terrorism is just one symptom of a much larger conflict.

In any case, the job of the strategic assessment officer is to help foster a conversation among policymakers about their reasoning behind the strategy, and what they will see if it is “working.” It is extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of a strategy with multiple theories and intervention strategies, especially if the desired outcome is framed in a particular way (negatively or positively). Sometimes policymakers are unwilling to discuss flaws in their strategies. One way the assessment officer can gently illuminate competing theories or endstates is to talk with policymakers about any reported confusion that exists in the field where program managers are attempting to implement the strategy.

With practice, assessment officers can improve their ability to identify competing hypotheses and design assessment plans to help and better assess whether or not a strategy is working, and if not, why. This is the final step in determining the theory of change.

8. Why will this approach be effective? Assessing the theory of change

As discussed in Table 1, the theory of change includes three distinct parts: the conflict theory (problem statement); the theory of intervention (strategic approach); and the hypothesized impact of the strategy on the problem. The strategic assessment focuses on evidence that one or more of these hypotheses are true, and thus attempts to determine how well the overall strategy is working. Assessing effectiveness is determined through measuring indicators of performance (internal organization and implementation) and effectiveness (external impact on the problem).

In addition to strategic intelligence assessments about the changing environment, data collection should also include interviews with policymakers, program managers, and others about what they are seeing from their point of view. In particular, program managers in individual departments and agencies, non-profits, and industry are best positioned to see the impacts of their programs and activities. The questions in Table 5 help the assessment officer determine whether the strategy is being implemented as envisioned.

Table 5.

Questions for implementers.

From your perspective, do you think the strategy working? If not, why not?

Do you have any obstacles preventing you from implementing your programs and activities?

Should the strategy change? And if so, in what way?

Policymakers and planners are usually separated from the implementers, and each makes assumptions about the others’ motivation and actions. These questions give implementers a chance to tell policymakers and planners about any obstacles or failures, as well as successes, in implementing the strategy. Since implementers are closest to the problem, they have a unique perspective about the effectiveness of the overall strategy.

Table 6 contains sample questions that strategic assessment officers can use to help think through the assessment. Ideally, the assessment reflects the theory of change back to the policymakers, discusses the overall impact or “success” of the strategy, and recommends changes to the strategy.¹⁹

Table 6.

Strategic assessment questions on the theory of change.

What is the hypothesized source of conflict? Are there other possible sources of conflict? How does the hypothesized source of conflict shape the policymaker’s intent?

What level (local, state, international) is the target for intervention? Why is this level chosen? Is there another possible avenue of approach? What other levels could they target?

What is the strategy trying to change (behavior, situation, attitudes)? Why did they choose this? Is there another possibility? How do they intend to accomplish this? How will they assess change?

What is the theory of change?

One theory of change may not be enough in a complex conflict. Is this the only possible theory of change? What could impact the theory of change and make it untrue?

Even if a theory of change in a strategy is missing or not well-articulated, strategic assessment officers should address it anyway, especially because of the critical relationship between the theory of conflict, the intervention strategy, and the way the desired endstate is framed (positive or negative). The key question for policymakers is whether or not the strategy is working, and if not, why? The strategic assessment illuminates the explicit and implicit theories that are embedded in the problem statement about the conflict itself, evaluates the progress of the intervention plan’s programs and activities, and addresses their collective impact on the desired endstate.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

All statements of fact, analysis or opinion are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense or any of its components, or the US government.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Cathryn Quantic Thurston

Author biography

Dr Cathryn Quantic Thurston joined the faculty of the College of Strategic Intelligence at the National Intelligence University in December 2018. She teaches in the Intelligence Enterprise Department and her research focuses on the role of intelligence in assessing the effectiveness of national strategies and plans. She completed a two-year Joint Duty Assignment from 2016 to 2018 as Branch Chief, Strategic Assessments at the National Counterterrorism Center. From 2009 to 2016, she held several leadership positions at NIU in the Office of Research, including Deputy Vice President for Research (2015–2016), Acting Vice President for Research (2013–2015), and Director, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (2009–2013). Before NIU, she was a researcher at the RAND Corporation where she specialized in measuring the value of military security cooperation programs. She also worked on a number of research projects on building partner capacity, terrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction. From 1995 to 2000, she was an intelligence analyst on the Army Staff. She holds a PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, an MA in International Relations from Syracuse University, and a BA in International Studies from the University of Denver.

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