Commentary on Endsley’s “Situation Awareness Misconceptions and Misunderstandings”

Summarizing 25 years of research in just under 100 words near the end of her article, Endsley (2015) succinctly outlines the far-reaching effects that the concatenation of two seemingly simple words has had on both research and operational communities. Endsley states,

Over the past 25 years the construct of SA [situation awareness] has moved from revolutionary newcomer to the mainstream. Numerous articles have been written on what it is and how it works cognitively, based primarily on research in ecologically valid settings with experts. The SA construct evolved in real world environments where pilots struggled to keep up with the rapidly changing information provided by a myriad of sensors, displays and new technologies and the complexity and challenges of the flight environment, and has spread to a wide variety of domains that struggle with many of the same challenges. (Endsley, 2015, p. 28)

Yet, this article also reveals that research scientists continue to debate the basic tenets of this “mainstream” construct and its theoretical underpinnings. Endsley’s thoughtful clarifications in this article have addressed some of the so-called fallacies surrounding situation awareness (SA). Still, the fact that these misconceptions and misperceptions exist suggests a potential collective degradation of SA in the research community; but on the bright side for all of us (myself included), the debate in this issue, including calls for continued research, should help in its restoration.

Ongoing debates, misunderstandings, and misconceptions aside, where does the operational community stand with respect to the construct of SA? In aviation, the construct of SA is pervasive. However, the aviation community has largely adopted the moniker situational awareness for this construct. (For example, a search of the Summit Aviation Digital Aviation Reference Library, which contains most of the available Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] regulatory and advisory material, yielded about 630 instances of the term situational awareness and about 70 instances of the term situation awareness.) Widespread references to the construct can be found in a range of industry and government documents, both domestically and internationally. For example, in addition to numerous accident and incident reports explaining human error, discussions of or reference to situational awareness can be found in the following:

Why has the construct of SA become so widespread in the operational community? Because SA is an intuitive and intrinsically satisfying construct that is applicable to both understanding and enhancing human performance in applied environments. SA also serves as a great orienting term to aid in communication about human performance. That is, when used in either conversation or writing, it immediately alerts the recipient to the general area of discussion forthcoming. Whether referenced by an operator learning ways to optimize individual performance or by a human performance analyst providing insights into what factors may have led to breakdowns in performance, use of the term SA helps to focus discussion. To the operational community, SA is not a model or theoretical approach—it has become a foundational tenet associated with keeping your head in the game and a key to ensuring operational safety.

The operational community can be incredibly suspicious of academic theorizing, and a research scientist has little chance of affecting an end user unless there exists a “magic decoder ring” to translate the science to actionable components. Although it is arguable whether Endsley’s article and accompanying debates are reductionistic, that there is a fair amount of theory- or construct-specific terminology associated with research in this area cannot be debated. This jargon itself requires a level of SA to fully comprehend the discussion and its nuances; this requirement can impede the flow of knowledge from the research community to the operational community.

But that does not mean the operational community has ignored some of these nuances. One definition of SA contained in FAA guidance states,

Situational awareness is defined as a continuous extraction of environmental information, integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture, and the use of that picture in directing further perception and anticipating future events. Simply put, situational awareness means knowing what is going on around you. (U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, Watch Supervision section, para. 11)

This definition is devoid of jargon, and there is no mention of Level 1, 2, or 3 SA (or even the abstractions of perception, comprehension, projection). But it does effectively translate Endsley’s SA model into functional terms that end users in the operational realm can readily apply.

Even the methodology for assessing SA has been translated into the operational realm. The FAA’s Practical Test Standards (PTS) outline the performance standards for pilots earning a certificate or rating. “Situational awareness” is a requirement contained in these standards, and the stated objective for this requirement is that pilots must be able to explain the construct of situational awareness and associated factors. But beyond having knowledge of the construct, the standards state, an applicant undergoing a flight test must be able to

state [to the examiner] the current situation at anytime during the flight in such a way that displays an accurate assessment of the current and future status of the flight, including weather, terrain, traffic, ATC situation, fuel status, and aircraft status. (U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 2011, p. 14)

This codification of SA in test standards for pilots is a testament to the accepted utility of this construct in aviation.

Finally, the FAA requires that airplanes used in most passenger-carrying commercial operations be equipped with “an approved terrain situational awareness display” (see FAA Terrain Awareness and Warning System, 2000, 2001). Endsley discussed the potential confusion that exists for some between the sources of SA and SA itself. Although this regulatory-based example and others in FAA guidance seemingly attribute SA to a display, it does not appear to be based so much on confusion as it is the result of functional naming conventions. It is helpful to remember the orienting power of the term situational awareness, and its appearance in rules and guidance as it pertains to hardware or displays helps to overtly provide the functional purpose of the instrumentation. Clearly, the display promotes is implied in these instances, and support for that position can be found in numerous airworthiness directives correcting for a potential loss of instrumentation in which the FAA has noted that the loss of information could reduce the flight crew’s “situational awareness.”

From the operational perspective, continued debate over the nuances of SA is healthy, and I suspect many in the operational community would also encourage it. But those in the research community should take no offense if we do not hang on every word of the debate. Instead we will wait for tested and refined deliverables with practical guidance to use in better understanding human performance (or further ensuring its reliability). An interdependency exists between the research and operational communities, as at various points in the incremental evolution of human factors knowledge, we each consume the other’s products. In the operational community, we are looking to the research community to provide insights into human performance, things people need to reliably perform in both routine and exceptional situations; and in return, the operational community will help to demonstrate the relevance of research by providing real-world examples of evolving operational needs as well as documenting achievements and breakdowns in human performance. The construct of SA demonstrates what can come from this synergy.