Blockchain Potentials for the Game Industry: A Review

Abstract

In the past few years, there has been a significant increase in the adoption and recognition of blockchain technology. The increasing demand for blockchain technology has led to its swift development and widespread adoption across various sectors, including the gaming industry. The potential implications of this nascent technology in the realm of digital games are considerable, yet it is crucial to acknowledge the absence of scholarly investigations regarding blockchain games. To bridge the current research gap, this study's objective is to conduct an in-depth review of the potential uses of blockchain technology in gaming.

Keywords

blockchain blockchain games crypto games NFTs smart contracts

Introduction

The integration of blockchain technology into the gaming industry has generated considerable attention and facilitated the emergence of novel advancements. Blockchain gaming refers to a broad range of gambling and digital gaming applications that utilize decentralized ledger technologies (Scholten et al., 2019). Although blockchain gaming faces various challenges, many individuals engage in crypto gaming due to its potential for entertainment and profit (Culannay, 2022). The emergence of blockchain-based games has become a rapidly expanding phenomenon, facilitating peer-to-peer transactions within the gaming environment through the utilization of blockchain technology (Min & Cai, 2019).

The blockchain and gaming combination offers many possibilities, promising to change traditional game development models, including distribution, ownership, and gameplay mechanics. Game developers utilize the unique features of blockchain, such as immutability and decentralization to enhance player experiences, community engagement, and virtual asset ownership. The field of blockchain-based games is experiencing growth, yet there remains a lack of academic research concerning the advantages that blockchain technology offers to the gaming industry.

This systematic review aims to explore the potential that blockchain technology offers to the gaming industry. The primary objective is to comprehend the fundamental principles linked to blockchain technology, considering its historical progression and contextual foundations, as well as its utilization within the realm of gaming.

Method

We defined two research questions as follows: RQ1: What are the key features of blockchain technology? and RQ2: To what extent do these features contribute to the advancement of the gaming industry? The research study was initiated by conducting an extensive search within six scholarly databases, namely Google Scholar, IEEE, Science Direct, Scopus, Springer, and ProQuest. The search utilized relevant phrases such as blockchain, blockchain-based games, blockchain games, nonfungible tokens (NFTs), cryptocurrency, crypto games, peer-to-peer games, and smart contracts. Additionally, we employed a combination of these keywords through the use of logical operators such as “AND” and “OR.”

Several additional criteria have been established to select papers that conform to the requirements for consideration in the evaluation, as follows: (a) dated from January 2013 to September 2023; (b) the study was written in English; and (c) included an abstract.

The researchers conducted a comprehensive literature search by utilizing electronic scientific databases, according to the PRISMA methodology as outlined by Page et al. (2021). The methodology was structured into four discrete stages, specifically identification, screening, eligibility, and inclusion (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

The selection process of publications.

The process of searching through the mentioned databases yielded a total of 2649 results. During the second stage, the titles of the shortlisted papers were screened, resulting in the finding of 977 relevant papers. In the third stage, the process involved reviewing the abstracts of 977 research papers and subsequently applying a filtering criterion based on their respective contributions. The subsequent stage included evaluating the quality of 503 preselected papers by analyzing their complete texts. The methodology encompassed a thorough analysis of the research, with a focus on identifying papers that contained pertinent material related to various aspects of blockchain technology and its application in the context of blockchain-based games.

In summary, a comprehensive selection of 166 scholarly publications (as shown in Table 1) was made for this study based on their relevance in addressing the research topic. Table 2 categorizes the blockchain concepts and features examined in this paper. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of publications across the six databases that were examined. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of publications examined in each respective year.

Figure 2.

The percentage distribution of the reviewed paper across several databases.

Figure 3.

Reviewed papers across last decade by year.

Table 1.

Distribution of Investigated Papers.

Database	IEEE	Science Direct	Springer	Google Scholar	Proquest	Scopus
Number of papers meeting the inclusion criteria	37	9	10	59	31	20

Table 2.

Blockchain concepts and features investigated in this paper.

Research category	Year	Publications
Blockchain - history & definition	2014	Champagne
	2015	Extance
		Pavlovski
		Gibb
		Garay
		Popper
	2016	Ølnes
	2016	Buterin
	2017	Narayanan
		Dannen
		Hellegren
	2018	Milutinović
		Elliott
		Vujičić
		Memon
	2019	Sherman
		Whitaker
		Berentsen
	2020	Dutta
	2022	Al-Zoubi
		Warin
		Benz
		Guo
	2023	Bauk
		Latif
		Padmavathi
		Ko
		Thakur
Consensus model	2014	Buterin
	2017	Baliga
	2020	Bigini
	2020	Saad
	2021	Fu
	2021	Wu
	2023	Gurnani
DApps	2019	Wang et al.
		Min
		Taş
		Scholten et al.
		Du et al.
		Yuen
	2020	Muthe
	2021	Wu
		Singh
		Gao
	2022	Culannay
	2022	Jiang et al.
	2023	Chen
Cryptocurrencies	2014	Pape
	2015	Popper
	2016	Bissessar
		Gervais
		Harwick
		Mukhopadhyay et al.
	2017	Nakamoto
	2017	Kaushik
	2018	Ghimire
	2019	Hazari
		Nicolas
		AL-JAROODI
		Rice
	2020	Kiayias
	2021	Chohan
		IQBAL
		da Silva
		Chohan
		Nair
	2023	Hossaion
		Bommer et al.
		Wandhöfer
DAO	2014	Buterin
	2016	Jentzsch
	2017	Alimoğlu
	2017	DuPont
	2019	Wang et al.
		Kondova
		Kaal
		Zichichi
	2021	Liu et al.
	2021	Write
	2022	Brummer
		Zhao et al.
		Santana
		Cohan
	2023	Pereira
		Ziegler
		Park
		Despotović et al.
		Stibe et al.
		Egliston
		Proelss
Smart contracts	2015	Gibb
		Malkovský
		Popper
	2016	Luu
	2016	Anderson
	2017	Alharby
		Jani
		Huh
		Ng
		Magazzeni et al.
		Narayanan
	2018	Xu
	2018	Memon
	2019	Min et al.
		Whitaker
		Norvill
		Brammertz
	2020	Zheng
		Wang
		Kemmoe et al.
		Khan et al.
	2021	Gabashvili
		Hewa et al.
		Vigliotti
		Stibe
	2022	Paajala et al.
	2023	Park
		Qasse et al.
		Chen
		Alqahtani
NFTs	2019	Steinwold
		Norvill
		Min
	2020	Goyal et al.
		Scheiding
		Serada et al.
	2021	Chohan
		Guadamuz
		Popescu
		Wang et al.
		Fowler et al.
	2022	Schmitz
		Pinto- Gutiérrez et al.
		Osivand
		Malik et al.
		Idelberger
		Park et al.
		Zainab
		Fara
		Usmani
P2E	2019	King et al.
	2022	Kshetri
		Karapapas
		Aguila et al.
		Delfabbro et al.
	2023	Sareen

Blockchain: History and Definition

In 1979, David Chaum proposed the vault system, a protocol resembling blockchain technology. The author's research establishes a set of methodologies that offer a structural basis for the development of computer systems that prioritize security. Groups with mutual distrust are the target audience for these systems (Al-Zoubi et al., 2022; Hellegren, 2017; Pavlovski, 2015; Sherman et al., 2019; Warin & Strategy, 2022). In 1991, Haber and Stornetta proposed a novel system to address the issue of time stamping. The system consisted of distributed blocks that resembled today's blockchain (Gipp et al., 2015; Memon et al., 2018; Narayanan & Clark, 2017; Padmavathi & Rajagopalan, 2023; Thakur, 2023). Szabo conceptualized BitGold in 1998, which employs computational operations to produce a sequence of bits based on an established number of challenge bits (Dutta, 2020; Elliott, 2018; Milutinović, 2018; Ølnes, 2016; Popper, 2015a, 2015b). Nakamoto’s 2008 Bitcoin whitepaper introduced the Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, a distributed ledger-based decentralized digital currency platform. The initial implementation of blockchain occurred with its introduction as the foundational system for Bitcoin transactions (Berentsen, 2019; Champagne, 2014; Extance, 2015; Garay et al., 2015; Latif et al., 2023; Vujičić et al., 2018). In 2014, Vitalik Buterin developed Ethereum, a smart contract-based tokenization technology. Ethereum offers a user interface that stands out for its enhanced user-friendliness, enabling the development of tokens with financial characteristics (Bauk, 2023; Buterin, 2014a, 2014b; Dannen, 2017; Whitaker, 2019). The Ethereum network was launched on July 30, 2015, and Ethereum 2.0 was introduced to enhance its speed, scalability, efficiency, and security, implemented in three distinct phases from 2020 to 2022 (Buterin, 2016; Guo & Yu, 2022; Ko et al., 2023). We summarized the background mentioned in Figure 4, illustrating the chronological progression of blockchain history and the evolutionary stages of blockchain technology.

Figure 4.

Blockchain technology timeline.

Blockchain technology has the potential to improve transaction processing and data management efficiency and transparency, which has attracted significant interest from industry leaders (Benz et al., 2022). A blockchain refers to a set of connected records secured through various cryptographic techniques. A viable approach to maintaining a comprehensive and permanent log of exchanges between two entities involves utilizing a distributed ledger system. This refers to duplicated transaction-recording files that are maintained in a synchronized manner across multiple sites by a consensus mechanism (Bigini et al., 2020; Buterin, 2014a, 2014b; Gurnani et al., 2023). The consensus mechanism is a collaborative algorithm that validates records across all nodes in the blockchain. It determines transaction legitimacy and maintains account synchronization. Each consensus node verifies and examines the database, and valid data are added once a predetermined number of nodes verifies it (Baliga, 2017; Fu et al., 2021; Saad & Radzi, 2020; Wu et al., 2021).

Blockchain is acknowledged not just as a distributed public ledger but also as the basis for decentralized applications¹ (Wang et al. 2019), which are computer applications that store data and execute operations on a distributed ledger (Scholten et al., 2019; Singh, 2023; Taş & Tanrıöver, 2019). DApps are categorized into 17 categories: exchanges, games, finance, gambling, development, storage, high-risk, wallet, governance, property, identity, media, social, security, energy, insurance, and health (Wu et al., 2021). As shown in Figure 5, over the past year, gaming DApps have consistently exceeded other DApps within the blockchain, with transaction volumes fluctuating around 160 million marks, while the remaining categories have consistently recorded transaction volumes below 20 million (Jiang et al., 2022). Blockchain gaming constituted 37% of Dapp's activity in August 2023. The number of daily unique active wallets reached 758,330, indicating a 6.4% growth compared to the previous month.

Figure 5.

The number of transactions per category, as of as of September 2023.¹⁵

Blockchain games are online digital games created and operated using blockchain as their underlying foundation (Gao & Li, 2021). Smart contracts manage players’ virtual assets in blockchain games. Participants must associate their address with the blockchain to access their virtual gaming assets (Min et al., 2019; Yuen et al., 2019). Blockchain-based smart contracts can automate core operations such as virtual game asset management and rule enforcement, ensuring transparency and immutability (Chen et al., 2023a, 2023b). These games also feature incentive structures like staking, which provides the players with in-game assets and tokens as rewards, fostering community growth and supporting game content development (Jiang et al., 2022). Figure 6 demonstrates the timeline of how blockchain gaming evolved over time.

Figure 6.

Evolution of blockchain gaming.

Min et al. (2019) classified blockchain-based games according to the blockchain features they used, which include asset ownership, user-created content, cross-platform asset reusability, and rule transparency. Du et al. (2019) categorized blockchain games into two categories: those that use smart contracts for game tasks, facilitate virtual product exchange, and convert cryptocurrencies into fiat money. CryptoKitties, a pioneering decentralized game, generated about £26 million from 2017 to 2019 (Scholten et al., 2019). The second category of blockchain games employs a smart contract to execute a part of the game's process. Players own assets recorded on blockchain, preventing centralized developers from tampering with player information (Du et al., 2019).

Due to the rapid advancements in the market, developers are investing billions of dollars in game development (Muthe et al., 2020). In the third quarter of 2023, the blockchain gaming sector experienced 12% growth, with the average daily UAW reaching 786,766. Axie Infinity and Gods Unchained are leading games with transaction volumes of $90 million and $50 million, respectively. This growth highlights the importance of blockchain gaming in the industry.

Cryptocurrency

David Chaum introduced the first anonymous electronic money system called ECash using the blind signature protocol, which allows users to mint a coin and hide the coin's serial number using a blinding factor (Bissessar et al., 2016; Pape & Pape, 2014; Popper, 2015a, 2015b; Wandhöfer & Nakib, 2023). The first decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, is considered the trailblazer of digital currency standards. Numerous cryptocurrencies emerged over the following few years (Ahamad et al., 2013; Bommer et al., 2023; Ghimire & Selvaraj, 2018; Hossaion et al., 2023; Möser et al., 2013; Nakamoto, 2017; Rice, 2019).

According to Harwick (2016), cryptocurrency generates virtual currency while assuring secure ownership, transaction integrity, and originality. Bitcoin developed Proof of Work,² a consensus protocol used in cryptocurrencies to validate transactions and enable mining (Dumas et al., 2013; Hazari & Mahmoud, 2019). In the PoW consensus mechanism, peers use their computing power to vote, solving proof-of-work instances and generating blocks. Bitcoin's hash-based PoW algorithm requires miners to discover a nonce value that is lower than the target value. The hash of the preceding block is then added to the header of the current block. The entire block's hash is utilized to validate the integrity of data and interblock relationships (Putri et al., 2023). The network layer distributes the block to peers. Verification involves other network participants calculating the block's hash and validating the target value (Gervais et al., 2016; Kiayias & Zindros, 2020; Nair & Dorai, 2021). Transaction fees, optional in Bitcoin but mandatory in other cryptocurrencies, encourage parties’ engagement (Harwick, 2016).

Double spending is a significant vulnerability in cryptocurrencies, allowing dishonest individuals to manipulate the system by using the same currency in multiple locations (Decker & Wattenhofer, 2013; Kumar et al., 2023; Larimer, 2013). Attackers might generate new blockchain transactions to replace existing ones. Malicious and authentic chains compete, with faster advances potentially overwriting legal transactions and allowing attackers to regain the currency (Chohan, 2021a, 2021b; Iqbal & Matulevičius, 2021; Kaushik et al., 2017; Nicolas & Wang, 2019). According to Mukhopadhyay et al. (2016), mining minimizes double spending by verifying transaction amounts and payer ownership. Mining technologies differ by cryptocurrency, with some focusing on time constraints and others on rapid, lightweight services.

There are more than 500 digital currencies available worldwide as of January 2015 (Al-Jaroodi & Mohamed, 2019). Ethereum and Bitcoin lead the gaming currency market. Ethereum's smart contracts, DApp infrastructure, and simplified game development make it appealing in the gaming industry, whereas Bitcoin is widely used in gambling (Da Silva & Omar, 2021).

Decentralized Autonomous Organization

A Decentralized Autonomous Organization³ is a type of organizational structure wherein interactions between members, whether they be humans or machines, are facilitated using a blockchain system (DuPont, 2017; Pereira & Garcia, 2023). The system's interactions are governed by the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)’s smart contract and encoded in the blockchain protocol (El Faqir et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2019; Wright, 2021; Zhao et al., 2022).

Upon launching in April 2016, the DAO project raised $150 million with over 11,000 participants. However, on June 18, a recursive call vulnerability allowed an attacker to steal Ethereum from token sales. The attack took 3.6 million Ether,⁴ worth $50 million at the time, causing a significant decline in cryptocurrency value (Alimoğlu & Özturan, 2017; DuPont, 2017; Liu et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2019). Despite the initial DAO project's failure, subsequent projects continued to progress (Despotović et al., 2023; Park et al., 2023a, 2023b). According to the analytics provided by Deepdao,⁵ it was observed that there was an estimated total of 220 DAOs in the month of April 2022 (Santana & Albareda, 2022).

The concept of a DAO attracted significant attention within the Ethereum community following the introduction of smart contracts. These smart contracts facilitated the development of self-executing code that automated various organizational processes (Buterin, 2014a, 2014b). Decentralized Autonomous Organizations can independently and autonomously upgrade smart contracts, enabling timely modifications based on precise data. This dynamic system establishes a governance framework based on code, which can be adjusted through feedback loops (Jentzsch, 2016; Kaal, 2021; Santana & Albareda, 2022). In addition, smart contracts enable the transfer of ETH among DAO members, with tokens linked to the sender's account that can be used in exchange for ETH (Zichichi et al., 2019). Decentralized Autonomous Organizations can transform how organizations, businesses, industries, and markets operate by facilitating transparency and eliminating the need for centralized intermediaries in decision-making, thereby transforming the way businesses operate (Ziegler & Zehra, 2023).

Blockchain technology is being applied in video games through decentralized administration and ownership using DAOs. These DAOs often generate “governance tokens,” which give holders control rights and a portion of earnings. These tokens enable users to participate in decision-making processes through voting mechanisms (Kondova & Barba, 2019; Stibe et al., 2023; Wright, 2021; Zhao et al., 2022). For instance, the Sandbox DAO allows users to vote on crucial aspects such as the priority of features. Emerging metaverse games also incorporate DAO governance structures as a fundamental component (Egliston & Carter, 2023).

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations are being used in blockchain gaming guilds, where players gather to participate in, progress within, exchange resources, and generate revenue from games (Brummer, 2022). The implementation of scholarships in Axie Infinity, facilitated by smart contracts that allow for the borrowing of AXE⁶ in return for a share of profits, played a crucial role in the expansion of these gaming guilds (Aguila et al., 2022). This strategy was developed to help beginner gamers overcome financial constraints and achieve success in these games (Proelss et al., 2023).

Smart Contracts

In 1991, Haber and Stornetta proposed a method to provide tamper-resistant timestamps for digital documents entitled “How to Timestamp a Digital Document” (Gipp et al., 2015; Memon et al., 2018; Narayanan & Clark, 2017; Whitaker, 2019). The concept involves allocating a certificate to a digital document, which includes the date of its creation and associated details that enable the retrieval and verification of a document's creation date (Kemmoe et al., 2020). In 1994, Szabo presented the concept of smart contracts as a framework for performing electronic contractual commitments. These obligations encompass various aspects, including payment schedules, conditions, confidentiality, and procedures for enforcement. Also, smart contract design aims to mitigate purposeful and inadvertent deviations from the contract while minimizing reliance on intermediaries (Ng, 2017; Popper, 2015a, 2015b). In 1996, Szabo described smart contracts, which incorporate contractual elements such as liens, bonding, and property rights. The objective was to financially penalize contract offenders. Szabo defined smart contract characteristics as verifiability, privity, observability, and enforceability (Brammertz & Mendelowitz, 2019; Magazzeni et al., 2017; Vigliotti, 2021).

The incorporation of blockchain technology facilitates the decentralized implementation of modern smart contracts. These contracts offer dependable service availability and facilitate automated transactions according to predetermined parameters (Gabashvili et al., 2022; Hewa et al., 2021; Malkovský, 2015; Zheng et al., 2020). Smart contracts enhance confidence by allowing parties to independently verify contract terms and conditions. Smart contracts are compact code segments containing mutually agreed-upon terms. Participants can examine the code for compliance with the provisions, ensuring that a registered blockchain contract remains unmodified (Alharby & Van Moorsel, 2017; Stibe et al., 2023; Vigliotti, 2021).

Smart contracts consist of states, which are variables that hold data, as well as functions, which are code segments that can read or modify the states. The process of establishing a smart contract involves executing its constructor function using a blockchain transaction, which subsequently leads to the storage of the generated code on the blockchain (Khan & Byun, 2020; Luu et al., 2016).

Ethereum introduced a revolutionary feature to the realm of blockchains by incorporating a Turing-complete programming language, which enables the construction of smart contracts (Anderson et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2023a, 2023b; Jani, 2017). Ethereum smart contracts facilitate peer-to-peer DApp development. By employing Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security⁷ protocols, they ensure the secure transmission of encrypted data. This implementation minimizes variations in the encrypted traffic detected among different DApps operating on the same platform (Wang et al., 2020).

Smart contracts are written in Solidity (Hasan & Salah, 2019; Huh et al., 2017), and their implementation within Ethereum is facilitated by the Ethereum Virtual Machine⁸ (Park et al., 2023a, 2023b). EVM is a quasi-turing complete state machine that executes commands and modifies state values within a predetermined gas limit given for contract execution. It uses a stack-based architecture, including read-only memory,⁹ memory, and account storage, to store state values and contract programmes' bytecode (Xu et al., 2018). The Ethereum bytecode is a set of opcodes and fixed values processed by the EVM with the developer's discretion for smart contract source code release, often remaining undisclosed (Norvill et al., 2019; Qasse et al., 2023).

By using smart contracts, blockchain games can provide genuine ownership of digital assets and direct transfers of them without third parties (Paajala et al., 2022). For example, the Crypto Kitties game uses smart contracts for operations such as buying, selling, and breeding cat-related items (Min et al., 2019). Another popular blockchain-based game is gambling. Like Cryptokitties, gambling games use smart contracts to prevent cheating and promote transparency (Li & Gao, 2019).

Nonfungible Tokens

In 2012–2013, the integration of file hashes into the Bitcoin blockchain was used to verify content authenticity, leading to the development of Colored Coins (Anand et al., 2016; Kräussl & Tugnetti, 2023; Schueffel et al., 2019; Steinwold, 2019). Subsequently, the Namecoin blockchain utilized tokens to facilitate the registration of domain names, establishing an alternative and decentralized system for managing top-level domains (Kalodner et al., 2015; Ko et al., 2023; Taherdoost, 2022). Counterparty memes Rare Pepes demonstrates how blockchain-enabled trading might expand NFT applications (Choudhary, 2022; Idelberger & Mezei, 2022). The popularity of Ethereum led to a surge in meme trading in 2017, with Peperium being a decentralized marketplace and trading card game specifically designed for exchanging memes (Trevisi et al., 2022). In 2019, Cryptopunks was created by John Watkinson and Matt Hall, integrating NFTs into the Ethereum blockchain and allowing users to generate and acquire unique characters (Schaar & Kampakis, 2022; Steinwold, 2019; Zhang et al., 2023).

The smart contract of the token includes metadata, ensuring uniqueness. Network participants can verify the NFT's authenticity and transaction history, preventing counterfeit duplicates (Popescu, 2021). Additional components, such as the creator's wallet address for purposes of identification and a link to the original work, can also be included in NFTs (Guadamuz, 2021). The core concept underlying NFT is simply a digital certificate of authenticity that is inherently nonreproducible (Sestino et al., 2022). The term “non-fungible” originates from economic and accounting contexts, signifying anything that cannot be exchanged for an identical or similar item (Chohan, 2021a, 2021b; Regner et al., 2019).

Nonfungible tokens use smart contracts for verifiability, tamper resistance, and traceability, as they are stored on transparent blockchains like Ethereum, providing decentralized applications with a secure and transparent solution (Dowling, 2022; Guadamuz, 2021; Pinto-Gutiérrez et al., 2022; Wilson et al., 2022). Smart contracts are crucial for managing ownership and transferability of NFTs, facilitating transactions, and ensuring their enforcement (Ante, 2022; Khan et al., 2021; Schmitz, 2022).

The Ethereum network is experiencing a rise in the quantity of Ethereum Improvement Proposals.¹⁰ Within this, the Ethereum Request for Comment¹¹ represents a subset, most of which outline templates for contracts intended for specific purposes (Norvill et al., 2019). ERC is a document that outlines Ethereum's environmental elements and is open to peer review. It simplifies smart contract operations on the Ethereum network (Goyal et al., 2020). NFTs are created and utilized on Ethereum by implementing the ERC721 standard (Duguleană & Gîrbacia, 2021; Hong & Chang, 2022) which was formally established in 2018 (Houser & Holden, 2022). ERC721 outlines metadata requirements and smart contract functions compatible with various trading platforms and interfaces (Casale-Brunet et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021).

Nonfungible tokens are used in video games to enhance character visuals by offering exclusive outfits and limited-edition products (Scheiding, 2022). Players can claim ownership over assets through activities such as breeding, earning unique items, purchasing digital items, or creating new characters (Osivand, 2022).

Crypto Kitties, an immensely successful game, facilitates the exchange and reproduction of crypto cats as NFTs (Min et al., 2019; Sako et al., 2021). Three factors determine Crypto Kitties token value: blockchain's sociotechnical power, perceived materiality, and ownership (Serada, 2020; Serada et al., 2021; Smith, 2022).

The metaverse is incorporating NFTs into its economic structure (Park et al., 2022; Zainab et al., 2022), offering a variety of game-related assets and equipment (Far et al., 2022). Trading NFTs enables individuals to support events and express opinions, establishing communities where NFT owners may communicate, share ideas, and collaborate (Usmani et al., 2022).

Play-to-Earn¹² Model

In the past, video games primarily followed a pay-to-own¹³ model where customers purchased gaming consoles, handheld devices, or software to access gameplay features and levels. The player's game progression determines access to additional game content (Alha et al., 2014). The emergence of the free-to-play¹⁴ model, the subscription model, and the freemium model can be attributed to the widespread availability of broadband internet (King et al., 2019).

The utilization of digital assets, including NFTs and cryptocurrencies, has generated considerable attention in the advancement of blockchain games constructed upon the play-to-earn model (Jiang et al., 2022). The fundamental concept underlying these games is that players receive digital assets as a form of reward during gameplay (Lee & Park, 2023). These assets can be traded within the game environment or converted into fiat currency through cryptocurrency exchanges. Open blockchain-based asset trading in games eliminates the necessity of secondary marketplaces since smart contracts safeguard sales, reducing the risk of fraudulent activities (Sareen 2023).

Many P2E games necessitate an initial investment to acquire the primary NFT, wherein early participants acquire these tokens and subsequently accumulate wealth through in-game activities (Lee & Park, 2023).

In certain instances, P2E games convert playing into labour, and participation in such games is no longer voluntary. A number of individuals, particularly those from underprivileged communities, engage in these games to generate revenue. Axie Infinity, a P2E game that engages underprivileged people, serves as an illustrative example (Aguila et al., 2022; Delfabbro et al., 2022; Karapapas et al., 2022; Kshetri, 2022).

Conclusion and Vision

In conclusion, the dynamic landscape of blockchain gaming has witnessed remarkable growth over the past decade, although the existing literature reveals a notable scarcity of comprehensive investigations into the potential applications and advantages that blockchain technology brings to the gaming sector. This study aimed to bridge this gap by conducting an in-depth review of prior research related to the features of blockchain technology within the context of blockchain-based gaming. To bolster our conclusion, we summarize the main findings from the literature:

Evolution of Smart Contracts: From tamper-resistant timestamps to decentralized execution on platforms like Ethereum, smart contracts have become instrumental in automating and securing contractual commitments.

Role of NFTs in Blockchain Gaming: NFTs have evolved as digital certificates of authenticity, offering unique ownership of assets in the digital domain. The ERC-721 standard on Ethereum ensures the secure and transparent management of NFTs through smart contracts.

Play-to-Earn Model: The P2E model represents a change in basic assumptions in gaming, offering players the opportunity to earn digital assets through gameplay. While it presents advantages such as transparent transactions, the ethical implications of turning play into a source of income, as seen in Axie Infinity, need careful consideration.

In drawing implications from these findings, we recognize the potential for blockchain technology to revolutionize the gaming sector by providing secure, transparent, and decentralized frameworks. Table 3 summarizes these blockchain use cases for the gaming industry. However, we also highlight the need for further research, particularly through primary methodologies such as surveys and case studies, to understand user experiences, motivations, and challenges in adopting blockchain-based games. Additionally, we emphasize the role of blockchain technology in shaping the metaverse, fostering innovation, and ensuring an inclusive and enduring outlook for blockchain gaming.

Table 3.

Blockchain use cases in gaming industry.

Blockchain	Application in games
Smart Contracts	Automating transactions and securing trade activities
NFTs	Ownership, transferability
DAOs	Eliminating the need for centralized organizations
Cryptocurrencies	In-game trading

This study on blockchain technology in gaming has limitations due to its reliance on English-language sources. It may lack valuable insights from non-English sources, limiting cross-cultural and global perspectives. Future research should incorporate primary research methodologies such as surveys, interviews, or case studies to gain firsthand perspectives from key participants in the blockchain gaming ecosystem. Understanding user experiences, motivations, and obstacles that limit the adoption of blockchain-based games is crucial for game makers. Blockchain technology can enable applications, including the advancement of Metaverse, a globally accessible and decentralized content infrastructure. The incorporation of blockchain technology has the potential to act as a payment layer inside this framework, hence enabling the formation of game production platforms. This effort holds the capacity to significantly influence the progress and growth of this emerging discipline, foster innovation, and ensure a more inclusive and enduring outlook for blockchain gaming.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Golshid Jaferian

Darya Ramezani

Notes

Author Biographies

Golshid Jaferian is a Ph.D. student in Digital Media at the Antoinette Westphal College of Media Arts & Design at Drexel University. Her work focuses on computer games, educational games, and Blockchain and Metaverse technology.

Darya Ramezani is a PhD student at the Antoinette Westphal College of Media Arts & Design at Drexel University. She has been working on serious games, Blockchain and Metaverse technology, and immersive media.

Michael G. Wagner (Ph.D.) is a professor and Department Head of Digital Media at the Antoinette Westphal College of Media Arts & Design at Drexel University. His work focuses on the theory and practice of the educational use of digital media, immersive audio, computer games, and Blockchain technology.

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Blockchain Potentials for the Game Industry: A Review

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Method

Blockchain: History and Definition

Cryptocurrency

Decentralized Autonomous Organization

Smart Contracts

Nonfungible Tokens

Play-to-Earn 12 Model

Conclusion and Vision

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iDs

Notes

Author Biographies

References

Play-to-Earn¹² Model