Abstract
This case tells the story of a failed public–private partnership. It illustrates how stakeholders, encouraged by the current political context, rushed into a partnership without establishing a basis for mutual understanding and expectations. As a result of this hasty arrangement, questions emerged over who ultimately controlled decisions related to curriculum and personnel issues. This case speaks to educational school and district leaders as well as private sector actors interested in becoming involved in public education. Students studying this case should examine the power and potential of memos of understanding and contracts, the importance of a unified educational vision and the successes and pitfalls of public–private partnerships.
Keywords
Introduction
Former Mayor Michael Bloomberg embraced the concept of creating a “portfolio of schools,” modeled after the investment portfolios of the corporate world. During his tenure, the New York City Department of Education (DOE) made a series of decisions that significantly expanded the involvement and influence of private sector players in New York City’s schools (DiMartino, 2014; Bulkley, Henig, & Levin, 2010; Foley, 2010). One such policy involved the creation of new small schools, many of which were required to be partnered with private sector organizations called Partner Support Organizations, or PSOs. Examples of PSOs include The College Board and New Visions for Public Schools (DiMartino, 2009; Foley, 2010). The theory behind this reform embraced the idea that public schools needed to partner with outside actors to push for innovation and change within schools. The PSOs received funding from foundations, such as the Gates’ Foundation, to support the growth of these small schools during the first 4 years of the school’s existence. The amount depends on the partner support organization, ranging from US$400,000 to US$575,000, or about 10% of what the district provides to each school for annual operating expenses (Foley, 2010). Principals of these new schools sought out the PSO’s money and support to help launch their schools. Partnerships tended to happen fast, and funds were readily exchanged. Partners seldom discussed the parameters of the relationship, including who controls key educational decisions.
Overview of the Case
This case unfolds over four parts. It begins, in Part I, by focusing on the contextual factors that influenced an actual principal–PSO partnership in 2004. The motivations to partner, the partnership process, stakeholder characteristics, and student selection processes will be discussed in this section. Part II examines whose educational values—those of the school community and/or those of the PSO—tended to set the agenda at the school level, and how power was negotiated when conflict emerged. This section explores issues of personnel and teaching and learning. These issues culminate in Part III, where the breakdown of communication and assertions of power between the key players lead to the dissolution of the partnership. The case concludes with Part IV, which explores issues of sustainability and scaling up for each organization as well as of this approach to school reform.
Part I: Contextual Factors That Affected the Partnership
The Partnership Quest: A Speedy Union
In the fall of 2004, A DOE principal partnered with Metropolitan United, a PSO, to found a new small school named Excelsior Academy (Excelsior). The vision for Excelsior came from Principal James, an African American in his 30s. Before founding Excelsior, James worked as a teacher in New York City for 3 years, and later co-founded charter schools in New York and New Jersey. Rather than seeking a placement in an existing school, James wanted to create a new school that followed his own educational vision and philosophies. James knew that he wanted to create a school that would be all male, college preparatory, and which would develop urban business and community leaders.
James’s completion of his aspiring principal’s program corresponded with the DOE’s push for schools to be co-founded with partner support organizations. James understood that partnering with, in particular, a Gates funded partner support organization would provide his school with, “an additional $575,000 of grant money to spend over the next four years,” as well as in-kind support. This was the money that James described as being free of “DOE red tape” which often makes purchasing difficult because of long turnaround times and vendor restrictions. To this end, James isolated his search: The City University of New York (CUNY), and the College Board were his top choices. By happenstance, at one of College Board information sessions, he ran into a friend who was also starting a new school with an organization called Metropolitan United. The friend recommended that he contact Metropolitan United because they moved quickly. James explained, I e-mailed Metropolitan United and they got back to me. It was an ultra quick turnaround. My first interview was on a Saturday afternoon, my second was on Monday night and then they hired me on Tuesday or whatever partnered with me.
Throughout the spring of 2005, James and Metropolitan United worked together to get the school accepted by the DOE, and then to prepare for its opening in the fall of 2005.
From Partner to Manager: An Introduction to Metropolitan United
Since the late 1990s, Metropolitan United had been involved in the creation of more than 15 schools in New York City, predominantly serving low-income students. Metropolitan United’s founder and president, Steven Burger, a White male in his 60s, trained as a lawyer and had spent the majority of his life as a successful businessman before entering the educational realm. Burger was also personal friends with the school’s chancellor, Joel Klein. Unlike many PSOs which embraced a particular school design model. Burger’s original vision for new small school reform rested on two pillars: themes and partnership. Themes, such as sports or law, provided a base around which a school would build goals for education, which in turn helped to define its curriculum and approaches to teaching. To help with the integration of the school’s theme and to coordinate the work of partners, each Metropolitan United school was required to have a partnership coordinator. Hired by Metropolitan United and the school’s principal, the partnership coordinator worked inside the school.
From the fall of 2004 until the spring of 2006, Metropolitan United’s role was solely as partner support organization co-founding new small schools and supporting the development of their theme. During this period, Principal James received nearly all technical and financial support from the district, not Metropolitan United. In James’s mind Metropolitan United encouraged him to have a theme and gave him seed money, but otherwise asserted no authority over his school.
The Metropolitan United Contract
In 2006, Metropolitan United’s relationship with Excelsior would take a decided turn. On July 1, 2006, Metropolitan United signed a contract with the DOE to independently manage and support schools in the Metropolitan United network (personal communication, October 16, 2006). No longer content to support from the sidelines, Metropolitan United was now looking to take the reins as a school manager. As Burger put it, “we’re operating and managing the schools. There’s no district, there’s no district.” When asked why he chose to take this route, his main reason was that schools in the Metropolitan United network received inconsistent support around curriculum, budgeting and personnel from the district; which he thought could be better served with direct support. Metropolitan United was able to realize this desire for more control by leveraging Burger’s professional and personal ties. Specifically, his relationships with the Chancellor and other high-ranking officials at the DOE were instrumental. In the case of Metropolitan United, Burger’s social networks helped secure, as the Metropolitan United website described, “an unprecedented collaborative management agreement that may become a prototype for other public/private school management contracts.” The contract signed by Burger and members of the DOE gave Metropolitan United authority to operate public schools and assume responsibility for their success and student achievement (personal communication).
What would this change in authority mean for the Excelsior–Metropolitan United partnership? Under a “prototype contract,” it was ambiguous as to what “operating public schools” would entail, especially since the Metropolitan United contract remained distinct from the types of relationships the other support structures had with schools. From Burger’s point of view, the fact that all Metropolitan United schools were listed as being under the DOE was “administrative only. We are not reporting to the DOE, it’s a technicality.” Although Metropolitan United affiliated schools were officially listed as being part of the DOE, principals reported to and were held accountable by Metropolitan United. An aura of mystery surrounded the Metropolitan United–DOE contract. It was not officially recognized as a type of school support on the DOE website.
In many ways, the contract looked similar to the type of management agreement that an educational management company or a charter school might have with a district, specifying the terms and conditions of school support, funding, personnel, accountability, and exiting the agreement. On this note, Burger described this contract as a type of privatization in education, breaking away from “a system of top down control.”
The Transition From Partner to Manager or Metropolitan United Becomes the “The Man”
When Metropolitan United presented this new contractual relationship to the principals of Metropolitan United schools in summer 2006, they highlighted certain “non-negotiables,” which the principals and their teachers would have to follow: (a) meeting performance expectations; (b) attending Metropolitan United principal meetings and events; (c) participating in the principals’ network; (d) providing accurate school data; (e) collaborating on key hires: principals, assistant principals, mentorships, and partnership coordinators; and (f) implementing programs in key areas: college-bound, mentors and partnerships (personal communication, October 16, 2006). These “non-negotiables” marked a stark shift in the way Metropolitan United would be interacting with schools. No longer simply acting as an agent of support for the theme and partnerships, Metropolitan United would be officially playing a role in hiring and firing, professional development, accountability measurements, and curricular programs. A member of Metropolitan United reflected on the governance change: Metropolitan United had been in a relationship with our schools where we were their advocates, we fought the man for the schools, and now Metropolitan United is the man! This new role changed the relationship. Last year [2006-2007] was a transition year. We each did our dance.
Part II: Decision-Making Processes
Decision-Making Processes: Personnel
Personnel
When the partnership began in 2004, administrative decisions, such as curriculum and budgeting, fell primarily under James’s domain as the principal, with the exception of faculty and administrative hiring decisions. These personnel decision were made in concert by the principal, teachers, and Metropolitan United, though Principal James’s involvement was the most extensive; he coordinated and ultimately hired all new teachers and support staff. Yet Metropolitan United, according to their list of non-negotiables, retained the right to collaborate “on key hires: Principals, assistant principals, mentorship and partnership coordinators.” When probed about why Metropolitan United wanted to be involved in hiring decisions, Burger shared that a lot of it had to do with experience. In his opinion, as all of Metropolitan United’s principals were first timers they were not experienced at hiring other administrators, making it important for Metropolitan United and its staff to act as another check.
Metropolitan United also wanted to play a role in hiring teachers. Principal James expressed frustration with Metropolitan United’s involvement, characterizing the situation as having a “double boss,” meaning both the district (DOE) and Metropolitan United. As he explained, One of the things they had us do in the planning period was that all of the people that we were considering hiring, Metropolitan United also wanted to interview. So number one they didn’t ask us, they told us. Number two, it was just illegal. It is against the law they can’t do that. So, it was more of a conversation, so they termed it.
On the positive side, James admitted that Metropolitan United added, “another objective third party perspective on these people, which is tremendously helpful.”
Burger saw the management contract as the lever he needed to push schools to improve. He explained that, post management contract, if a school was struggling to meet its academic targets, Metropolitan United planned to institute this idea of a school in need of intervention (a similar strategy used by the state), and then depending on what the problem is and how pervasive, et cetera—then or when they lose control over their budget then they lose the ability to hire teachers.
In this way, Burger saw it as within Metropolitan United’s purview to re-assert control if necessary, including making personnel decisions. With contractual changes starting in 2006, what was not clearly defined was the question of who had hiring and firing authority over James himself; Metropolitan United, the DOE, or both?
Decision Making: Teaching and Learning
Curricular and instructional decision-making power would change tremendously from the 2005-2006 to 2006-2007 school years, corresponding to the periods when the school was under the district and Metropolitan United governance structures, respectively. As one teacher exclaimed, “[this school is] such a good school to choose [to study] because we’ve been under the district, we’ve been in the network and we’ve been in a partnership. We’ve really experienced it all!” Depending on the governance structure, each group of decision makers possessed its own educational philosophies. Under the district structure, teachers reported following the district’s curricular guidelines, especially in math and English Language Arts, and attending professional development opportunities offered by the district. Although many mentioned trying to implement the theme of the school into their lessons, Metropolitan United had no role in the selection of curricula.
Although the majority of teachers referred to the district providing professional development sessions during this period, only one teacher recounted attending a professional development sponsored by Metropolitan United for English teachers. However, teachers’ experiences were set to change drastically in the following year, as Metropolitan United hired managers to do the work of the district.
The contract that Metropolitan United signed with the DOE stipulated that Metropolitan United needed to have a school support team, guided by an educational leader, to work with its schools. Burger understood that his Metropolitan United team needed to grow to fulfill its role as manager of schools. In the summer of 2006, Burger hired four new employees to provide schools with educational and technical support.
In describing the work of the school support team, the new team leader, Shannon Shaken, explained, “we have an achievement coach, a special services manager, and a business manager … think of us as a mini-district, closer to the locus of control.” A White female in her late fifties, Shaken had worked in the DOE for more than 30 years as a teacher and an administrator. Along with these new staff members, Metropolitan United also hired a new executive director, Claire Sondheim, a former superintendent, to guide the organization in its new capacity. In addition to these personnel changes, Metropolitan United began researching new curricular programs for its schools to implement, including Jensen’s College Readiness program and the Education Trust program. By the summer of 2006, the new members of Metropolitan United were in place–bringing with them their own educational philosophies and agendas. From the beginning, the new Metropolitan United players found themselves at pedagogical odds with members of the Excelsior school community.
The Learn Now incident
Teachers and members of the school community recounted “the Learn Now incident” as a harbinger of the strife to come. In August 2006, the Metropolitan United Executive Director and Network Team Leader began organizing a summer retreat for Metropolitan United schools. However, the planning neglected to take into account that in the spring of 2006, James and his faculty, with the approval and encouragement of Metropolitan United, had won a Learn Now grant. The program focused on teaching academically at-risk students of color the necessary study skills to achieve in school, in line with the school’s mission. Although James had informed Metropolitan United about the dates of this professional development, that information seemed to have been lost in the personnel shuffle at Metropolitan United. Thus, dates conflicted, and James chose Learn Now over Metropolitan United’s professional development session. Recalling the many small steps that would risk a major break, the partnership coordinator shared, I know they [Metropolitan United leaders] had brought up that he didn’t attend the principal retreat in the summer, but it was because we were at the Learn Now training that he’d told them about months in advance. They were unhappy about that.
Some teachers also believed that the new Metropolitan United director and support team leader had philosophical differences with Learn Now’s approach to teaching and learning. Specifically, that Learn Now focused on basic study and organizational skills, while the network leader was very “anti explicit teaching.” Similar issues of conflicting educational philosophies would arise during Metropolitan United staff members’ visits to Excelsior.
Shannon Shaken’s first visit and memorandum
Tension between Excelsior and Metropolitan United became markedly more acute after Shannon Shaken, who directed Metropolitan United’s instructional team, made her first visit to the school. Shaken’s review would be resoundingly negative, souring the relationship between the partners. In fact, every teacher interviewed for this study mentioned Shaken’s visits and her resulting memorandum; one even carried pieces of it around with him as a reminder. Describing the visit, Principal James recalled, She’s visiting classes, she’s talking with teachers, she’s talking with kids. She’s going to lunch and recess. She’s all over the place. At the end she gives me a 100% negative review, like she had nothing good to say. So at the end I say, you had nothing good to say? And she was just like, “yeah, I know it’s hard to hear,” that was her response.
In her memorandum to James, Shaken spoke critically about the school environment, approaches to teaching, curricular content, and the overall lack of classroom libraries, without targeting specific faculty, administrators, or support staff. An excerpt from the memo read, If you used the Excelsior Teacher Checklist, with the exception of one teacher, none would receive a satisfactory. I stated to you that there was virtually no engagement in any classes I saw. Teachers do not smile at students and students do not smile at teachers either. I saw no interactions between individual students and teachers.
Although this is a small excerpt from the memorandum, it accurately captures its overall tone and style. Although Shaken did offer some suggestions toward the end of the memorandum, such as increasing teachers’ knowledge of “pre-adolescent and adolescent development,” she did not provide clear strategies on how to tackle the many problems she perceived in the school.
James disseminated Shaken’s memo, with his appended comments, to faculty and staff. The memorandum and subsequent visits made Excelsior’s faculty and staff very frustrated, particularly because, in their previous experiences working with the district and with Metropolitan United, they had received generally positive feedback. An English teacher explained: “I don’t understand what caused the change, but it did feel like it was night and day from one year to the next in our relationship with them.”
Teachers posited the change was the result of a shift in governance. The same English teacher continued, This year Metropolitan United kind of took on more of the district role. They would come in and look at the classes. Except for, with the district, I always knew what they wanted to see. It’s a Learning Point (LP) district, so if I’m doing LP in here, they’re happy. But Metropolitan United didn’t give us any kind of materials so when they came, it’s like, “I don’t know what you’re looking for.” I didn’t know what they wanted.
Teachers felt that they were being held to shifting standards, with no clear guidance on expectations. One teacher shared that she wanted to know what Metropolitan United’s mandates were for the school. Excelsior’s teachers had missed the Metropolitan United orientation at the beginning of the school year, and could not recall being invited to any Metropolitan United–sponsored professional development sessions in the 2006-2007 school year. A math teacher explained, “Metropolitan United was constantly speaking poorly of us without any kind of support or any kind of conversations around it. Everything we got passed down from them came through Mr. James.” Rather than sparking intended change, Metropolitan United’s feedback seemed to galvanize the school community’s opposition to the influence of its partner.
Drawing the Battle Lines
By the middle of the fall semester, teachers felt that “there was some type of battle going on between Mr. James and Metropolitan United.” The partnership coordinator, conjectured that Metropolitan United was particularly upset with Mr. James because “James would push back on some of Metropolitan United’s ideas and say, that’s not going to work at my school.” As rancorous behavior continued, teachers began to wonder about their fate, the school’s fate, and the fate of Principal James. A social studies teacher, remembered, For the longest time we didn’t know what was going on. We didn’t know if we were leaving Metropolitan United. We didn’t know if Metropolitan United was going to get rid of Mr. James. We didn’t know.
The staff remained supportive of their principal. A science teacher recalled, I remember people saying, if we had to choose we’d rather not be part of Metropolitan United. If this is what it’s going to mean to be a Metropolitan United school we don’t want any part of it. If we’re going to lose our principal in order to be a Metropolitan United school we’d rather keep our principal and not be a Metropolitan United school.
Part III: The Dissolution of the Partnership
After Shaken’s critical memorandum, it had been settled that Principal James would be creating a work plan for improving Excelsior due in early October. Yet right before the deadline, James received a letter requesting an intervention conference with the principal and the principal’s union representation. This development surprised James. He could not understand why a intervention conference, usually a precursor to termination, would be scheduled before he had even handed in his work plan. James quickly contacted his union representation. James described the meeting: It was the most horrible meeting I have ever been to in my life. It was like they asked me everything conceivable. How many years had I taught before and what’s your instructional vision, what does your instruction look like? It was all this because they were trying to assess my capacity to do the job. So near the end of the meeting my union rep says nothing the whole time. She’s writing, taking notes. So near the end of the meeting she says, so you’re not his grading officer so what does all this mean?
The representative from the principal’s union was referring to local legislation and union regulations that stipulate that the community superintendent, as the principal’s rating officer, was the only official allowed to evaluate the work of the principal. She went on to inform the Metropolitan United participants that as they were not James’ rating officers, and, in fact, not even DOE employees, the community superintendent would need to get involved.
Reflecting on the situation, James’s view is that the principals’ union was particularly supportive of him because of their opinion that the Mayor was “creating quasi-charter schools; which is illegal. He’s privatizing public education in such a way where the people, the community, or our membership no longer has the authority to supervise these principals and assistant principals.” The community superintendent visited Excelsior in November. James described the superintendent’s review of Excelsior as being “very middle of the road;” not strong enough to have him fired as principal.
Meanwhile, members of Metropolitan United expressed displeasure at the recent developments. They had assumed they had the authority to hire and fire principals and administrators in their network at will. However, a closer reading of their contract with the DOE revealed that members of the Metropolitan United network could only “make recommendations to the DOE regarding principal hiring, termination and incentives decisions.” The DOE would give their recommendations “great weight consistent with the intent of this agreement when making such decisions,” but no explicit authority was granted. Yet still, Burger espoused an expanded interpretation of the parameters of his power. He explained, We definitely hire them [principals]. The understanding is that I can hire and fire. That’s the understanding. They can’t say that, you know, put it in writing. And so basically what the contract says is that decisions, our recommendations on those matters will be given great weight. So the decision is still technically-well, certainly the Chancellor’s. I mean certainly if the Chancellor doesn’t want us to do something, we won’t do it.
This disconnect between the public, explicit, agreement outlined in the Metropolitan United–DOE contract, and the private, implicit “understanding” Burger believed he had with the Chancellor fueled great tension in the Excelsior school community, and would eventually lead to a dissolution of the partnership.
New York City DOE Response
Eventually, members of the DOE’s Office of New Schools would step in to make the ultimate decision about the fate of the partnership. In spite of this forced compromise, Burger would continue to argue for a broad interpretation of the powers afforded under Metropolitan United’s contractual agreement with the City. Yet when interviewed about personnel issues and intermediary organizations, Seymour Kaufman, an official at the DOE, described it as being a series of “checks and balances.” As he described it, members of Metropolitan United had a seat on the administrative committee, called a C30, which makes hiring decisions. This position gave members of the partner organization a say in hiring, but no role in firing principals. Officials at the Office of New Schools decided to support Principal James over Metropolitan United. At a follow-up meeting, he was given several options for the future; his choice was to stay on as principal at Excelsior, but to leave the Metropolitan United network.
Regardless, Burger still believed that he had always had the option to fire James from Excelsior, but had decided not to exercise that right because it would be politically disadvantageous for him and his relationship with the Chancellor. Burger explained, “I had authorization to fire him [James], but decided not to fire him because it would have displeased the Chancellor and the Office of New Schools.” He added, “Joel [Chancellor Klein] had been getting beaten up in the press a lot.” In Burger’s view, his political capital had afforded him a “back door” agreement with the Chancellor, and now political expediency was dictating Metropolitan United’s restrained response to an unruly principal.
Post Break-Up: Settling Accounts and Changing Names
In terms of logistics, breaking up with Metropolitan United directly affected the school’s foundational funding, the position of the partnership coordinator, external partnerships cultivated with the help of Metropolitan United, and the question of the school’s name. As previously described, the Gates Foundation’s small school model in New York City revolved around outside organizations receiving the grant money so that they could act as levers of change. To this end, Burger explained, “we fought hard for the Gates money to continue, but Gates was very firm and very clear. We give the money to the partners, not the schools. And so they-there wasn’t a lot involved anymore, but they lost it.” When asking Principal James how much money the school had lost, he said, “I don’t know. I’ve avoided counting … whatever I didn’t spend.” As the school received US$575,000 over a 4-year period, James estimated that the school spent about one third of the Gates money and that Metropolitan United kept two thirds of it. When compared with the overall annual school budget of about US$1 million, this was not a predominant funding stream, but as previously described, was particularly useful as a funding stream with little “red tape.” From a logistical perspective, Metropolitan United and James decided on an end date, which they used as a cutoff point for accessing Metropolitan United funds.
In addition to the cessation of funding streams, the fate of the partnership coordinator was an issue for the former partners as both saw her as a valuable asset to the school. Burger commented, “The school had a great partnership coordinator and a lot of programs that were working very well. And we didn’t want to see it disrupted. We didn’t want to see her lose her job.” The partnership coordinator shared the uncertainty of the moment: For a little while they [Metropolitan United] were saying I would stay for a month or something and then go to Metropolitan United and work out of their office. And meanwhile James and I were talking, saying if that’s what they want to do I’m just going to quit and you can hire me on a DOE line.
In the end, Metropolitan United and Principal James worked out a way for the partnership coordinator to stay at Excelsior by effectively transitioning the partnership coordinator to a DOE position.
Having settled the issue of funding and the partnership coordinator position, James turned to Excelsior’s other partnerships. Although James had direct relationships with some partners, others were facilitated through Burger’s networks. James recalled, One thing that Metropolitan United does for you very early and does relatively well is establish partnerships for you based on your theme. I called the partnership coordinator into my office two days later and [I] said, Metropolitan United is going to call and say we’re going to notify your partners that we’re no longer with you. We need to figure out how to preempt that, so let’s strategize.
In reaching out preemptively, the school was successful in maintaining these external relationships. The last issue that Excelsior had to address was its name. Following the break, there was pressure to drop Metropolitan United from the school’s title. Describing the climate, one of the teachers shared, “It was not a pleasant break, so it wasn’t like well, you can use our name. It wasn’t a marriage who splits nicely and you still have your husband’s last name. It wasn’t a nice divorce.” Immediately following the break, James recalled receiving an e-mail from the executive director of Metropolitan United, in which she “copying me on it, copying the world, said take Metropolitan United off the name of the school.” Metropolitan United’s moniker was officially removed from the school title, stationary, and signage as well. The “divorce” was swift, and final.
This case covers the period of 2004-2007, the peak of new small schools’ creation in New York City. Championed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and funded primarily by foundations, this approach to school reform relied heavily on private organizations partnering with public schools. The case highlights the challenges of partnerships, the pitfalls of changing management contracts, and how evolving governance and political contexts directly affect those working in public schools.
Discussion Questions
Did the Mayor have a vision for how to reform public education?
What levers did the Mayor use to see the implementation of his vision?
How did the vision of Burger change over time? How did these changes affect principal James and Excelsior?
How could some of the miscommunications between the Metropolitan United Community and the Excelsior community have been avoided?
What were the key breaking points in the partnership?
Was the relationship between Excelsior and Metropolitan United a partnership or something else? If so, how would you characterize the relationship?
How could the role of the partnership coordinator have been modified to ease the tensions between Excelsior and Metropolitan United?
What personality traits exhibited by Principal James and Burger foreshadowed the failure of the partnership?
What role did the failure of community building on the part of Metropolitan United have in the demise of the partnership?
Teaching Notes
This case can be analyzed utilizing the lens of educational values. Kirst and Wirt’s (2009) The Political Dynamics of American Education offers a useful introduction to the basic values in education policy. These values—quality, efficiency, equity, and choice—help students interpret the New York City policy environment that encouraged the use of public–private partnerships to create and support schools, and of the tensions that arise between the partners over issues of curriculum, teaching, and hiring practices. Using the conceptual lens of educational values, students will reflect on stakeholder enactment of these values throughout the case, refer to Figure 1.
Description of educational values (Kirst & Wirt, 2009, pp. 69-70).
For example, the students will discuss the value of quality. How questions of quality of curriculum and teaching standards as well as hiring practices lay at the core of tensions between Metropolitan United staff members and Excelsior Academy’s administrators and teachers. Or, on a more macro-political level, what role does the value of choice play in small school reform. What does it mean that parents can choose from a portfolio of school offerings? And, more intimately to this case, what does is mean that a principal can choose to partner with a private sector actor to deliver a public good? All these become important and interesting questions for students and their teachers to engage in as they read, reflect on, and interpret this case.
As experienced in this case, stakeholders often clash over educational values, and, ultimately, one group or stakeholder’s vision prevails. Excelsior Academy and the Metropolitan United organization formed a partnership bounded by the context where New York City was pushing an experimental model: encouraging aspiring principals to partner with organizational partners in establishing schools. Through this values framework, we can see both the subtle and obvious differences in the values espoused by Principal James and Burger, Metropolitan United’s leader. In addition, we have the opportunity to identify the sources of power each of these primary stakeholders used to achieve their goals, specifically the enactment of their values at the school level. Here, discussions of positional power, power-plays, and agenda setting are key discussion points. It is also important to pursue a discussion about value alignment. How could stakeholders have acted differently to build a successful partnership? What small actions could have built trust rather than disunity?
This case provides insights into principal–private sector organization as a stakeholder in the complex business education ecosystem. We can see how Metropolitan United and the DOE, as external constituents, had values, expectations, and demands that affected Excelsior Academy. Key to this case is the myriad interpretations and sometimes misinterpretations of verbal and written agreements—concrete manifestations of their educational values—between stakeholders. We are able to acquire an understanding of the importance of contracts, how they are negotiated and the balancing of collaborative versus adversarial tactics in reaching agreements (DiMartino & Scott, 2013; Hill et al., 2009; Honig & DeArmond, 2010). The following activities provide instructors and students with opportunities to use critical analytic skills in decision making regarding stakeholder motivations and actions that form the skeleton of this case. In addition, students will acquire the skill to critique the areas of the case where effectively constructed contracts were or would have served to minimize conflict.
Activity 1: Role-Plays
Students will role-play the parts of Principal James and Burger. Using quotes available in the case as well as extrapolating from the case, the students will create a dialogue between the two stakeholders. Students will perform the dialogue in front of the class. The content of the dialogue should reveal stakeholders educational values and engage decision making around curriculum, personnel, or budget. Each actor must state his vision and agenda, and reveal a “power-play” to enact their goals. Students should be encouraged to “re-write” history. If they choose, they could use this opportunity to re-make this case into a successful partnership. Students will act out their parts in front of the class and then reflect on the outcomes of the interactions between stakeholders. During the reflection time, the class will be asked to think about the following questions:
What educational values did each stakeholder champion?
What was the tone of the dialogue? Were particular words more powerful than others? Did body language play a role?
Who were the winners and losers? If so, how do you know this?
Activity 2: Contract Analysis
Students will read, reflect, and respond to a contract, agreement, or memo of understanding between a district, state DOE, and a private sector partner. Students will be divided into groups of three, and each will be given an excerpt of a contract to read and analyze. After analysis, students will share their findings with the class. Students will be asked to consider the following:
Who is the author? Who signed the contract?
What are the key educational values at play?
What are the aspired outcomes from the district or state department of education?
What are the aspired outcomes for the private sector partner?
What potential problems does this contract avoid?
What potential problems does this contract create?
What would you add to the contract?
Relationship to Educational Leadership Courses
This case speaks to content taught in introductory educational administration courses as well courses in organizational theory and practice, and school and community relationships. The case would also be useful in educational law courses and in courses taught in business schools where there is a focus on entrepreneurial leadership.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.