Special Invited Paper

How Do We Make Sense of Such Statements?

I propose using grounded theory methods. For newcomers to grounded theory, and perhaps to qualitative research more generally, here is a definition. Grounded theory methods consist of a systematic approach to qualitative inquiry for the purpose of theory construction. ¹ This method begins with inductive data and adopts key strategies for doing research. Since its earliest days when Glaser and Strauss (1967) created grounded theory, the method has emphasized data analysis. It does have implications for data collection, which are beginning to be articulated (Charmaz, 2014a, 2015b). Grounded theory uses comparative methods throughout the analysis, as I explain below. A major benefit of using grounded theory is that it inspires researchers’ continued involvement in the research process. In short, grounded theory is an interactive method from the beginning of the research through the last draft of the report.

Which strategies form the core of grounded theory? What continuities can we discern among versions of the method? What contradictions can we find between different versions of grounded theory? How do these contradictions affect research practice? How do new versions of grounded theory contribute to theorizing and to critical inquiry? and Which practices do we need to enact?

To answer these questions, I begin with a brief overview of grounded theory and the logic of its strategies for those who are unfamiliar with the method. Next, I argue that shifting the ontological and epistemological foundations of grounded theory to the constructivist version resolves contradictions in the method and strengthens it. Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) follows the inductive, emergent, open-ended, and iterative approach of Glaser and Strauss’s first statement of the method but goes further. CGT integrates developments in qualitative inquiry over the past 60 years and, moreover, treats data and theorizing about these data as constructed, not discovered. ² Thus, I introduce how CGT rejects the positivist epistemology of earlier versions and builds on the pragmatist heritage of Strauss (1959, 1961, 1993). The result makes the method more flexible, places it in the social constructionist tradition, brings reflexivity into the forefront, and opens a path to critical inquiry.

Grounded theory means that we researchers consider and assess all possible theoretical understandings of our data, including our own new theoretical constructions. We develop tentative interpretations about the data through constructing codes, the labels we give fragments of data, and nascent theoretical categories, the abstract terms we construct to account for batches of data and clusters of codes. Then, we check and refine our major categories. We do that in several ways by (1) using our categories to comb through earlier data that we collected before defining the category, (2) returning to the field site(s) and gathering more data, and (3) building focused questions to flesh out our categories during later data collection.

What distinguishes grounded theorists from other researchers? Grounded theorists value theory construction over description, patterns in the data over individual stories, developing fresh concepts and theories over applying received theory, and theorizing processes over assuming stable structures. Grounded theorists view the contexts, situations, and actions constituting structures as shifting, as well as our responses to them.

Grounded theory is more than a specific method of qualitative analysis. It is a general method and its strategies have been generalized—and stretched over the decades. Questions about grounded theory supersede the method. Rather, current questions and challenges about grounded theory explicate issues pervading qualitative inquiry. Think about adopting British psychologists Henwood and Pigeon’s (2003) view of grounded theory. They see it as a useful nodal point where researchers can discuss and debate contemporary issues throughout qualitative inquiry.

Such discussions and debates raise fundamental questions about qualitative inquiry, how we should conduct it, which purposes it serves, as well as claims about what grounded theory really is, and whose versions should be followed. Grounded theory is a contested method from within and without. Despite being contested, grounded theory has become the most widely adopted qualitative method.

Nonetheless, researchers have often misunderstood and misused grounded theory. (Understand that what stands as misunderstanding and misusing the method flows from specific perspectives of it.) That said, tensions between its positivist and pragmatist roots have been evident from the beginnings of the method until the present. These tensions contribute to misunderstandings and have resulted in contradictions in the method and contested versions of it. Yet, the development of different versions of the method opens new spaces for integrating methodological advancements occurring over almost six decades.

Different Versions of Grounded Theory Rely on Similar Methodological Strategies

Essentially, grounded theory approaches are a constellation of methods (see also Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2010, 2014a). Proponents of various versions of grounded theory share certain common methodological strategies.

Grounded theorists of various persuasions subscribe to the following research practices (Charmaz, 2014a, 2015a), even if they do not consistently follow all of them:

Going back and forth between collecting and analyzing data—grounded theory is an iterative process.

Data collection sparks analysis.

To give an idea of how grounded theory works in practice, recall Emily’s story when she tells about seeing her reflected image. How can we analyze Emily’s statements? What might we think is happening in these data? What does Emily mean when she says:

…It’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience, because I don’t know that person.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Initial Grounded Theory Codes	Emily’s Interview Statement
Contextualizing concern Joining self and body Struggling to reconcile past and present images of body and self Catching glimpses of new body Seeing unsettling images Disavowing the unrecognizable image as self Experiencing a lag between the new body and self	It’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience because I don’t know that person.

Our initial engagement with coding can give us ideas to work with. Already I have gained some interesting ideas about these data. “Experiencing a lag between the new body and self” sparks ideas and speaks to experiences beyond weight. Seeing those unsettling images is an intriguing experience to follow. The notion of “disavowing the unrecognizable image as self” captures my attention.

The data we collect, the codes we construct, the questions we ask, and the comparisons we make, all shape our emerging analyses.

Tina echoes Emily’s concern about the jarring effect of seeing unsettling images of one’s body. Tina’s story also brings in the added dimensions of wholeness, its absence, and sympathy. What is the relationship between body image, self, and sympathy? What can we learn by comparing data? Bonnie’s statement gives some clues when she talks about being in pain and not being able to breathe.

Bonnie’s reflection tells of moments when suffering becomes visible and real to those who can—must—look and act. Despite his initial refusal to help, Joe soon sensed that Bonnie needed critical care. Defining “seeing suffering as real” gives me another code for making comparisons. Bonnie’s story also reveals the tensions between the potential helper’s self-concerns and the escalating crisis. Tina’s story tells of people who see her disability but can turn away from it. Like Tina, Bonnie speaks of the unsettling images of body and self that are reflected by another person. Her account brings further complexity into the analysis. What does it mean when a close friend refuses to help? For getting immediate care? For images of self and one’s value? Bonnie’s story also raises further analytic questions about how images of the person sick body not only permeate the moment but also may puncture other people’s taken for granted views of the sick person. Further comparisons with other data may reveal conditions when the illness, which had lurked in the background leaps into the foreground.

Epistemological Assumptions Profoundly Affect Research Practice and Knowledge Production

Researchers from a variety of perspectives can use grounded theory strategies. Some proponents of grounded theory claim that this method can be used with any epistemology or perspective. My response to this claim is “yes” and “no.” Grounded theorists who adhere to different versions of the method can use the strategies of coding data, memo-writing, theoretical sampling, and sorting. How they use these strategies differs according to their epistemological assumptions. Thus, what they produce flows from their assumptions and concrete practices, both of which may be implicit or wholly taken for granted.

A few proponents of grounded theory even view this method as having no epistemology. I disagree. Buried underneath any method is a theory of knowledge. In their 2007 article in Qualitative Health Research, Carter and Little state: “A reflexive researcher actively adopts a theory of knowledge. A less reflexive researcher implicitly adopts a theory of knowledge” (2007, p. 1319). The theory of knowledge to which we subscribe or our claim to having no theory of knowledge has profound implications for which research questions we ask, the data we collect, our relationships with research participants, and how we render our analyses.

Underlying the views that grounded theory lacks an epistemology is the assumption that the strategies of grounded theory are neutral. Methodological strategies may be more or less helpful but they are not neutral. They come from somewhere at sometime. Ultimately, our methodological strategies derive from value positions and contain deeply held assumptions. Such fundamental assumptions inform what we do during our research in both subtle and obvious ways. One much contested assumption about positivist grounded theory is Glaser’s notion that we can enter our research with no preconceptions. He argues that reading earlier research and theory will preconceive how researchers interpret the data.

An increasing number of grounded theorists disagree (e.g., Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2000, 2008, 2014a; Clarke, 2005; Dunne, 2011; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003; Thornberg, 2012; Thornberg & Dunne, in press). Grounded theorists can develop their critical faculties to subject earlier works to thorough critique.

We all make assumptions about the world and about our methods. These assumptions shape our standpoints and starting points. Thus, our assumptions shape what we do during research and affect whether, when, how, and to what extent our standpoints change throughout the research process. Conducting qualitative inquiry means learning about the empirical world. Unlike earlier grounded theorists, constructivist grounded theorists attend to how, when, and to what extent our standpoints change during the research process.

CGT is located in time, space, and circumstance rather than general and separate from its origins and aimed toward abstract understanding rather than explanation and prediction. We constructivists assume that researchers are a part of what we see, we cannot stand apart from it. Our views are multiple and interpretive, not singular and self-evident (Charmaz & Henwood, in press).

Most of us would agree that our research participants’ standpoints change with their experience, and with the women I have quoted, it is a deeply embodied experience. Years before her statement above, Tina had told me about unsettling contrasts between how she experienced her body and the images of self-reflected to her by other people. At that time, Tina’s arthritis caused her to suffer from debilitating pain but it was visible only to herself. Instead, she looked like an exceptionally attractive young woman, an image to which she gave considerable attention. ³ Tina said,

I may look like I’m healthy and all this stuff and I get—all these guys start making catcalls and I’m in pain and it just seems incongruous . I go, “What are they whistling at?” I usually identify with how I feel, even though I go through a lot of effort to make myself look good, I still identify with how I feel . It’s like being—feeling like an old person in a young person…. It’s like only an old person is entitled to have all this pain. (Emphasis added)

The Positivist and Pragmatist Underpinnings of Grounded Theory Result in Contradictions Between Versions of the Method

Objectivist versions of the grounded theory method echo key tenets of positivism. CGT expresses its pragmatist heritage. This version of the method shifts the foundations of the method from positivism to a relativistic epistemology. By shifting the epistemological foundations of grounded theory, CGT changes research practice. ⁴ The following major differences between objectivist and CGT lead to divergent research practices:

CGT Gives Us a Route to Conducting Critical Qualitative Inquiry

CGT is aimed toward abstract understanding rather than explanation and prediction. To borrow a phrase from critical psychologist Stainton-Rogers (2013, p. 339), we aim for “explication not explanation” and thus move grounded theory away from its positivist roots. CGT offers an alternative to earlier versions predicated on positivism with its two touchstones of objectivity and empiricism, what many researchers call “naïve empiricism.” Rather than aiming for the positivistic goal of explanation of abstract generalizations, explication leads to insight and understanding. It necessitates gaining intimate knowledge of the research topic, participants, and settings. CGT encourages contextualizing the research in ways many grounded theorists have not done.

The pragmatist roots of CGT shape the methods focused on studying meanings and action. This focus supports developing critical inquiry. Meanings matter—whether given in language or hidden in silences. Actions can speak without words. All can heighten our awareness of the reach and content of power. CGT fosters taking power into account.

CGT helps us to unveil what we take for granted as well as what our participants take for granted. Excavating what our participants take for granted enables us to understand them in the context of their lives, including their actions, and concerns as political and public actors. Similarly, engaging in reflexivity helps us to excavate our preconceptions, to understand ourselves as methodologists and researchers, and to learn how our preconceptions reflect our positions (Mruck and Mey, in press; Ruokonen-Engler and Siouti, 2016). Social and cultural preconceptions become engraved in our consciousness. These derive from social class, gender, race, age, health, and professional statuses. If we don’t excavate our preconceptions, we foreclose a valuable route into critical inquiry.

In short, CGT encourages us to engage in Harding’s (1991) “strong reflexivity” and scrutinizes ourselves from our participants’ standpoints. She also asks us to stand behind our participants and view the specific social and cultural content of our project. We can subsequently locate our work in our methods, the hidden assumptions contained in these methods, and identify how this strong reflexivity challenges our standpoints, as well as how our work compares with other studies (Charmaz, 2017). And we can ask Vanner’s (2015) searching question: “Am I doing more harm than good?”

CGT fosters developing awareness of how Anglo-North American worldviews pervade qualitative inquiry—both in method and in practice. I advocate developing a strong methodological self-consciousness that pierces the taken-for-granted individualism in our methods and in our consciousness (Charmaz, 2017). Even social scientists and professionals seldom engage in deep reflexivity about unearned privileges such as those deriving from race, gender, social class, and/or health, unless they are directly affected by them (for notable exceptions, see Bainbridge, Whiteside, & McCalman, 2013; Schreiber & Thomm-Bonde, 2015; Vanner, 2015). Methodological self-consciousness includes examining our data and data collection practices in addition to what we do and how we do it when analyzing data. Engaging in critical inquiry intensifies our need to examine the sources and quality of our data. The stories above indicate the depth of the women’s experience and the openness of their reflections. In the excerpt below, Tina alludes to connections between image and illusion:

Tina’s evocative insight raises intriguing questions about relationships and tensions between image and illusion that transcend illness. We might not only further interrogate the experience of illness but also investigate relationships between image, illusion, and ideology in other realms. CGT not only aids researchers in theorizing but also fosters defining and developing emergent critical questions during the research process.

Qualitative researchers, including myself, have exported Anglo North American qualitative methods across the world. Critics (e.g., Alasuutari, 2004; Amelina & Faist, 2012; Gobo, 2011; Tarozzi, 2011) are correct that qualitative inquiry is imbued with taken-for-granted Anglo-North American ideas and approaches. ⁵ Neither fit conducting research in all communities and cultures. Indigenous qualitative researchers here in Canada and across the globe have critiqued and resisted conventional qualitative inquiry (e.g., Kovach, 2016; Smith, 1999). Their critiques and actions indicate the limits of Anglo-North American methods. Numerous paths lead to knowledge and produce numerous knowledges.

When we go deeper into our preconceptions, we find further obstacles that impede developing critical inquiry. Among them are taken-for-granted territorial stakes—for ourselves, our disciplines and professions, our theoretical and methodological approaches—and the careerism and competition embedded in these stakes. Methodological self-righteousness likely follows with claims that my way is the way, the only way. Taken together, they result in making a method an idol and adhering to it with unquestioning dedication: methodolatry. ⁶