Public fear or public sphere? A content analysis of user comments on Egyptian newspaper Facebook pages

Abstract

This content analysis examined posts and user comments on four of the most followed Egyptian newspaper Facebook pages: Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Saba’, Al-Shorouk and Al-Ahram. The purpose of the analysis was to assess the extent to which Egyptians are able to navigate ongoing government authoritarianism to self-express online. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that Facebook page size appears to be a much more important factor in dictating the conditions of Egyptian news spheres than editorial policies and ownership structures. Overall, this suggests that current authoritarian conditions in Egypt have rendered editorial lines relatively unimportant.

Keywords

Arab media content analysis Facebook public sphere social media

Introduction

Since taking power following a 2013 military coup, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has clamped down on all forms of public expression and dissent (Elmasry, 2020). The Sisi regime has shut down opposition news outlets, jailed critical journalists, and issued draconian legislation dramatically restricting the range of news narratives (Mansour, 2015). The government has also sought to restrict online public expression, blocking hundreds of websites between 2017 and 2019 (Netblocks, 2019).

Despite the overarching authoritarian environment and an effectively closed off and restricted public sphere, public anger has given rise to small street protest movements in 2019 and 2020 and an increasing campaign of social media criticism. The government has responded to street protests by arresting activists (Associated Press, 2020) and intensifying a broader crackdown on civil society and human rights groups (BBC, 2020). In response to social media criticism, the Sisi regime has cracked down on Egyptians who have more than 5000 social media followers (BBC, 2018) and arrested private citizens who have made critical social media posts (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

This paper examines the extent to which Egyptians, in an overall atmosphere of authoritarianism, are able to use social media as avenues of self-expression. The paper uses quantitative content analysis and public sphere theory to examine user comments on the Facebook pages of Egyptian newspapers. The purpose of the paper is to assess the extent to which Egyptians are able to navigate ongoing government authoritarianism to self-express online.

Specifically, the study examines user comments on four newspaper Facebook pages: Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Saba’, Al-Shorouk and Al-Ahram. These newspapers were selected for two reasons. First, they are four of the largest Egyptian newspapers in terms of Facebook followers: Al-Youm Al-Saba’ has 15 million followers, Al-Masry Al-Youm has 11 million, Al-Shorouk has 5.4 million and Al-Ahram has 4 million. Second, the four newspapers can be neatly grouped into two categories: government propaganda newspapers (Al-Ahram and Al-Youm Al-Saba’) and semi-independent newspapers attempting to circumvent some government restrictions and present somewhat more balanced reporting (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk). Posts and comments representing seven prominent political themes published in January 2020 were selected for analysis: President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the People’s Assembly, government ministries, the Ethiopian Dam crisis, Al-Azhar University, terrorism and the Trump administration’s Israel/Palestine ‘Deal of the Century’.

Examining the Egyptian social media environment is important because social media posts may provide indicators of tensions simmering below the surface. To what extent are Egyptians willing to take risks and criticize or mock the government online? To what extent are Egyptian government-affiliated newspapers able to control narratives on popular social media news websites? These are the broad questions at the heart of this research.

The public sphere

The contemporary German philosopher Jürgen Habermas coined the term ‘public sphere’, which signifies the space where private citizens gather and engage in public deliberations of commonly held interest. This space, which is open to all individuals without restraints, allows for the possible formation of public opinion (Habermas et al., 1974). According to Habermas, the critical debates and rational discussions that take place in the context of the public sphere originated among the bourgeois class during the 18th-century Enlightenment Era in Europe. They have often been the outcome of ‘a reasoning public’ (Habermas et al., 1974: 50). The term ‘public’ points to ‘ideas of citizenship, commonality, and things not private, but accessible and observable by all’ (Papacharissi, 2002: 10).

In its normative form, the public sphere is inclusive enough to embrace all types of arguments. It postulates ‘a reflexive, impartial, reasoned exchange of validity claims where only the force of better argument “wins out”’ (Dahlberg, 2005: 113). The scope of public participation and the standards of the discourse are detrimental to the success and effectiveness of the public sphere (Grbeša, 2003). Consensus is the ultimate outcome of the public deliberations that take place in the public sphere (Habermas et al., 1974).

Participants in the public sphere engage in ‘communicative action’ through dialogical debates and argumentation to reach a level of shared understanding (Dahlberg, 2005: 121). The dialogical nature of these debates is exemplified in what Kim and Kim (2008) describe as unstructured ‘everyday political talk’ (p. 66). Although this ‘talk’ may seem to be insignificant and inconsequential, it can enhance the level of deliberative democracy and set the parameters for public reasoning (Kim and Kim, 2008).

In order for the public sphere to come to fruition, it ought to be separate from the state. In fact, it is expected to scrutinize and even be critical of the state. It is also to be detached from the economy. Hence, ‘it is not an arena of market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a theater for debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling’ (Fraser, 1990: 57).

Dahlgren (2005) identified three dimensions for a functioning public sphere: the structural dimension (which deals with issues that manage the boundaries of a discursive space, such as access and freedom of expression); the representational dimension (which focuses on the quality of media discourse in terms of features such as truthfulness, balance, multiplicity of opinions and ideological biases); and the interactional dimension (which highlights the individuals’ communicative interactions with the media and with their peers).

According to Habermas et al. (1974), daily newspapers have often played an essential role in enriching the public sphere, not just as conveyers of news, but as ‘an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a mediator and intensifier of public discussion’ (p. 53). However, they argued that the increasing interference of state authorities in the functioning of the press, coupled with the rise of commercialization and advertising that started during the latter half of the nineteenth century, have led to the deterioration of free, rational and critical debates and to the ‘structural transformation’ of the public sphere (Duvenage, 2005: 1).

The virtual public sphere

The rational-critical debates that are considered the hallmark of Habermas’ public sphere have taken on new meanings in the virtual world thanks to the internet’s supposedly anti-hegemonic, more open and dialogical nature (el-Nawawy and Khamis, 2013). New media technologies have been associated with an optimistic outlook that envisions a revitalization of the public sphere, an enhancement of deliberative democracy and an increase in civic engagement and political participation (Papacharissi, 2002).

Arguably, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have created an ‘online public sphere’ where the interactive ‘empowered and participatory citizen culture [is] harnessing the power of the web’ (Douai and Nofal, 2012: 267).

Social networking sites, particularly Facebook and Twitter, are increasingly becoming popular sources of news, and many mainstream daily newspapers are sharing their stories via their Facebook sites in order to increase their reader base and encourage reader engagement (Welbers and Opgenhaffen, 2018).

The patterns of news dissemination and consumption are moving away from ‘mass media logic’ and closer to ‘social media logic’ (Welbers and Opgenhaffen, 2018: 46). This social media logic dictates that the journalistic messages via venues such as Facebook adopt a less objective and more personable format that appeals to reader taste and emotion. Readers interact with these messages through the use of comments, emoticons, likes and emojis (Welbers and Opgenhaffen, 2018). Thanks to the participatory nature of the social media logic, news media have altered ‘their traditional one-way communication strategy by giving . . . [their audiences] the freedom to comment on news and sometimes allowing them to customize the online platforms into their own preferences’ (Al-Rawi, 2017: 874).

Facebook, in particular, can play a critical role in facilitating public discussions in a way that can enhance the quality of the public sphere. Zùñiga et al. (2012) highlighted Facebook’s ability to improve civic and political engagement by creating ‘discussion networks’ through which individuals can embrace a participatory approach and present their views without inhibitions (p. 329).

Along the same lines, Smuts (2010) argued that Facebook allows free access to deliberations on issues of common public concern. However, according to Smuts (2010), Facebook does not allow for ‘inclusivity’, an important public sphere criterion. Some individuals are deprived of Facebook use due to lack of technical skills and resources ‘owing to the digital divide’ (Smuts, 2010: 75). Still, Facebook’s open nature presents an alternative platform for public deliberation and can represent a serious challenge to authoritarian governments (Smuts, 2010).

The initial wave of enthusiasm about the interactivity and openness of the virtual public sphere has given way to a more critical perspective that views the internet as a tool constrained by prevailing political agendas. Iosifidis and Wheeler (2015), for instance, questioned the democratic potential of social media and their ability to enhance a deliberative public sphere.

Despite their potential downsides, it can still be argued that social media have opened up venues for free debate, especially in a region like the Arab world, where the public sphere has been subject to severe government restrictions (Murphy, 2009). In the Arab world, social media have broken the government monopoly over news media and have contributed to the rise of a new Arab public that has challenged the hegemonic powers of the state (Murphy, 2009). Members of this new Arab public have become more comfortable using social media as alternative spaces through which they can negotiate their demands and expectations (Lynch, 2015).

The Egyptian public sphere under President Sisi

The Egyptian public sphere, in both its offline and online forms, has become more politicized following Egypt’s January 2011 revolution. This politicization has impacted the coverage of mainstream media as well as discussions on social media. The tight government control over public and private mainstream media has caused Egyptians to turn to social media for more free and independent exchange of ideas (Badr, 2016). Under these circumstances, Facebook has emerged as a ‘communicatively constituted public sphere . . . [that] offers the voiceless and marginalized a possibility of circumventing traditional censorship and exclusion barriers, and hence embodies the notion of a counter-public sphere’ (Badr, 2016: n.p.).

Since the 2013 military coup, which was followed by the 2014 election of current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian public sphere has suffered from near-complete control by various arms of the regime. One of those arms, the Supreme Council for the Administration of the Media, whose director and members are appointed directly by Sisi, holds a tight grip over print, broadcast and social media (Siapera and Abdel Mohty, 2020).

Since Sisi’s rise to power, there has been a consistent and systematic transformation to standardized oppression (Grimm, 2015). Social media, in particular, have been the target of governmental restrictions, a reality highlighted by the government’s blocking of prominent news websites, including Mada Masr and Daily News Egypt. Online users have also been harassed online by government-appointed hackers, with some individuals arrested for posting material considered to be a threat to the country’s security. These and other measures have created an environment of anxiety, dismay and political uncertainty (Siapera and Abdel Mohty, 2020).

A report by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces alluded to the absolute power of the Egyptian military establishment over domestic news flow (Bolliger et al., 2016). According to the report, President Sisi has adopted an array of strategies for controlling the media, including friendly directives addressed to the supportive state media and the subjugation and harassment of critical journalists. The report concluded that ‘the use of such progressively repressive and targeted policies has produced a dramatic degradation of media freedom in the country’ (Bolliger et al., 2016: 22).

Another report by the International Forum for Democratic Studies highlighted the restrictive nature of the Egyptian public sphere under Sisi’s rule. The report also spoke to the regime’s continued attempts to void Egyptian civil society of all venues for deliberation and debate (Mansour, 2015). Additionally, the report pointed to the increased tendency among Egyptians to access news online, particularly through Facebook, as an alternative to government-controlled mainstream media. Virtual political discourse remains subject to severe government scrutiny, and is accompanied by restrictive laws that allow for the silencing of the regime’s opponents and the harassment of online users (Mansour, 2015).

Hypotheses

Based on literature presented here about the Egyptian public sphere, and also the position of the four newspapers under study (briefly outlined in the Method section), the following eight hypotheses are presented:

H1: Posts made by the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) will be more positive-facing towards the Sisi regime than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk), which will include a higher percentage of negative and neutral frames about the government.

H2: The two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) will be more likely to filter comments than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk).

H3: The two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) will include more comments supportive of the regime than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk).

H4: The two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) will feature more comments critical of the regime than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram).

H5: The two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) will feature more likes and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments critical of the government than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram).

H6: The two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) will feature more likes and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments supportive of the government than the two semi-independent papers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk).

H7: The two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) will feature more laugh emojis and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments mocking the government than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram).

H8: The two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) will feature more angry emojis on the most reacted-to comments mocking the government than the two semi-independent papers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk).

Method

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study employed content analysis. Content analysis refers to the systematic, quantitative examination of manifest content. The method lends itself to relatively large samples and generalization.

Four newspaper Facebook pages were selected for analysis: Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Saba’, Al-Ahram and Al-Shorouk. All four pages are in Arabic.

These four newspaper Facebook pages were selected because of their popularity – they are four of the most popular Egyptian Facebook newspaper pages. They were also selected because of their diversity. Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk are semi-independent newspapers which strive for at least some semblance of balance in their reporting. Meanwhile, Al-Ahram and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ are government propaganda papers.

Al-Masry Al-Youm was launched in 2004 as an independent, privately owned paper (Elmasry, 2012a). Its founding editor, Hesham Kassem, ‘sought to insulate his reporting staff from state efforts to intervene in their work’ (Sternfeld, 2014: 76).

Al-Shorouk started as a privately owned daily publication in 2009. Thanks to its relatively courageous coverage, it has ‘gained respect and credibility in the Egyptian media market’ (Sternfeld, 2014: 78).

Al-Ahram was launched in the late nineteenth century. It is the largest, most prominent government-owned newspaper in Egypt (Elmasry, 2012b).

Al-Youm Al-Saba’ was launched as a daily newspaper in 2008. It has long held a very tight relationship with the Egyptian government (Halabi, 2015) and is owned by the United Media Services Group, a government intelligence agency (Mada Masr, 2020).

Facebook page content was examined from January 25, 2020, to February 3, 2020, a 10-day period during which several ongoing political themes/issues were receiving attention in the Egyptian media. A total of seven political themes – all either focused on or concerning the Egyptian government – were identified for analysis. Issues surrounding the Egyptian government were desired as analytical focal points because of the likelihood that Egyptian Facebook users could feel fear, or at least some hesitation, over commenting critically about their authoritarian government. User comments about governments are also useful measures of political self-expression. Moreover, the researchers were interested to know how the newspapers under study framed the Egyptian government. The seven identified political themes were as follows:

President Sisi;

The People’s Council;

Government (i.e. government ministries or governorates);

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project;

Al-Azhar University;

Terrorism; and

The Trump administration’s ‘Deal of the Century’ for Palestine/Israel.

President Sisi, the People’s Council, and government were selected because the researchers wanted to understand how newspaper Facebook posts talked about the Egyptian president and the Egyptian government entities, and also how Egyptian Facebook users commented about them. The other four themes represented political events. These events – the GERD project, Al-Azhar University, terrorism and the ‘Deal of the Century’ – were selected because of their relatively controversial nature and because all had been receiving ongoing attention in Egyptian news. Importantly, all four also involved the Egyptian government.

The GERD project is an Ethiopian government project designed to alleviate Ethiopia’s energy crisis. It is viewed negatively in both Egypt and Sudan because the waters of the Nile could be redirected in such a way as to negatively affect water supply in both countries (Mbaku, 2020).

The Al-Azhar University issue centred round a debate about the role of religion in public life between Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam, Ahmad Al-Tayyeb, and the president of Cairo University, Othman Al-Khisht. The issue divided Egyptians and was highly controversial, mostly because Al-Khisht, closely allied with President Sisi, presented a relatively secularist vision, one that seemed to contradict normative Islamic teachings. Al-Azhar is closely aligned with the Egyptian government and a public debate between the Grand Imam and the Egyptian president, or a person representing the views of the president, is rare (Dalloul, 2020).

Terrorism was selected because of its ongoing importance in Egyptian society and because the Egyptian government’s ‘war against terrorism’ occupies significant political (and media) space. Sisi has also been criticized forover his handling of terrorism, with some analysts alleging that his heavy-handedness has exacerbated, rather than alleviated, the problem (Shahin, 2015).

The ‘Deal of the Century’ refers to the proposal presented by the administration of then US president, Donald Trump, to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. The issue was selected because of its global reach and regional impact, because Egypt’s government was a close ally of the Trump administration at the time of the deal, and because Egyptians were highly critical of the plan (Amin, 2020).

Different content aspects were studied and, as such, there were three units of analysis: the individual newspaper’s Facebook post, the most reacted-to user comment, and the individual user comment. Since this research included multiple units of analysis, it follows that there were multiple samples.

The individual newspaper’s Facebook post

All posts surrounding the seven themes were selected for analysis during the search period. The search features on all four Facebook newspaper pages were used to retrieve posts about the identified themes. The entered search terms focused specifically on the seven issues under study. For example, the term ‘President al-Sisi’ was entered into all four Facebook page search features to retrieve posts about the ‘President al-Sisi’ theme. All posts that dealt centrally with the aforementioned seven issues/themes were selected for analysis. A total of 148 newspaper posts (N = 148) were retrieved and examined.

The most reacted-to user comment

Further analysis was done on the most reacted-to user comment on each of the 148 posts.

For this section of the research, the sample size was also 148 (since there was one most reacted-to comment for each of the 148 posts).

The individual user comment

In all, 29,700 comments were left on the collective of 148 newspaper posts. For reasons of manageability, only the first 20 comments under each post were selected for further analysis. This further analysis consisted of determining whether individual comments were either explicitly supportive or explicitly critical of the government (or neutral). Most posts included at least 20 comments, but some included fewer than 20. For this part of the analysis, a total of 2240 comments (N = 2240) were examined (to determine whether they were either explicitly supportive, explicitly critical, or neutral towards the government).

The coding sheet consisted of 14 questions concerning the overall framing/directionality of newspaper posts, and the kinds of user comments and reactions that posts generated. In terms of user comments and reactions, the coding sheet examined supportive comments, critical comments, and sarcastic/humorous comments. Sarcastic/humorous comments were examined because a prereading of comments by the researchers revealed that this kind of comment was common on the studied Facebook pages.

Coding sheet questions asked about how the newspaper post framed the Egyptian government (positive, negative or neutral); how many total comments the newspaper post generated; and how many of the first 20 comments were either explicitly supportive, explicitly critical or neutral towards the Egyptian government. Additional questions asked about how many of an individual newspaper post’s comments were filtered out; how many likes and heart emojis were generated by the most reacted-to comments both critical and supportive of the Egyptian government; and how many laugh emojis, heart emojis and angry emojis were generated by the most reacted-to sarcastic comment that mocked the Egyptian government.

Two graduate students fluent in Arabic served as coders. The coders were trained on the coding scheme over a period of several weeks in Spring 2020. Initial training revealed strong agreement on most variables, and some difficulty surrounding the framing variable. Further training was carried out on the framing variable until acceptable levels of agreement were achieved. Ultimately, intercoder reliability was formally tested using Scott’s Pi for the study’s lone nominal level variable (framing the Egyptian government), and Krippendorf’s Alpha for all other variables. The ReCal online tool (Freelon, 2010) was used to calculate reliability scores. Overall, reliability scores ranged from good to perfect.

The framing the Egyptian government variable was measured at the nominal level. It achieved a percentage agreement score of 93 per cent and a Scott’s Pi score of 0.71. All other variables were measured at the ratio level. Krippendorf’s Alpha reliability scores for these variables ranged from 0.84 to 1.

Results

The results ran counter to expectations, with none of the study’s eight hypotheses supported. The size of the newspaper was a more likely predictor of government support (by either the newspaper or users) than the political/editorial orientation of the paper. The results will be described here and further explained and contextualized in the Discussion.

H1 predicted that posts made by the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) would be more positive-facing towards the Sisi regime than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) under study. The hypothesis also predicted that Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk would be more likely to frame the government negatively and neutrally. This hypothesis was not supported. Table A1¹ shows the results.

The results show statistically significant differences across the newspapers (χ² (df = 3, N = 148) = 12.9, p = 0.005)), but not in the way predicted by H1. Al-Masry Al-Youm (21.4%) and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ (25.6%) were far and away the most likely papers to frame the Egyptian government positively. The Al-Youm Al-Saba’ result is in line with H1’s prediction and not surprising. However, the result for the semi-independent Al-Masry Al-Youm is particularly surprising, especially when compared with the other semi-independent paper (Al-Shorouk, 2.8%) and the flagship government paper (Al-Ahram, 3.2%). No posts framed the Egyptian government negatively.

As shown in Table A2, there were significant differences in total comments per post across newspaper Facebook pages (f(df = 3, N = 148) = 4.61, p = 0.004). Al-Youm Al-Saba’ (M = 412.7) and Al-Masry Al-Youm (M = 238.8) featured far more comments per post than the other two newspaper Facebook pages.

H2 predicted that the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) would be more likely to filter comments than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk). Statistically significant differences across newspapers were identified (f(df = 3, N = 148) = 6.37, p < 0.001], but not in the direction predicted. H2 was not supported. Al-Masry Al-Youm (M = 54.8) and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ (M = 62.7) included more filtered comments per post than Al-Ahram (M = 8.5) and Al-Shorouk (M = 16.4). The results are displayed in Table A2.

However, it should be noted that both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ were much more likely to receive comments on posts than the other two papers. This reality perhaps best explains these results: since there were many more comments received by these papers, it is unsurprising that they filtered more comments.

Even using proportional figures, however, does not allow support for the predictions laid out by H2. As a proportion of overall comments, Al-Youm Al-Saba’, one of the two government propaganda papers under study, was the least likely paper to filter comments. The paper had an average of 62.7 filtered comments per post out of an average of 412.7 comments per post (for a proportion of one filtered comment out of every 6.6 comments). Al-Masry Al-Youm filtered one comment out of every 4.3 comments (238.8 comments per post and 54.8 filtered comments per post); Al-Ahram filtered one comment out of every 3.7 comments (31.7 comments per post and 8.5 filtered comments per post); and Al-Shorouk filtered one comment out of every 4.4 comments (72.1 comments per post and 16.4 filtered comments per post).

H3 predicted that the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) would include more comments supportive of the regime than the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk). No statistically significant differences were observed (f(df = 3, N = 148) = 1.59, p = 0.194) and this hypothesis was not supported. Overall, there were very few comments that were explicitly supportive of the Egyptian government, with the four newspaper Facebook pages averaging only .49 supportive comments per post. The results are displayed in Table A2.

H4 predicted that the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) would feature more comments critical of the regime than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram). Overall, comments explicitly critical of the government were rare. Statistically significant differences across the newspapers were observed (f(df = 3, N = 148) = 5.78, p = 0.001), but not as predicted by H4. Al-Masry Al-Youm (M = 2.14) and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ (M = 3.23) included more critical comments than the other two papers. However, as a proportion of comments, Al-Ahram (an average of 0.97 critical comments per post out of an average 31.7 total comments per post) was the most likely of the papers to feature critical comments. As a proportion of overall comments, the three other papers featured far fewer critical comments: just 1 of out every 112 Al-Masry Al-Youm comments, 1 of every 128 Al-Youm Al-Saba’ comments and 1 of every 100 Al-Shorouk comments were critical.

H5 predicted that the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) would feature more likes and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments critical of the government than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram). No statistically significant differences were observed and this hypothesis was not supported. Overall, the most reacted-to comments critical of the government generated an average of 10.6 likes and an average of 4.2 heart emojis. These results are displayed in Table A3.

H6 predicted that the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) would feature more likes and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments supportive of the government than the two semi-independent papers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk). Overall, it was rare for comments supportive of the government to generate likes or heart emojis. The results (Table A4) show that, on average, the most reacted-to supportive comment only generated 2.95 likes and 1.0 heart emojis. No statistically significant differences were observed across the newspapers. The hypothesis was not supported.

H7 predicted that the two semi-independent newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk) would feature more laugh emojis and heart emojis on the most reacted-to comments mocking the government than the two government propaganda papers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram). As Table A5 shows, there were only 41 laugh emojis in total, and all of appeared on comments on the Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ pages. There were only 42 heart emojis in total, and all but one appeared on the Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ pages. Differences across newspapers were not statistically significant. The hypothesis was not supported.

H8 predicted that the two government propaganda newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Ahram) would feature more angry emojis on the most reacted-to comments mocking the government than the two semi-independent papers (Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk). Although there were observed differences – all of the angry emojis appeared on the Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ pages – the differences were not statistically significant. H8 was not supported. These results are also displayed in Table A5.

Discussion

This study sought to examine posts and user comments on the four most followed Egyptian newspaper Facebook pages: Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Saba’, Al-Shorouk and Al-Ahram. The purpose of the analysis, which was broadly influenced by Habermas’ public sphere theory, was to assess the extent to which Egyptians are able to navigate ongoing government authoritarianism to self-express online.

Unsupported hypotheses are not necessarily a sign of problems in a study’s research design (Jaccard and Jacoby, 2010). In fact, important findings are often the product of unsupported hypotheses and unexpected findings. In some studies, having unsupported hypotheses ‘may be success in disguise’ (Leung, 2011: 477). Hence, it is essential in academia ‘to recognize and accept well-reasoned hypotheses that turn out to be unsupported, and restrain from criticizing research with unconfirmed hypotheses as lacking a strong theoretical foundation’ (Leung, 2011: 477). Nonetheless, it is uncommon for a study to produce eight unsupported hypotheses. The lack of support for all eight of this study’s hypotheses requires some reflection and discussion.

It is reasonable to scrutinize, as a starting point, the basis for the eight hypotheses proposed here. Were the hypotheses reasonable to begin with?

The driver for all eight hypotheses was the studied newspapers’ proximity to the Egyptian government. Here, the researchers were influenced by past research suggesting that Egyptian news ownership patterns and government-news outlet relational dynamics exert significant impact on editorial lines and final news outcomes (Cooper, 2008; Elmasry, 2012a, 2012b; Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012; Mellor, 2005). On the face of it, then, and in the context of prior scholarship, the hypotheses appear reasonable. Al-Ahram is Egypt’s flagship government newspaper and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ is owned by an Egyptian government intelligence body and has emerged (during the Sisi period) as a primary government propaganda mouthpiece. Meanwhile, prior research has clearly documented the relative/comparative independence and professionalism of both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk (Egypt Today staff, 2018; Krajeski, 2013; Elmasry et al., 2014).

Why, then, did the results of this study contradict what research has shown to be true of Egyptian news? Arguably, the answer to this question points to the lack of relevant post-2014 empirical research on Egypt, as well as to this study’s major contribution.

This research’s primary contribution is that the new, post-2014 Egyptian political structure may have ushered in a new national news system, one which renders ownership structures relatively meaningless. In the face of unprecedented, far-reaching authoritarianism, all of Egypt’s news outlets, even those which are technically ‘privately-owned’, may have fallen under government control. Much more empirical evidence is required on a much broader sample of Egyptian news production, but, at a minimum, future research should grapple with this distinct possibility. The findings of this study – the ownership structures and outward ideological leanings of the four newspapers under study did not seem to be associated with the direction of the Facebook posts or the nature of the comments (positive, negative or neutral) they generated – seem to support such a structural shift.

This study’s findings also suggest that Facebook page size appears to be a much more important factor in dictating the conditions of Egyptian news spheres. While Al-Ahram and Al-Shorouk reflected very little action on their Facebook pages due to having fewer followers, Al-Youm Al-Saba’ and Al-Masry Al-Youm, the two papers with the most followers, featured by far the highest number of total comments. These findings suggest that the newspapers’ editorial lines were rendered relatively unimportant, and that the size of a newspaper’s following goes a long way towards dictating the extent and type of user participation. In other words, the findings of this study suggest that sustaining a vibrant public sphere online requires having large virtual gatherings and consistent activity.

Results from this analysis also show that while authoritarian governments like Sisi’s can exert meaningful control over editorial narratives, they may not be able to completely prevent news consumers from self-expressing online. Fear and filtering notwithstanding, the active participation of Egyptians on newspapers’ Facebook pages demonstrates a willingness to criticize the government. The newspapers appeared to go to some lengths to try and limit critical self-expression.

It is true, after all, that social networking services like Facebook allow ‘the public . . . [to] come together to freely discuss and exchange ideas, identify problems and propose solutions’ (Caplan and Boyd, 2016: n.p.). This seems to be the case in this study, with findings pointing to new possibilities for communicative action for Egyptian Facebook. Despite the limited venues for self-expression in the current Egyptian physical space, Facebook can be considered an ‘alternative public sphere’ that is challenging the government-controlled discourse of the Egyptian mainstream media (Batorski and Grzywińska, 2018: 364). No matter how much power the Egyptian government has over the mediated public sphere, Facebook, as a privately owned social networking site, can evade the government’s influence to at least some extent (Smuts, 2010). Arguably, Facebook has played a role in transforming Egyptian users into active participants in the online news flow. The users’ contributions – as reflected in comments and emojis – exemplify ‘discussion networks beyond the influence of “face-to-face” discussion and traditional news media use’ (Brundidge, 2010: 695).

In this context, it is worth emphasizing, again, that the findings showed that all four newspapers frequently filtered out user comments. Overall, approximately one out of every five comments (or 20 per cent of all comments) were filtered out. Despite filtering, the number of comments that were critical of the government on all four pages was more than three times the number of comments supportive of the government. Egyptian Facebook users posted critical comments on all four pages, including those belonging to government propaganda outlets, despite the well-known risks associated with doing so, and also despite the knowledge that critical comments could be filtered out. Arguably, this points to the democratizing potential of Facebook news pages, even for authoritarian societies.

All the papers except Al-Shorouk had higher means of likes and heart emojis for the most reacted-to critical comments (a total mean of 10.6 for likes and 4.2 for heart emojis) than for the most reacted-to supportive comments (2.95 for likes and 1.0 for heart emojis). The Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Saba’ pages had 41 most reacted-to comments mocking the government, and they drew relatively high means of laugh emojis on these comments. Here, again, the newspapers’ editorial lines appear to hold limited importance, especially in comparison to the size of their Facebook traffic. It is clear that users attempted to challenge the government’s narratives via these Facebook push-button reaction features, which are, apparently, difficult to censor or filter out. Emojis constitute an important form of online emotive expression because their ‘interactivity and expressiveness’ (Wagner et al., 2020: 306) can enrich a virtual conversation.

The findings also showed that private Egyptian individuals can utilize Facebook to express their views on issues of common concern. In doing so, however, Egyptian Facebook users face challenges related to the operative public sphere’s structural and representational dimensions, which were discussed earlier in this paper. Structurally, Facebook may not be accessible to all Egyptians due to the ‘digital divide’ (Smuts, 2010: 77). Also, the government’s censorial policies clearly limit the range of possible discourse. This reality is bound to affect Facebook’s representational dimension as it applies to the Egyptian context. The quality and diversity of discourses on the four newspaper Facebook pages studied here was clearly compromised. First, fear likely prevented many Egyptians from saying things they would otherwise have wanted to say. Second, extensive filtering of comments is an obvious form of censorship that limits the range of public discussion.

Despite filtering, Facebook’s interactional dimension has been clearly reflected in this study’s findings. Individual users interacted with the four newspapers through their Facebook pages, and also interacted with each other through comments and emojis. Arguably, they used Facebook ‘as a facilitator of public opinion’ (Smuts, 2010: 80). This interactional dimension, reflected in the contribution patterns of Egyptian Facebook users, represents the ‘everyday political talk’ (Kim and Kim, 2008: 66) that takes place among independent individuals who are determined to defy government restrictions.

Through their active interaction, this group of users may represent an optimistic outlook for a more revitalized Egyptian public sphere that hinges upon the growing population of youth in Egypt. According to Egypt’s Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egyptian youth (aged between 18 and 29 years) accounted for 39.5 per cent of the domestic job market in 2019 (Arab Finance, 2020). In this context, Ayish (2018) argued that large segments of young populations with liberal perspectives, digital media literacy skills and innovative ideas in several countries of the Arab Middle East can contribute to ‘a youth-enabled virtual public sphere . . . [with] an excellent promise for future democratization’ (p. 67).

The virtual public sphere’s potential as a decentralized and open venue for rational critical debates cannot be overlooked. However, its impact and efficacy rely on the level of authorities’ interference in online political discourse (Su, 2016) and on government reactions to the issues raised in the virtual public sphere (Dekker and Bekkers, 2015). In the case of Egypt, the current regime has used all the means at its disposal to tighten its grip over the virtual public sphere, just as it has done with the physical public sphere. As per the findings, not a single newspaper post out of the 148 posts that were included in this study’s sample – including those featured on the Facebook pages of two semi-independent papers – framed the government negatively. This shows the extent of control that the Egyptian government has over all Egyptian newspapers.

It is impossible to visualize a public sphere without solid connections ‘with civil society on the one hand and democratic institutions on the other’ (Celikates, 2016: 39). So, in order for the seeds of the anti-hegemonic, interactive, dialogical and deliberative discourse that were reflected in this study’s findings to grow, they must be integrated in Egypt’s ‘national public sphere’ through civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (Iskander, 2011: 1235). So far, this seems to be unattainable, if not entirely unrealistic, given Egypt’s current, highly restricted sociopolitical environment.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A5.

Mean number of laugh emojis, heart emojis and angry emojis on most reacted-to comment mocking the government.

Newspaper	Mean laugh emojis	Mean heart emojis	Mean angry emojis
Al-Masry Al-Youm	11.6 (N = 19; SD = 17.4)	0.26 (N = 19; SD = 0.7)	0.24 (N = 17; SD = 1.0)
Al-Saba’	15.6 (N = 22; SD = 36.3)	0.32 (N = 22; SD = 1.3)	0.09 (N = 22; SD = 0.3)
Al-Ahram	– (N = 0; SD = –)	1.0 (N = 1; SD = –)	– (N = 0; SD = –)
Al-Shorouk	– (N = 0; SD = –)	0 (N = 0; SD = –)	– (N = 0; SD = –)
Total	13.76 (N = 41; SD = 28.9)	0.31 (N = 42; SD = 1.0)	0.15 (N = 39; SD = 0.7)

Mean Laugh Emojis: f(df = 2, N = 41) = 0.197, p = 0.659

Mean Heart Emojis: f(df = 2, N = 42) = 0.238, p = 0.789

Mean Angry Emojis: f(df = 1, N = 39) = 0.438, p = 0.512.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Mohamad Hamas Elmasry

Notes

Author biographies

Mohamad Hamas Elmasry is Professor of Media Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Elmasry received his PhD in Mass Communication from the University of Iowa, where he was a Presidential Fellow. His research on Arab media systems, news coverage of race, and the media and terrorism has appeared in reputable refereed publications, including Journalism, Journalism Practice, Journalism Studies and the International Journal of Communication. He has also written for Al-Jazeera English, Middle East Eye, The New Arab, Muftah and Jadaliyya, and appeared as an analyst on Al Jazeera, CNN, BBC World News and other networks.

Mohammed el-Nawawy is Director of the Board of Doctoral Studies and Professor in the Media Studies Program at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Before holding his current post, he was the Charles A. Dana Professor of International Communication and Middle Eastern Studies at Queens University of Charlotte. His areas of expertise and research interests are focused on the new media, particularly satellite channels and the internet, and their impact on the global public sphere in general and the Arab public sphere in particular. He is also interested in issues of media framing of terrorism and race.

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