Abstract
The purpose of this symposium is to consider new ways of judging merit in academia, especially with respect to research in psychological science. First, I discuss the importance of merit-based evaluation and the purpose of this symposium. Next, I review some previous ideas about judging merit—especially creative merit—and I describe some of the main criteria used by institutions today for judging the quality of research in psychological science. Finally, I suggest a new criterion that institutions and individuals might use and draw some conclusions.
Coming up for tenure was not the most stressful time in my life. More stressful, I remember, was a bout of childhood asthma, when I was wondering whether I would be alive in the morning. That worry was about my physical life. Maybe coming up for tenure was the second most stressful time, because that was a worry about my professional life. Would I be (professionally) alive the next morning if I didn’t get tenure?
Most of us in academia go through a series of increasingly more challenging evaluations—first to get the PhD, next at the time of hiring, then at the time of reappointment, subsequently at the time of tenure, and finally at the time of promotion to full professor. And when we go through these evaluations, we almost inevitably wonder whether the criteria by which we will be judged are fair and whether the criteria, whatever they are, will be applied fairly.
This symposium is devoted to an evaluation of how scientific merit is judged in academia, a problem that is relevant to almost all of us. The motivation for the symposium was a book Don Foss and I edited with Susan Fiske (Sternberg, Fiske, & Foss, 2016), with contributions by the large majority of still living psychological scientists (100 individuals in all) on a list compiled by Diener, Oishi, and Park (2014) of 200 “eminent psychologists of the modern era.” Diener and his colleagues used a number of criteria for identifying the psychologists—h indices, amount of coverage in introductory-psychology textbooks, awards, and so forth. But in comments to us, some psychological scientists, including some from our book, challenged the criteria or the weighting of the criteria, which led us to wonder just how eminence, or performance at any level, should be judged. What is the future of such evaluations of scientific merit?
Don Foss and I then decided—regrettably, Susan Fiske was unavailable to participate at the time—to pursue this universally important issue by creating the present symposium for Perspectives on Psychological Science. We invited several distinguished psychological scientists who have worked on the problem of merit and eminence in psychological science and asked them each if they would write an essay for Perspectives. They all understood that their submissions would be peer reviewed, both by others in the symposium and by at least one psychological scientist not in the symposium. (This introduction was peer reviewed as well.) All of the psychological scientists we invited agreed to write.
Of course, this symposium is not the first consideration of the factors underlying scientific merit. Simonton (2004) has examined factors behind a successful career, including the notion that those scientists who are more creative often produce more: They have more scientific hits (but also more misses). Gruber and Wallace (1999) proposed that successfully creative scientists have a network of enterprises—interrelated projects that investigate scientific phenomena from multiple interlocking perspectives. In another investigation of creativity, Sternberg and Lubart (1992) argued that creative scientists are willing to defy the crowd and, metaphorically, “buy low and sell high” in the world of ideas. That is, they are willing to produce and promote unpopular ideas and then, after convincing other scientists of the value of their unpopular idea, move on to the next unpopular idea. Csikszentmihalyi (2013) pointed out that quality of creative work depends not only on the state of a domain of research, but also on the relation of the research to the field or the social structure of the domain. In the end, creativity is a matter of judgment of one’s peers in the field rather than any fixed entity. And Sternberg, Kaufman, and Pretz (2002) argued that creative contributions are of different kinds, ranging from forward propulsions that merely move a field forward from where it is, to redirections that move a field in a new direction, and reinitiations that essentially restart a field. Focusing on actual published research work rather than individuals, Sternberg and Gordeeva (1996) suggested that high-impact work has six characteristics: quality of presentation, theoretical significance, practical significance, substantive interest, methodological interest, and value for future research.
Evaluation of Scientific Merit Today
Evaluations today are almost certainly more valid than they were in the past. In the middle of the 20th century, merit often was decided in large part by phone calls between power brokers in the field. Anything could be fair game, including gender, race, religion, or any particular characteristic a recommender liked or did not like (Sarason, 1988). Today we have more indices available, each of which, taken individually, is incomplete at best and flawed at worst. Here, we consider only indices relevant to scientific research, not those (also very important) indices relevant to teaching, service, and outreach.
This list of course is not exhaustive but it covers some of the major indices used today to measure research-based merit among psychological scientists.
Evaluation of Scientific Merit Tomorrow
There is one kind of assessment institutions do not much use that might enhance the evaluation process: a statement of how a scientist’s past, present, and future work has made or will make a difference. In particular, institutions, as part of their merit review, might ask faculty to write a statement regarding how the work they have done so far, and the work they plan to do, will make a positive, meaningful, and perhaps even enduring difference to some entity—psychological science, science in general, students, one’s department or institution, or perhaps even the world. The emphasis in such an essay would be not just on what one has done but also why one thinks it matters. We often are so busy doing stuff that we do not have time to reflect on why we do what we do or what difference it makes. Such a statement might be useful not only in evaluation by one’s institution, but also in faculty members’ self-evaluation.
Big Psychology Versus Small Psychological Science
When I entered the field of psychological science, what excited me was that, historically, the field was full of big thinkers—scholars like Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers in psychotherapy, Edward Tolman and B. F. Skinner in learning, Herbert Simon and more recently Daniel Kahneman in cognition, and Abraham Maslow and David McClelland in personality. They represented psychological science in the large—a kind of “big psychology.” A concern I have developed over the years is that our field is moving toward a kind of psychological science in the small—a kind of “small psychology.”
There are not many big theorists left. Some would say that the shift represents a natural progression as the field becomes more and more of a natural science akin to physics and biology. But there were big thinkers in physics (Einstein or Dirac) and in biology (Darwin or Mendel) too. The big thinkers of yesterday perhaps might have been taken aback by the amount of work done in modern times—the effect of this genetic marker or that environmental variable on some particular behavioral variable, the area of the brain that lights up when a subject is given such-and-such part of so-and-so-task, the speed with which people recognize this kind of stimulus or that kind of stimulus. Such findings can be important in the context of a compelling larger theory, but they shrink toward small psychology in the absence of such a theory. And big thinking pays off. For example, Sigmund Freud has an h index of 265, B. F. Skinner of 98, Herbert Simon of 163, and Daniel Kahneman of 123. Their total citations are prodigious, for example, 450,339 for Freud, 277,573 for Simon, and 254,326 for Kahneman. In today’s scientific climate, it may be challenging to be a “big psychological scientist,” but I believe big thinking pays off in the kind of impact (with accompanying citation statistics) that lasts over generations, not merely over the duration of one’s career or a part of one’s career. In the long run, the big thinkers are the ones who most create a lasting legacy.
Conclusions
In all likelihood, the best evaluation will be one that considers all of these factors together, although determining how to weigh the factors is problematical. It is not clear that there is any one weighting that would be optimal for all scientists.
In my own theory of successful intelligence, people are successfully intelligent to the extent that they formulate and achieve goals that make sense for them in the context in which they live and work by capitalizing on strengths and compensating for or correcting weaknesses (Sternberg, 1997). In this view, the most effective scientists will be those not who follow any one particular path to success, but who find a path to success that uniquely works for each of them.
But can we do better, or can we combine these and other measures in some way that makes the measures particularly effective in their use for evaluating candidates for hiring, reappointment, tenure, and promotion? Do we need other kinds of measures, perhaps of ethical behavior (Sternberg & Fiske, 2015) or of quality of mentorship? Are existing measures equally fair for all psychological scientists, or do they tend to favor some groups over other groups? Should we be using any quantitative indices at all? These are the kinds of questions our symposium participants address.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.
