On the Nature of Objectification: Implications of Considering People as Means to Goals

Determinants of perceived instrumentality

Perceived instrumentality of a means is determined by the strength of the means-goal mental association (Orehek, Mauro, Kruglanski, & van der Bles, 2012; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; Zhang, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2007). The means-goal connection can be strengthened by successful use of specific means to attain a goal (Custers, Eitam, & Bargh, 2012; Danner, Aarts, & de Vries, 2007). For individuals who typically cycle as a means of transportation, reminders of a transportation goal (vs. control) bring to mind the means of riding a bicycle (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). For individuals who typically consume alcohol in social situations, a socialization goal (vs. control) brings to mind drinking alcohol (Sheeran et al., 2005). Thus, the strength of the connection between a means and a goal is determined by the frequency with which they co-occur and the usefulness of the means for obtaining the goal (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2002).

Coactivation of means and goals: “Thinking is for doing”

Many goals are pursued over time (Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2013). When a goal is being pursued, the ways and means of obtaining the goal are brought to mind (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Custers et al., 2012; Danner et al., 2007; Sheeran et al., 2005) and capture one’s attention (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; Moskowitz, 2002). The availability of means can also bring to mind the goal to which the means is instrumental (Shah, 2005; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). This allows individuals to take advantage of opportunities by being sensitive to moments in which a goal is likely to be attained (Shah, Hall, & Leander, 2009). Thoughts about activities disruptive to a goal are inhibited when it is being pursued (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). Thoughts about means and goals covary such that each is brought to mind while the actor is attempting to make progress on them, both are deactivated or inhibited when not being pursued (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009; Fitzsimons, Friesen, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009; Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Liberman & Förster, 2000; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Zeigarnik, 1927).

Thus, it seems that the turn of phrase “thinking is for doing” (Fiske, 1992) has proven apt. In other words, the goals of the moment direct attention toward goal-relevant thoughts, and determine how means are perceived. Research has extended this principle to thinking about people. Initiation of academic achievement or sociability goal pursuit led participants to bring to mind others who are helpful toward the goal (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). Thinking about or being in the presence of a specific person leads to the activation of the goals to which the person is instrumental (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a, 2003b).

Evaluation of means according to perceived instrumentality: “Liking is for doing”

To successfully orient oneself during goal pursuit, the actor must evaluate potential means of goal attainment with respect to their instrumentality to current goals. As has been pointed out, “liking is for doing” (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). In other words, objects are evaluated positively or negatively depending on whether they are instrumental to current goals (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Constantinople, 1967; Feldman, 1973; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kopetz & Orehek, 2015; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Mitchell & Knudsen, 1973; Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2016). For example, if a person has a goal of satisfying his hunger, he will find food momentarily valuable. If the person is not hungry, food will be perceived as noninstrumental to current pursuits: “food has zero incentive value to a completely sated organism” (Atkinson, 1964, p. 283).

Evaluation of objects should shift in accordance with the goal being pursued. That is, a particular object could be viewed quite positively at one moment, but quite negatively a little while later because the actor’s goals have changed. As one’s goals change, the evaluations of objects in the environment do indeed seem to change accordingly (Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Cabanac, 1971; Lazarus, 1991; Lewin, 1926, 1935a; Loewenstein, 1996; Markman & Brendl, 2000; Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson & Chassin, 2003). People evaluate objects more positively when the object is instrumental to a current goal as compared to objects that were instrumental to an already completed goal (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). People also feel good while pursuing means attached to a current goal. For example, people with a food enjoyment goal feel better when eating tasty but unhealthy items (e.g., hamburger and fries) than those in a weight-watching goal (Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004).

Means that do not align with current goals may be viewed negatively if they interfere with the goal or may be devalued if they are irrelevant to the goal. For example, smokers who had a current goal of smoking were less willing to pay for a raffle entry to win money as compared to smokers who did not have an active smoking goal (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003; see also Markman & Brendl, 2000). The smokers devalued the raffle ticket because it was not instrumental to their current goal of smoking. In another study, participants negatively evaluated objects that were inconsistent with or interfered with an active goal, such as social activities while pursuing an academic achievement goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010). Individuals exhibit a tendency to approach goal-related objects and to avoid goal-disrupting objects (Fishbach & Shah, 2006).

Taken together, these findings demonstrate that means instrumental to a currently pursued (vs. not) goal are evaluated more positively (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) and people feel better when using them (e.g., Fishbach et al., 2004). Moreover, means irrelevant (Brendl et al., 2003) or inconsistent with (Zhang et al., 2007) current goals are devalued. In the next section, we consider the implications of these means-goal principles for situations in which people serve as means.

Is objectification immoral or inevitable?

Previous writers were split on the answer to this question. Several influential authors declared objectification immoral in all instances (e.g., Kant, Marx, and Nussbaum). Some authors were more inclined to assume that objectification is inevitable (e.g., Sartre). Psychological theorizing supports the inevitability assumption. Theories of human perception, evaluation, goal pursuit, and memory do not distinguish between the way objects and people are mentally represented. Instead, they assume that people and objects are treated equivalently in the perceptual, memory, and evaluative systems. For example, theories about cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957, 1962; Heider, 1946, 1958), memory and decision making (Anderson et al., 2004; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Hintzman, 1984), human judgment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985), and goal pursuit (Kruglanski et al., 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2002) all assume that people and objects are mentally represented in the same way and according to the same principles. Relationship researchers have also suggested that people think about objects in much the same way they think about people (Lakey & Orehek, 2011; Orehek & Forest, 2016). This body of psychological theory, in combination with the research reviewed above, suggests that objectification is inevitable. Human minds evaluate other people according to their perceived instrumentality to goals (Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016).

We argue that the psychological process that produces objectification is neither moral nor immoral. Evaluating others according to their perceived instrumentality is neither good or bad, right or wrong, ethical or dubious. Instead, the determination of morality depends on the content of the goal to which a person is evaluated, not the process by which the evaluation occurs. Objectification itself cannot be immoral because it describes an inevitable psychological process of evaluation. To suggest that people should not be objectified is to say that they should not be evaluated.

Yet, a person may find a particular instance of objectification to be moral or immoral based on two considerations. First, a person can be judged immoral for objectifying someone with respect to his or her instrumentality toward a goal the perceiver has judged as immoral. For example, a perceiver may consider objectifying a person as a pornographic actor immoral because he or she believes that it is wrong to distribute pornography. A second way objectification may be deemed immoral is if the person being evaluated is judged according to his or her instrumentality toward a goal to which he or she does not want to be instrumental. For example, a person who is evaluated according to his or her physical appearance or sexuality who wishes not to be evaluated on those grounds may be an immoral form of objectification. Thus, judgments of the morality of objectification must be considered according to the specific case at hand, the values of the person doing the judging and the expectations of the person being objectified.

Is objectification callous and cold?

A related question concerns whether evaluation of people according to their instrumentality toward one’s goals is necessarily cold and callous. Indeed, notions of using people for one’s personal gain, exploiting people for the value they bring, or winning an exchange of services for payment can certainly be cold and callous. However, it need not be the case. One determinant of whether objectification is cold or warm, callous or compassionate, is the goal to which a person is instrumental. If a person is instrumental toward the goal of being loved, to have a caring relationship, to establish a strong social bond, to have supportive others to rely on, with whom to laugh, and so on, then objectification can be quite warm (cf. Orehek & Forest, 2016). Thus, just as the morality of objectification hinges on goal contents, so too does the callousness of its application. As with the morality of objectification, the second consideration is whether the person wants to be instrumental toward the other’s goal. If the person does not want to serve as a means to that goal, then the person is being used in a cold and callous manner. If instead, the person would like to serve as a means to the other’s goals, then the relationship is likely to be marked by warmth and compassion.

Do people dislike being objectified?

People differ in the goals to which they want to be instrumental and whether they are comfortable being evaluated according to their instrumentality toward each of them. For example, John may think he is quite skilled at certain sexual acts and may enjoy it when his wife commends him on his sexual prowess. However, Steve may not like performing similar acts and may feel uncomfortable when praised for completing them. Similarly, one woman may feel flattered and happy when praised for her beauty, while another may feel offended or uncomfortable that her beauty was her quality that attracted attention. Several of the subcomponents of objectification outlined by Nussbaum (1998) can be understood according to the (mis)match between a perceiver’s goals and the target’s desire to be evaluated according to his or her instrumentality on those grounds. Beyond instrumentality, Nussbaum (1998) included denial of autonomy, inertness, violability, denial of subjectivity, fungibility, and ownership as features of objectification. We consider each of these in the foregoing sections.

Kant defined dignity as acknowledgment that a person is unique and does not have an equivalent. The dictionary defines dignity as “the quality of being worthy of honor or respect.” According to the Belmont Report, to treat a person with respect, “individuals should be treated as autonomous agents” (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978). Denial of autonomy involves treating the target as though he or she does not have self-determination. To treat a person as inert is to deny a person agency. Thus, to grant a person autonomy, respect, dignity, and to avoid treating him or her as inert is to provide the person with a choice regarding whether or not he or she is used for a particular purpose or evaluated according to his or her instrumentality to a particular goal. Therefore, people are disrespected, denied autonomy, and treated as inert when they are treated as if they do not have alternative courses of action, or do not have a choice in the goal dimensions by which they will be evaluated. The same conditions foster violability, which involves treating a person as though his or her personal boundaries lack integrity and may be breached, and denial of subjectivity, which occurs when a person is treated as if his or her personal experiences and feelings may be disregarded or do not exist. These principles, taken together, underscore the importance of considering both the expectations of the perceiver and the expectations of the target.

For example, a physician who wants to be evaluated according to his or her medical knowledge and procedural skills, but is instead evaluated according to his or her sexuality and expected to be responsive to sexual advances, would be denied respect, dignity, and autonomy. If that same physician would like to be perceived as instrumental to his or her spouse’s sexual goals, then being evaluated as attractive, arousing, and sexy would be welcome, respectful, dignifying, and would help maintain his or her autonomy. Indeed, people often want to be considered instrumental to another person’s goals. In the context of caring relationships, people strive to be instrumental to their partners (Murray, Aloni, et al., 2009) and experience positive feelings of social connection (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2012), self-esteem (Piferi & Lawler, 2006), and self-worth (Gruenewald, Liao, & Seeman, 2012) when they are able to be instrumental (Inagaki & Orehek, 2017). In addition, when they fail to be instrumental, people can feel decreased positive affect (Williamson, Clark, Pegalis, & Behan, 1996). People evaluate their own self-worth according to the notion that they are valuable to the people in their social network (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Thus, whether people want or like to be objectified depends on the goal to which they are expected to be instrumental. If it is a goal that they strive to be skilled in accomplishing and one that is part of their self-identity, then they are likely to welcome the objectification, but will not welcome objectification on dimensions for which they do not wish to be instrumental, even if the evaluations are positive (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult, Finkel, & Kumashiro, 2009; Swann, 2011).

The reductionist problem

A related concern among those who are objectified is the feeling that they are replaceable, nonunique, or reduced to their individual features. A person is treated as fungible when he or she is perceived as interchangeable with other people or objects. This is similar to Kant’s notion that people should not be reduced to their constituent features and that each person is unique. Objectification of a person suggests that a person is substitutable with any person who is also capable of serving as an instrumental means to the goal(s) he or she facilitates (Orehek & Forest, 2016). Indeed, people may be substitutable for one another, such as when a new employee is hired to replace a former person in the role, or when a new romantic partner replaces a former partner. The new person is never identical to the previous person, but may be similar with respect to his or her instrumentality to a particular set of goals. However, people become irreplaceable or unique by either serving as a unique means to a particular goal or by being instrumental to a constellation of goals that would be difficult to find in another person (Finkel, Hui, Carswell, & Larson, 2014; Light & Fitzsimons, 2014; Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009; Orehek, in press; Orehek & Forest, 2016). Another way to foster a sense of uniqueness is to draw close to the people so that they appreciate the uniqueness of the bond they share (Lakey & Orehek, 2011).

A consequence of reducing people to their individual parts is that they may be treated as an object that can be owned. Ownership is to treat a person as though he or she may be bought, sold, or traded for/with. For Marx, the payment of employees for their labor connoted ownership. An extreme example occurs when a person is sold into slavery. Less extreme forms occur when a person’s individual autonomy is reduced, such as when a professional athlete is traded for another player. This situation may be coercive, and the objectification can be augmented by common references to athletes as “assets” with “trade value” (e.g., Simmons, 2015) owned by teams and traded for one another.

The psychological ownership of means can be a by-product of the psychology of goal pursuit. Once a person becomes committed to achieving a particular end state, “motivational readiness morphs into a goal that the individual ‘owns.’ Indeed in every parlance, the goal concept implies commitment and ownership: It is your goal, my goal, or their goal, we commonly say, highlighting the possession aspect of goals” (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014, p. 371, italics original). People express ownership of people in the same way. The concept of close relationships implies commitment and ownership. Another person may be your child, my child, or their child; your spouse, my spouse, or their spouse. Valentine’s Day cards read “You’re Mine” or “Be Mine.” Sartre wrote of relationships as mutual possession. Such ownership has potential benefits such as a sense of social connection, belonging, interdependence, and cooperation. It can increase the sense that the other person can be relied on and trusted. However, it can also feel controlling, dependent, or restricting. Whether ownership feels right to the person being objectified rests on whether it is consensual and reciprocal. If a person wishes to be connected to another person, employer, or group, and the commitment is reciprocal, then they are likely to experience the upsides of such a partnership. If, however, the arrangement is nonconsensual or nonreciprocal, then the downsides are likely to predominate.

Relationships as goals rather than people as means?

Beyond merely serving as means to goals, maintaining a relationship with another person can become a goal. Means serve goals, which may themselves be subgoals to more abstract goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Scholer & Higgins, 2011). Thus, maintaining a close relationship with a partner can become a subgoal. The relationship can serve various goals, and also be served by means to facilitate its pursuit. People serve as means to everyday tangible goals such as finishing a work assignment, long-term self-actualization motives such as striving to be more compassionate, and basic needs such as social connection and physical safety. When commitment to a relationship partner is high, maintaining the relationship becomes a subgoal that is served by a variety of behaviors such as providing care and support (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2012; Koo & Fishbach, 2016; Lakey & Orehek, 2011), facilitating personal striving (Fitzsimons et al., 2015; Rusbult et al., 2009), and engaging in exciting activities (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000). Just as people inhibit thoughts about alternative goals while pursuing a focal goal (Shah et al., 2002), people protect relationships to which they are committed by derogating, devaluing, and inhibiting thoughts about potential alternative partners (Gillath, Mikulincer, Birnbaum, & Shaver, 2008; Linardatos & Lydon, 2011; Lydon, Fitzsimons, & Naidoo, 2003; Lydon, Meana, Sepinwall, Richards, & Mayman, 1999; Maner, Gailliot, & Miller, 2009).

Although it is important to recognize that people serve as both means and goals, this observation does not change the conclusions regarding objectification. A bicycle can serve as a means of transportation and exercise, so too can it become a goal to maintain and secure the bicycle. The fact that maintaining the bike has become a subgoal does not change the fact that it is evaluated according to its instrumentality to the goals it serves. The same is true of people. Even though maintaining a relationship with close others can become a subgoal, it does not change the fact that people are evaluated according to their perceived instrumentality to the goals they serve. In fact, relationship maintenance processes can be just as cold and callous as objectification itself. For example, Machiavelli (1513/1992) outlined a series of coercive practices for relationship maintenance in his treatise, The Prince. Thus, considering a person as a goal in addition to the role as means, as Kant suggested, does not tip the moral balance. Treating a person as a goal or as a means can be either moral or immoral, cold or warm, callous or compassionate.

Should psychologists work to reduce objectification?

Authors who have focused on the negative outcomes of being objectified (e.g., Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Marx, 1857–1858/1964; Nussbaum, 1998) have prescribed a reduction in the incidence of objectification. The design and testing of intervention to reduce objectification are considered by many psychologists to be an important next step (e.g., Roberts & Waters, 2012). We, too, would like to ameliorate the negative outcomes of objectification. However, rather than reducing objectification per se, we suggest that practitioners focus on adjusting the goals people expect others to serve. Objectification itself is inevitable, but expectations regarding the specific goals a person can be expected to serve are malleable. Whether the person wishes to serve as a means to those goals should serve as the guiding principle for attempts at reducing the negative consequences of objectification. For example, to reduce sexual objectification of women in workplace or educational settings, the focus should be shifted toward evaluating women according to their work-related skills and abilities and away from evaluating women based on their appearance. In other words, instead of suggesting that employees and students should not be evaluated according to their instrumentality, the suggestion is to ensure they are evaluated according to their instrumentality on appropriate dimensions. In addition, the prescription should not necessarily be to eliminate evaluation of women according to their instrumentality to sexual goals under all conditions, but instead to determine if and when they want to be objectified on those grounds (e.g., at specific moments in a romantic relationship).

In addition to being inevitable, recognizing and appreciating others’ instrumentality can be good both for the perceiver and the target. People who show a stronger preference for instrumental others over noninstrumental others are more successful in their goal pursuits (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). In addition, people who appreciate helpful others are likely to draw closer to them, work harder to maintain those relationships, and communicate the recognition of their partner’s helpfulness to the partner. This, in turn, should facilitate the partner’s feelings of usefulness, self-worth, and social connection. Thus, evaluating relationships through their instrumentality can be a strategic path to goal achievement and can facilitate feelings of social connection and perceptions of supportiveness. Interventions aimed at increasing appreciation and recognition of a partner’s instrumentality to goals the partner wants to serve could be used alone or in combination with interventions designed to reduce evaluation of people according to goals they do not want to serve.