Concentration in the media ecosystem: The case of the Spanish media and telecommunications industries

The importance of studying the concentration of cultural and technological industries

In 2021, the acquisition of Euskaltel by MásMóvil significantly transformed the Spanish telecommunications landscape, consolidating a new dominant player that, in 2024, further strengthened its position following a merger with the Orange Group. The creation of MasOrange demonstrates that the convergence between media and telecommunications is not merely an economic process but a structural phenomenon redefining both control over communication infrastructure and content production. This case, together with earlier developments such as the integration of Canal+ into Movistar, illustrates the growing complexity of the Spanish media ecosystem, where multimedia conglomerates, investment funds, and digital platforms compete and merge amid both fragmentation and concentration at regional and national levels.

Analyzing these dynamics is essential to understanding how concentration in cultural and technological industries influences pluralism and content diversity, thereby posing risks to democratic societies (Baker, 2007; Trappel & Meier, 2022). This article is part of the Global Media and Internet Concentration Project (GMICP), a collaborative initiative that examines transnational trends in media concentration across 38 countries. Our contribution to the project includes the compilation, standardization, and analysis of data on the Spanish market, enabling its placement within a comparative context thanks to the data published in the various national reports available on the project's website (https://gmicp.org), the datasets accessible through Dataverse, ¹ and the data dashboard at https://gmicp.org/dashboard/. In this way, we find international corporations leading markets such as telecommunications—Telefónica, Vodafone, or Orange—music—Warner and Universal—or online video services—Netflix and Amazon. Meanwhile, the press remains in the hands of local groups such as Vocento and Prensa Ibérica.

This article examines the evolution of the networked media economy in Spain during the period 2019–2022, covering the telecommunications sector (wireless and wireline), traditional and digital media (broadcast TV, radio, music, newspapers, magazines, online video services, games, and internet advertising), as well as internet service providers. During this period, the market registered only modest growth of 0.98%, reaching total revenues of €27,415.6 million in 2022, driven primarily by digital and internet-based sectors.

Understanding the risk of media concentration requires analyzing how media control shapes public discourse and opinion (Birkinbine, Gómez García and Wasko, 2016). Most cultural and telecommunications industries operate within corporate groups, necessitating ecosystem-wide studies such as those conducted by Bajgar et al. (2023) and Calligaris et al. (2024). One of the theoretical frameworks that facilitates the analysis of concentration structures is provided by the political economy of communication (Miège, 2006; Quirós, 2021). Media concentration has also been extensively studied in the context of cross-ownership and convergence (Just, 2009; Trappel & Meier, 2022), with growing interest in supranational and global dynamics (Noam & The International Media Concentration Collaboration, 2016; Winseck, 2022, 2024).

Measuring concentration in cultural industries provides insight into market competition, but it must also determine the degree of plurality or diversity resulting from corporate movements. For example, when a media group integrates a dozen newspapers, it does not necessarily guarantee informational diversity, especially when synergy-driven efficiencies lead to all outlets publishing the same content sourced from a single agency. Moreover, scholars such as Benson (2025) and Theine (2025: 874ff.) argue that each form of media ownership shapes the exercise of media power in distinct ways, which may be exercised with a public interest orientation or through various forms of instrumentalization, particularly of an economic or political nature.

Thus, the primary risk of concentration—whether through internal or external growth—within cultural industries lies in its effect on reducing the number of independent voices while simultaneously erecting barriers to market entry (Mansell, 2025). This risk is particularly pronounced in the case of GAFAM companies, which have not only been identified as facilitators of misinformation (UK Parliament, 2024) but have also been assumed as dominant gatekeepers (Miguel-de-Bustos & Izquierdo-Castillo, 2019), along with other global platforms (European Commission, 2024).

In light of these developments, the profound transformations within cultural industries in recent years call for a (re)newed analysis of the principles guiding competition policy. Encouragingly, the New Brandeis School of thought advocates for an antitrust approach focused on market structures and processes, rather than consumer welfare alone, acknowledging economic dominance as a form of private power (Khan, 2018).

In Spain, academic research on media concentration has been relatively limited, with most studies focusing on multimedia conglomerates. Within the framework of the GMICP, our work contributes to closing this gap by generating harmonized concentration indicators (CR4, HHI) that allow for comparison of Spain's position with that of other countries and for the analysis of recent trends in digital platforms and traditional media. The data employed include corporate financial statements (SABI), audience reports (EGM, Barlovento), and complementary sources on advertising investment and shareholder participation, all of which are integrated into the GMICP database.

This article offers a rigorous quantitative assessment of media concentration in Spain, a task made particularly challenging by the lack of transparency among both corporations and regulatory bodies. Our research advances the study of Spanish media concentration by considering cultural and technological industries as an integrated ecosystem and by developing quantification methodologies that address the sector's opacity. In doing so, our work builds upon and complements the extensive scholarly literature on the Spanish context. Early research by Miguel-de-Bustos (1993) identified key trends such as international expansion, vertical integration, and strategic alliances within European media groups. Subsequent studies have highlighted the increasing financialization of major Spanish media companies. For instance, García-Santamaría (2018) emphasizes bank indebtedness as a critical factor undermining editorial independence and pluralism. Similarly, Almirón (2009) raised early concerns about ownership structures and financial models, which she later expanded through a detailed analysis of PRISA's transition from family ownership to investor control and its broader democratic implications (Albornoz, Segovia & Almirón, 2020). More recently, Artero-Muñoz, Zugasti and Hernández-Corchete (2021) provided a historical overview of Spain's major media groups, though their analysis focused primarily on traditional sectors and largely overlooked digital-native platforms.

A comprehensive dataset on the Spanish media landscape is compiled by Campos-Freire et al. (2020), who examined trends in newspaper circulation, as well as audience behavior in radio, television, and internet use. However, his analysis does not incorporate multimedia integration or cross-platform convergence. Additionally, Artero-Muñoz and Sánchez-Tabernero (2015; 2016) provided broad overviews of the cultural and telecommunications industries, offering pioneering documentation of both legacy and emerging internet-based cultural activities. Their research contributed a distinctive element by measuring concentration through the CR4 and HHI indices, within the framework of the previous edition of the Global Media and Internet Concentration Project, to which our study also belongs.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) classified the Spanish media system within the “polarized pluralist” model. Unlike Northern European countries, where public service media developed with institutional independence, Spanish media have often been marked by politicization and clientelism (Fernández Viso & Fernández Alonso, 2019). Clientelism, a common practice in Mediterranean and Latin American contexts (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002), takes a distinctive form in Spain: instrumentalization has not primarily stemmed from external industrial interests but from within large multimedia conglomerates, notably PRISA and Telefónica (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 178).

Today, however, investment funds are increasingly present among the shareholders of Spanish media groups—sometimes even as majority stakeholders. According to the 2022 Euromedia Ownership Monitor (Parilla et al., 2025: 5), 56% of the legal owners of Spain's leading media outlets are financial entities, such as trusts, banks, and management funds.

Despite ongoing changes in the media sector, Hallin and Mancini's (2004, 2016) framework remains relevant, as political influence over public service media persists across Europe (Fernández-Lombao, Blasco-Blasco & Campos-Freire, 2024). Some progress has been made through regulatory reforms, such as transparency measures and the creation of a mandatory media register overseen by the CNMC under EU Regulation 2024/1083. However, the register's failure to require disclosure of ultimate media ownership raises concerns about its effectiveness (Suau et al., 2025: 6).

Although the legal framework contains provisions on transparency, these measures are not effectively enforced. This is due, in part, to the absence of an independent regulatory authority overseeing the media sector. Transparency has become a critical issue, particularly following the creation of the Euromedia Ownership Monitor in 2021 and the adoption of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) in 2024, which entered into force in August 2025. In line with these European initiatives, Spain approved its Action Plan for Democracy in 2024. One of its strategic measures, Action Line 2.3—“Review of pluralism and competition safeguards to prevent media concentration in a few hands”—explicitly calls for stronger regulatory mechanisms to safeguard media diversity.

Similarly, it remains necessary in Spain to ensure transparency regarding the investments made by various public administrations through national and regional advertising campaigns, as these exert a significant impact on the financial accounts of media outlets at different levels. As Fernández-Viso and Fernández-Alonso (2024: 16) point out, when data is available, there is evidence of a systematic bias in favor of media aligned with governing political parties. They also note that although the creation of a macro-regulator in 2013—responsible for audiovisual oversight—was a noteworthy development, its powers remain limited in comparison to those of regulatory bodies in other Mediterranean countries, particularly because its functions are exercised by council members appointed directly by the government.

In broad terms, the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (Suau et al., 2025) warns that media market plurality in Spain remains at high risk. This risk is driven not only by the lack of transparency, but also by audience concentration levels exceeding 75% in television, radio, and newspapers, and similar high ownership concentration—especially in radio and print, where data is available. The general lack of transparency and recorded information also hinders academic research on media concentration in Spain.

This paper addresses the issue of media concentration in the Spanish context. The scarcity of reliable data, compounded by the lack of transparency and limited cooperation from both media corporations and public institutions, presents formidable obstacles. As a result, significant efforts must be devoted to designing estimation models that approximate the economic realities of these industries, an endeavor that is crucial for ensuring the proper advancement of democracy in our societies.

Objectives and methodology

The objectives of this research focus on analyzing the degree of concentration in both digital and traditional media industries, as well as the telecommunications sectors within the Spanish market.

This article focuses on the period 2019–2022, which includes the exceptional disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic and the structural acceleration of digital media consumption. Although short, this timeframe captures a turning point that can help interpret recent concentration trajectories and regulatory responses in a post-pandemic context.

The lack of transparency from media companies and public institutions poses, as mentioned in the previous section, significant limitations and challenges for this research. The primary source of economic data comes from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos—SABI). This system gathers information from various official sources, including commercial registries, the Official Gazette of the Commercial Registry (Boletín Oficial del Registro Mercantil—BORME), as well as press and agencies such as Reuters for stock market data. However, media companies do not provide these entities with data segmented by sector, nor do they disclose such details in their annual reports. This prevents, for example, knowing advertising revenues or sales of print copies, or disaggregating advertising from subscriptions on television platforms, or even separating Amazon Prime Video's revenues from the total income of Amazon Inc. ² The reports from Barlovento and the General Media Study (EGM) are also useful for audience analysis.

On the other hand, multinational companies such as Netflix did not pay taxes in Spain until 2021, despite beginning their operations in 2015. Furthermore, in 2023, the CNMC changed its methodology and ceased providing disaggregated data by pay-TV operators. This is a common limitation: the absence of company-level disaggregated data. In the music industry and the video game sector, it is highly complex to identify the highest-grossing companies, as records are linked to songs, albums, or games. This opacity appears to be accepted by the stakeholders involved (industry associations, public bodies, and consumers), yet it hinders proper monitoring of media concentration in the country. Other sectors lack specialized and up-to-date reports. This is the case with internet advertising.

By drawing on the GMIC's cross-country database and harmonized indicators (CR4, HHI ³ ), this study provides comparable insights into Spain's place within global concentration dynamics.

The cross-media economy in the Spanish market

The cross-media economy in Spain exceeds 27 billion euros, and its evolution in recent years has shown signs of stagnation. Between 2019 and 2022, the cumulative growth was 0.98%, although its performance varies depending on the sector analyzed (Figure 1). The period under analysis includes the years associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, which altered audience behavior due to lockdown measures. However, the stagnation observed is more closely linked to changes in consumption habits that had already been taking shape prior to the pandemic. These changes are driven by digitalization, with the most affected sectors being those related to network services and traditional media. In contrast, there has been growth in the internet and internet-based services.

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Figure 1.

Cross-media industry revenue trends 2019–2022 (current €, millions).

The sectors with the highest business volume are linked to the internet economy, particularly wireless services, although they experienced a clear decline between 2019 and 2022 (−11.7%). In contrast, the second-largest sector in terms of revenue, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), grew by 12.4%, reaching 4.9 billion euros, mainly due to the massive shift of customers toward fiber-based technologies (FTTH/fixed 5G), as well as the growing business demand for connectivity—both trends accelerated by the lockdown period. This shift indicates a changing trend in technological services, favoring internet-based services, which have primarily affected wireline services, leading to a 29% decline in that sector. Indeed, Telefónica officially decommissioned its last ADSL exchanges in May 2025, completing the nationwide transition to fiber.

The growing dominance of the internet is also evident in the media and audiovisual entertainment industries. Online Video Services (OVS) experienced the highest growth rate during the analyzed period (+205.2%). The COVID-19 crisis in 2020 marked a turning point, as home confinement led to a direct surge in demand for these services, effectively doubling their revenue during the pandemic. Until 2023, however, these platforms were exempt from taxation in Spain. This changed with the 2022 Audiovisual Law, which required OVS providers to allocate 1.5% of their revenues to the funding of public television. This measure replaced the levy introduced in 2009 on telecommunications operators—originally designed to offset the withdrawal of advertising from the state-owned broadcaster—deemed abusive by the European Union in 2010 but enforced until 2022.

Despite their rapid expansion, OVS revenues remain significantly below those of internet advertising—the most profitable online segment, which generated nearly €5 billion and grew by 30.2% overall, including a 26.5% surge in 2021. OVS is neither the most consumed nor the highest-earning medium. Traditional broadcast TV still leads with over €3.3 billion in revenue, though growth has stagnated (+3.5% from 2019–2022). Video games, the second most consumed medium, generate €2 billion and show steady annual growth (+36%). The music sector rebounded as well, with physical and live revenues rising 24.2% after a 41.9% drop in 2020 and surging 96% in 2022, surpassing pre-pandemic levels.

Television audience distribution in Spain from 2018–2022 reveals a market dominated by nationwide private broadcasters (Telecinco, Antena 3, La Sexta, Cuatro), consistently capturing over 37% of viewers and peaking at 40.1% in 2021. State-run public broadcasters (La 1 and La 2) barely exceeded 12%, while regional public channels held around 8%, with slight annual increases (Figure 2). Free-to-air thematic DTT channels, benefiting from audience segmentation, maintained a significant share near 29%, whereas pay DTT channels and other formats, including OTT and hybrid platforms, experienced only modest growth.

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Figure 2.

Broadcast television audiences.

However, this aggregated national outlook hides significant territorial differences. At the regional level, media consumption shows greater plurality, with regional public broadcasters often competing closely for audience share. In the Basque Country, Telecinco leads with around 14%, but EiTB's two channels follow closely with a combined 12–13.2%. In Catalonia, the dominance of public broadcaster TV3 is even stronger: in 2018, regional public channels captured 17.4% of the audience—well ahead of national public broadcasters (12.1%) and competitive with private channels.

Public television funding also shows distinct features. Since 2009, Radio Televisión Española (RTVE) has operated under a non-commercial model financed by mandatory contributions from telecom and private broadcasters (Law 8/2009). In 2022, these included €22.5 million from pay-TV operators, €43.8 million from free-to-air broadcasters, €113.5 million from telecom companies, and €410 million for radio spectrum use. Additionally, RTVE received €603.5 million in direct subsidies, bringing total revenues to over €1 billion.

The radio sector, by comparison, has sustained moderate growth despite having one of the lowest revenue volumes within the broader media ecosystem. In 2022, it generated €463.45 million, representing a 10.9% increase compared to 2019. The impact of the pandemic was nevertheless evident: in 2020, industry revenues fell by 24% before gradually recovering in subsequent years. The radio sector, though one of the smallest by revenue, shows steady growth. In 2022, it generated €463.45 million, 10.9% more than in 2019. The pandemic, however, left a mark, with revenues falling 24% in 2020 before recovering in subsequent years.

Radio remains a key component of the Spanish media landscape, marked by high audience engagement and strong corporate concentration. The sector is largely dominated by a few major private groups, notably Prisa—also dominant in the print press—and Grupo Godó, which has a strong presence in Catalonia. Atresmedia and Ábside Media (formerly Grupo COPE, owned by the Spanish Episcopal Conference) also hold significant positions (Figure 3). On the public side, national radio is led by RTVE, complemented by various regional broadcasters within decentralized communication systems.

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Figure 3.

Generalist radio audiences (%).

Despite the large number of radio stations in Spain, the generalist radio market exhibits a high level of concentration. In 2018, three private groups controlled 65.2% of the generalist audience (67.6% in 2022). When the audience share of the state public broadcaster is included, the concentration level reaches 75% in 2018 and 73.9% in 2022, consolidating the existence of a private triopoly complemented by a public operator with strong penetration.

By contrast, the thematic radio segment exhibits significantly lower concentration. The top four stations accounted for 48% of the audience in 2018, a figure that declined to 43.6% in 2022 (Figure 4). Nevertheless, these stations also belong to the three dominant private groups in the generalist radio market (PRISA, Ábside Media, and Atresmedia), indicating continuity in ownership structures, albeit with a somewhat more balanced distribution of audiences.

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Figure 4.

Thematic radio audiences (%).

The available data predominantly come from state sources and therefore reflect a centralized view of the market. However, when analyzing audience distribution by autonomous communities—especially in those with co-official languages—a greater presence and influence of regional public broadcasters is observed. These highlight how ownership structure and audience distribution in the Spanish radio sector reproduce a pattern of strong concentration in the generalist domain, with relatively higher levels of plurality in regional contexts and thematic formats.

Among traditional media, the worst-performing sector during the analyzed period has been the press. Newspapers suffered a 26.7% revenue decline, with fluctuating trends throughout the period, ultimately yielding a negative result. However, this revenue pattern does not allow for the identification of a consistent trend within the sector. A similar situation is observed in the magazine industry: in 2020, it experienced a 22.1% decline, remained stable thereafter, and showed a slight recovery in 2022. Nevertheless, this rebound was insufficient to restore pre-pandemic revenue levels.

The structure of the daily press in Spain is characterized by a high level of corporate concentration. During the 2020–2022 period, the four main publishing groups—Vocento, Prensa Ibérica, Prisa, and Godó—collectively accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total distributed copies, with figures ranging between 62% and 66%. Vocento led in 2021 with a market share of 27.63%, followed by Prensa Ibérica and Prisa, which competed for second place, and Grupo Godó, maintaining a stable presence around 9%.

Despite national concentration, the press exhibits strong territorial segmentation. Most of the titles published by the major groups have a regional or local presence, which allows them to hold a dominant position in their respective territories. In this regard, Vocento holds shares exceeding 75% in several provinces; Grupo Godó surpasses 50% penetration in Catalonia; Promecal dominates Castilla y León; Grupo Joly leads in Andalusia, Grupo Noticias in the Basque Country, and Serra in the Balearic Islands. National newspapers—in the strict sense—constitute a minority within the total number of titles audited by the Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión (OJD).

On the other hand, the number of independent newspapers has declined significantly. Of the approximately 90 newspapers audited by the OJD, barely 10% do not belong to any group, whether large or medium-sized, highlighting the progressive disappearance of autonomous editorial entities.

This phenomenon of concentration is also observable in the magazine sector, albeit with some nuances. Only three publishing groups exceed 10% of total circulation, and the presence of independent magazines declined from 11% in 2020 to 8.3% in 2022. Many of these publications are designed for national distribution, with limited territorial presence. A notable exception is Sunday supplements published by press groups such as Vocento, Godó, Unión Editorial, and Prensa Ibérica, which together account for nearly 10% of total magazine circulation.

Concentration in the telecoms and internet access services industries

As observed, the telecommunications sector has experienced a significant decline in recent years, signaling a shift in trends within communication technology industries, particularly in wireline and wireless services. This decline is primarily due to the gradual abandonment of traditional telephone lines. Additionally, the wireless sector, which includes both mobile voice and data services, is gradually losing market share to Internet Service Providers (ISPs).

In recent years, Spanish telecommunications operators—supported by public funding—have made significant investments to expand fiber-optic infrastructure (Europa Press Economía Finanzas, 2024). As a result, Spain now leads Europe in fiber penetration, with a rate of 81%, ranking third globally after South Korea and Japan. Despite this progress, wireline services continue to decline, while internet service providers (ISPs) show steady growth. Rising demand for streaming, gaming, remote work, and online education has increased the need for broadband and fiber-based internet consumption.

Market concentration in the telecommunications industry is linked to the same key companies across all sectors. Telefónica, Vodafone, Orange, and MásMóvil dominate the industry, operating within a vertically integrated structure across wireless, wireline, and ISP services. Some of these companies also provide their own multichannel video distribution and OVS. The leader is Movistar (Telefónica), holding a 36% of the retail market (Figure 5), followed by Orange (21%) and Vodafone (20%). In April 2024, Movistar was surpassed for the first time by MasOrange—a merger between Orange and Grupo MásMóvil, although its share remained stable at approximately 33%, according to data from CNMC. 4

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Figure 5.

Market share of leading telecoms operators, 2022. Source: CNMC, SABI, companies' annual report

Mergers, agreements, and negotiations among leading operators remain frequent. Recently, MasOrange and Vodafone announced the creation of a joint fiber infrastructure company (FibreCo), with the participation of a third investor (Muñoz, 2025). The new entity aims to extend fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) coverage to over 12 million households. In an increasingly competitive environment—where tech giants such as Amazon and SpaceX are developing their own wireless internet solutions (Peña, 2025)—synergies and strategic alliances have become essential. Consequently, market concentration remains high, with the CR4 index stable at around 90 throughout the period (Figure 6), largely due to Movistar's dominance: nearly half of the wireline and ISP market and about one-third of the wireless segment.

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Figure 6.

CR4 scores for the telecom & internet access sectors, 2019–2021 (based on revenue). Source: CNMC, SABI, companies' annual report

The HHI index provides insight into the entire sector beyond the top four market positions, offering a more precise measure of market concentration. All sectors exceed 2500 points, except for wireless, where the index ranges between 2400 and 2499 points, indicating moderate concentration. The wireline sector stands out with levels surpassing 3500 points in 2019, while the ISP sector remains around 3000 points (Figure 7).

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Figure 7.

HHI scores for the telecom and internet access sectors, 2019–2022 (based on revenue).

In all cases, concentration levels decrease over the analyzed period, indicating a slight increase in market diversity among industry operators.

Concentration in the traditional and online media industries

Traditional and digital media in Spain reveal significant heterogeneity. Although both sectors tend toward concentration, diversity persists, largely supported by the regional communication system that complements the national framework. Public media operate through the state-owned RTVE and a network of autonomous regional broadcasters grouped under the Federación de Organismos de Radio y Televisión Autonómicos (FORTA). These entities mainly manage radio and television assets but also maintain a strong presence in Online Video Services (OVS), with RTVE notably running its own platform, RTVE Play.

In the private sector, leading corporations display diagonal concentration, holding assets across television, radio, OVS, and print. This multimedia integration fosters diversification and economies of scale. The dominant players are Atresmedia and Mediaset, which together control nearly 40% of the market—ranking just behind the public operator (31%). Their core business remains radio, television, and OVS. Smaller groups are generally regional or specialized in print, such as Vocento and Unidad Editorial/RCS Mediagroup.

The relative diversity of the television sector translates into moderate concentration, with a CR4 index between 79 and 88 points (Figure 5). Spain's broadcast TV market is led by four main operators: two private groups (Mediaset and Atresmedia) and two public entities (RTVE and, collectively, FORTA). Between 2019 and 2022, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) fell by 5.3 points, indicating market stability despite ongoing digital transformation.

Moderate concentration (CR4 between 60 and 89 points) is also observed in traditional music (excluding live concerts), video games, and newspapers. The music industry is led by global firms: Universal Music Group (39% share in 2022), Sony Group (29.8%), and Warner Music Spain (26.7%). Including live music revenues (e.g., festivals) raises the index to nearly 100 by 2022.

The video game sector also shows moderately high concentration, with multinationals controlling most of the market. Although data fragmentation complicates precise analysis, Nintendo and Sony emerge as the top companies by revenue, with market shares of 37% and 31% respectively in 2022. Nevertheless, the industry remains diverse, with numerous smaller developers each holding around 1% of total revenues, contributing to sector fragmentation. As a result, the CR4 index for video games remains around 80 points (Figure 8). ⁵

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Figure 8.

CR4 scores for traditional and online Media, 2019–2022 (based on revenue).

Radio also exhibits high levels of concentration, exceeding 90 points until 2022, with its diversity increasing, as evidenced by a decrease in the CR4 to 83.7 points, a negative deviation of 14.1 points since 2019. The HHI index also indicates moderate concentration, ranging between 2500 and 3000 points, with a trend toward decentralization (Figure 9). The lack of disaggregated data for the multimedia groups comprising this sector makes it difficult to extract specific information on the radio industry, particularly regarding the state-owned public operator.

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Figure 9.

HHI scores for traditional and online Media, 2019–2022 (based on revenue).

In the private sector, PRISA stands out for owning Spain's top-rated radio stations, including Cadena SER, and a strong presence in print media with newspapers like El País and the financial outlet Cinco Días. Ábside Media Group, owned by the Spanish Episcopal Conference, controls Cadena COPE and a television network. Uniprex, part of Atresmedia, owns Onda Cero and Europa FM. Radiocat XXI S.L. (Grupo Godó) is another key player, with holdings in print and television (Figure 9).

Online video services show one of the highest concentration levels, reaching a CR4 of 99.4 points in 2022. However, the HHI index indicates increasing decentralization, particularly after 2020, when it dropped from 5185.3 to 2959.5 points. This shift was driven mainly by the entry of Disney+, which quickly became the second-largest platform—behind Netflix and ahead of Amazon Prime Video—and by the rapid growth of DAZN, the British sports streaming service, whose revenues rose from €14.9 million in 2019 to €293.7 million in 2022.

The sectors with the lowest degree of concentration are newspapers and magazines. In 2022, both surpassed 60 CR4 points, though newspapers show slight decentralization trends—unlike magazines. The HHI index reinforces this view: while both sectors remain low in concentration, they have become more decentralized, with declines of 26.6 and 10.5 points, respectively.

This fragmentation reflects the presence of specialized groups operating across diverse geographic areas. The main players—Vocento, Unidad Editorial, PRISA, and Prensa Ibérica—have consolidated their positions through diversification and regional expansion. Over recent decades, these companies have retained market relevance despite digital disruption and financial strain, adapting by developing digital platforms, adjusting to new consumption habits, and reinforcing their regional footprint.

Conclusions

The results confirm that Spain's media and cultural ecosystem exhibit significant concentration, particularly in telecommunications, digital services, and generalist broadcasting. While these trends align with global dynamics documented in the international literature (Noam & The International Media Concentration Collaboration, 2016; Winseck, 2024), they manifest uniquely in Spain due to territorial media fragmentation and a weak, fragmented regulatory framework.

Quantitatively, the highest concentration levels occur in oligopolistic industries such as telecommunications, online services, and music. Only big tech and streaming services account for 14.4% of the total revenue of the networked media economy, although this figure likely underestimates their penetration, as it relies on estimates due to a lack of transparency. Thus, it may be closer to the levels reported in other countries such as Canada, Switzerland, or the Czech Republic, which also form part of the GMICP (Szczepanik et al., 2024: 64).

On the other hand, three groups account for over 65% of the generalist radio audience, and the four main press groups represent about two-thirds of the daily newspaper market. Similar patterns are observed in television and digital platforms. Conversely, sectors with more fragmented structures, like newspapers and magazines, still contain groups with significant market shares. Although these figures are comparable to other European countries, they gain particular significance in a context marked by insufficient transparency and competition policies, as highlighted in recent reports (Parrilla et al., 2025; Suau et al., 2025).

According to cross-national data from the GMIC Project, media concentration in Spain exceeds that of France and Italy. All three countries face increasing dominance by global technology platforms—Google, Meta, Netflix, and Amazon—particularly in advertising, streaming, and digital applications. This shift has coincided with a sharp decline in traditional media sectors such as print journalism, linear television, and fixed-line telephony. Concentration levels also vary by sector across these countries, with the exception of newspapers, magazines, and radio, where the HHI in France (Lefevre & Bouquillon, 2023), Italy (Galli et al., 2024), and Spain is comparable.

Spain's digital transformation has been notably faster, with streaming growing 189% and online advertising by over 30%, in stark contrast to Italy, where the overall media market shrank by 3.5% over the same period. Spain's main vulnerability lies in its lack of transparency regarding media ownership. Combined with a higher reliance on the public sector, this places the country's media ecosystem in a more fragile and exposed position than that of its European counterparts. Compared with previous GMICP findings (Noam, 2016), changes in HHI concentration values are observed, although they remain within the same range. Between 2012 and 2022, three levels of concentration can be identified: low for newspapers and magazines (HHI < 1500), moderate for TV, radio, and mobile telephony, and high for ISPs and online video. The main differences are seen in radio, where the HHI increases from 1937 to 2576, and in wireline, which sees a decline from 5317 to 2963. Thus, different levels of concentration coexist, although it can be established that more recent activities (online video, ISPs, mobile telephony) are more concentrated than traditional ones (broadcast TV, newspapers, magazines)—with the exception of radio.

Theoretically, these findings reinforce political economy of communication perspectives, which argue that concentration must be addressed beyond economic metrics to consider democratic implications. As Mansell et al. (2025) and Baker (2007) note, concentration undermines informational plurality, cultural diversity, and democratic deliberation—especially as unregulated digital platforms become dominant intermediaries. Added risks stem from the growing influence of investment funds in media financing, whose short-term profitability logic may conflict with editorial independence and public service goals. In this context, the GAFAM companies and social networks play a central role. In addition to creating content, platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube primarily function as distributors and gatekeepers. Currently, YouTube is the most-watched video platform in Spain—doubling Netflix's audience—and Google and Facebook drive traffic to newspapers, magazines, podcasts, and other media. This visibility can create dependence, as illustrated by Playground, Vice, or BuzzFeed: when the algorithm stopped promoting their content in 2018, these outlets lost the majority of their readers, who had been primarily sourced from Facebook (Mohorte, 2019).

This study also corroborates the limited role of public policies in fostering a pluralistic ecosystem. The lack of transparency in media ownership and the allocation of public funds (such as institutional advertising) reinforces this structural weakness, generating opacity and encouraging political clientelism—a practice particularly widespread in Southern European countries (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002).

In conclusion, this study demonstrates that concentration in the Spanish cultural industries is not merely a matter of market structures but a complex phenomenon with profound consequences for democracy, pluralism, and the right to information. Addressing these challenges requires the development of more integrated monitoring instruments, inspired by initiatives such as European Media Freedom Act (EMFA, 2024), and the implementation of a regulatory framework capable of responding to both the economic risks and the social and cultural implications of concentration.