Professional or personal framing? International media coverage of the Israel–Hamas prisoner exchange deal

Introduction

Shalit’s kidnapping, especially the story that has unfolded since his kidnapping, attracted extensive national and international media attention. Apart from being a riveting human-interest story, the Shalit deal represents a rare case in which the Israeli government agreed to negotiate indirectly with Hamas by using Egyptian and German mediators. This step was considered to be unusual due to the recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, the release of hundreds of prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier gave rise to heated international debate regarding the political and moral implications of such a deal.

The Shalit deal presents complex dilemmas and challenges for how journalists should cover controversial political events since media framing of such events has significant implications regarding how the public and policymakers think about such issues (Evans, 2008). When covering these events, journalists can choose whether to adopt a universal professional perspective or a domestic national one (Lavie-Dinur et al., 2013).

The current research aims to explore whether ethical considerations or other ideological and national political agendas determined the content of domestic and foreign television news media coverage of the 2011 Israel–Hamas Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal.

A quantitative content analysis was conducted on 2,162 news reports from five news networks – BBC, CNN, Fox and Israel’s Channels 1 and 2. The analysis focused on four main aspects of coverage: the deal itself, how Shalit was treated, how the Palestinian side was treated, and the Egyptian television interview (which took place following Shalit’s release). Different aspects of framing, such as prominence, main theme, word choice and attribution of credit, were analyzed in order to examine the similarities and differences in media coverage among the five networks.

This work builds on a growing body of research on media framing of political events and the effect of a media outlet’s country’s political context in regard to its coverage.

Background: The Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal and US–Hamas relations

The Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange agreement is the third largest prisoner exchange agreement that Israel has carried out. The largest prisoner exchange took place in 1983 between Israel and ‘Fatah’ (Palestinian National Liberation Movement). This was an exchange for six live Israeli soldiers traded for a sum total of 4,765 security prisoners. The second largest prisoner exchange deal, the Jibril exchange deal, took place in 1985. In this case, Israel released 1,150 security prisoners in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured during the First Lebanon War.

The Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange followed an agreement between Israel and Hamas to release captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in exchange for 1,027 prisoners – mainly Palestinians and Arab-Israelis – completed in two phases. Gilad Shalit, who was captured by Hamas on 25 June 2006 in southern Israel along the Gaza border, had been held in captivity for 5 years and 4 months at the time of his release.

The first phase of the deal was executed on 18 October 2011, with Israel releasing 477 Palestinian prisoners and Hamas transferring Gilad Shalit to Cairo. The second phase was carried out in December 2011, when another 550 prisoners were released. The majority of the Palestinian prisoners who were released as part of the exchange resided in the West Bank, which includes East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Another commonality between these security prisoners is that the majority of them were not Israeli-Arab citizens but Palestinians. The Shalit deal represents an agreement between the Israeli government and the Hamas government. Indeed, Hamas is often framed by Israeli and Western media as a fanatical, dogmatic, Islamic terrorist organization bent on destroying Israel (Wagemakers, 2010).^1,2 The new Hamas-led Palestinian government took effect in February 2006, but in March the US cut its diplomatic ties with Hamas and withdrew its financial support from the Palestinian government (Chehab, 2007).

The ‘Free Gilad Shalit’ campaign, which spanned more than 5 years (from 2006 till 2011), included mass marches, a protest tent encampment, frequent media appearances and daily countdowns on major Israeli television channels. The mainstream Israeli news media rallied to the cause, creating a consensus in Israel in support of Shalit’s release. Some argued that the media’s behavior created the necessary public pressure for a deal, while others claimed that the media acted irresponsibly and raised the expectations of Hamas (Kershner, 2011).

News framing of political events

According to framing theory, the media actively set frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret political events (Entmann, 1991; Entmann and Rojecki, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978: 9; Wolfsfeld, 1997). These frames emphasize particular aspects of a story and form a central organizing theme ‘by selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues’ (Entmann, 2003: 5). For example, the media’s decision to raise the prominence of a particular subject or the decision to choose and emphasize a certain image or offer specific explanations and commentary regarding the reasons for – and consequences of – events, all contribute to the construction of news frames with an identifiable ‘slant’ (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Bloch-Elkon, 2007: 25; Callaghan and Schnell, 2001; Gamson, 1992; Naveh, 2002; Paletz, 2002; Tankard, 2001).

When it comes to political conflict or crises, the media have the ability to structure stories to emphasize conflict or dramatic narrative (Jamieson and Waldman, 2003; Tuchman, 1978) and can use certain words and images to stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict (Entmann, 1993). The type of framing employed can lead the public to feel a closer ‘proximity’, and identify (and empathize) with one side or group in a conflict. On the other hand, coverage which focuses on the complexity of a conflict leads the audience to feel detached from events taking place far from them, creating a feeling of ‘distance’ between the audience and the victims (Evans, 2010; Robinson, 2000).

There is also variation among national news organizations, which is often determined by the media organization’s target audience. For example, as public television stations are generally trying to reach a more educated and elite audience than private television stations (broadcast, satellite and cable), they also tend to feature less sensational and more informational coverage of issues than private television stations (Levine, 2003; Newton, 1999). However, it is important to note that even when public stations attempt to feature more informational coverage, this does not necessarily mean that the information portrayed is not framed, nor does it mean that the information presented is more accurate. For instance, Israeli Channel 1, which operates under the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA), has always been placed under political supervision. Thus the Israeli news network (Channel 1) faces political pressure to serve the current coalition and governmental needs due to the fact that its budget is not only supervised but also approved by parliament; additionally, the government appoints the IBA’s executives. ³

‘Ours’ and ‘theirs’: Media framing of foreign/domestic news

Studies on media coverage of political conflict show that the news media are heavily influenced by the political context of their country (Oliver and Maney, 2000) and that news coverage often depends on a country’s geographical, political or cultural affinity to the news outlet’s home country despite globalization (Chang and Lee, 1992; De Vreese et al., 2001; Rosengren, 1974; Sreberny and Stevenson, 1999; Westerståhl and Johansson, 1994; Wu, 2000). Thus, the media treat events differently depending on whether the conflict is internal ‘ours’ (i.e. whether it concerns the media’s nation state) or external ‘theirs’ (it does not concern that media’s nation state) (Cohen et al., 1993; Liebes, 1992; Nossek, 2004), ultimately highlighting the falsehood of the claim of media objectivity.

Studies show that when a conflict is domestic, media coverage tends to support national foreign policy goals, especially when the national interest is threatened, thereby acting as a source of ‘national integration’ (Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Paletz, 2002; Schudson, 2002) or unifying force behind government decisions/actions (Rivenburgh, 1996; Waisbord, 2002). The alleged national interest is often constructed by the government, whose interest in turn is constructed by the media and then this often follows the public to affirm similar beliefs.

When it comes to foreign news coverage, studies show that while globalization has resulted in the emergence of supranational and global media corporations, news organizations continue to tackle foreign news from a local angle (Caliendo et al., 1999; Golan and Wanta, 2003; Nossek, 2000, 2004; Sreberny and Stevenson, 1999; Stevenson and Gaddy, 1984), i.e. media coverage of foreign news is still shaped strongly by national as well as international factors (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981; Herman and Chomsky, 1988), such as geo-political goals, corporate investments, commitments to regional allies, and so on.

Gamson (1992) and Wolfsfeld (1997, 2004) deduce that journalists tend to construct news frames that resonate with public assumptions and sentiments when a conflict is affiliated and defined as ‘ours’. In contradiction, it is not the case that the media invariably embodies the public’s view or attitude concerning the conflict but the news frame is constructed in support of administration policy. Furthermore, these perspectives, which the government asserts, are in line with the national objectives of the state (Handley and Ismail, 2010), contributing in turn to public opinion. Many studies found that the bias in foreign news coverage is usually consistent with the foreign policy of the network’s government (Bennett et al., 2007; Hallin, 1986; Handley and Ismail, 2010; Kumar, 2006; Reese, 2004; Reese and Buckalew, 1995) and reflects the same values that are in the national news. These similarities become more pronounced especially if there is a clear enemy or threat against a nation (Kara and Atabey, 2013). For example, Dardis (2006) examined US and UK news media reporting of the Iraq War protests and found that differing sociopolitical environments were reflected in each nation’s press coverage. Similarly, De Vreese et al. (2001) found differences in media framing of the introduction of the common European currency, the euro, among several European countries.

Media coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Studies show that there has been disproportionate coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Evans, 2010; Hawkins, 2011) that received 35 percent of US foreign news television coverage in the early 1990s, despite accounting for only 5 percent of the world’s population (Hess, 1996).

Research suggests that American news coverage is biased and gives prominence to Israeli perspectives whilst marginalizing Palestinian perspectives (Friel and Falk, 2007; Ross, 2003; Viser, 2003). Dunsky (2001) argues that the American foreign policy tilt is implicitly absorbed into US reporting on the Middle East. However, according to Handley and Ismail (2010), Israeli news can become ‘our’ [US] news when the strategic interests of the two states converge. Thus, whether the US news media are critical of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians depends largely on whether Israel is perceived to operate in accordance with US interests. When Israeli actions are seen as problematic for US objectives, the US news media will criticize those specific Israeli policies.

In the case of the Israeli media, many studies find that in times of violent confrontations the Israeli media are inherently ethnocentric in orientation (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008), often personalizing the Israeli side while demonizing the enemy (Karniel et al., 2014; Liebes, 1992). Moreover, while covering the military operation ‘Cast Lead’ in Gaza between 2008 and 2009, it is noted that the public proposed a request to deliver a more transparent chauvinistic approach. Such a demand occurred when Yonit Levy, one of Israel’s most popular news anchors, was accused of expressing what was perceived as excessive sympathy for the enemy in her coverage of the Gaza war. Channel 2, which was considered to be the most popular television broadcast station, was flooded with complaints and demands that she be fired (Orgad, 2009).

In this way, the Israeli media is consistently subversive when following the formal Israel press council’s Rules of Journalistic Ethics (1996). The practice states that Israeli media must be politically balanced when reporting all issues, especially issues with inherent social tension. Furthermore, a significant measure of objectivity must be taken into account when approaching the Israeli–Palestinian conflict due to it being a highly sensitive subject in Israeli culture. This notion can be linked to Orgad’s (2009) insight; in her study she raises an important question, asking how journalists can achieve a ‘proper distance’ when reporting on a conflict affecting their own communities? This term, introduced by Silverstone in 2007, was used by Orgad as an approach to help understand our mediated relationship to the ‘other’, which in this case refers to the Palestinian side in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange. Hence, in order to be aligned with the formal Israel press council’s Rules of Journalistic Ethics, Orgad argues that a degree of estrangement – de-familiarization from the commonsensical national narrative of ‘us’ – is vital in order to achieve a balance in different reportages, especially in times of conflict.

According to Levin (2003: 31), ‘the Israeli news media has a long history of being closely associated with government interests and political parties.’ The Israeli media generally framed Palestinians as vicious and blamed them for the deterioration of the peace process (Wolfsfeld, 2001). It is not solely that the Israeli public, just like most publics, demand that coverage be focused on themselves – their negotiators, their political infighting, their dead, and so on (Samuel-Azran et al., 2015). Henceforth the media frames focus the public attention by means of chauvinistic reporting (Wolfsfeld, 2001); media frames that encourage the media to report in a different manner are not principally driven by public demand.

The BBC has been subject to intense scrutiny in its coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, with both sides systematically accusing the corporation of being more favorable to the other. An Independent Panel appointed to investigate claims of bias relating to the BBC’s coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict concluded that: ‘there was little to suggest deliberate or systematic bias’ (Savigny and Marsden, 2013: 41). On a similar note, Gaber et al. (2009) conducted a study that focused on the BBC’s coverage of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war; they found that, whilst certain aspects of the coverage were problematic, the BBC covered the conflict more or less impartially.

This study includes analyses of prominence – how the news networks ‘under study’ highlight some perspectives over others through coverage frequency, length of news reports and news format depth – and other framing devices, including main theme selection, attribution of responsibility and overall direction of news report. The study expects that media coverage of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal will differ according to the political context of the media outlet’s home country. Therefore, the current study seeks to answer the research question: How did coverage of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal differ among American, European and Israeli news channels?

Method

The current research examines how five different news media outlets (Israeli Channels 1 and 2, CNN, Fox and BBC) framed the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal. The focus on these predominant news outlets is based on the fact that these outlets are the center of the power of information and they have a monopoly over all other outlets. All news broadcasts featured on these networks during the 5-day period, starting two days before the Shalit deal and two days after the Shalit deal (from 16–20 October 2011) were recorded using the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s television recording system.

The five news outlets were chosen because they represent a broad geographical area and have unique political, cultural and ideological leanings. CNN and Fox, the two US-based channels, were selected because they are the two leading news networks in the US. The two channels represent opposing political ideologies and have both been accused by some of partisan bias (though in opposite ways, with Fox accused of being more right-leaning toward pro-Israel and CNN more left-leaning) (Aday et al., 2005). The BBC is the official British news channel recognized as one of the most popular media outlets people turn to for international information (Gaber et al., 2009). In parallel, we are fully aware that other significant news channels exist, such as BSkyB. However, because we have decided to focus on outlets that served a clear agenda in the coverage of Shalit’s return, these provide no advantage for this particular study. Moreover, the aforementioned chosen networks on which we focused are known to have a complicated history regarding coverage of sensitive events that have transpired in Israel. Similarly, we came to the conclusion that choosing three commercial and two public networks would supply us with the diversity needed in this study in order to thoroughly examine the differences of coverage between them. Israeli Public Channel 1 and Commercial Channel 2 were chosen as they are leading Israeli news channels and a major source of foreign news for Israelis (First, 2009). Furthermore, according to polls (‘Sample Project Panel’, 2012), 49 percent of the sample regard Channel 1 to be aligned with governmental interests, and thus right wing. This could be deemed ‘accurate’ as this outlet is state owned. On the contrary, the commercial outlet – Channel 2 – as illustrated by 65 percent of the ‘Sample Project Panel’s (2012) representative sample, categorizes them as left wing since their media reports tend to be characterized as opposing the government’s acts and decisions. This agenda-mosaic is indispensable when examining highly sensitive issues in Israel such as the return of Gilad Shalit – a media event that led to different framing on the networks and reflected many political interests, which we will shed more light on later.

The study examined news reports that directly dealt with the Shalit prisoner exchange deal. The final sample included 2,162 news reports. The unit of analysis was the broadcast news report. News items were sorted according to type (area reports, interviews, studio reports, etc.) and network. Three Israeli undergraduate students were trained extensively on the coding scheme, which incorporated the use of specific terminology by the networks, for instance the use of the word ‘captive’. For this study, a captive is someone held as a prisoner of war, who is forcibly confined by the adversary because of the Israeli–Palestinian political agenda. They were asked to address questions such as: (i) What is the main issue presented in the item? Here the coders were required to decide which category most accurately reflected what was shown in the item. The options available were: (1) the Shalit family; (2) the activity of the free Shalit movement; (3) the story revolving around the kidnapping itself; (4) the return of Shalit (mostly on the actual day of his release); (5) Shalit’s physical or mental health; (6) an interview with Egyptian television; and (7) the release of Palestinian prisoners of war including the celebration in Gaza. Following this, an additional 10 options pertaining to the nature of the exchange were presented. Similarly, the coders were asked whether the Hamas organization receives credibility in the item and at the other end of the coin if Netanyahu is receiving credibility in the item. They answered these on a Yes/No basis. Once all the items were coded, an inter-coder reliability test was calculated on 220 items (approximately 10% of the items) that were randomly chosen from the content of all five news networks. The test was revealed to be a sufficient indicator of agreement between the independent raters (Kappa’s α > .70), thereby allowing us to determine that the coders were generally in agreement in regard to assessing the characteristics of the messages. In line with Entmann’s (1993) belief about content analysis, our coders identified and described the textual meaning of frames. The coders measured the salience of prominent segments in the text, thus freeing the investigation from bias.

In order to examine the way the Shalit deal was framed by each network, we analyzed different aspects of framing, such as prominence, main theme, word choice and attribution of credit. We focused on five main aspects of coverage: first, we examined how the Shalit deal was treated (e.g. attribution of responsibility – here termed ‘credit’ for the deal, opposition, arguments for opposition and sources of opposition). Second we examined how Shalit was treated (e.g. was Shalit referred to in a personal or professional manner?) in the items. Third, we examined the Israeli–Palestinian balance, i.e. what was the article’s main theme (e.g. the deal itself, Israeli aspects, Palestinian aspects, etc.). Fourth, we examined how Hamas was treated (e.g. if it was referred to as a ‘terrorist organization’, etc.). Finally, we examined the ways in which the different networks treated a specific event – the Egyptian television interview with Shalit (e.g. was the interview criticized?).

Results

The current study included 2,162 news items related to the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal.

How Hamas was treated

Shalit’s references versus Hamas references

As can be seen in Figure 1, while the Israeli channels mostly referred to Shalit in a neutral manner, they also referred to him in a personal manner. At the same time, the Israeli channels mostly referred to Hamas in a descriptive manner. CNN and the BBC tended to refer to Shalit in a neutral or a descriptive manner (as a soldier and captive) in similar frequencies and to Hamas mostly in a neutral manner. Fox, on the other hand, referred both to Shalit and Hamas in a descriptive manner: Hamas mostly as a ‘terrorist organization’ and Shalit as a ‘soldier’. It is interesting to note that Fox referred to Shalit in a personal manner more than any other international network.

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Figure 1.

Relative frequencies of items referring Hamas (left side) neutrally or in a descriptive manner and Shalit (right side) neutrally, in a descriptive manner, or personally, as a function of network. Percentages are calculated separately for Shalit (out of items that mentioned Shalit) and Hamas (out of items that mentioned Hamas). Percentages are within networks.

Egyptian television interview with Shalit

Approximately 10 percent of the items (on all networks) broadcast the Egyptian television interview. The relative frequency of items concerning the interview was: Israel Channel 1: 10 percent, Israeli Channel 2: 7 percent, CNN: 10 percent, Fox: 22 percent, and the BBC: 14 percent.

As can be seen in Figure 2, the BBC covered the interview in a completely informative manner, while CNN and Fox presented a certain degree of criticism regarding its mere existence. However, among the Israeli channels the picture is different. Israeli Channel 1, Israel’s national channel, mostly covered the interview in an informative manner (70% of the items) and presented criticism regarding its mere existence, the Egyptians who delivered it and its content. Israeli Channel 2, the Israeli commercial channel, covered the interview in an informative manner only in approximately 30 percent of the relevant items and presented a great degree of criticism regarding the interview’s mere existence, its content and the Egyptians who delivered it.

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Figure 2.

Descriptions of the Egyptian interview with Shalit by network. Percentages are calculated out of all items that concerned the Egyptian interview within each network.

Discussion

The Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange which involved the rare agreement between the Israeli government and Hamas – considered by Israel to be a terrorist organization – resulted in extensive media coverage of both the deal and Shalit’s subsequent release and return to Israel.

Shalit’s release followed a 5-year campaign spearheaded, in part, by the Israeli media, which kept Shalit on the public agenda and created public consensus in favor of a prisoner exchange deal. According to some, ⁴ the Israeli media played an important role in pressuring the Israeli government to secure Shalit’s release (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2011, 2013). Following the issues that Entmann (1993) highlights in regard to journalists’ perceptions, it could be noted that likewise the Israeli media’s rather biased stance and coverage is in favor of the deal itself, demonstrating how in certain situations, professional journalistic norms are in favor of ideological considerations. Therefore, ‘journalists may follow the rules for “objective” reporting and yet convey a dominant framing of the news text that prevents most audience members from making a balanced assessment of a situation’ (p. 56).

The study’s findings reveal considerable differences in media coverage of the Shalit deal among Israeli and international news channels. These findings are consistent with previous studies that show that the bias in foreign news coverage is usually consistent with the foreign policy of the network’s government (Bennett et al., 2007; Hallin, 1986; Handley and Ismail, 2010; Kumar, 2006; Reese, 2004; Reese and Buckalew, 1995).

Findings show that the Israeli networks strongly aligned themselves with the government’s position, expressing support for the deal, personalizing Shalit and attributing credit for the deal almost exclusively to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As a means of illustration, from the findings of this research, approximately 20 percent of Israeli networks presented items showing opposition to the deal. This is in comparison to 50 percent on the BBC and CNN and 80 percent on Fox, thus making it comprehensible that the Israeli channels downplayed the strategic disadvantage of Shalit’s release – i.e. the release of over a thousand Palestinian detainees. Instead, the Israeli media chose to cover this important media event in a personal manner, highlighting the return home of the prodigal son, ignoring the political and security implications of the transaction.

As expected, the Israeli channels focused on Israeli aspects of the transaction compared with CNN and the BBC. There were also differences in the way the networks referred to Gilad Shalit. The Israeli media referred to Shalit by his full name and in a personal manner, often calling him ‘son’ in expressing a desire to ‘bring our son home’. The Israeli media’s reluctance to refer to Shalit as a ‘captive’ may stem from the term’s negative connotation, used often to refer to a hostage who has perished or disappeared. This finding can be explained by Entmann’s (1993) framing theory. The theory suggests that terminology choices are a priori aimed at composing an ideological picture. Supposedly, the perceived reality, arousing from Israeli coverage of Shalit’s exchange, was manifested by the essence of the created media frames. It was an obvious agenda: that the ‘national son’ needs to be returned home (to Israel). In general, all Israeli media, with no particular exception, praised Shalit’s return, thus creating a moral judgement. Entmann would suggest that this moral judgement in turn serves the government’s interest to create a consensus regarding Shalit’s release, omitting the consequences of the act. The moral value presented in the terminology of ‘captive’, ‘son’ and ‘home’ shed some clear light on the legitimation they strived to achieve.

Furthermore, the Israeli channels highlighted Shalit’s strength more than any other network. This reflects a more ethnocentric attitude and may be attributed to the fact that the Israeli public (and media) feared that Shalit would be in dire mental and physical health. Thus, the Israeli media (and public’s) reaction to Shalit’s relatively stable mental and physical strength was relief – thus he was described as ‘strong’. On the other hand, the international networks highlighted Shalit’s weakness, demonstrating a more objective report of what Shalit looked like at the moment of his release – for instance, that he had lost weight and looked pale. While these findings confirm past studies on the subject, this case presents an extreme example of how national ideology trumps professional journalistic norms. Following Entmann’s framing template (1993), the Israeli media tendency to highlight Shalit’s strength, which was also influenced by the public spirit, can be framed as ‘treatment recommendation’. The media discussion constantly involved the issue of Shalit’s fatigue as a settlement for decreasing public fear of the first visual image of the ‘prodigal son’. By receiving a clear frame of his positive welfare, the public interests, and one could say, the government agenda for declaring the transaction as an achievement, were fulfilled. To emphasize the awareness of this framing, as mentioned previously, we can see that the international networks were not trying to sensationalize Shalit’s health issue into a positive frame, but portrayed it in a more authentic manner, by reporting the image with less emotional value.

With regard to the Egyptian television interview, Israel’s Channel 2 was very critical of its existence, which seemed to reflect the ideological position of the general Israeli public. The findings demonstrated that Channel 2 covered the interview in an informative manner only in approximately 30 percent of the relevant items. This indicates that the coverage was characterized predominantly from an emotional point of view. Moreover, the coverage presented a great degree of criticism regarding the interview’s mere existence, its content and the Egyptians who delivered it. Indeed, Israel’s Channel 2, a commercial station, is known for providing more unprecedented success among viewers, which has often been criticized by academics and media critics for its blunt commercial nature, unsophisticated contents, sensationalism and unquestioning patriotic tone (Yuran, 2001), thus making the Shalit deal coverage on Channel 2 no different. This critical and emotional coverage may be attributed to Israel’s sometimes volatile relationship with Egypt – Israelis have been taken captive in Egypt in the past. The international channels, on the other hand, treated the interview in a mostly professional and informative manner, with the BBC providing the most balanced coverage.

The study also reveals differences in coverage among the international channels themselves. Differences were found between the two US channels: CNN refrained from calling Hamas a ‘terrorist organization’ and focused more on the Palestinian side than any other network, while Fox focused mostly on Israeli aspects of the deal. The international channels (BBC and CNN) referred to Shalit as a soldier and captive significantly more than the Israeli channels. CNN referred to Shalit by his full name and as a soldier in similar frequencies, while the BBC referred to Shalit by his full name in over half its items. In contrast, Fox had the least amount of items referring to Shalit by his full name, and the highest number of items (of the non-Israeli channels) that referred to Shalit in a personal manner. Fox described Shalit as a soldier at a higher rate than any other network and, similar to Israeli channels, rarely referred to him as a captive. Fox’s reluctance to refer to Shalit as a captive may be attributed to the US’s policy against hostage negotiations with terrorists. This choice of framing is explained by Entmann’s (1993) theoretical concept of ‘dominant meaning’. That is to say, a particular framing of a political occasion – i.e. the Shalit transaction – was predominantly emphasized by Fox news channel’s broadcast. The dominant meaning, as Entmann stated, must follow the audience schemata. Thus, it may be explained that the representation of the Shalit transaction was following a strict hostage negotiations policy dictated by the US government and showing a significant alienation of the issue.

In terms of opposition to the deal, CNN’s high level of opposition may reflect the US government’s position against negotiation with terrorists (the US considers Hamas a terrorist organization). It is interesting to note that Fox, considered to be a right-wing station, chose to support the Israeli government’s position over the traditional right-wing stance against negotiating with terrorists.

Our findings affirm previous literature that shows that news media are heavily influenced by the political context of their country (Oliver and Maney, 2000). ‘The closer the reporters/editors are to a given news event in terms of national interest, the further they are from applying professional news values’: this notion, put forward by Nossek (2004: 343), subscribes to the belief that the framed national interest is influenced by governmental construction and the media agenda which sequentially affect the way the event is reported on by the journalists. Thus US coverage of the Gilad Shalit deal is less professional and balanced than the BBC, reflecting the US government’s extensive involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In this case, it seems that Fox’s coverage is more closely aligned with that of Israel, while CNN reflects the US position against negotiating with terrorists.

On the other hand, the BBC seems to reflect the UK’s more neutral stand and involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Indeed, the BBC provided the most balanced coverage of the deal, referring to Shalit in neutral terms and refraining from attributing credit or responsibility to either side. BBC coverage focused on the deal itself and refrained from personal and/or emotional coverage. The findings are consistent with previous studies which attest to the BBC’s balanced reporting (Gaber et al., 2009). Thus, the findings suggest important differences in the way foreign and national news networks cover controversial political events. Furthermore, they elicit how national interest is constructed by the governing body and the media, and not by the public in itself.

Plausibly, the findings from this study elucidate the consequences of biased media coverage relating to the case of the Gilad Shalit deal. By finding that the media failed to serve the public objectively, as expected in democratic societies, in framing the Shalit deal through different motivations, such as chauvinism, for example, one can assume that the media’s contribution to democracy is at risk. Moreover, it is not solely the Gilad Shalit deal that engendered different frames through various media outlet agendas but common journalistic practice that is frequently inclined to undermine the ideal ethical roles of journalism, thereby misleading viewers. This pattern, indicated by our findings, has an inherent potential to disrupt possible collaboration between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. In this way, the political players are even more alienated and the long lasting conflict is deepened, with more lives endangered by the conflict at hand.

This work builds on a growing body of research on media framing of political events that finds that government agendas and dominant political ideologies contribute toward the framing of media coverage. The results invite further studies on news media’s influence on their home country’s political ideology and foreign policy objectives on news coverage. The study also encourages further research and comprehensive discussions regarding journalistic practices that influence media framing of political events. This should include subjects such as journalist–source relationships and how journalists define newsworthiness as different news organizations around the world, both print and broadcast, have graduated from practices in which ‘professional’ journalists define what is newsworthy toward letting the market decide. This tendency has generated much opportunism on the part of news organizations, causing them to doubt the choices of journalists, as proposed by McManus (1992). Many different interpretations have been given to ‘newsworthiness’ – a fluid term, determined by news outlets, which has the potential to influence media framing presented by journalists and which should be the subject of further research. Future studies should also examine the differences in media coverage between commercial and public broadcasting channels.