Strategic synchrony? The co-projection of identity narratives by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia

Abstract

Influencing public opinion abroad via the media is a longstanding ambition of the Russian government, where media influence is used to counter an anti-Russian campaign carried out by so-called unfriendly states. This article presents a comparative narrative analysis of how the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian state-controlled Sputnik co-projected identity narratives about Latvia between 2019 and 2021 prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The analysis identifies three recurring narratives on freedom of speech, history, and language, portraying Russia as a righteous protector and Latvia as a Russophobic, Western-influenced antagonist. Empirically, the study demonstrates the co-projection between state and media actors, showing that Sputnik operates as an almost integrated part of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s communication strategy, rather than as an independent outlet. Theoretically, it applies Chatman’s terminology of story and discourse (see Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film, 1980) to explain how rhetorical form and degree of explicitness influence the persuasive force of strategic narratives. Contextually, the findings indicate that antagonistic portrayals of Latvia reflect Russia’s view of the Baltics as part of its legitimate sphere of influence, aiming to weaken trust in Latvian institutions, and undermine the country’s international reputation. These narratives also contribute to changing the discursive environment in which they operate.

Keywords

antagonistic narration international communication Latvia Russia Sputnik strategic narratives

Introduction

Influencing public opinion abroad via the media is a longstanding ambition of the Russian government. It is mentioned as an explicit goal in every Foreign Policy Concept Russia has issued since 2000. Strategic narratives, defined as “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors” (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 3), are widely adopted by Russia and other states. As a result, states have developed organizations to “tell their story to the world” (Brown, 2017: 165) and position themselves and their goals when engaging with foreign audiences (Pamment, 2014). The latest Russian Foreign Policy Concept from 2023 furthermore states that media is used to strengthen Russia’s position in the global information space and counter “the coordinated anti-Russian campaign carried out on a systematic basis by unfriendly states” ( Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023).

The Russian state-controlled news agency Sputnik was launched in 2013 through a presidential decree by the merger of the international radio channel Voice of Russia and the nationally focused news agency RIA Novosti (nowadays part of Rossiya Segodnya, which houses Sputnik and RT). Sputnik is tasked with generating “coverage abroad of the state policy of the Russian Federation and public life in the Russian Federation” (President of Russia, 2013) and, in comparison to RT, has been described as the unadulterated “Voice of Russia” (Birge, 2022).

Among Sputnik’s various regional branches, Sputnik Latvia represents an especially interesting case. As a Russian-language media outlet operating in a Baltic state with a significant Russian-speaking minority, Sputnik Latvia serves as a key platform for projecting Russian identity narratives in a region with deep historical and geopolitical tensions with Russia. Latvia, a member of both NATO and EU, has been a frequent target of Russian information campaigns (Chakars and Ekmanis, 2022; Kruks and Skulte, 2022; Zeleneva and Grantseva [Ageeva], 2017) particularly in efforts to undermine trust in Western institutions and reinforce narratives of Baltic states’ discrimination toward Russian speakers (Hoyle et al., 2024). The Russian government has codified Russian-speaking compatriots living abroad as central elements of its foreign policy (Cheskin, 2015; Cheskin and Kachuyevski, 2019), where compatriots’ protection has been used to justify the use of hard military means in Georgia and Ukraine.

Sputnik and RT have been accused of blurring the lines between public diplomacy, propaganda and traditional journalism (Elswah and Howard, 2020; Rawnsley, 2015; Wright et al., 2020). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Sputnik and RT have been blocked in the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2022) but are accessible through VPN and continue to publish regularly. This begs the question whether the ban was justified. Previous research shows that Sputnik’s narrative content is often amplified through social media and local media outlets, allowing it to reach audiences far beyond Sputnik’s direct consumers (Hoyle et al., 2022; Ramsay and Robertshaw, 2018). Although active audiences of Sputnik, like RT, are thought to be relatively small (Crilley et al., 2020), the wider dissemination of its narratives may still influence foreign audiences’ perceptions of local politics.

However, while previous studies have explored how different states are narrated in Russian state-controlled media such as Sputnik (Deverell et al., 2020; Hoyle et al., 2024; Wagnsson and Barzanje, 2021) and RT (Hoyle et al., 2022), the process of narrative co-projection between state actors and state media is rarely studied. Most previous studies have skipped the state actor and relied on a priori strategic narrative without a clear indication of where these narratives come from and how they are shaped and changed. This study makes the case that the projection of Russian strategic narratives requires further study and specification as understanding an actor’s strategic aims is central for making claims about narratives’ performative aspects, making understanding what actors are trying to do with narratives crucial. Identity narratives, which define a political actor through its values, roles and place in the world, help foster a sense of belonging or division. This is particularly relevant in conflicts, where narratives are used to mobilize support or delegitimize opponents. While issue narratives change with geopolitical events, identity narratives have a lasting impact as they influence public attitudes over time.

This study investigates how Russian strategic narratives are projected and adapted when moving from official government discourse to state-controlled media before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, it compares press briefings from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Sputnik Latvia’s news coverage by asking: what are the strategic narratives about Latvia, and how are they co-projected by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia? Despite extensive research on the content of such strategic narratives, less attention has been paid to systematically comparing how identity narratives are communicated. By focusing on the interaction between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia, this study provides insights into the mechanisms through which narratives exert their influence. Furthermore, it clarifies whether narrative projection is a top-down centralized process and demonstrates the role of state-aligned media as intermediaries in the projection of strategic narratives. While Miskimmon et al. (2013) and Roselle et al. (2014) emphasize the role of media in shaping perceptions, few have analyzed the specific role of state-sponsored media like Sputnik in the narrative process.

Previous studies show how Latvia has been described by the Russian government as a state in economic and social decline, a poor periphery of the West, abandoned by their new hosts and facing serious difficulties after leaving the Soviet Union (Rönngren, 2022, 2025; Zeleneva and Grantseva (Ageeva), 2017). Considering Russia’s interest in keeping post-Soviet states such as Latvia within its “sphere of interest,” the awareness of how the strategic narratives are communicated and mediated is vital.

Narratives must be understood as not merely representational: they have a performative thrust. Narratives often evoke strong feelings, which makes it challenging to make a sound judgment on the content of a story compared to picking apart an argument (Wagnsson and Barzanje, 2021). In today’s chaotic world, narratives are essential for ordering chaos, making it crucial to develop ways to decipher such narratives, especially since narrative contestation makes up the basis of democracy. People are storytelling human beings, which makes debunking a necessary but incomplete way of countering so-called antagonistic narration, where an actor disperses critical or hostile information about another actor to inflict harm (Deverell et al., 2020) as it is easier to continue to embrace a false impression than to challenge an existing story. As this article demonstrates, the strategic narratives projected between 2019 and 2021 anticipate rhetorical strategies later employed to legitimize Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Theoretical framework

This study uses the conceptual framework of strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013), where a strategic narrative consists of four components: actor, setting, conflict, and resolution. Actors are those who have agency and are depicted as necessary to the narrative. Setting refers to how the world is depicted and how it works. What constitutes the stage? Where is the action taking place? The conflict highlights the importance of temporality. Who does what to whom or what? Finally, resolution. Narratives appeal to human beings due to the presentation of action to resolve a conflict or disrupt the status quo (Roselle et al., 2014).

Strategic narratives are studied at three levels of analysis: system, identity, and issue narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013). This study primarily addresses identity narratives that convey the historical experience and sense of self of an actor, its values and goals. Three processes are associated with the communication of strategic narratives: formation, projection, and reception. This study focuses on the projection and argues that what makes a narrative strategic is its selective emplotment and intentionality. Different events are connected and turned into episodes, and this plot formation is always conducted to influence an audience (Coticchia and Catanzaro, 2022). Strategic narratives are deliberately constructed (Freedman, 2006) and can be understood as a strategy in narrative form. The strategic intentionality, temporal dimension, and sense of movement distinguish strategic narratives from framing and discourse. They are seen as building bricks for creating strategic narratives where discourses and frames do not feature a causal transformation that takes actors from one status quo to another as strategic narratives do (Coticchia and Catanzaro, 2022; Livingston and Nassetta, 2018; Miskimmon et al., 2013).

Inspired by Chatman’s (1980) understanding of narratives as consisting of story (the what) and discourse (the how), this study emphasizes how the narrative is communicated. By explicitly focusing on the storytelling part of the strategic narrative, it showcases how narratives are adapted, reframed, and amplified. Discourse is here understood as the rhetoric of the narrative, describing how the story is told. As such, this study complements the framework of Miskimmon et al. (2013) by studying from what perspective the story is being told (point of view), how events are communicated (narrative voice), and the suggested interpretation of the story (commentary).

Point of view and narrative voice are closely connected where three senses distinguish point of view: literal (through someone’s eyes, perception), figurative (through someone’s worldview, ideology, conceptual system) and transferred (from someone’s interest-vantage, characterizing their general interest, profit, welfare, well-being) (Chatman, 1980). Point of view is the physical place or ideological situation, or practical life orientation to which narrative events stand in relation. Narrative voice refers to the speech or other overt means through which events and existence are communicated to the audience. Texts can manifest one or more kinds of point of view and perspectives, and the expression does not need to be lodged in the same person. Commentary consists of speech acts by a narrator that go beyond narrating or describing. Commentary is done implicitly (ironic) or explicitly through interpretation, judgment and generalization. Interpretation is relatively value-free and uses words such as “because”, “since,” and “as a result.” Judgment, on the other hand, expresses moral opinions using different adjectives. Generalization refers to universal truths or actual historical facts.

Method

Data selection

The empirical data were subject to narrative analysis. Strategic narratives were operationalized using a framework inspired by Roselle et al. (2014) and Chatman’s (1980) theory on narratives consisting of story and discourse. The sample period (October 2019 to March 2021) covers Russian strategic narratives during a critical transitional period, including both pre-pandemic conditions and the onset of global disruptions. Exploring the co-projection of identity narratives, this study consists of two parts. First, press briefing statements mentioning Latvia were downloaded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (mid.ru). In total, 34 documents mentioning Latvia were analyzed. Second, texts from Sputnik Latvia (lv.sputniknews.ru) were downloaded. Since Sputnik Latvia produced a large amount of content (8,960 texts), a sampling strategy was applied. For each press briefing, Sputnik texts published the day before, the same day, and the day after were collected to ensure topical relevance. This three-day window yielded a total of 80 Sputnik texts, which were selected for analysis based on their temporal proximity to the press briefings.

Data analysis framework

Each press briefing statement and Sputnik text was read chronologically, and repeated topics were noted. When coded, the texts were approached focusing on four key thematic components: actors, setting, conflict, and resolution (see Table 1). The first component, actors, examined how individuals and groups were positioned within the narrative. The narrator assigned different roles such as villains, heroes, fools or innocent victims, shaping perceptions of agency and morality. This process revealed how certain actors were negatively framed, while others were portrayed positively. The second component, setting, explored the narratives’ understanding of the world. This involved analyzing how the stage was constructed and how the world was depicted in terms of power structures, historical context, and cultural frameworks. The third component, conflict, was central to the strategic narrative. The problem or conflict also highlighted the importance of temporality shaping their perceived urgency and meaning. Finally, the fourth component, resolution, focused on how narratives provided closure or proposed solutions. Strategic narratives often include expectations of action and the way solutions were framed influenced not only interpretations of the problem but also the legitimacy of proposed actions and responses.

Table 1.

Questions posed to data and code (story).

Questions posed to the data	Code
Who are the actors involved?	Actors
What constitutes the stage? Where is the action taking place?	Setting
What is the problem posed? What are the reasons behind the problem?	Conflict
What are the suggested solutions?	Resolution

This study combined the framework of strategic narratives with Chatman’s (1980) ideas of narratives consisting of story and discourse. The analysis of narrative discourse focused on how storytelling shaped meaning and interpretation (see Table 2). One key theme was point of view, which determined the perspective from which the narrative was constructed. Another central theme was narrative voice, which shaped how events were communicated. A third theme, commentary, examined how narratives guided interpretation. Language choices and framing signaled to the audience how they should perceive events, whether through explicit explanations or subtle cues embedded in the text.

Table 2.

Questions posed to data and code (discourse).

Questions posed to the data	Code
From what perspective is the story told?	Point of view
How are the events communicated?	Narrative voice
How should the reader understand the story?	Commentary

All texts were systematically coded by the author using NVivo software. After coding all texts, a comparison was made between press briefing statements and Sputnik texts. Given the strong alignment between press briefing statements and Sputnik Latvia, this article provides selected citations from either source rather than duplicating references for each example.

Results

The study identified three strategic narratives. The following section describes and illustrates how the narratives are reproduced, legitimized, and amplified focusing on story and discourse. In this way, the section shows how the Russian Foreign Ministry and Sputnik co-project strategic narratives about Latvia.

Reproducing the identity narrative: Thematic overlap between MFA and Sputnik

Three strategic narratives were identified pertaining to freedom of speech, history, and language. The most common strategic narrative during the period focused on Latvia’s ban on different Russian media outlets, the second most prevalent narrative was the interpretation of history, where Latvia was accused of attempting to rewrite history and revise the outcomes of World War II and, in doing so, glorifying Nazism. The third narrative concerned Latvia’s efforts to remove the Russian language from the education system. These narratives mirror key justifications used by Sputnik and RT to legitimize Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, where alleged discrimination against Russian speakers, historical revisionism, and suppression of pro-Russian voices were framed as threats requiring intervention (Hutchings et al., 2024).

A key characteristic of Sputnik Latvia’s reporting was its close alignment with the official messaging of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The results show that Sputnik Latvia regularly published texts with extensive excerpts from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press briefing statements. These excerpts were direct quotes and summarizations of the statements in combination. This happened with almost every press briefing during the research period, where each statement was followed by a Sputnik text citing the Foreign Ministry.

In all three narratives, Latvia was narrated as an undemocratic state failing to comply with international regulations on ethnic minorities’ linguistic rights (Russian MFA, 2019a). By banning Russian media, Latvian authorities were accused of cleansing the information sphere to eliminate undesirable points of view. Latvia’s decision to ban wearing Soviet military uniforms and the St George ribbon at public events, thus making them equivalent to a Nazi uniform, was perceived as insulting the memory of people who liberated Europe and Latvia from Nazi enslavement. The education reform was perceived as a forced assimilation of Latvia’s Russian-speaking population.

Russia was, in contrast, narrated in a more neutral manner, portraying itself as a victim of Western Russophobia and an elder brother acting as a watchdog, for example, by Zakharova stating that Latvian authorities “will not be able to hide these revanchist incidents from the global community. People in Latvia see what is happening and condemn it. We will monitor Latvia’s compliance with its obligations” (Russian MFA, 2021b). Russian journalists and war veterans in Latvia, on the other hand, were narrated as heroes for standing up for democracy and access to alternative information, and for having liberated Latvia from forced Nazi enslavement during World War II. Simultaneously they were narrated as victims persecuted by Latvian Security Services or losing the right to access information in their native language (Russian MFA, 2019d). For example, the closing of the TV channel Perviy Baltiskii Kanal was understood to have been done ahead of the Riga City Council election to deprive the parties representing the interests of Russian speakers of their primary media platform (Russian MFA, 2020a). The education reform was emphasized to have negative consequences such as a negative psychological impact on Russian-speaking children who could no longer receive education in their native language (Russian MFA, 2019d) or would lead to inequality in the labor market and lower living standards for ethnic minorities (Russian MFA, 2020c).

In all three narratives, the suggested solution was to allow Russian media to operate in Latvia according to democratic principles of freedom of speech, for Latvia to abandon its perceptions on history and accept Russia’s interpretation as the only correct version of historical events and to allow its Russian-speaking minority to receive education in their native language.

Legitimizing the identity narrative: Use of additional voices

To add legitimacy, Sputnik Latvia incorporated third-party voices. Several other texts followed a similar pattern and usually accompanied the text quoting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement. A common strategy was to feature pro-Russian Latvian politicians, academics or citizens who supported the Ministry’s stance. For example, Miroslav Mitrofanov, co-chairman of the pro-Russian political party Latvian Russian Union (LRU), whose ideas closely align with Russia’s perspective, was regularly cited. When discussing the media ban, he stated that Russian television was banned primarily to eliminate competitors in the media landscape (Sputnik, 2020a). In another example, he described the ban on RT as symbolic and a tool for maintaining a negative attitude towards Russia (Sputnik, 2020c). As a rule, pro-Russian actors in Latvia were complemented by voices in Russia, such as the people mentioned above but also Russian organizations, such as the Union of Journalists of Russia, where its chairman, Vladimir Solovyov, commented on the detention of Russian-speaking journalists in Latvia: “This, of course, is absolutely unacceptable . . . In fact, illegal actions are taking place. Once again, one of the Baltic countries is openly violating the freedom of the press and the freedom to disseminate information” (Sputnik, 2020f). It was also common to quote Western critics of NATO or other EU policies. These third-party voices of both local representatives in Latvia and actors in Russia make the narratives appear more organic and less like state propaganda.

Voices were also included to downplay the threats posed by Latvia, and boost the image of Russia. For example, when commenting on the banned Russian media outlets, Dmitry Kiselev, head of Rossiya Segodnya, stated in a text that Latvian authorities should stop persecuting freelance journalists who had done nothing wrong: “We in Russia find all this wild. Nothing like this is practiced here. Everyone here writes what they want” (Sputnik, 2020e). Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT, also commented on the ban herself, stating that the ban would have little effect: “In Latvia our Sputnik was blocked from all sides a long time ago, which does not prevent it from being a fairly effective resource there” (Sputnik, 2020b).

Amplifying the narrative: Rhetorical and emotional strategies

While both Maria Zakharova and Sputnik Latvia used sensationalist rhetoric, there were similarities and differences that intensified the narrative through rhetorical choices. Third-party voices often used a harsher tone. As a rule, one text with the Russian Embassy in Latvia’s comments was published within the sample. For example, when commenting on the vandalization of a Soviet monument in Jēkabpils, the Embassy described it as “neo-Nazi revanchism.” The Russian Embassy also noted that the vandalization took place the night before 23 February (when Russia celebrates Defender of the Fatherland Day), paying attention to the timing of events. In the same text, the Embassy called Latvia’s interpretation of history straight out “perverted” (Sputnik, 2021b). Latvia was accused of “anti-Russia hysteria” campaigns and Latvian authorities were described as obsessed with and afraid of Russian content (Russian MFA, 2020d) and portrayed as bullying Russia using fabricated news (Russian MFA, 2019b).

Using conspiratorial rhetoric, when banning Russian media, Latvian authorities were accused of cleansing the information sphere to eliminate undesirable points of view. Latvia was narrated as calculated villains determinedly persecuting Russian journalists as part of a Baltic policy to cleanse the information space from Russian influence (Russian MFA, 2020a). Riga was also assumed to be waging a real attack against everything that was Russian or related to Russia (Russian MFA, 2020e). Similarly, Latvia was narrated as a villain due to its collaboration with Germany. Particularly politicians from the National Alliance were seen as radical nationalists and villains. Zakharova described the timing of the decision as the Latvian parliament being so “anxious to time their malicious initiatives to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War over the brown plague” (Russian MFA, 2020b). Vandalizations of Soviet monuments in Latvia were seen as proof that radical representatives of the Latvian governing coalition planned to destroy the Soviet memorials once and for all¹ (Russian MFA, 2019c), where vandalizations of monuments were described as “a long-term and well-directed policy course of Riga and Tallinn towards the falsification of history” (Russian MFA, 2019b).

There were also instances of ridiculing Latvia, such as questioning Latvia’s agency by citing Ruslans Pankratovs, leader of the Eurosceptic Latvian Action Party (Rīcības partija), who jokingly called Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs part of the US State Department (Sputnik, 2020d) explaining that Latvian foreign policy followed the US so closely that it was part of their state apparatus. When discussing the media ban, Latvian authorities were simultaneously narrated as incompetent fools for not understanding the owner structure of Rossiya Segodnya and RT. Latvian authorities’ decision to ban RT was also ridiculed by Mikhail Smolin,² who called it a mixture of Russophobia and stupidity.

A notable difference between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia was their emphasis on international organizations. Zakharova frequently referenced actors like the EU, portraying them both as legitimate authorities and as complicit in anti-Russian campaigns when they failed to meet Russia’s expectations (Russian MFA, 2021a). This dual framing was less evident in Sputnik Latvia’s coverage. Zakharova depicted Latvia as exploiting EU sanctions to suppress Russian media, accusing the EU of enabling this through inaction (Russian MFA, 2021a). At the same time, Latvia was narrated as failing its EU obligations, with the EU protecting it through silence (Russian MFA, 2020f). These contradictions reflect the Russia versus the West narrative prior to the invasion (see, e.g., Grigor, 2020), where the West is stated to have its own perception of pluralism of opinions (Russian MFA, 2021a). Although both actors used sensational language, Sputnik Latvia amplified the narratives by projecting them in a more dramatic and provocative manner.

Narrative discourse: A comparison

Most strategic narratives during the period were told from a perceptional point of view, meaning through the eyes of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Maria Zakharova. Speaking as “we,” she represented the Ministry while addressing audiences as “you” as in “let me remind you,” referring to Latvia, the EU, or other actors, and at times as “they.”

When projected by Sputnik Latvia, the narrative became more complex due to the media outlet’s strategic use of different voices in its storytelling. Sputnik texts, in general, had no stated authors, and words such as “I” or “we” were rarely used. There was seldom a journalist or narrator present in the texts. Most Sputnik texts were not signed by a journalist. Instead, a narrative voice was created by combining different quotations from different actors building a narrative that correlated with Russia’s state policy. Texts typically ended with a summary; however, what appeared as closing summaries by Sputnik were often little more than restatements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position, blurring the line between state and media discourse. This ending statement or summarization was often identical for three or four texts covering one topic contributing to the sense of coordination of narratives.

Furthermore, it emerged that Sputnik did not conduct interviews themselves. Usually, the media outlet cited information from other news agencies and news portals or cited statements by politicians and organizations posted on their official social media accounts to reinforce the narrative. Exceptions were columns written by columnists, and one text where the author interviewed eyewitnesses at the vandalized Soviet monument in Jēkabpils. The text was written in first-person using the word “I,” where he, apart from citing witnesses by the monument, also commented on their statements: “unable to bear another sermon about the ‘occupiers’ and the ‘horrors’ of the Soviet period from a 40-year-old man” when interviewing a man who supported the demolition of the Soviet monument, clearly showcasing a subjective opinion when marking his disagreement with the interviewee (Sputnik, 2021a). It could therefore be said that Sputnik Latvia mainly used a figurative point of view, where the reader was presented to the narrative through someone’s worldview, ideology, and conceptual system. The narrator was not as present as Zakharova, who, as the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embodies the ministry, but it was the same worldview and ideology that was being narrated.

Finally, commentary was done explicitly through both judgment and generalization. As shown previously, different adjectives were used for expressing moral opinions often connected to “anti-Russia hysteria.” Generalization occurred frequently when referring to historical facts around World War II. Interestingly, freedom of speech was referred to almost as a universal truth by both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia. However, there were differences where Zakharova’s statements appeared more objective and were subtly framed to favor Russia’s perspective whereas Sputnik Latvia’s texts were more explicitly opinionated, and did not just report about the event but guided the reader toward an interpretation. Sputnik texts were linked together to reinforce the strategic narrative by grouping seemingly unrelated events and actors together. This way, the reader was led to understand a situation in a certain way without Sputnik Latvia explicitly providing the interpretation and expecting the reader to make the connections and accept the implicit logic. For example, a text about education in Latvia ended with a link to another Sputnik text with the headline: “Depriving a child of his native language: How the ethnocide of Russians occurs in Latvia” (Sputnik, 2019a).

Discussion and conclusion

This study identified three strategic narratives about Latvia, co-projected by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia between 2019 and 2021. These narratives pertained to freedom of speech, history, and language, and were reproduced by Sputnik Latvia, which closely followed the timing and statements made by the Foreign Ministry.

The fact that Sputnik Latvia sometimes published texts on a topic before the Ministry’s official statement, often building on earlier briefings, raises questions about the temporal dynamic and coordination between the two actors in projecting strategic narratives. In the projection, Latvia was narrated as an unfriendly and Russophobic state inferior to Russia. Latvian authorities were simultaneously portrayed as both evil and calculated, yet at the same time foolish and incompetent. Russia and Russian speakers in Latvia were simultaneously narrated as victims and heroes. Taken together, these patterns illustrate how Russian strategic narratives about Latvia combine moral superiority with grievance, a duality that has been central in Russia’s broader narrative projection.

The study makes three main contributions, offering different perspectives on how Russian strategic narratives are co-projected. The first contribution is empirical. A systematic comparison between foreign policy statements and Sputnik Latvia’s reporting reveals consistent overlaps. Press briefings were, as a rule, published as news texts directly citing the Ministry’s statements, with minimal or no editorial modification. This pattern aligns closely with Birge’s (2022) findings that Sputnik aggressively promotes Russia’s foreign policy objectives. The findings suggest that Sputnik should be seen as an almost integrated part of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s communication strategy, calling into question its journalistic independence. This dynamic offers concrete empirical evidence of the co-projection of strategic narratives between state and media actors, and clarifies the status of Sputnik, which has long been accused of blurring the lines between public diplomacy, propaganda and traditional journalism (Elswah and Howard, 2020; Rawnsley, 2015; Wright et al., 2020). Although maintaining a close affiliation with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sputnik stands out for its direct reproduction and dissemination of official statements with little to no adjustment of the text, and the systematic release of several follow-up texts after each briefing. In this respect, Sputnik departs from other international broadcasting outlets such as BBC, Al Jazeera, and CGTN.

These findings align with previous research on Russian strategic narratives in English-language versions of RT and Sputnik (Deverell et al., 2020; Hoyle et al., 2024; Wagnsson and Barzanje, 2021), which identified consistently negative portrayals of countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and recently Latvia. Empirically, this study extends those insights by showing that similar strategic narratives are also projected by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward Russian-speaking audiences, suggesting a coherent and cross-platform narrative strategy.

There are, however, differences compared to previous studies. Russia itself was narrated differently in the strategic narratives about Latvia. Compared to prior research, Russia was still narrated as a victim of Western Russophobia, of which Latvia was taking an active part with Estonia and Lithuania, but it was also narrated as superior to Latvia. This was done by stressing that Russia’s interpretation of history is the only correct version and by urging Latvia to let go of historical grievances and seek common ground in a bilateral relationship with Russia. This finding coincides with Grigor’s (2020) idea of Russia perceiving itself as a big brother of all Slavic nations and, in this case, as knowing and acting better than its Baltic neighbor. These examples also illustrate that Russia narrated itself as a responsible actor by raising concerns over freedom of speech and the rights of minorities, similar to Claessen’s (2021) findings on Russia’s narration of Ukraine.

The second contribution is theoretical. By focusing more explicitly on the storytelling of the strategic narrative and describing more fully the rhetoric of Russian strategic narratives inspired by Chatman’s narrative theory, this study advances our understanding of how narrative form and rhetoric shape persuasion. While foreign policy statements were embodied by the spokesperson Maria Zakharova, the narrative voice in most Sputnik texts was missing. Posting texts without bylines is typical also for other media outlets, but what stood out was the direct copies from foreign policy statements as well as text copied from social media posts published by the Russian Embassy and other pro-Russian politicians. In terms of storytelling, one important finding was that Sputnik Latvia explicitly provided an interpretation of events, which, compared to previous findings, did not prompt the reader to co-construct meaning, diminishing the probability that they would internalize the message (Wagnsson and Barzanje, 2021). Such explicit narration could therefore weaken the strategic narrative, as it may be perceived as too direct and loudly communicated, making it less likely that a reader would accept the narrative uncritically. Theoretically this refines the concept of strategic narratives by demonstrating that their persuasive power depends not only on content but also on the form and degree of explicitness in their storytelling.

The third contribution is contextual. By focusing on a Russian-language outlet targeting audiences in a post-Soviet state, this study demonstrates how the relationship between Russia and the target state shapes both the tone and degree of antagonism in strategic narratives. A plausible explanation for the differences identified here is that the Russian government still regards the Baltics as part of its sphere of interest. This finding responds to Hoyle et al.’s (2024) call to explore how a state’s relationship with Russia might fluctuate the degree of antagonism used in strategic narratives. What used to be considered part of Russia’s “legitimate” sphere of influence is now part of the EU and NATO. With Putin’s statement, where a few great powers should control the world, small states like Latvia have no recourse through collective security (Chakars and Ekmanis, 2022). It is, therefore plausible that Russia’s strategic communication seeks to undermine trust towards the EU and NATO. Like Deverell et al.’s (2020) findings, a likely additional rationale for this narrative strategy is to weaken Latvia and the EU, divide the Baltic states, and undermine Latvia’s international reputation. These findings mean that the relationship between two states will likely influence the projection of strategic narratives and how these states are narrated. By narrating Russia as a protector and the West as aggressors, Sputnik Latvia provides ideological support for Russian foreign policy, including interventionist policies toward Russian-speaking minorities abroad.

Continuous exposure to and repetition of such narratives may gradually reduce trust in state institutions and journalism. The antagonistic narration identified is particularly sensitive to Latvia due to its small size and dependence on European and international structures, and its significant Russian-speaking minority. As Kruks and Skulte (2022) note, Russian speakers in Latvia hold grievances rooted in local realities, and their opinions are often underrated in public governance and the public sector in general. The linguistic cleavage between Latvian and Russian speakers and the different interpretations of memory and history are also often exploited through emotional and identity-based narration.

Given these findings, it is legitimate to question whether the EU’s decision to ban Sputnik following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in March 2022 was justified. From a broader EU perspective, such narratives may also shape how audiences across Europe perceive Central and Eastern European countries and the idea of European unity itself. The results indicate that Russia’s use of antagonistic narration toward Latvia poses a security risk for small states dependent on international alliances and with large Russian-speaking minorities. This evidence supports the EU’s assessment that Sputnik functions not as an independent journalistic outlet, but rather as an instrument of state-driven information warfare.

While this study was limited by its small sample and focus on specific timestamps, it nonetheless contributes to a deeper understanding of how strategic narratives are projected and coordinated within Russia’s state-media ecosystem. The findings are specific to the case examined and are not intended to be generalized beyond this context. Knowledge of Sputnik Latvia’s internal workings remains limited, particularly following the EU ban. At the time of writing, Sputnik Latvia continues to publish texts, albeit at a much lower frequency. Future research could explore how Sputnik Latvia’s strategy has evolved following the EU ban and how Russian strategic narratives may shift in light of Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept. Another future endeavor should be to study the reception of such strategic narratives (Rönngren, 2025; Hoyle et al., 2024; Wagnsson and Lundström, 2022; Wagnsson et al., 2023) among the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia. It would also be valuable to examine whether other editions of Sputnik or RT show similar patterns of convergence with Russian foreign policy messaging. Finally, given the prominent role of the spokesperson Maria Zakharova, future research could further explore her role in shaping Russian strategic narration and how it may have evolved since her appointment in 2015, building on the work of Krasnyak (2020). Beyond these directions, the findings should also be understood within the broader hybrid media environment, where social media, bots, and cross-platform repetition contribute to the circulation and amplification of state-sponsored narratives. Although this study focused on Sputnik Latvia, future research could explore how similar narratives travel across platforms and resonate within the wider European information environment.

Despite these limitations, the study makes an important contribution to understanding how strategic narratives are co-projected through the interaction between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sputnik Latvia. As Sputnik Latvia continues to publish and Russian strategic narratives continue to spread more widely across social media, tracing and deciphering such narratives remains vital. Strategic narratives are not only instruments for creating a shared past, present and future but also tools for managing expectations and changing the discursive environment in which they operate (Miskimmon et al., 2013). It is also highly likely that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to circumvent restrictions by using different platforms and outlets, and encouraging audiences to access banned content through VPNs, suggesting that these strategic narratives will continue to be part of the hybrid media ecology.

As this article has demonstrated, the strategic narratives identified anticipated rhetorical strategies later used to legitimize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and continue to shape the information landscape in 2026, where Latvia remains a symbolic frontline and recurring target in ongoing regional confrontation. Ultimately, this study underscores that analyzing the co-projection of narratives between state and media actors is essential for understanding how information influence sustains geopolitical conflict in an evolving hybrid media ecology.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Emma Rönngren

Ethical considerations

Not applicable.

Consent to participate

Not applicable.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and publication of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and publication of this article.

Data availability statement

The data analyzed in this study consist of publicly available articles and official press briefing statements. All sources are cited within the text and reference list. No additional data were generated.

Notes

Author biography

Emma Rönngren is a senior lecturer in media and communication studies at Örebro University. Her research interests include strategic narratives, information influence, media reception, and geopolitics, with a particular focus on Russia and the Baltic region.

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