Global Trends 2030

Global Trends 2030 is clearly the result of an extensive process of compiling the thoughts and projections of a variety of experts from around the world. It can serve as a useful source for many who wish to examine the possibilities for the near-term future. Unfortunately, in my judgment, this report is the forecast of the thousand hands. On the one hand, this may happen, and on the other hand, that may happen; you guess which. What I find most disturbing about the Global Trends 2030 is not what it includes but what is missing—some sort of quantitative perspective for policy makers.

Specifically, I find it difficult to discern or calibrate the connections between the various trends and their counter-trends as presented in the report. Most of the scenario components seem to be of the all-other-things-being-equal variety, offering little or no quantitative cross-impact analysis of any of the events that constitute the described trends. For example, if the mean global atmospheric temperature in 2030 (rather than 2045) reaches a point 2°C higher than it was in the late twentieth century, what is the effect of the resulting rising ocean levels and storm intensities on the survivability of Bangladeshis? In turn, what is the effect of that on the economy of India? And what is the effect of the changed economies of Bangladesh and India on the political stability of the People’s Republic of China?

As another example, trends relating to the so-called Arab Spring seem to be accelerating in intensity and impact above those outlined in the report. How do these changes affect the relationships between the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries? Where, what, and how intense are the cross-impacts? And what is the relative importance to global health of these relationships in light of the likelihood of catastrophic global temperature increases by the end of the century and possibly by 2030?

Of course, I don’t really expect that such obscure chains of events would be part of a report at the level of abstraction of Global Trends 2030. But it would be comforting to know that some group of the experts involved in the production of this report had in fact done some sort of quantitative cross-impact analysis of that nature. Yet, the report merely alludes to a number of models of various sorts that formed the basis for the statements made within it. Since some of these models are listed as proprietary, there seems to be no way by which the reader can determine their content, their methods, or their subsequent viability. Nor is there any indication of the interrelationships, if any, between different models in other impact areas.

Instead we have the “traditional” qualitative set of best-case and worst-case scenarios and black swans (game changers) without much guidance as to the relative likelihood of their projected trends or their components. Of particular concern to me is the relatively small emphasis given to the possible consequences of climate change: the elephant in the corner. Although the report was compiled in 2012, it seems that some of the global-warming events discussed or implied there as long term have already occurred and are currently causing (or should be causing) more apprehension about the rate of warming and its potentially devastating consequences.

In short, Global Trends 2030 is an important compilation of the opinions of a wide variety of experts around the world, but it is only a beginning, and the time is short. Much more needs to be done—and very soon.