Abstract
Thomas Weiss focuses on the future possibilities of global governance and global government.
He defines global governance as the sum of the informal and formal values, norms, procedures, and institutions that help all actors—states, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), civil society, transnational corporations (TNCs), and individuals—identify and address trans-boundary problems. This is a process, not an entity.
While states are, and for the foreseeable future will likely remain, the primary actors in world affairs, the opening chapter posits reasons why global governance emerged. Beginning in the 1970s, interdependence and rapid technological advances fostered a growing recognition that certain problems defy solution by a single state. Another explanation is the rapid growth in numbers and importance of nonstate actors (NSAs), both within civil society and among not-for-profit organizations.
Weiss feels that no big and idealistic global government plans are presently on the horizon, given the many dismal failures of the past, for example, The Concert of Europe, the Hague Conferences, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League of Nations just to name a few. He views the United Nations as a “makeshift expedient,” the best that current and proceeding generations have been able to concoct for addressing global problems through universal organizations. For Weiss, global governance and not global government is now the point of departure for even the most idealistic analysts of international relations. He notes that, unlike earlier generations of scholars in this field, today’s analysts “are embarrassed by the supposedly simple notion of supernationality.”
The power that institutions possess, in the form of incentives and punishments they can apply, is a key component in looking at the future of global governance. Quantifiable norms can establish benchmarks for acceptable behavior, a role the United Nations has an exceptional opportunity to perform by seeking global consensus on how incentives and punishments should be applied.
Examining the impacts of more than eighty IGOs and international nongovernmental organizations (INGO), Weiss identifies five gaps in global governance: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional, and compliance. He illustrates each of these gaps with reference to six specific areas: the use of military force, terrorism, generation of human rights, the responsibility to protect, human development, and climate change.
The first of these, the Knowledge Gap, includes both empirical information about the nature, gravity, magnitude, and cause of a particular problem, and explanations for its emergence. Before 9/11/2001, the “fog of war” was often thick because so-called facts were frequently contested, much complex history underlies current events, and valid studies on terrorism were few. Since then, it has become a major focus of attention by historians. The impacts of climate change and other areas of human development are also more studied since the start of the twenty-first century.
While the accumulation of knowledge has grown, the subjective appreciation of facts and how they can be interpreted remains challenging, certainly in the political arena but often among technical experts as well. Better data and better understanding are both vital to more widely accepted knowledge.
The second gap is Norms, that is, the way most people act or ought to be acting. Norms are based on the values, attitudes, and approaches individuals, states, and corporations adopt. Weiss identifies a three-stage normative life cycle: the emergence of a new norm at the domestic level through advocacy by norm entrepreneurs; its international cascade after a critical number of states accept it, creating enough support for a tipping point; and finally internalization (or socialization) when norm-conforming behavior occurs with little or no debate.
He offers a detailed example in the area of human rights, noting that the establishment of “the responsibility to protect” (R2P in United Nations parlance) was an early twenty-first century initiative. Protecting the rights of a nation’s population now more often balances the privileges of sovereignty, thanks in part to the UN International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
The third gap appears in efforts to formulate international public policy, which require an articulated and linked set of governing principles and goals. In examining the six areas, Weiss is disappointed by the lack of progress in human rights and humanitarian action with regard to the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. Another failure on a global scale is the multistate refusal to adopt measures to implement the Kyoto Protocol for environmental control.
Seemingly more successful are global efforts to establish worldwide technical standards. Weiss offers the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union as examples. Also, the R2P policies seem to have proved effective in such recent cases as Libya and the Ivory Coast.
The fourth gap is Institutional. Given the increased presence of both IGOs and INGOs, Weiss sees some shrinking in this gap. Accomplishments range from peacekeeping to counter-terrorism units, as well as efforts to foster the responsibility to protect, improve human rights reporting, push forward human development, and help counteract climate change. One example offered is the progress on programs for settling disputes under the General Agreement on Transfers and Trade (GATT).
The final gap is Compliance, which Weiss notes “remains an overwhelmingly voluntary affair and does not reflect material resources alone.” In fact, it is the area involving more of the social dimensions of interactions between states.
It is a gap where realists argue that powerful states only comply when it is in their material interests to do so, and the weak only because of pressure from the strong. Neo-liberals argue that the states move toward compliance because they recognize the benefits accruing from cooperation, and are even willing to accept in the short-term losses, knowing that, overall, they will benefit in the long-term.
Evidence of gap shrinkage is offered in the condition of human rights, where Weiss sees individuals becoming more empowered relative to the state. In the evolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), he sees an important step in closing this particular gap.
The final chapter asks, Can global governance adequately address worldwide critical issues without a global government? Weiss expects that slow but often painful progress will be made.
State sovereignty will remain the core of international relations, but the leverage and significance of a host of NSAs is growing in observable ways. Fledgling steps have been taken toward enhanced international order, predictability, stability, and fairness. To this mix have been added the energy, resources, and problem-solving skills of a host of other actors, not only from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations but also from the for-profit sector.
Monitoring the use of force is more widespread now, and the evidence gathered is being used to compel states and other belligerents to abide by their promises. Global governance of human rights is remarkably different and much improved since the end of World War II—thanks to more knowledge, new norms, institutions, and policies. Human development concerns increasingly figure in the policies and practices of both government agencies and donor groups. In the area of climate change, there has emerged a true scientific consensus: climate change is recognized as a looming threat that requires urgent action to reverse or at least to slow human-induced damage.
For Weiss, global federalism may not appear so far-fetched a half century from now. “As the reader may have surmised, I am a half-full global governance glass guy.” He ascribes continuing technological advances that will foster greater economic integration as well as removing obstacles such as distance and enhancing communication between people and government worldwide. In addition, increasingly, private-sector standard-setting is becoming a foundation for addressing many issues, such as global food and hunger problems.
[Note: Written by an optimist who believes that human beings can organize themselves to deal with the global problems they have created or inherited, Weiss addresses how existing global governance can be moved toward global government. With an extensive pedigree that includes years of work with United Nations institutions, Weiss writes with clarity and cogency, and his insights suggest that the contemporary world can be governed in a way that will enhance all lives. What he does not consider here are the impacts of “miscreants”—the tyrants, robber-barons, dictators, charismatics, and schemers who always seem disruptively active somewhere on the globe.]