Abstract
This case commentary examines the CJEU judgment in HZ v Tribunalul Galați (C-272/24), focusing on whether national austerity measures - in this case, mandating compensatory rest instead of financial remuneration for judicial overtime - are compatible with the principle of judicial independence under Article 19(1) TEU. While the CJEU accepts deficit reduction as a legitimate objective of general interest, such measures must be part of a non-discriminatory framework that does not target the judiciary in isolation. Crucial is the requirement that remuneration must remain sufficient to preclude public doubt regarding judicial independence. The commentary concludes that the HZ v Tribunalul Galați judgment provides a pragmatic refinement of the Court's case law by allowing non-monetary compensation, provided such rest is practically accessible. Notwithstanding certain caveats, the judgment serves as a vital safeguard for the separation of powers in Member States like Romania and Belgium, where chronic understaffing and fiscal pressures threaten to render the right of judges to commensurate remuneration merely theoretical.
Keywords
Introduction
Over the past decade, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has progressively articulated minimum standards for the protection of judicial independence. 1 Judicial independence, enshrined in Article 19 TEU, requires Member States to guarantee effective judicial remedies before independent and impartial tribunals established by law in all areas covered by EU law. 2 An important dimension of this principle is the guarantee that the judiciary exercises its functions autonomously, shielded from external interventions or pressures that might jeopardise impartial adjudication. One of the essential elements of this protection constitutes the receipt of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions judges carry out. 3
On 13 November 2025, the CJEU - sitting in a formation of five judges - delivered its judgment in HZ v Tribunalul Galați, 4 refining its jurisprudence concerning the impact of excessive government deficits 5 on judicial independence and the importance of commensurate remuneration. The Court was tasked with determining whether the substitution of pecuniary overtime compensation with rest periods in the context of such a procedure constituted a violation with judicial independence. This case commentary explores the background of the case and the Court's assessment. Furthermore, it examines the practical implications of this ruling for judiciaries facing chronic understaffing and budgetary pressure, where the theoretical right to commensurate remuneration risks being decoupled from the reality of the judicial workload.
The case
Background of the case
The case concerned HZ, a Romanian judge serving at a regional court since 1 April 2017. From 2019 onwards, the court was understaffed due to several judicial posts remaining vacant. HZ claimed that he performed not only his own duties but also tasks associated with the vacant positions, resulting in overtime for which he sought remuneration. He calculated the requested amount as a pro rata share of the net salaries and allowances attached to the vacant posts, divided by the number of active judges who had taken up the additional workload. 6
The Bucharest Regional Court dismissed HZ's claim as unfounded. Central to the dispute were several emergency orders adopted by the Romanian Government following the 2020 excessive deficit procedure. 7 These orders derogate from existing Romanian legislation, which stipulates that overtime must be compensated by paid time off within 60 days or, failing that, by a financial bonus equivalent to 75% of the basic salary. The emergency orders provide that additional hours worked by staff within the budget line for executive or managerial positions performed could be compensated only by time off, excluding any financial compensation. In this context, HZ was only entitled to claim a rest period. 8
HZ appealed the Court's decision, arguing, inter alia, that the possibility of compensating his overtime with rest periods was merely theoretical given his actual workload. The Court of Appeal decided to address a request to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the Romanian emergency orders with EU law. More specifically, the Court of Appeal referred to the principle of judicial independence, read in the light of Article 2 TEU, points 5 and 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and Articles 3 and 5 to 7 of Directive 2003/88 (Working Time Directive). 9 10
The Court's reasoning
The CJEU held that the Working Time Directive was not applicable in the present case, as it found no elements indicating that compensation for overtime by a rest period could adversely affect the right to statutory annual leave. 11 It further found that point 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers was not relevant to the preliminary question. Consequently, the Court narrowed the preliminary question to the compatibility of the emergency orders with the principle of judicial independence, as guaranteed by Article 19 TEU, read in the light of Article 2 TEU and point 5 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 12
The Court observed that while HZ sought payment for overtime, he had not formally requested a rest period from his employer. Consequently, there was no evidence that the employer had deterred or prevented him from exercising his right to compensatory rest as provided for under the emergency orders. The Court therefore concluded that HZ's grievance concerned his remuneration under conditions of understaffing, rather than the nature of the compensation for overtime. Furthermore, the Court noted that the claimed overtime was not officially recorded but was instead estimated based on the court's vacancy rate. Given the inherent nature of judicial duties, such as the requirement to deliver judgments within statutory deadlines and the unpredictable duration of court hearings, tasks are frequently performed outside normal working hours. Moreover, the CJEU observed that, in any event, overtime must be evaluated based on the actual volume of work performed, rather than an estimate based on vacant posts. 13
Furthermore, the CJEU recalled that the concept of judicial independence presupposes a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions judges carry out. Remuneration must be sufficient to preclude any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals regarding judges’ neutrality and their imperviousness to external factors. Within the specific socio-economic context of a Member State, remuneration must be high enough (compared to the average salary in the Member State) to provide economic independence and protect against the risk of corruption. Assessing judicial remuneration's adequacy requires accounting not only for the basic salary, bonuses, and allowances, but also for any exemptions from social security contributions. While justice policies should also consider the salaries of other legal professions to ensure the attractiveness of the judiciary, a level of remuneration lower than that of liberal professions, such as lawyers, does not in itself violate judicial independence. In any event, the rules for determining the remuneration must not give rise to doubts regarding the independence of the courts from the legislature and the executive. Finally, these rules must be subject to effective judicial review. 14
To assess whether a derogating measure limiting overtime compensation to rest periods complies with the principle of judicial independence, it must meet several requirements. Primarily, the measure must be established by law and justified by a legitimate objective of general interest, such as the necessity to eliminate an excessive government deficit. Crucially, such fiscal constraints must not target the judiciary in isolation but must form part of a comprehensive framework requiring the broader civil service to contribute to budgetary stability. Furthermore, the measure must be appropriate for achieving the objective, limited to what is strictly necessary, and restricted to the duration required to attain the objective. The measure must make sure that the judicial remuneration remains commensurate with the importance of the functions judges carry out so they remain independent, and the entire compensatory scheme must be subject to effective judicial review. 15
Applying these principles, the CJEU left it to the Romanian Court of Appeal to ascertain two elements: first, whether the vacant posts were actually budgeted, which, if true, would call the consistent pursuit of the excessive deficit objective into question; and second, whether judges were deterred or prevented in practice from actually taking their compensatory rest. 16 Ultimately, the CJEU ruled that Article 19(1) TEU does not preclude national legislation that limits overtime compensation for judges handling vacant posts to rest periods alone, provided that the judges can actually use that rest and that the measures do not undermine the commensurate relationship between their remuneration and the importance of their functions. 17
Commentary
The Court's acceptance of excessive government deficit reduction as a legitimate objective of general interest is not surprising, as it follows from the established line of case law. 18 Indeed, as part of the public service, the judiciary is not exempt from contributing to reducing the government's deficit, provided it is not specifically targeted. 19
When fiscal measures impact judges’ remuneration, they implicate the external aspect of judicial independence. This external aspect requires that courts exercise their functions autonomously, free from hierarchical constraints, subordination, or external instructions that might impair the independent judgment of their members. 20 This protection extends beyond direct instructions to include indirect influences liable to affect judicial decision-making. 21 The CJEU's approach relies on a ‘social perception’ test: independence must be assessed from the perspective of the public, who must not perceive any factors that impair the imperviousness of judges to the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, the Court -following the ECtHR's example - emphasised a judge's self-perceived independence. For instance, the fear of arbitrary termination may create a perceived need to align with the executive's expectations. 22
Both dimensions of this social perception test deserve scrutiny in the HZ v Tribunalul Galați case. First, the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard indicates that 30% of the Romanian public perceives judicial independence as ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’ (see figure 1). While this figure represents a more favourable perception compared to the lows observed in Member States such as Hungary or Poland, it nonetheless signals a significant lack of public confidence. Such data underscores a fragile social perception of judicial independence, suggesting that any further erosion of judicial status, for example via fiscal measures, could increase existing public skepticism regarding the judiciary's immunity from executive influence. Second, HZ's dissatisfaction with his remuneration during a period of chronic understaffing suggests a potential impact on his self-perceived independence. Budgetary measures must take into account judicial professional precarity to prevent the subtle erosion of the judiciary's perceived independence.
The 2025 EU justice scoreboard. 28
The underlying context of this case - chronic understaffing leading to an increased individual workload - raises fundamental questions regarding the sustainability of judicial independence. While the CJEU ruled that the Working Time Directive did not apply because the claim concerned remuneration rather than health and safety, which is not surprising given its jurisprudence since the Matzak case, 23 the dangers of understaffing remain. Can remuneration truly be considered ‘commensurate’ when a judge must discharge the duties of multiple vacant posts? This ruling provides an opportunity to reflect on judicial remuneration amidst budget cuts, understaffing and broader pressures on the separation of powers. This is not a uniquely Romanian issue: several Member States, including Belgium, Austria, and France, are currently subject to excessive deficit procedures. 24
In Belgium too, the situation has become problematic, as understaffing and budgetary constraints have become endemic. Protests and open letters from the judiciary have highlighted how these pressures threaten the separation of powers. 25 Furthermore, the CJEU has noted that the concept of judicial independence presupposes that the salary of judges remains attractive in comparison to other legal professions. In this regard, situations in which budget cuts lead to reforms in pension schemes should also be taken into account. 26
A final aspect concerns the evidentiary difficulty judges face in proving overtime. The CJEU has asserted that overtime must be evaluated based on the actual volume of work performed rather than vacancy estimates. Conversely, the Court has admitted that the specific nature of judicial duties - such as statutory deadlines and unpredictable hearing durations - prevents the precise recording of working hours. This creates an inherent tension: while the nature of the judicial office makes recording nearly impossible, judges are precluded from claiming overtime without such exact records. How this relates to the Court's conclusion in the CCOO case that working time measurement is essential for guaranteeing the Working Time Directive's achievements, i.e., the effective protection of workers’ living and working conditions, remains unclear. 27
The HZ v Tribunalul Galați judgment clarifies that Article 19 TEU does not grant an absolute right to financial remuneration for all additional work and that compensatory rest can be a legally sufficient alternative, provided such rest is practically accessible to the judge. Moreover, the judgment confirms that while the judiciary is not exempt from contributing to national fiscal consolidation, budgetary measures remain lawful only when they are general, justified, and proportionate. Ultimately, the CJEU's reasoning underscores that the safeguard of judicial independence is not the specific modality of overtime compensation, but rather the maintenance of an overall level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the judicial office. By acknowledging that fiscal necessity must not lead to the targeted erosion of judicial status, the Court continues to uphold the rule of law while remaining pragmatic regarding Member States’ budgetary obligations. Nevertheless, the ruling exposes an inherent tension between the Court's high standards for judicial independence and the systemic realities of chronic understaffing. Without proactive structural investment, the economic safeguards designed to protect the judiciary from external pressure risk becoming purely illusory, particularly in Member States where budget cuts have become an endemic feature of the judicial landscape.
No conflicting interests or funding to declare. No ethical approval nor informed consent statements were necessary for this research. There is no data available.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
