Abstract
Randi Gressgård’s (2010) Multicultural Dialogue: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, Conflicts is a thoughtful theoretical examination of issues of difference. The dilemma she cites is the tension between cultural distinctiveness and the idea of equality (and thus no difference) in liberal society. Speaking from a specifically Norwegian context, which has implications for general theory, she further points out the paradox that despite liberal discourse, integration policies commonly are ethnocentric and are underscored by assimilationist goals, thereby engendering inequality. She asks, then, how the conflict between principles of equality and those of cultural difference can be resolved. Gressgård’s concern for dialogue between groups presupposes different, not universal, identities, yet she also indicates that ‘structures of domination … proceed from and result in a firm cultural identity’ (p. xv). Her aim is not to theorize a solution to the above-stated problems; rather, her intent is to weave together various perspectives to give voice to other theorists as well as her own. That said, her perspective is clearer regarding the dilemma and the paradox than on how to constructively engage the conflict. This essay embraces Gressgård’s general sensibilities about difference, but it problematizes multiculturalism somewhat differently and also suggests some fundamental principles towards a constructive engagement with the conflicts and tensions surrounding difference.
Whereas Gressgård frames the issues with reference to liberal society, I call attention to neoliberalism. Although liberal discourse abounds, so too does neoliberal discourse, and, crucially, neoliberal practices. As Foucault (2008) suggested, liberalism as a set of practices in capitalist society is unsustainable because inequality, the basis of neoliberalism, inevitably occurs as actors compete in the market. Put another way, the perfect competition envisioned and modeled by mainstream economists is illusory because on-the-ground competition is about outcompeting competitors, leading to inequality. Foucault (2008) recognized a wide range of types of government intervention that can come into play in different contexts to reign in unbridled competition (from relatively mild Keynesian policy to the extreme of Nazism), but the tendency is towards competition, and thus inequality.
Foucault suggested optimistically that liberalism acts as a critical check on neoliberalism. More skeptically, I suggest that liberal discourse is appropriated by neoliberal actors as a rhetorical device to justify and legitimize neoliberal actions that result in inequality; a prime example is IMF endorsement of US protection while stipulating no protection in the name of free trade in countries in the global South, thereby devastating local industries in the global South, sustaining uneven terms of trade, and engendering an ever-increasing gap between the global South and North. Another example that pertains specifically to the issues engaged by Gressård is the US melting-pot metaphor for race relations that purports to represent all citizens as equal while presuming that Others inevitably jettison their Other identities in a fundamentally assimilationist design.
Understanding the backdrop for issues of difference across many axes of difference in terms of inequality, rather than equality, alters the conceptual terrain. Gressgård views inequality as the result of practices (implementation of multicultural policy) that diverge from liberal discourse and, accordingly, her explanation of inequality lies in the specifics of Norwegian multicultural policy. Alternatively, if analysis begins with the understanding of systemic inequality, we are better able to explain the policy itself. Gressgård contextualizes emergent problems of difference with reference to a society oriented to the political management of differences and a sense of democracy in which (respect for) difference lies at the core, but this orientation leaves unclear why multicultural policy has evolved in such a frustratingly paradoxical way.
Alternatively, contextualizing problems of difference in a society fraught with inequalities helps clarify how diversity commonly results in frictions of difference over time and across space (in Norway, the United States, and elsewhere), and how multicultural policy both produces and is produced by inequality. It matters whether inequality is conceptualized as a result or cause of policy. That said, multicultural problems and policies are complex, and it is unlikely that they derive from a singular cause.
Following a Foucauldian framework, there are multiple mentalities and associated discourses in operation, and thus there are multiple governmentalities. Germane here is how a neoliberal mentality associated with an enterprise culture (Foucault, 2008) articulates with a racialized mentality (and patriarchal, homophobic and many other mentalities) to construct a system in which a range of inequalities cascade around societal actors. In this type of context, problems of difference may be tweaked (by various forms of government intervention, including multicultural policy) but the management of difference pivots implicitly on inequality around multiple axes of difference.
But how does subjectivity figure in a kaleidoscope of inequalities? The point here is not that actors consciously design policies to engender inequality; sinister designs admittedly occur, but more commonly in a post-apartheid, post-Jim Crow world, people may construct policy with positive intentions while unconsciously reproducing institutionalized racism and inequality more generally. The compartmentalization of theory and policy in academe and the dearth of social and critical theory in policy arenas regrettably prefigure policy that is constructed in the absence of explicit discussion of the root causes of problems. Consequently, multicultural policy often is oriented ineffectively to diversity, taking the form of special events such as festivals; this type of policy lacks any recognition of the frictions of difference that occur in the context of diversity, and certainly does not treat them. More self-conscious policy does account for tensions, and aims to alleviate or resolve tensions that both produce and are produced by inequality. However, here too, efforts commonly remain focused on once-in-a-while events such as orchestrated discussions, which lack connection to everyday practices (e.g. see Riley and Ettlinger, 2010). Another common strategy presumes that physical proximity (co-location) begets social proximity, despite the rippling of segregationist practices at finer scales within so-called integrated housing complexes, schools, and the like (Ettlinger, 2009).
Policy that might alter actions and attitudes requires collaboration among all actors in a design that would alter daily practices, which in turn might help to produce new truths. Policy designed to change discourse without changing daily practices, or policy that aims for conviviality in co-location without meaningful social interaction (Gilroy, 2004) misses the tensions that help explain the superficiality of interaction, offering little towards dissolving longstanding material and discursive barriers among groups. Effective multicultural policy is possible on the condition that those involved in both its design and implementation proactively strive to inject difference as an asset (as opposed to liability) routinely into the rhythms of daily life so as to redefine and reframe interaction among actors associated with diverse groups. This would mean designing social interaction that would generate meaningful knowledges about Others to permit the appreciation of people’s talents, histories, sadnesses, humor … to render the choice to be with and engage in productive activity with Others an opportunity, not a constraint. The underlying logic here is that difference becomes a problem and contributes to tension because of the absence of knowledge of Others, producing fear, thereby engendering discrimination, encouraging separation, and preventing communication (Ford, 1992; Young, 2000). It is the absence of knowledge that requires targeting so as to constructively bridge knowledges that have been constructed separately (Ettlinger, 2009).
Policy to change subjectivities signifies, however, just one possible trajectory towards change. Again, following Foucault, if we recognize power as diffuse rather than as located in particular positions or people in a hierarchy, then ‘there is no power without potential refusal or revolt’ (Foucault, 2000a: 324). What Foucault meant generally by ‘resistance’ or ‘revolt’ and ‘refusal’ is not a confrontation between groups – the powerless against the powerful – but rather an individual’s reflexive critique of, and challenge to, a mentality (Foucault, 1997, 2005), such as neoliberalism or racism and related discriminatory practices. That said, refusal to accept the status quo requires courage to embrace difference when it commonly is cast as a liability, as well as perseverance to sustain a different mentality and, moreover, associated practices that transcend socially constructed boundaries; such difficulty of refusal in part renders it a minority politics (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Nonetheless, there are countless individual acts of unsung courage that occur everyday to change not the whole system, but the microspaces of people’s lives (Dodson, 2010); 1 these count, and form fertile ground for possible (although certainly not inevitable) connection among those who question the mentalities that support what Rancière (1999, 2010) has conceptualized as the existing order or consensus of inequality.
Beyond bold actions of individual actors, social movements and the development of an alternative collective consciousness among counter-cultural groups represent another trajectory towards possible change, as currently exemplified by Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and its counterparts elsewhere in the United States and around the world. Despite criticisms that OWS lacks clarity regarding demands, especially striking about these demonstrations is that they seem to have helped to construct a new discourse, evidenced in the dramatic increase in articles in the popular media pertaining to inequality since their inception (Dreier, 2011). 2 The lack of OWS’ and its counterparts’ specificity affords a generalized glue among the wide range of groups under their umbrella. It is this glue and associated lack of specificity that constitutes so beautifully the Rancièrian moment of equality, when differences dissolve in the development of universal disidentifiers such as ‘We are all German Jews’, ‘We are all Hamas’, ‘We are all children of immigrants’ (Rancière, 1999, 2010; see also interview with Blechman et al., 2005), ‘We are all the 99%’. Crucially, however, such equality for Rancière constitutes a fleeting disruption to the consensus of an otherwise static order that obstructs spaces of negotiation. For Rancière, a bleak postpolitical situation obtains because of the impossibility of the erasure of power relations that equality requires. More concretely, I suggest that an underlying problem for OWS is that discursive change alone leaves material practices embedded in daily rhythms of life outside Zucotti Park (and the spheres outside other urban plazas) unattended. Further, the idea of equality, as Gressgård clarifies, lacks an appreciation of difference, and indeed, Rancière’s normative framework self-consciously pertains to the denial of difference.
My preference is oriented towards Gressgård’s sensibilities. Drawing from Jean-Francois
Lyotard (1988) and Hans
Herbert Kögler (1999), she
suggests that difference be preserved but also constructively communicated across groups
– an agonistic politics that hinges on what Iris Young (2000) called ‘relational autonomy’,
which conceptualizes figurative and literal boundaries around groups as open, not
closed, and identities not as a set of binaries but as interdependent. Although
agonistic democracy and relational autonomy logically lack connection with a neoliberal
context, it is worth thinking about possibilities regarding the proactive construction
of change towards a new politics of truth (Foucault, 2000b) and, crucially, the
associated material practices that daily reproduce a new discourse. Whether the starting
point is policy, individual acts of courage, or the demands of groups with an already
formed collective consciousness, I reiterate the importance of targeting efforts
appropriately and strategically – to practices embedded in the rhythms of daily life and
to the development of knowledges about preconceived Others. Further, sustainable change
requires the commitment of actors in a wide range of time-space contexts, beyond any
particular starting point. Consistent with the sensibilities of agonistic democracy, the
end goal is no end, but rather continual, proactive efforts to construct the conditions
to create spaces of negotiation. Pure equality is impossible. But settling for all or
nothing misses opportunities to avoid the continual replication of past errors and
injustices. The value of critical theory is in the charting of a new course, which
requires attention to the production of everyday practices to avoid the problems of the
past. Much less of a perfectionist than Rancière, Foucault suggested that: The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them [power relations] in the utopia
of completely transparent communication, but to acquire the rules of law, the
management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the
practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as
little domination as possible. (Foucault, 1997: 298)