Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to identify general trends in the perception of animals in the Sunni Qur’anic commentary (tafsīr) tradition. Animal ethics in Sunni exegetical literature is explored through an analysis of Q6:38 in which animals are described as umam like humans. A broad analysis of seventy-two commentaries demonstrates that exegetes mostly aim to minimize the psychological, social, and spiritual complexity of animals implied by the shared term umam. This is achieved by restricting the denotation of the term to predominantly external features that emphasize the outward similarity between humans and animals without affording the latter any internal complexity. There are few exceptions to this rule in the pre-modern period; the commentaries that buck the trend generally have a more rationalistic and/or Sufi orientation. Contemporary exegetes are more willing to acknowledge the psychological, social, and spiritual complexity of animals and explore the full gamut of human-animal similarities insinuated by the term umam.
Introduction
This article explores animal ethics in the Sunni Qur’anic commentary (tafsīr) tradition. I use the term “animal ethics” in this study in a general sense that denotes the overall objective of avoidance of cruelty towards animals. The term umam in Q6:38 is used as a lens through which I investigate the perception of animals in the Sunni exegetical tradition. Qur’an commentators ostensibly have a difficult time deciphering what this means, and many interpretations are offered. I begin by examining all the denotations of the term umma and then scrutinize the myriad manifestations of the term in the Qur’an. Subsequently, I carry out a general survey of the Sunni commentary tradition. Trends are investigated through an analysis of the most popular significations of the term in addition to its diachronic development. I then explain these trends in light of the possible influences of other Qur’anic verses, traditions of Prophet Muḥammad (ḥadīths), the Neoplatonic idea of the Great Chain of Being (GCB), and the Epistle of the Brethren of Purity, among others.
Background
The Qur’an pays an inordinate amount of attention to animals. There are over two hundred verses of the Qur’an that mention animals. Additionally, six chapters are explicitly named after animals. Further, there are numerous prophetic traditions that exhort humans to treat animals well (Ghotbi 2020). All of this leads Sarra Tlili to observe that “the welfare of animals … received ample attention” in the Qur’an and prophetic traditions (2012, 3). Despite this attention, however, Tlili argues that “issues connected with the natures and status of nonhuman species did not benefit from the same level of consideration” because Muslims … generally share the idea that the latter [nonhuman animals] are inferior to humans (2012, 3). This comprehensive analysis of the Sunni commentary tradition investigates whether Tlili’s assessment is corroborated in this genre, and if so, to what extent? Since the objective of this study is to interrogate the commentary tradition, I scrutinize one of the most important verses vis-à-vis the spiritual and moral status of animals: Q6:38. Specifically, I analyze the term umma, which is used for both animals and humans, to see whether Qur’anic exegetes take this to signify some kind of spiritual or psychological affinity between humans and animals.
Method
Summary of interpretations of Q6:38 in Sunni commentaries.
Frequency of the most popular terms for “umam” in the Sunni commentary tradition.
Proportion of the most popular interpretations for “umam” in the Sunni commentary tradition.
Trends in the interpretation of “umam” over time.
Interpretations of “umam” in the Sunni commentary tradition over time.
Trends in the most popular interpretations of “umam” over time.
Most popular interpretations of “umam” in the Sunni commentary tradition over time.
The seven most popular interpretations of “umam” in the Sunni commentary tradition over time.
Denotations of umma
The term umma, either in its singular (umma) or plural form (umam), occurs sixty-four times in the Qur’an. Prior to considering what it means in these places, it behooves one to state all the denotations of the term: 1. It is a way of acting/behaving. 2. It refers to a religion. 3. It refers to a people to whom a prophet was sent. 4. It means a race/body/tribe/nation. 5. It refers to a collective body of humans or any living beings. 6. It is a kind/genus of humans or any living beings. 7. It refers to a party/community/people/kinsfolk. 8. It refers to a people of one era or one generation. 9. It refers to the creatures of God. 10. It is a righteous person who is the object of imitation, or someone who follows the true religion, or someone who is known for their goodness/learning. 11. It is a statue of a person, or the form of someone’s face. 12. It is a period of time (Ibn Manẓūr 2000, 133; Lane 2003, 1:90).
Notwithstanding the penultimate denotation (a statue/form of face), all denotations appear in the Qur’an. The renowned lexicographer Aḥmad ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) adds that ummah (with a ha at the end) denotes “to forget” (n.d., 136). Al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (d. 175/791) explains that “umm” is used by the Arabs to denote anything that leads and has followers (2003, 1:87). This is why an umma is a religious group that follows the umma who is the prophet, or it could be a non-religious group because the term umm ultimately denotes “intention” or “purpose” (qaṣd) (2003, 1:89). Therefore, an umma is a group that has the same purpose or intention (Farāhīdī 2003, 1:87-89). Yoshiko Oda argues that the term umma in the Qur’an can be divided into three main categories: 1. A religious community, that is, a community that adheres to a set of religious laws. 2. A non-religious community, that is, a community which is defined as a social group. 3. Miscellaneous (1984, 95-105).
He places animals in the “miscellaneous” category along with “a period of time” (Oda 1984, 96). Nevertheless, there is an underlying lexical thread that ties together all these denotations. Since the fundamental denotation of umma is “a way, course, mode, or manner, of acting, or conduct” (Lane 2003, 1:90), all three categories are connected through this. While the religious umma acts in accordance with religious ordinances, the social one acts in accordance with social requirements. What Oda terms as “miscellaneous,” namely, “a period of time” and “animals” are also connected to this. The former signification of umma appears twice in the Qur’an (Q11:8 and Q12:45). In both these cases, it refers to a way of acting in a certain period of time. Q11:8 refers to the hypothetical deferment of God’s punishment whereas Q12:45 refers to the act of Joseph’s cellmate in telling the king of Egypt about him. This would suggest that the term umma in Q6:38, which is the only time it is mentioned in reference to animals, must also refer a certain way of acting or behaving for a certain period of time. The designation of umma for animals thus signifies that animals are either socially or religiously bound to certain actions. A deeper examination of why the religious and social groups in the Qur’an are given the name umma explains the reason for this term being applied to animals. One notes that when the Qur’an uses the term umma, it denotes not a single way of acting, but two ways of acting: the first is the way one acts in their relationship with God; the other is the way they act in their relationship with other living beings, most commonly other humans. The former is termed “the rights of God” (ḥuqūq Allāh), and the latter “the rights of servants” (ḥuqūq al-‘ibād) (Anwar 2013). Umma also operates on an individual and a societal level. While the rights of God were seen by jurists to operate ostensibly at the societal level, the rights of servants operated more at the individual level (Emon 2006, 326). Taking into account all the factors mentioned, umma in the Qur’an may be defined fundamentally as: “a way of acting, either individually or in society, for a designated period of time.” This succinct definition applies to all sixty-four instances of the term in the Qur’an. Whereas religious communities act in accordance with the rights of God and servants to differing degrees, non-religious communities did not act in accordance with the rights of God. The Qur’an maintains that non-religious communities may act in ways that fulfil the rights of other living beings (e.g. Q3:75), but they do not act in ways that fulfil the rights of God. This, then, brings us to the question of Q6:38 and how the aforementioned definition applies to animals. Q17:44 and Q24:41 are key verses that explicitly declare that animals praise God. Tlili argues that while animals always praise God, most humans do not (2006, 142). It is for this reason that Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) argues that in this sense animals are superior to humans (Chittick 2009). Nevertheless, the ontological superiority of humans as a comprehensive locus of divine manifestation is beyond doubt (Ibn ‘Arabī 2002, 48-56).
Analysis of Q6:38 in the Sunni commentaries
Before Q6:38 is scrutinized in the commentary tradition, we must establish when the tradition started. Scholars are divided on the issue. While some claim the Qur’an commentary tradition cannot be established with any degree of certainty before 200/815 AD (Berg 2005, 15), others believe that students of ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās (d. 68/687), wrote down his commentary of the Qur’an (Motzki 2012, 231). Others still, take a middle position that claims the commentary transmissions of the early exegete Mujāhid ibn Jabr (d. 104/722) can be reliably traced to 150/767 (Berg 2005, 93). Notwithstanding these differences of opinion, it is now generally accepted that the commentary of Muqātil ibn Sulaymān is the first commentary that was written by the exegete himself (Sinai 2014, 130). The commentary of Muqātil is thus the earliest commentary that is analyzed in this study. If Muqātil’s commentary constitutes the starting point of the analysis of Q6:38, one must also acknowledge a major event that had a significant influence on the commentary tradition: the Translation Movement when ancient Greek texts were translated into Arabic under instruction of the ‘Ābbāsids from around the mid-second/eighth century. Recent studies have demonstrated the extent to which the Sunni commentary tradition was permeated by Ancient Greek ideas (Lala 2023). However, it was not until the middle of the ninth century, or after the formative stage of the exegetical tradition (Hidayatullah 2014), that the influence of the Translation Movement really began to make its mark (Lala 2023). Tlili (2012, 54-55) remarks on the prominent appearance of one of the ideas from the Hellenistic tradition: the Great Chain of Being (GCB). According to GCB, all things in the world exist in a hierarchy, with inanimate things like rocks being at the bottom of the chain, followed by plants, then animals, then humans, then angels, and God at the top of the chain (Lovejoy 1966). Arthur Lovejoy credits Aristotle with being the main promulgator of this idea (1966, 58). This hierarchy was based on “powers of the soul” in a nested hierarchy in which the rational human soul contained all the powers of the animal soul which, in turn, contained all the powers of the nutritive plant soul (58-59). Tlili (2012, 61) observes that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) took GCB to be axiomatic, which would indicate that the idea had gained wide acceptance by his time. Indeed, Seyyed Hossein Nasr remarks that GCB was thoroughly integrated into the thought of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-ṣafā’) (Nasr 1993, 66). The Brethren of Purity were a group of anonymous scholars from Basra in the fourteenth century
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who wrote a collection of fifty-one or fifty-two epistles that dealt with diverse issues (De Callatay, 2003). In one of the epistles, animals accuse humans of subjecting them to unimaginable cruelty. Humans adduce arguments for their superiority over animals, and they eventually win the case (Goodman & Richard 2009), underscoring the ultimate fidelity of the Brethren of Purity to GCB (Nasr 1993, 66). However, the epistle does highlight, as Ian Netton mentions, that “the question of whether man was, in fact, superior to the animals, had obviously aroused some debate in Baṣra” (2016, 92). This means that by the time the epistle was written between around 297/909 and 358/969 (Goodman and Richard 2009, xvii), there was widespread acceptance of GCB in the Islamic tradition as emblematized in Al-Rāzī’s commentary and others, even if the epistles of the Brethren were generally more concordant with Ismaili doctrines (Goodman and Richard 2009). Analysis of commentaries of Q6:38 before the possible permeation of GCB in Qur’anic exegesis shows that these commentaries were predominantly focused on merely defining what umma signified, with Muqātil simply stating that they are “diverse species (aṣnāf muṣannafa),” and Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Akhfash (215/830) offering little more than a synonym for umam (“group, jamā‘a”) (see Table 1). Possible reasons exegetes do not engage deeply with the signification could be that, as Hidayatullah points out, commentaries in the formative period were not as sophisticated and complex as they became in the later periods (2014, 24). The exegetes from this period were only concerned with mainly legal verses of the Qur’an, or material from Jewish and Christian sources that provided details on some Qur’anic verses. If a verse did not fit into these categories, they generally provided superficial glosses on them like we observe with the commentaries of Muqātil and Akhfash. Another possibility is that these exegetes were not influenced by GCB and so did not elaborate on the similarities between humans and animals. However, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣan‘ānī (211/826), who died a little before Al-Akhfash, mentions the source of similarity as the resurrection (see Table 1). The basis of this is the ḥadith that is transmitted on the authority of Abū Hurayra (d. 58/678), which states, All forms of creation will be gathered on the Day of Resurrection—beasts (bahā’im), riding animals (dawābb), birds, and everything else—and the justice of God will reach them on that day, such that the unhorned animal will take from the horned one, then He [God] will say, “Be dust!”
This tradition, or variations thereof, feature in almost a third (twenty-six) of the commentaries considered in this study, and it seems to be the basis for the most popular interpretation of Q6:38 (see Figures 1 and 2).
Some commentators of this tradition, much like their Qur’anic exegete counterparts, go to considerable lengths to explain away the ostensible meaning of the tradition in which animals are afforded moral significance (see below). Abu’l-‘Abbās al-Qurṭubī (d. 656/1258), for instance, cites an interpretation that ignores the apparent meaning of the tradition: It has been said about the meaning of the tradition that its purpose is only to give an example in order to demonstrate the importance (ta‘ẓīm) of recompense and requital (qiṣāṣ)…. This is supported by the addition (ziyāda) to this tradition … that he [Prophet Muḥammad] said, “such that the unhorned sheep will take revenge on the horned one, and the stone will take revenge on the one who rode on it, and a piece of wood will take revenge on another”. It is thus clear from all this that the purpose of this [tradition] is to give an example that is useful for emphasis and exaggeration (tahwīl) [only], since inanimate objects do not comprehend speech, nor do they have reward (thawāb) or punishment (‘iqāb). (1996, 6:564)
According to this opinion, animals are in the same ontological category as inanimate objects; an addition to the tradition is adduced to highlight this. The entire tradition is thus interpreted metaphorically and the retribution of the unhorned animal is reduced to mere exaggeration.
Other commentators assume that the tradition cannot be taken literally because animals are “not religiously accountable” (ghayr mukallaf), and thus the aim of the tradition is just to inform God’s servants that rights (ḥuqūq) are never lost.… In summary, the situation [described] indicates, through exaggeration (mubālagha), the perfection of divine justice amongst those who are religiously accountable, for if this is the case for animals—who are not religiously accountable—what would be the case for those with intellects? (Walwī 2015, 578)
Again, the tradition is said be a form of exaggeration that displays the perfection of divine justice and not to be taken literally because that would imply animals are morally complex and religiously accountable. “Resurrection” as the reason humans and animals are called umam in the Qur’an is among the most consistent interpretations throughout the centuries with the interpretation not mentioned in just the tenth/sixteenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries (see Figures 3–7). The latter could be due to the low number of commentaries studied from this period, but the same cannot be said for the former. Notwithstanding these two centuries that are outliers, resurrection is the most consistent and popular interpretation of umam in the exegetical tradition. This means GCB from the Brethren of Purity had a very limited impact on Sunni commentaries; the main influence is the prophetic traditions. Of the traditions, the one on the authority of Abū Hurayra that imbues animals with complexity and resurrection in the same way as humans is most widespread. Hellenism-inspired GCB and this prophetic tradition thus offered two distinct lenses on the moral complexity of animals. While the former was hierarchical and metaphysical (and had limited effect), the latter was more theologically egalitarian (and more influential). Nevertheless, the ostensible egalitarianism of the prophetic tradition was resisted by many exegetes, both in prophetic tradition commentaries and in Qur’anic commentaries. However, as Tlili notes, there is also an opinion that offers an alternative view to the Abū Hurayra-transmitted tradition, which is from Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynā (d. 198/814). Ibn ‘Uyayna takes an essentialist interpretation of Q6:38 by stating that people display certain characteristics of animals, such as the courage of a lion, the pride of a peacock, the base tastes of a pig, and so on (Tlili 2012, 146). Even though this opinion is mentioned without objection by Abu ‘Abd Allāh al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273) and Al-Rāzī (2012, 146), it does not enjoy wide circulation among Sunni commentaries. More significant is the interpretation attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās that stands in stark contrast to the Abū Hurayra-transmitted tradition by declaring that animals will have no resurrection because their resurrection is their death. This opinion is mentioned in numerous commentaries, often alongside the Abū Hurayra-transmitted one, such as in the commentaries of Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) (2000, 11:345-7), Abū Isḥāq al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035) (2002, 4:147), Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 719/1319?) (1997, 2:161), and ‘Imād al-Dīn ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) (1998, 3:230), among others. Moreover, it is probable that this is the basis of the interpretation of umam being death, which is the fourth most popular interpretation (see Figure 1). While this highlights the polyvalency of most commentaries and their fidelity to the tradition in faithfully transmitting contradictory opinions (Calder 1993), it also demonstrates that the resurrection of animals, even though it is the most popular opinion, is still highly contested, as Ibn Kathīr (1998, 320) points out. More generally, it is emblematic of an overall reticence amongst many exegetes to acknowledge the moral complexity of animals that the Abū Hurayra-transmitted prophetic tradition confers. The contradictory opinion attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās, which cannot compete with a rigorously authenticated prophetic tradition in terms of reliability (Muslim n.d., 4:1997), still manages to compete with it in terms of popularity due to the intrinsic aversion of many exegetes to adopt the plain sense of the prophetic tradition.
To complicate matters, there seems to be disagreement about whether there is disagreement vis-à-vis animal resurrection. Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1354/1935), for instance, says that both Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites agree that animals will be resurrected, the one difference of opinion is whether it is incumbent on God to resurrect them. Predictably, the Mu‘tazilites—who unwaveringly emphasize divine justice—believe it is incumbent on God, whereas the Ash‘arites—who favor divine omnipotence and will—argue that it is not (Riḍā 1990, 7:326). Further, there are opinions attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās that are diametrically opposed to the one cited; for example, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) records that Ibn ‘Abbās stated animals would be resurrected (Al-Suyūṭī n.dSuyūṭī., 3:267). Other commentaries also describe how Ibn ‘Abbās affords animals remarkable complexity: “They know God, believe in His oneness, praise Him, hymn His praises, just as the believers amongst us do” (Riḍā 1990, 7:328). This reflects the perception of animals as superior to many humans because they fulfil the rights of God in contradistinction to the majority of humans. Therefore, it is difficult to make definitive judgments about how animals are viewed in the Sunni commentary tradition. Nevertheless, we can make some general statements about the historical development of the commentary tradition whilst acknowledging that there may well be outliers.
Historical development of Q6:38 in the Sunni commentary tradition
The following are the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the commentaries: 1. The four main interpretations for umam are: “resurrection,” “creation,” “sustenance,” and “death/lifespan.” Collectively, they constitute almost half of all responses (48.7%) (see Figures 1 and 2). Notwithstanding “resurrection,” which implies that animals are morally responsible to some degree and will therefore be resurrected for requital, the other three interpretations downplay the psychological and moral complexity of animals and reduce the similarity between humans and animals insinuated by the shared term umam to merely superficial similarities. Even “resurrection” is downplayed by many exegetes as only a superficial requital for offences by other animals without the full requital afforded humans in heaven and hell (Al-Bayḍāwī 1997, 2:161). The results of this study thus corroborate Tlili’s assertion that there was “a tendency to minimize the significance” of the similarity implied by the term umam (2012, 139). Sunni exegetes explained that animals and humans were the same in the most generic sense, through their shared characteristic of being created by God and being dependent on Him for their sustenance. Likewise, their lifespan and time of death was determined by God. Even though, as Tlili notes, Al-Rāzī dismissed most of these interpretations as too obvious and too general to be useful (Tilli 2012, 141), most exegetes limited their interpretation to only these. 2. The almost identical frequency of the interpretation of umam as “resurrection” (12.8%) and “death/lifespan” (11.4%) (see Figures 1 and 2), indicate that, despite the prophetic tradition that animals will be resurrected, many commentators relied on the interpretation attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās that their resurrection was metaphorical. This is yet another instantiation of downplaying the moral complexity of animals. 3. The external features of animals, such as their dependence on God for their creation, sustenance, outward affairs and states in the world, and time of death; and their comprehension of other members of the species, their instinct to avoid danger, and so on, are by far the most prevalent interpretations of umam (78.5%). The internal features of animals, which attribute to them moral and psychological complexity, such as worshipping God (5.7%), having moral responsibility (1.3%), possessing esoteric knowledge of God (1%), and being admitted into heaven or hell (0.7%), together only make up 8.7% of the total, if the most popular response of “resurrection” (12.8%) is not included in this calculation (see Figures 1 and 2). This demonstrates the extent to which Sunni commentators relegated the similarity implied by umam to predominantly superficial and external similarities between humans and animals. 4. Exegetes before the fourth/tenth century were content with simply defining the term umam as “species.” However, even in this period, “resurrection” was still given as an interpretation of umam, which demonstrates that it was part of the interpretation from the very beginning due to the influence of the prophetic tradition (see Figures 3–7). 5. The most generic interpretation of umam that animals are just a “creation” of God, like humans, which deprives animals of all moral and psychological complexity, is the most popular (12.4%, see Figures 1 and 2) and most consistent interpretation after “resurrection.” However, this interpretation only gained traction after the fourth/tenth century. It seems that the minimization of similarity between humans and animals, therefore, began two centuries after the beginning of the Sunni commentary tradition. “Creation” as an interpretation of umam is not mentioned in the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries, but this is most likely due to the low number of commentaries considered from these periods (see Figures 3–7). 6. Even though the interpretation of umam as “death/lifespan” began in the fourth/tenth century like “creation,” other terms that minimize the similarity between humans and animals, such as “sustenance” and “affairs/states” began from the fifth/eleventh century (see Figures 3–7). It therefore seems that the minimization of the similarity between animals and humans was in full flow after the fifth/eleventh century. 7. The most significant interpretation for umam that emphasizes the internal aspect of animals and affords them moral complexity is that they worship God. This interpretation was consistently applied from the fourth/tenth century (see Figures 3–7). The reason for this is the Qur’anic verses that explicitly state that animals worship God, such as Q17:44 and Q24:41. The former verse explains that all things praise God, but we do not comprehend their modality of praise. There are other verses, too, such as Q21:79, which declares that mountains and animals praise God. Included in the 5.7% are the verses that mention the cognizance of animals that there is only one God who should be worshipped, such as when the Hoopoe (a type of bird) declares the oneness of God, and His sole right to be worshipped in Q27:25. Given that there are multiple verses that clearly proclaim animals worship God and that they are aware of His oneness, it would be expected for this interpretation to be one of the most widespread interpretations of umam, yet it is only the seventh most popular interpretation (only 5.7%, see Figures 1 and 2). Further, it is not even consistently applied, as it is not mentioned in the ninth/fifteenth, eleventh/seventeenth, and twelfth/eighteenth centuries. The lack of attention to this key interpretation of umam, which features multiple times in the Qur’an, shows that the minimization of spiritual similarity between humans and animals was an important characteristic of the Sunni commentary tradition. The almost complete lack of mention of the spiritual complexity of animals from the ninth/fifteenth to the twelfth/eighteenth centuries corroborates the thesis of Zahra Ayubi and others that the androcentric worldview that was promulgated in this period, especially, undermined the status of anyone that was not male and human, like women and animals (Ayubi 2019; Bauer 2015). 8. Notwithstanding “resurrection” and “worship,” interpretations that attribute spiritual, psychological, and moral complexity to animals do not feature in the top seven most popular results through the centuries, (see Figure 7). The majority of interpretations that imbue animals with spiritual, psychological, and moral complexity are from the modern period. It thus behooves us to investigate this further.
Q6:38 in the modern Sunni commentary tradition
There are isolated accounts of spiritual, psychological, and moral complexity that are attributed to animals in the pre-modern period. A conspicuous example is the commentary of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) who says that umam could signify that animals are issued with commands and prohibitions, just like humans, and similarly, that they are given glad tidings and/or warnings based on their actions (2005, 4:482). Other examples are the commentaries of Samīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 756/1355) and Niẓām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī (d. 850/1446) who both speak about how some animals will experience felicity (sa‘āda) in the hereafter and others damnation (shaqāwa) in the same way as humans (Al-Ḥalabī 1996, 1:119; Al-Nīsābūrī 1995, 3:75). There are a few pre-modern commentaries, as well as modern ones, that mention animals possess esoteric knowledge (ma‘rifa) about God and bear moral responsibility (taklīf) just as humans do (see Table 1). Nevertheless, these are parochial interpretations in the pre-modern period. They become far more common in the modern era. 2 Some modern commentaries mention the psychological and social complexity of animals and suggest that they have governments and societies in the same way as humans do. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭīb (1390/1970) mentions the first view (Khaṭīb n.d., 4:167), whereas Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (d. 1371/1952) mentions the latter view (Marāghī, 1946, 7:118). This opens up the possibility that animals are complex social creatures just like humans, which means that they must face consequences for their actions that impact society in the hereafter. It also raises the question of animal citizenship, which is investigated by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011, 3). Other contemporary commentaries are even more explicit and attribute characteristics like rationality and an innate natural disposition (fiṭra) to animals, which were thought to be the exclusive domain of humans in the pre-modern period. The commentaries of Rashīd Riḍā and Muḥammad al-Sha‘rāwī (d. 1418/1998) are especially significant in this regard. Riḍā mentions that, because God has used the term umam to describe animals and humans, it means we have something in common. He lists the possibilities as: religion, era, place, qualities (ṣifāt), or actions (Riḍā 1990, 7:326-27). However, we do not know definitively how we are similar to animals since God has not disclosed this to us (7:328). This means that it is possible, as some Sufis say according to Riḍā, that animals are “rational (‘āqil) and bear moral responsibility (mukallaf), and they even have messengers from among them” (7:328). If this is the case, then it follows that “God, the Exalted, will resurrect them like He will resurrect us, and He will requite them like He will requite us” (7:328). This, then, represents the highest possibility of similarity imparted by the term umam in which the key distinctions of humankind of rationality, moral responsibility, requital in heaven or hell, and even guidance through prophets are granted to animals as well. There are earlier commentaries that allude to this maximal level of similarity but do not go as far as to delineate all the possibilities, such as Muḥammad Ṣiddīq Khān ibn Ḥasan (d. 1307/1890) (1992, 4:135) who writes that “it is more appropriate to say that they [animals] are equivalent in every way that is possible.” Pre-modern thinkers who were more rationalistic, like Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502/1108) (Mohamed 1995, 61), tended to favor a more broad-sweeping application of umma that attributed to animals moral responsibility with everything that was implicit in that due to their prioritization of explaining the suffering of animals (Al-Iṣfahānī 1999, 1:11-12). Indeed, the rationalist thinker and logician, Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316), states that by his time there was already a well-known debate as to whether animals possessed rationality and bore moral responsibility, and he even adduces the possibility that umam signifies the angel of death captures the souls of animals in the same way as it captures human souls, adding yet another distinction to animals that is usually reserved for humans (n.d., 501-02).
Sufi commentators, too, had the same general inclination of maximizing the similarity between humans and animals due to their focus on internality and because the term implied an inward complexity as well an outward one. Indeed, there is no mutual exclusivity between the rationalistic and Sufi perspectives as they are often corroborative, such as in the case of Al-Iṣfahānī (Mohamed 1995). The influential Morroccan Sufi, Aḥmad ibn ‘Ajība (d. 1224/1809), for instance, writes that umam means God is in charge of the affairs of animals, just like many of his counterparts, but he adds that this refers to both their outward (ẓāhir) states and affairs and their inward (bāṭin) ones (1998, 2:115). Ibn ‘Ajība seems to be echoing the position of his illustrious Sufi predecessor, ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), who believes that umam means animals are dependent on God for their “spiritual attributes (al-ṣifāt al-nafsiyya) and their essential traits (al-nu‘ūt al-dhātiyya)” (Al-Qushayrī n.d, 1:470). The idea of dependence is subverted by Ibn ‘Arabī who explains that animals’ dependence on God implies that God is “dependent” on them for His lordship because without them there would be no lordship (Chittick 2009). This bilateral “dependence” applies to the human-animal interaction, too, so just as animals are subjected to humans, humans are subjected to animals. But animals are superior to humans, says Ibn ‘Arabī, because they accept the position that God has placed them in, unlike humans who seek to challenge it thereby exhibiting their dissatisfaction with divine decree. Further, our dependence on animals far outweighs their dependence on us, which is why if they get the chance, they always flee from humans (Chittick 2009). Notwithstanding Ibn ‘Arabī’s daring interpretation of dependence, pre-modern exegetes are, on the whole, less willing than their modern counterparts to engage in all the ways animals and humans are similar insinuated by the shared term “umam.” The latter show a marked preoccupation with the complexity of animals and thus advocate for their rights more perhaps because they were affected by the increasing cruelty towards animals in the industrialized world (Poya and Schatzschneider 2022). Riḍā has already been cited as an example of this, but the highly influential Egyptian scholar Muḥammad al-Sha‘rāwī (d. 1418/1998) provides an even more perspicuous instantiation of this tendency. In his commentary, he says, God has given every animal besides humans faith (īmān) through their natural disposition (fiṭra), and He has guided them to their sustenance through instinct (gharīza). He has distinguished humankind above all creation through intellect, but humankind sometimes uses its intellect in an unimpaired and correct way that leads it to faith, and sometimes it uses it in an incorrect way, so it leads it away from faith. (1997, 6:3607-08)
Al-Sha‘rāwī states that it is not intellect that is required to worship God, but natural disposition (fiṭra). Indeed, the intellect that humans are given at times actually serves to impede the default guidance that is offered by natural disposition, which is why animals always have faith in God while some humans—who have used their intellect in an incorrect way—do not. Having unimpeded natural disposition is one way in which some animals have superiority over humans; another, says Al-Sha‘rāwī, is that animals are sometimes the teachers of humans. An explicit example of this is Q5:31 in which a crow teaches Cain how to bury his brother Abel after the former murders him (1997, 6:3607-3608). The attribution of fiṭra—a guiding natural disposition—to animals, which is regarded as the exclusive remit of humans by pre-modern scholars (Ibn Taymiyya 1991), represents a pellucid example of just how far modern exegetes take the similarity implied by the term umam.
Conclusion
The foregoing has demonstrated that exegetes mainly aim to minimize the psychological, social, and spiritual complexity of animals implied by the shared term umam. This is achieved by restricting the denotation of the term to predominantly external features that emphasize the outward similarity between humans and animals without affording the latter any internal complexity. Even though “resurrection” is the most popular interpretation of umam because of the prophetic tradition in which this is explicitly stated, most exegetes interpret it as only a superficial requital for offences by other animals without the full requital afforded humans in heaven and hell. Others go further and state that the resurrection is metaphorical, based on the interpretation attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās. By far the most popular interpretation of umam that imbues animals with moral and spiritual complexity is that they worship God, which still only constitutes 5.7%, despite being stated explicitly in other verses like Q17:44 and Q24:41. There are a few commentaries that buck the trend of minimizing the similarity between animals and humans implied by the term umam in the pre-modern period. The ones that do so generally have a rationalistic and/or Sufi orientation. While the former seek to make sense of the suffering endured by animals in the overall divine scheme, the latter’s focus on internality conduce them to attribute spiritual similarities with humans. In contradistinction to their pre-modern counterparts, contemporary exegetes, perhaps affected by the increasing cruelty towards animals in the industrialized world, are far more willing to acknowledge the psychological, social, and spiritual complexity of animals and explore the full gamut of human-animal similarities insinuated by the term umam.
Further studies
This study has taken a broad-brush approach by looking at scores of commentaries over centuries in order to identify general trends. In so doing, it inevitably suffers from giving inadequate space to the nuances that exist within certain complex works. Due to this, the findings of this study need to be treated as preliminary that require further studies for corroboration. Additionally, this study does not delve into the inter-exegetical relations, or the extent to which commentators were influenced by their predecessors or contemporaries. Other studies would need to be conducted to explore this, and how it affected the general trajectory of the Sunni exegetical tradition. Finally, this study only considers Q6:38 as a window into the perception of animals in the Sunni exegetical tradition. Future studies would need to investigate other verses of the Qur’an that mention animals and attribute to them special qualities, such as Q16:68-69, Q17:44, Q24:41, Q27:18, Q27:22 etc.
Glossary
Footnotes
Acknowledgement
The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Homoud Al Kabi for his help with the graphical representation of the commentary survey. The author would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their detailed and insightful analysis of an earlier version of this paper.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Gulf University for Science and Technology.
