“Stop Being so Fkn Soft”: Masculinity,Politics,and the Acceptance of Gender-Based Online Violence Myths Among Young Canadian Men

Abstract

Defining manhood is a critical concern in contemporary politics, especially due to its increasing role in shaping cultural narratives toward gender-based violence—and in particular, toward gender-based technology-facilitated violence and abuse (GBTFVA). In this context, this study investigates how political affiliation influences perceptions of GBTFVA among young Canadian men. To explore this, we draw on a survey of 1297 young Canadian men who align themselves with ideological affiliations across the political spectrum. Overall, our results show that political ideologies matter when understanding who enacts and sustains GBTFVA, as they significantly shape attitudes toward gender-based violence in digital spaces. Moreover, while we note that conservative participants displayed higher acceptance of GBTFVA myths than their liberal counterparts (such as She wanted it and She asked for it), findings show that these harmful narratives are endorsed in different yet meaningful ways throughout all ideological affiliations. Furthermore, we found that one myth—It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse—is similarly endorsed across all political affiliations, thus highlighting the scope of these narratives that diminish the experience of targets across political discourses. By illuminating these intersections, this study provides valuable insights into the cultural and ideological underpinnings of GBTFVA, offering leverage points for societal change and prevention efforts.

Keywords

gender-based technology-facilitated violence and abuse cultural narratives violence masculinity politics Canada

Introduction

Defining manhood is a critical political concern of our times. For example, in the context of the 2024 United States presidential election, journalists, academics, and activists noted a stark contrast between what different political parties perceived to be desirable masculinity (Ishisaka, 2024). In Canada, where this study takes place, different understandings of manhood have long been at the center of political communication and advertising, as exemplified in ongoing comparisons between the way masculinity is represented by political leaders such as Perre Pollievre and Justin Trudeau (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2023; Trimble et al., 2015).

Along the political constructions of manhood and masculinity, there is a wide range of accompanying attitudes toward gender-based violence—or violent acts that are shaped by gender roles (Russo & Pirlott, 2006). Political constructions of manhood have been noted to naturalize and even promote gender-based violence. For instance, Türkoğlu and Cingöz-Ulu (2019) found that men’s endorsement of masculinity ideology is closely related to the frequency in which violence against women is enacted and supported. Similarly, Raney and colleagues (2019) noted how women politicians in Canada were often the targets of sexual or gendered violence and harassment, including situations

where one male MP [member of parliament] referenced a “three-some” while taking a photo with women colleagues; another who likened a woman MP to a stripper and another who dismissed the sitting Environment minister, who was a woman, as “Climate Barbie.” (p. 17)

Gender-based violence is thus closely linked to the political discourses that shape society—the same ones that define what gendered behaviors ought (not) to be.

Examining how different societal discourses and ideologies, such as political alignment, shape attitudes concerning gender-based violence is not new. Certainly, there is an ample scholarly trajectory of such theories and concepts that have done so—most relevant for this study is scholarship on rape myths (Payne et al., 1999). Rape myths refer to “prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists” (Burt, 1980, p. 219). Through this conceptual lens, sociologists and feminist scholars center the cultural narratives that normalize, enable, and incentivize gender-based violence (Payne et al., 1999). Rape myths emphasize sexism, not as an outlier group of “weirdos” or extremist, but as a prevalent cultural narrative embedded in our construction of identity and sociality (Manoussaki & Veitch, 2015). Drawing on rape myth acceptance measures, scholars have explored the role of political views on gender-based violence. For instance, various studies have linked right-wing authoritarianism with a higher endorsement of rape myths (Canto et al., 2021; Manoussaki & Veitch, 2015).

While there is a strong foundation of scholarly work exploring the connection between political affiliation and rape myths, it is unclear whether this connection also occurs concerning a rising form of gender-based violence: gender-based technology-facilitated violence and abuse (GBTFVA). GBTFVA is now a key element in the continuum of gender-based violence (Dunn, 2021; Gosse, 2021), encompassing a wide range of violent acts, from dating abuse, cyberstalking, and harassment to non-consensual image sharing and doxing, among others (Dunn, 2020; Henry & Powell, 2018). A particularly prevalent venue of GBTFVA is social media platforms, where techno-cultural infrastructures have been noted to facilitate its spread and enactment (DeCook, 2018; Stubbs-Richardson et al., 2018). By drawing on the GBTFVA conceptual umbrella, we aim to emphasize the expansive arsenal of harmful practices that exist on digital platforms to target women and non-binary people, thus highlighting it as a mechanism for sustaining patriarchal structures of power in place (Dunn, 2021). The United Nations (2023) has noted that—as gender-based violence affects approximately one in every three women across the world—GBTFVA is a critical mechanism through which women and girls are put at risk.

In this study, we explore how myths concerning GBTFVA differ across liberal and conservative men by surveying 1297 young Canadian men about their perceptions of GBTFVA and their political affiliation. More specifically, we ask:

RQ1: Is there a significant relationship between political ideological affiliation and men’s perception of GBTFVA?

RQ2: How does men’s perception of GBTFVA differ across participants’ political affiliations?

This study expands on our previous work exploring gender-based online violence myths among Canadian men, where we found that young men commonly endorse a variety of cultural narratives concerning GBTFVA (Morales et al., 2024). When exploring how these myths related to various demographics (such as age and educational background), we noted that they appeared to be closely connected to political affiliation. In this article, we focus on the differences across political ideologies, examining the intersection of harmful narratives concerning GBTFVA and contemporary political discourses on manhood and masculinity. In this way, we advance nuanced understandings of cultural narratives that sustain and promote GBTFVA through a political lens, identifying possible leverage points to enact societal change and address the underlying political ideologies that enable these forms of gender-based violence.

Literature review

Political affiliation and views on gender-based violence

People with contrasting political views are finding fewer and fewer points of agreement with those who think differently—that is, our societies are increasingly polarized. At its core, polarization evidences an ideological effort to engage in processes of othering against those who have different political ideas—a process of marking an us (who are right) and a them (who are wrong) (Mason, 2018). These efforts of separating who is in and who is out are not purely (or even mostly) cognitive—instead, they are often affective, whereby our emotional responses are guided by and responsive to our ideological sorting (Mason, 2016). Through these affective polarization processes—heightened by social media platforms design and cultures (Boler & Davis, 2020)—out-group members are effectively dehumanized and are seen to pose “a threat to civil discourse and dialogue, as this communication reduces the willingness to engage in productive discourse with political opponents needed for a healthy democracy” (Harel et al., 2020, p. 2).

It is therefore not surprising that polarization also shapes how men with various political affiliations understand and enact gender-based violence. Indeed, as political parties put forward their construction of what “proper” masculinity is, they also advance ideas of whether (or how much) gender-based violence should be tolerated or even desired (Daddow & Hertner, 2021). The literature has long noted that attitudes toward gender-based violence vary across political parties. Most notoriously, there is evidence that conservatives and right-wing politicians construct manhood in ways that are harmful to women (Brown, 2023; DiMuccio & Knowles, 2023). For instance, Araujo and Gatto (2022) found that conservatism usually leads to fewer policy efforts that address violence against women, as these policies are deprioritized. In this context, feminist collectives and scholars have called attention to the rise of right-wing populism, which is often seen as more dangerous toward women (Kováts, 2018).

At their core, critiques of conservative views on masculinity are grounded in two aspects. On the one hand, right-wing political ideologies conceive a narrow view of masculinity, “a full-blooded testosterone male” (Brown, 2023, p. 462) closely aligned with so-called “traditional” and “alpha” mindsets that engender patriarchal hegemonic dominance. On the other hand, it views women who dare challenge such hegemonic dominance as toxic and harmful, thus deserving of their hate and harm (Brown, 2023; García-Favaro & Gill, 2016; Strick, 2020). From such a standpoint, gender-based violence often finds fertile ground under conservative-minded ideological affiliations.

Importantly, while much literature discusses the relationship between gender-based violence and right-wing politics, toxic masculinity is not exclusively an issue of conservatives, with leftists and liberals often holding similar toxic cultural narratives against women (Daddow & Hertner, 2021; DiMuccio & Knowles, 2023). For example, in the context of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, some Bernie Sanders followers—sometimes referred to as The Dirtbag Left—engaged in misogynistic attacks against female politicians and journalists who opposed their candidate (Menon & DeCook, 2021). As discussed by Menon and DeCook (2021), gender-based violence from liberals and leftists is often overlooked.

And while technology—and specifically, social media platforms—has long been associated with left-wing movements like Occupy Wall Street or the Women’s March on Washington (Syed et al., 2023), recent support of right-wing American President Donald Trump by many notable technology entrepreneurs like Peter Thiel and Elon Musk (Akuffo, 2024) suggests that it is naive to associate digital platforms with only one ideological orientation. Certainly, as digital communication platforms increasingly become places where political alliances are reinforced, the question of whether the acceptance of GBTFVA is expressed differently by people with different political affiliations remains one worth exploring more deeply.

Political affiliation and views on GBTFVA

GBTFVA is now an important element in the contemporary continuum of gender-based violence (Dunn, 2021), with impactful negative consequences for its targets (Backe et al., 2018; Gosse et al., 2021; Jane, 2018). GBTFVA encompasses a wide range of harmful practices that extend beyond the screen, including harassment (Jane, 2014), surveillance (Dragiewicz et al., 2018), and symbolic violence (Cepeda, 2018). Rather than a novel phenomenon, GBTFVA has been present since the earlier stages of online communities (Miltner, 2014; Phillips, 2019; Shepherd et al., 2015)—a feature of the internet rather than an exception.

Previous studies have long discussed how men’s views of GBTFVA are deeply tied to perceived challenges to their masculinity (Marwick & Caplan, 2018; Zimmerman, 2022). This connection is, in turn, increasingly defined by political ideologies. In particular, scholars have noted the prevalence of GBTFVA among men’s rights advocates attached to conservative and far-right views (DeCook, 2018; Rothermel, 2023). In this sense, Barter and colleagues (2022) found that

those with less egalitarian attitudes, regardless of gender, were more likely to report [interpersonal violence and abuse] perpetration (. . . ). This supports theoretical accounts of the ways in which beliefs which support gender inequality, hegemonic masculinity and perpetration of intimate violence intersect. (p. 558)

Barter and colleagues were not specifically examining political alignment, but their work suggests that those who do not believe in egalitarian ideas are much more likely to engage in violence against those who do—a chilling finding once we consider the political discourses that encourage zero-sum and us versus them thinking.

Evidence of the overlap between conservative political discourses and GBTFVA abounds in the literature. Here, scholars have noted that communities across social media platforms (such as Instagram, Reddit, and YouTube) have become spaces where far-right groups socialize their ideologies and recruit followers through GBTFVA (DeCook, 2018; Marwick, 2021; Marwick & Caplan, 2018). The clearest example of such communities is the manosphere—a network of sites and communities that aim to uphold men’s rights through the lenses of misogyny, anti-feminism, and male supremacy (Dickel & Evolvi, 2023; Ging, 2019). Anti-feminism and misogynistic attacks have been documented as one of the key mechanisms in which the manosphere recruits new members through platforms such as Reddit and YouTube (Guy, 2020). The link between the manosphere and right-wing views is best shown by the work of Mamié et al. (2021), who found “a large overlap between the user bases of the Alt-right and of the Manosphere and that members of the Manosphere have a bigger chance to engage with far-right content than carefully chosen counterparts” (p. 139). In a report for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Perliger et al. (2023) note that GBTFVA might be particularly attractive to these communities because it “provides a call for action, legitimises violence, and encourages the regression back to traditional gender roles in which men dominate and lead across societal sectors” (p. 24).

And even though it would be easy to say that GBTFVA is an exclusive problem of those attached to right-wing politics, literature on political views on gendered violence illustrates that gendered harms from people with liberal and leftist views are often underlooked and ignored (Daddow & Hertner, 2021; DiMuccio & Knowles, 2023; Menon & DeCook, 2021). In response to these tensions between GBTFVA myths and political ideologies, we argue that it is necessary to take a closer look at how different political parties engage in cultural narratives that enable, sustain, and expand toxic masculinity.

Methods

We examine how myths concerning GBTFVA differ across liberal and conservative men. Specifically, we aim to address two research questions: (1) Is there a significant relationship between ideological affiliation and men’s perceptions of GBTFVA? And (2) How do men’s perceptions of GBTFVA differ across participants’ political affiliations? We followed an exploratory approach to respond to these research questions, surveying young Canadian men about their perspectives concerning GBTFVA.

Instrument

We adapted the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance (IRMA) instrument (Payne et al., 1999), which contemplates seven rape myths (She asked for it, It wasn’t really rape, He didn’t mean to, She wanted it, She lied, Rape is a trivial event, and Rape is a deviant event) with various survey items for each. Since the original instrument assessed general rape myths and was not directly designed to respond to the cultural narratives that underlie GBTFVA, we modified the survey items and myths to better fit our study’s goals. For instance, the myth It Wasn’t Really Rape was converted into It Wasn’t Really Gender-Based Online Abuse, and the item Men from nice middle-class homes almost never rape was turned into Real men don’t perpetuate gender-based online abuse. The wording of each item was collaboratively discussed until a consensus was reached on the best phrasing. Answers were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). A complete copy of the Likert-type scale items and myths is available in Supplemental Appendix A, with details of the process of translation of survey items published in our previous work (Morales et al., 2024). To evaluate the internal reliability of our adaptation, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, as has been done in other studies using the IRMA instrument (e.g. Beck et al., 2012). We achieved a positively estimated alpha value of .827—where anything above .7 is regarded as reliable. Thus, we determined that our adaptation was a dependable instrument for this exploration of men’s acceptance of gender-based online violence myths.

Data collection

To gather data for our online survey we partnered with Leger, a Canadian research and analysis firm, and data collection occurred between June and July 2023, targeting male-identifying individuals aged 18 to 30 living in Canada. We targeted young men since they have been shown to play a critical role in creating, sustaining, and expanding cultures of gendered violence, especially among online communities (Botto & Gottzén, 2023; Marwick & Caplan, 2018). We received a total of 1782 survey submissions. After cleaning the data, we excluded 485 responses based on several criteria: completion time (under 3 min and 40 s, which was less than one-third of the median completion time), failure to pass three quality and attention-check questions, straight-lining (providing the same answer for all items), and nonsensical open-ended responses (e.g. “Gndhtsjysjgskhx”). Following this process, we retained 1297 valid responses, which served as the foundation for our analysis.

Data analysis

We used two analytical methods to answer our two research questions. We used Person’s chi-square test of independence to explore the significance of the relationship between political affiliation and men’s perception of GBTFVA.

When focusing on how men’s perception of GBTFVA changes across participants’ political affiliations, we relied on descriptive statistics (graphical representations and distribution of means) and codebook thematic analysis to better understand respondents’ views according to their political affiliation. For the thematic analysis, we followed the work of Braun and Clarke (2012, 2019), categorizing participants’ responses into pre-established themes—that is, into the seven gender-based online violence myths. For this qualitative analysis, we specifically relied on the question, “What would encourage you to intervene personally when you see gender-based online abuse?” as it was here where participants’ visions of GBTFVA were most commonly expressed.

It is important to note that, even as we noted that there are important nuances in the relationship in the data between those who identified as extremely, moderately, and slightly conservative/liberals, as well as those who identify with neither political view, we emphasize in our analysis a comparative view by grouping all of those who identified as conservatives and those who identify as liberals. While this is a considerable limitation of this study (as it constrains our ability to attend to the nuances within political views), it enables us to identify differences across political alignment. Detailed views of differences across these various identifications are shown in Supplemental Appendix B.

Participants’ demographics

Participants were fairly evenly distributed across the 18–30 age range: 378 (29.13%) were aged 18–21, 423 (32.61%) were 22–25, and 496 (38.25%) were 26–30. The highest education level for most participants was either a high school diploma (n = 439, 33.9%) or a bachelor’s degree (n = 321, 24.8%). A majority identified as neither liberal nor conservative (n = 469, 36.2%), though the sample leaned more liberal (slightly, moderately, and extremely liberal combined, n = 588, 45.4%) than conservative (slightly, moderately, and extremely conservative combined, n = 236, 18.2%). Regarding ethnicity and race, most identified as White (n = 641, 45.69%), followed by South Asian (n = 203, 14.47%), East Asian (n = 164, 11.69%), and Black (n = 140, 9.98%). Finally, most participants in our sample identified as heterosexual (n = 898, 69.3%).

Findings

RQ1: relation between ideological affiliation and views concerning gender-based online violence myths

The first study objective is to identify any significant relationships between political affiliation and young men’s acceptance of gender-based online violence myths. To achieve this, we conducted a Pearson chi-square test, where any value below 0.005 showcased a significant relation between the specific items and participants’ political affiliation. As shown in Table 1, results show a significant relation between political ideologies and GBTFVA myths, with values of 0.001 or below across all 14 items. Our analysis shows that political affiliation is highly related to men’s views across all seven gender-based online violence myths, showcasing the importance of considering ideological alignment when contemplating who endorses GBTFVA myths.

Table 1.

Results From Chi-Square Test Analysis Exploring a Significant Relation Between Political Affiliation and Participants’ Views Concerning GBTFVA.

Myth	Item	Chi-square value
It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse	Normal discussions or debates are often incorrectly called out as gender-based online abuse.	<0.001
It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse	Targets of gender-based online abuse should do more to stand up for themselves.	0.001
He didn’t mean to	Innocent things that people say online are often taken out of context as gender-based online abuse.	<0.001
He didn’t mean to	Online discussions sometimes get heated, but that doesn’t mean people are abusers.	<0.001
Gender-based online abuse is a deviant event	Gender-based online abuse is rare unless you seek out nasty people and places online.	<0.001
Gender-based online abuse is a deviant event	Real men don’t perpetrate gender-based online abuse	<0.001
She lied	Claims of gender-based online abuse are often weaponized against men	<0.001
She lied	People often lie about the severity/frequency of gender-based online abuse	<0.001
She wanted it	People who post about their gender or sexuality are looking to start arguments.	<0.001
She wanted it	People who post sexual content want men to make comments	<0.001
She asked for it	People who post provocative photos of themselves are just asking for trouble	<0.001
She asked for it	Targets of gender-based online abuse must have done something to incite or invite the abuse	<0.001
Gender-based online abuse is a trivial event	Edgy jokes and transgressive expressions are just part of online communication.	<0.001
Gender-based online abuse is a trivial event	Online threats and insults should be taken seriously.	<0.001

RQ2: men’s perception of GBTFVA across participants’ political affiliation

To better grasp the views concerning gender-based online violence myths across our sample, we explored differences according to political affiliations. We found that people who hold conservative or liberal views differ in how much they hold gender-based online violence myths (see Figure 1). Moreover, a detailed view of conservatives and liberals’ responses distribution in each myth is available in Supplemental Appendix C. Across 12 out of the 14 survey items, self-denominated conservatives more strongly held gender-based online violence myths than self-denominated liberals. While it is not typical to measure differences between means of Likert-type scale data through statistical analyses (such as independent t-test) due to its categorical nature, in the following paragraphs, we present the averages of the differences between the views of conservatives and liberals as hints of how much their views varied across the sample.

Figure 1.

Participants’ responses to each item across the seven gender-based online violence myths ranked by most to least endorsed among respondents across people who self-identify as liberals and conservatives.

The most stark difference between responses across liberals and conservatives is seen in two myths: She wanted it and She asked for it, with an aggregated average difference of 0.75 and 0.72, respectively—a noteworthy difference given the 1 to 5 range of the Likert-type scale. In both items, people who self-identify as conservatives most commonly held these gender-based online violence myths. Participants’ qualitative responses showed some of the reasoning behind such views. For instance, when asked about what would motivate him to engage in bystander intervention, a participant who self-identified as conservative argued the following: “The problem is some people like that attention.” Through such arguments, conservative participants imply that the blame for online abuse falls on the target. Similarly, conservatives’ qualitative responses point to views on transgender people to justify their responses concerning the myths She wanted it and She asked for it by saying:

If you want to change your life and change who you were when you were born, good for you! Be your new self, but don’t expect to be accepted or to be treated delicately. It’s like when a new boss steps into a role and demands respect from all the workers, nope you earn respect it’s not given, so acceptance isn’t always given, so deal with it!

Through such narratives, participants blame the online abuse on the victim. However, even while responses aligning to these myths were predominately put forward by conservatives, it was not unique to them. For instance, a participant who identified as either conservative or liberal said that “I think faggots and trannys are going way to far to get noticed. No one cares.” (sic)

Another myth with an important difference between conservatives and liberals is Gender-based online abuse is a trivial event, with an average of 0.61 difference between means. Here, conservatives appear to most commonly hold beliefs that online abuse is not consequential—or that, indeed, it is not harmful at all. A close reading of their qualitative responses further illustrates this point. For instance, a very conservative respondent argued: “I don’t believe gender-based online abuse is a problem.” Beyond and in line with views that online abuse is unimportant, others even see it as a positive part of conversations on digital platforms—a marker of humor. For example, a conservative participant said, “Online abuse is very funny.” In response to these displays of humor, critiques of online abuse appear to be read as calls for attention: “stop being so fkn soft.”

Differences between views across liberals and conservatives were also seen across the myth He didn’t mean to and She lied, with average differences of 0.57 and 0.52, respectively. Concerning He didn’t mean to, examples show how conservative participants diminished the perpetrator’s responsibility by, for instance, giving him the benefit of the doubt. For example, when asked about what would motivate him to intervene, a self-identified conservative participant said, “If I knew the abuser was truly without a doubt in the wrong, I wouldn’t intervene if what they were saying was controversial but they were saying something that makes some sense.”

Finally, the myth with the least difference between liberals and conservatives was It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse, with an average difference in means of 0.32. Being the most prevalent myth among all participants, respondents from both political ideological views hold this myth at somewhat similar levels—evidenced across qualitative responses. The two statements used to assess this myth were “normal discussions and debates are often incorrectly identified as GBTFVA” and “Targets of GBTFVA should do more to stand up for themselves.” Both statements point to narratives suggesting that the identification of violence is misapplied but also that the targets of violence are not doing enough to defend themselves. For instance, when asked what would motivate them to intervene, a conservative participant said, “Nothing. Bullying builds character,” and a slightly liberal participant said, “I wouldn’t because abuse is very subjective online. It is often times being used in a blanket form and causing issues for the ethos of internet which is free communications.”

While these examples illustrate the responsibilities that are placed upon GBTFVA targets to highlight online abuse as actual abuse across both political groups, it does not imply that both narratives are the same. Indeed, a close reading of responses hints at possible differences across these two groups. Conservative responses that illustrate endorsement for this myth, for instance, tend to emphasize the over-sensitive nature of targets, saying that they are “just being woke” and “have been coddled enough.” Liberal respondents, however, tend to trivialize the experiences of targets by placing their views in perspective to larger societal issues and thus diminishing the importance of their harm—by, for instance, arguing that they would only intervene if it is a “bigger issue than just trolling on the internet” and that “there will always be bad people.”

Discussion

By exploring men’s views of gender-based online abuse myths across political ideologies, this research sheds light on why manosphere and incel communities can successfully use rhetorical GBTFVA across social media platforms to recruit others to join their movements. Something in these myths speaks to young men, particularly those who identify as leaning conservative. Although the literature has identified considerable overlap between alt-right and manosphere ideologies (Guy, 2020; Mamié et al., 2021; Strick, 2020), most of our respondents did not identify as far-right or extremely conservative—and yet, they still accepted many GBTFVA myths. This suggests that myths may be an entry point that could draw moderate or strongly identified conservatives farther down a rabbit hole of extreme and regressive gender views. But why are these ideas so tempting to young men who identify on the conservative side of the political spectrum? Why is gender-based violence linked to ideologies on the right (Kováts, 2018; Strick, 2020)? And what explains the fact that conservative and liberal-identified respondents agreed with the myth It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse? In this section, we argue that in both liberal and conservative cases, the adoption or acceptance of GBTFVA myths have as much to do with a rejection of the neo-liberal status quo and a search for a comforting and familiar view of masculinity as they do with any underlying or malevolent adoption of patriarchy.

Through a survey of 481 men in the United States, Casey et al. (2024) found that men who most strongly endorse values of gender equity are significantly less likely to hold to traditional ideas of masculinity. This puts some of our findings into context: As conservative viewpoints most often maintain a desire to maintain or return to traditional gender norms, these views would also align with a lower likelihood of the endorsement of views of gender equality, which in turn would mean that these people would subscribe to ideas that women who experience GBTFVA must have done something to deserve it. Interestingly, Casey et al.’s research also found that men who do not subscribe to positive attitudes about gender equity are equally as likely to participate in gender-based violence as their traditionally masculine peers—an extension of this finding as applied to our study may be that both groups are equally as likely to refrain from taking action when they see violence. This is likely a result of subtle but systemic hegemonic masculinity impacting even people who do not subscribe to most GBTFVA myths.

In this sense, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) write that

we should understand hegemonic norms as defining a subject position in discourse that is taken up strategically by men in particular circumstances. Hegemonic masculinity has multiple meanings . . . Consequently, “masculinity” represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices. (p. 841)

In our data, we can see evidence of differences and similarities in how identification with liberal versus conservative politics influences acceptance of myths about GBTFVA. Masculinity, even hegemonic masculinity, is not one thing but rather “a field of discursive positions and practices” (Harrington, 2021, p. 350). That is to say, hegemonic masculinity, as it is expressed via right-wing ideologies, will necessarily take a different form than hegemonic masculinity expressed via left-wing ideologies. But that is not to discount the fact that on both sides of the political spectrum, hegemonic masculinity serves to reinforce particular practices and expressions of what it means to be a man among young male-identified people.

Studies centered on GBTFVA narratives across social media platforms have already illustrated that there is a link between just world beliefs and the acceptance of rape myths (Stubbs-Richardson et al., 2018). The just world hypothesis refers to the idea that the world is generally just, and as such, if people behave in a moral way, they will be likely to have good things happen to them. This belief is also implicated in rape culture because it aligns with the idea that a target must have been doing something to prompt being victimized. It also shows up in the It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse myth since a central tenet is the idea that GBTFVA targets should do better at sticking up for themselves. We suggest that a just world belief could also contribute to anxieties about masculinity. If a person feels that good people will be more likely to have good things happen, and then they experience an economic downturn, then a just world belief would prompt self-blame, which would in turn lead to the adoption of behaviors and beliefs to compensate for such misalignment.

In fact, studies have also linked economic anxiety to men feeling their masculine role as a provider is threatened (Warner et al., 2022). When a masculinity threat is felt, one common response is seen in “compensatory masculinity,” which manifests in the enactment of hypermasculine behaviors in general, and also across social media (Pyke, 1996). In fact, McDowell (2000) specifically linked economic anxiety in a transitional economy to the adoption of more regressive gender values. Furthermore, following the COVID-19 pandemic, many men turned to more traditional gender roles, even without a change in political ideology (Rosenfeld & Tomiyama, 2021). This is likely because COVID created great economic (and other forms of) anxiety, which could prompt a turn to more traditional forms of masculinity or, at the very least, a search for masculinities that help men gain a greater sense of self. In turn, compensatory masculinity could translate into a higher propensity for men to engage in harassment through social media platforms, as shown by Rubin et al. (2020), whose survey of young men’s perceptions of gendered harassment on Twitter illustrated that men who are more anxious about their own masculinity are more likely to endorse harassment. Indeed, both the far-right manosphere and far-left/progressive-left influencers are frustrated with neoliberalism and see identity politics as a force that divides the working class (Higdon & Lyons, 2022). These perhaps reflect economic and cultural anxieties that are acutely felt among young men. However, these anxieties are expressed differently on the right and left. On the right, we see a regressive normative patriarchal gender ideology that creates an alignment with far-right male supremacy. On the progressive left, we see a softer form of the rejection of gender inclusivity (by, for instance, claiming against women’s representation in politics when they campaign against their preferred male politicians (Menon & DeCook, 2021); however, that does not make the left less culpable in sustaining GBTFVA myths.

We do not argue that all men hold regressive views. Instead, we seek to shine a light on a culture in which patriarchal and hegemonic masculinity recreates itself and stifles men’s ability to engage in their own full expression of gender—beliefs that are in turn sustained and expanded through digital platforms. As illustrated by Casey and colleagues (2024), when men express supportive attitudes about gender equity, behavior does not always follow. In other words, even men who know the right words to say about equality are still constrained in how they enact their own gender. Harrington (2021) recognizes, for example, the growth of terms such as toxic masculinity in feminist communities and shows how leveling this critique serves to further marginalize already marginalized men, effectively maintaining gender hierarchies rather than resisting them. Following Sugiura (2021), we argue that we should not think of male extremists like incels or the manosphere as “deviant others” who are different from ordinary men because sexism manifested in these small groups is a microcosm of broader societal perspectives and structural misogyny.

Indeed, it tends to be traditional White cis-hetero capitalist and patriarchal values that are reinscribed in men and women in times of threat or high anxiety. This is important because, as our findings show, people across the ideological political spectrum have some views that align with masculinist myths about gender-based violence, so the problem must be tackled at the level of culture rather than pointing fingers at those who simply hold more traditional or regressive views. Casey et al. recommend gender transformative approaches to GBV prevention, which include challenging traditional patriarchal norms and calling for greater accountability. We echo this recommendation and further suggest that even men who do not subscribe to most of the GBTFVA myths may still be operating under an unexamined framework of hegemonic masculinity. Modern expressions of masculinity, particularly for young people, are also subject to a degree of contestation and anxiety. Thus, the data suggests we need policy interventions aimed at mitigating economic anxiety, combined with public health messages on and off social media that focus on positive depictions of masculinity outside of the regressive hegemonic norm being espoused by online influencers such as Andrew Tate or Jordan Peterson.

Conclusion

In this study, we set out to explore how myths concerning GBTFVA differ across liberal and conservative young men in Canada. Our data analysis shows that political ideologies matter when understanding who enacts and sustains GBTFVA, highlighting how future studies examining who endorses these harmful cultural narratives ought to consider political views in their analysis. Moreover, we also found that conservatives tend to endorse GBTFVA myths more than their liberal counterparts. This difference is particularly visible concerning the myths She wanted it and She asked for it, hinting at a possible alignment between political discourses on the right and efforts to blame those targeted by gendered violence. Even as this insight highlights the prevalence of right-wing views and aligns with the literature (e.g. Kováts, 2018; Rosewood & Hammond, 2023), we do not aim to diminish how it is present across other political views. Indeed, here we follow previous work that shows that violence coming from liberals and progressives tends to be overshadowed by that of the right, and it is thus harder to pinpoint (Menon & DeCook, 2021).

Certainly, the presence of cultural narratives that sustain and invisibilize GBTFVA across both political discourses was better illustrated by the results of the myth It wasn’t really gender-based online abuse—equally present among respondents who identified as liberals and conservatives. This result indicates an attempt of people across the political spectrum to diminish the experiences of targets of GBTFVA. This, in turn, results in women having to engage in processes of ontological labor—which “involves dismantling other people’s perceptions of online spaces as less real and of online abuse as less harmful” (Gosse, 2021)—across all political affiliations. Thus, beyond emphasizing the particular views of right and left-leaning people concerning GBTFVA myths, this study emphasizes how engrained gendered violence is in the contemporary neoliberal society (Bratich & Banet-Weiser, 2019)—and how digital platforms mediate violence in ways that actively expand and sustain these hegemonic masculinity worldviews. As we noted before, these results bring our attention to the crises of masculinity in an increasingly digitally mediated society where heteronormative patriarchy finds a solid ground where to seek comfort.

Due to the scope of this case study and its exploratory nature, future scholars could expand on our results by further expanding qualitative and quantitative approaches to understand better how gender-based online abuse myths varied across the political spectrum. Of particular importance are studies that extend an intersectional lens to our findings, exploring how race, age, class, or educational background, among many others, shapes how men hold harmful myths. Similarly, future studies could expand our work to grasp the intragroup differences across political ideologies better.

Beyond these limitations, we see key implications for scholars and practitioners in our findings. For instance, our findings shed light on how political alignment might act as a barrier or a booster of policy changes that aim to address GBTFVA. In light of this, Mark Zuckerberg’s recent claim that Facebook as a company needs to adopt more masculine values is troubling. If anything, we need policies and platforms that encourage people to reject regressive and stereotypical gender expressions and values, and instead adopt an expansive and inclusive idea of gender expression. In absence of these types of interventions, anti-violence professionals may use these findings to consider how to approach bystander interventions concerning GBTFVA—an effective method of dealing with gendered violence (Orchowski et al., 2020). Specifically, anti-violence groups need to find out the anxieties and stressors driving the turn to hegemonic masculinity, so that they can address the root of the problem, before anyone will be motivated to step into a helpful bystander role. Indeed, as the Canadian context struggles to grapple with the shifting nature of GBTFVA (Chen et al., 2024), we see an approach that differentiates political discourses—and its accompanying gender-based online abuse myths—as a starting point. In dealing with the cultural narratives that shape views of manhood and masculinity—and thus, gendered violence—across political discourses, we can find a potential mechanism for creating systemic and societal change in ways that prove beneficial for those targeted by GBTFVA.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-sms-10.1177_20563051251358754 – Supplemental material for “Stop Being so Fkn Soft”: Masculinity, Politics, and the Acceptance of Gender-Based Online Violence Myths Among Young Canadian Men

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-sms-10.1177_20563051251358754 for “Stop Being so Fkn Soft”: Masculinity, Politics, and the Acceptance of Gender-Based Online Violence Myths Among Young Canadian Men by Esteban Morales, Jaigris Hodson, Yimin Chen, Kaitlynn Mendes, George Veletsianos and Chandell Gosse in Social Media + Society

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Esteban Morales

Jaigris Hodson

Yimin Chen

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 936-2021-00275).

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Author biographies

Esteban Morales, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in Media and Digital Cultures at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. His research area is widely concerned with the (social, cultural, and technological) processes by which citizens and communities experience power through digital media. More specifically, Morales’ research focuses on platformized violence, critical data studies, and media literacies.

Jaigris Hodson, PhD, is the Canada Research Chair in Digital Communication for the Public Interest in Victoria, BC, Canada, her work concerns online democratic communication, and the threats to same via online harassment, polarization, and misinformation.

Yimin Chen, PhD, is a lecturer at the School of Computing Technologies at RMIT University. His work examines the causes of technology-facilitated abuse and seeks to develop effective social and technical interventions to counter it. His other research interests include internet culture, online trolling and memes, and mis/disinformation.

Kaitlynn Mendes, PhD, is a Professor of Sociology and holds the Canada Research Chair in Inequality and Gender at Western University, Canada. She is an expert on gender-based violence and digital technologies and has published widely in the field. She is Director of the GEMS Research Lab and PI of DIY: Digital Safety.

George Veletsianos, PhD, is Professor of Learning Technologies at the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities and Bonnie Westby Huebner Chair in Education and Technology. He studies education futures and learning in digital contexts.

Chandell Gosse, PhD, is the Senior Research Officer at Cape Breton University. Her interdisciplinary research examines the social dimensions of digital culture, with a focus on technology-facilitated violence, online abuse, and digital inequalities. She is particularly interested in how institutional, legal, and community-based systems can better support those impacted by harm in online spaces.

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