A new interpretation of Lenin's What Is to Be Done? A comparative study from a historical-sociological perspective

Introduction

Since Fei's (2003) call for the “expansion of sociology's traditional boundaries” two decades ago, the Chinese sociology community has made significant progress in this regard. However, upon reflection, it seems that much remains to be explored. To date, expansion efforts have been largely devoted to broadening the scope of research, but in terms of their depth, many of these studies remain superficial. In terms of the study of history, for instance, sociologists generally regard it as the task of historians or of interest only to the niche field of historical sociology, often considered a “tertiary discipline”. Most sociologists find themselves in a constant race against time to identify emerging phenomena, questions, concepts, and mechanisms. Undoubtedly, sociology should be a discipline that moves in step with the times. But what does it truly mean to keep up with the times? Aron (2015) described Max Weber as “our contemporary”. However, Weber died more than a century ago—can he still be considered “our contemporary”? Imagine the opposite, if the so-called “theoretical frontiers” of sociology abandon Weber or reduce and emasculate his work through “middle-range theories”, how can they truly keep pace with the times? As Strauss (2019: 9) pointed out, while the greatest minds may not live in the same era as us, they enable us to confront the most important themes of any era, helping us escape the “noisy, hurried, thoughtless, and shallow hustle of the intellectual marketplace and its detractors”.

Just as the legacy of a classical theory guides sociology in keeping pace with the times, so institutional and civilizational legacies are integral to the ability of sociology to address contemporary issues. For example, research on the danwei system once represented one of the most prominent achievements in Chinese sociology after its restoration as an academic discipline in 1979. However, as the danwei system became unrecognizable after weathering decades of reform, scholars grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of research ideas. In fact, one of the core elements of the danwei system—namely, the comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the danwei—did not change over time. Our attention is often drawn to the changes in recent phenomena, leading us to overlook the search for their deeper origins. Expanding from the danwei system to the organizational system of contemporary China, we often draw upon the Western concept of modern bureaucracy and the ancient Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy but fail to consider one potential institutional root: the organizational system of the “Leninist party”, that is, a proletarian party organized according to Lenin's party-founding principles. ¹ Similarly, when studying contemporary China's administrative subcontracting system, we tend to place the system's origins in ancient China, overlooking the military subcontracting system implemented by the CPC in its anti-Japanese revolutionary base areas (Ying, 2020). In fact, as an early member of the Communist International led by the Soviet Union, the CPC was deeply influenced by Soviet organizational systems and mechanisms. The principle of democratic centralism, inherited from the Soviet Union, remains the fundamental organizational system of the CPC today. This raises the question of which specific aspects of the CPC's party organizational system are directly derived from the Soviet Union, and which have been adapted to the social realities of China. Only by undertaking a thorough examination of the organizational foundations of the CPC can we discern its institutional nature and understand the direction and significance of its evolution. Accordingly, this paper explores and analyses the critical moment of the organizational genesis of the Lenin's theory of party-founding, namely, Lenin's seminal work, What Is to Be Done? (WITBD), written between autumn 1901 and February 1902, from the perspectives of comparative historical sociology and organizational sociology.

The intellectual and political context of WITBD

It is widely known that Karl Marx was the founder of class struggle theory and scientific socialism, as well as a leader of the European proletarian revolutionary movement. However, whether it was the first proletarian political party in the world—the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Germany—or the First or Second International, the basic organizational principles of these parties were like those of European bourgeois parties, all of which adhered to democratic principles whereby “the minority is subordinate to the majority”. Lenin's party-founding ideas marked a significant shift in the organizational form of the international communist movement. This raises the question of where Lenin's ideas come from.

Modern Russian revolutions can be broadly divided into four stages: the aristocratic revolution; the plebeian revolution; the bourgeois revolution; and the proletarian revolution. The period from the 1840s to the 1890s was a critical era in the history of modern Russian political thought, as it was during this period that the Russian intelligentsia emerged. The era was characterized by fierce debates and actions between the “fathers and sons” over the question of “Where is Russia heading?” In this respect, the so-called “fathers” mainly refer to the brilliant intellectual figures of the “Marvelous Decade” from 1838 to 1848, including Herzen, Belinsky, Stankevich, Petrovsky, Turgenev, and Bakunin, who made outstanding contributions to debates on individual freedom and social reform. The “sons” primarily referred to the Russian revolutionary populists of the 1860s to 1890s, led by the ideological pioneer Chernyshevsky. They were committed to the liberation of the people and sought to bypass capitalism and move directly towards socialism through the Russian peasant commune (obschestva). Initially, they emphasized the notion of “going to the people”: viewing the people as the ultimate source of truth and grounding all political movements and political legitimacy in popular support. Later, they began to stress the role of the intellectual elite in guiding and enlightening the people, relying on this elite to lead violent revolution. They also developed the idea of a party composed of revolutionaries who renounced private life and adhered strictly to party discipline (Berlin, 2003: 138–278; Jin, 2012: 510–528). By the 1870s, revolutionary populism had split into several factions: the insurrectionist faction represented by Bakunin; the propagandist faction led by Lavrov; the coup faction led by Peter Tkachev; and the Land and Liberty (Zemlya i Volya) revolutionary organization, which was heavily influenced by Chernyshevsky. After 1880, Land and Liberty further divided into the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) and the Black Repartition (Chorny Peredel) factions (Ma and Liu, 2013: 85–215; Рудницкая, 1997: 315–328). Although there were significant internal differences in thought within both the “fathers” and the “sons”, and despite Herzen being the first to initiate the radical political ideology of Russian populism, the intellectual conflict and opposition between the two generations became particularly prominent after the 1860s. As Berlin (2003: 322–324) insightfully noted in his analysis of Turgenev's Fathers and Sons (2012 [1862]), “They [the ‘fathers’] sought freedom and compromise; we [the ‘sons’] want revolution, destruction, and new foundations for life”. Essentially, the “fathers” regarded the “sons” as crude and fanatical, as “powerful but lacking in substance”, while the “sons” viewed the “fathers” as weak and timid, as “substantial but lacking in strength”.

In this context, beyond Lenin's intellectual connections with the Black Repartition faction led by Plekhanov and People's Will, to which his brother belonged, it is crucial to consider the influence of Pyotr Tkachev on Lenin's party-founding ideas. Scholars are divided in their interpretations of this influence. One view, represented by Weeks (1968), overemphasizes Tkachev's influence on Lenin, even going so far as to label Tkachev the “first Bolshevik”. The second view, championed by Lars (2008) and Harding (2014), almost entirely dismisses Tkachev's impact on Lenin, even questioning the significance of WITBD in Lenin's thought. The third view, supported by Pipes (1991) and Kolakowski (2015), recognizes the significance of Tkachev's influence on Lenin while highlighting the differences between their ideas. This paper aligns more closely with the third view. Tkachev, who represented the “coup faction”, has also been described as an advocate of “Russian Blanquism” or the “Russian Jacobin tradition”. After the failure of the “going to the people” movement, Tkachev began emphasizing the need for revolutionary elites to educate and lead the masses, promoting direct revolutionary action through violence and conspiration. He argued for a tightly organized revolutionary elite governed by “combat centralism”. These ideas had a profound influence on Lenin (Ma and Liu, 2013: 137–147; Harding, 2014: 15–20). This influence is evident in the similarity in the names of Tkachev's Society for the People's Liberation and Lenin's League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, as well as the parallel between Tkachev's work The Revolution and the State and Lenin's The State and Revolution. ² This influence is examined in greater detail in the textual analysis of WITBD later in this paper.

In March 1898, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) held its First Congress in Minsk. However, this congress failed to establish a party program, constitution, or central leadership. Most of the delegates and Central Committee members were arrested shortly after, meaning the task of formally establishing the party was not completed. The period from 1901 to 1904 was not only a critical phase in Lenin's intellectual development but also the formative period for Russia's main revolutionary factions. These included the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions within the RSDLP, as well as external groups like the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Constitutional Democratic Party (Li, 2006: 31–241). Published between autumn 1901 and February 1902, Lenin's WITBD laid the intellectual foundation for the Leninist party by emphasizing the need to overcome the limitations of trade unionism and economism and by calling for a highly secretive and strictly organized party of professional revolutionaries. In September 1902, Lenin further developed his ideas on party organization with the publication of “A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organizational Tasks” (hereinafter, “Letter to a Comrade”), offering additional insights into the party's structure. In July 1903, the RSDLP held its Second Congress in Brussels and London, during which intense debates on the organization of the party led to the formal split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. From February to May 1904, Lenin published One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, focusing on the debate over the first article of the party constitution at the Second Congress, criticizing organizational opportunism, and elaborating on the idea that the party represents the highest form of proletarian organization. He stressed that every party member must belong to a party organization and strictly adhere to party discipline. In April 1905, because of unresolved issues related to the organizational principles of the RSDLP, the Bolsheviks held a separate Third Congress in London, while the Mensheviks convened a party workers’ conference in Geneva. Between June and July of that year, Lenin published Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, which provided a theoretical justification for the Bolsheviks’ strategy and tactics during the 1905 Russian Revolution and systematically laid out the key tactical differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In April 1906, the RSDLP held its Fourth Congress in Stockholm, achieving a formal reunion of the two factions. The congress adopted Lenin's stance on the first article of the party constitution and, for the first time, officially endorsed “democratic centralism”, a principle initially proposed by the Mensheviks, as the party's organizational principle. In May 1907, the RSDLP held its Fifth Congress in London. By January 1912, at the Sixth Congress in Prague, the Bolsheviks allied with the Menshevik “party defenders” to expel the Menshevik “liquidationists” from the party. In April 1917, the RSDLP held its Seventh Congress in Petrograd, where the final split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks occurred. Following the Sixth and Seventh Congresses of the RSDLP, held in Petrograd in August 1917 and March 1918, respectively, the term “Bolshevik” was officially added to the party's name (hereinafter, RSDLP[B]) to distinguish it from the Mensheviks (Harding, 2014: 313–334; Schapiro, 1991: 31–202; Ye, 2008: 51–61, 89–103, 118–133).

As the early history of the Bolsheviks shows, Lenin's WITBD, “Letter to a Comrade”, and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back were intellectually pivotal in shaping the organizational form and developmental direction of the Bolshevik Party. While considering the other two texts, this paper focuses on WITBD. It is worth noting that the earliest Chinese translation of Lenin's WITBD was published in 1933 by the Soviet Foreign Workers’ Publishing House. In 1947, a version translated by Xie Weizhen was published by the Soviet Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow. A Chinese translation of “Letter to a Comrade” was published in 1933 by Zhonghua shudian in Shanghai and reprinted by the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China (Shanghai) in 1934. A Chinese translation of One Step Forward, Two Steps Back was published in 1941 by the Soviet Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow and partially by the Liberation Society in Yan’an (Beijing Library, 1994: 13–14, 16, 23). As such, these works of Lenin were disseminated in China early on and had a significant influence.

The mechanism of “indoctrinating” ideas: Differences and similarities regarding propaganda, agitation, and exhortation

Lenin’s WITBD comprises five chapters, excluding the foreword and conclusion: Chapter 1 addresses dogmatism and “freedom of criticism’; Chapter 2 discusses the spontaneity of the masses and consciousness of Social Democrats; Chapter 3 focuses on the politics of trade unionism and social democracy; Chapter 4 examines the “artisanal” (or “primitive”) methods of the Economists (the espousers of “economism”, a term in Marxist discourse of the time) and the organization of revolutionaries; and Chapter 5 outlines the “plan” for an all-Russian political newspaper (Lenin, 2018a). This section concentrates on a core issue raised in all but the fourth chapter: the indoctrination of ideas and its mechanisms.

Both Marx and Engels emphasized the significance of theoretical struggle within the proletarian movement, arguing that workers cannot develop proletarian consciousness when left to their own devices. Consequently, it is the task of the proletarian party to elevate the spontaneous thinking of the masses to a level of consciousness. How, then, is this consciousness to be elevated? In his commentary on the 1901 Program of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, Kautsky proposed that “socialist consciousness is something that is instilled from outside into the proletariat's class struggle, rather than something that arises spontaneously from it. Therefore, the old Hainfeld Program was entirely correct when it stated that the task of social democracy is to instill into the proletariat the awareness of its position and its tasks” (as cited in Lenin, 2018a: 40). Here, Kautsky reiterates a key concept he introduced as early as 1888 concerning the proletariat's theoretical struggle, namely, the concept of “indoctrination” (Wang, 1988). Lenin (2018a: 31) fully endorsed this concept, stating:

Workers cannot, by themselves, develop a social-democratic consciousness. It must be instilled from the outside. History in all countries shows that the working class, solely through its own efforts, can only develop trade-union consciousness, i.e. the conviction that it is necessary to form trade unions, to fight against employers, and to press the government to pass necessary labor legislation, and so on. However, the doctrine of socialism grew out of the philosophical, historical, and economic theories developed by educated members of the propertied classes, i.e. intellectuals. The founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels themselves, were bourgeois intellectuals by social origin. The same applies to Russia. The theoretical doctrines of social democracy did not arise from the spontaneous growth of the workers’ movement; they were the natural and inevitable outcome of the intellectual development of revolutionary socialist intellectuals.

How exactly is the mechanism of instilling ideas constructed? Lenin, considering the specific conditions of Russian society, modified and deepened Plekhanov's distinction between propaganda and agitation. In his 1892 essay “On the Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight against Famine in Russia”, Plekhanov claimed that “the propagandist imparts many ideas to one or a few individuals, while the agitator imparts only one or a few ideas, but to a large group of people” (cited in Lenin, 2018a: 67). Lenin expanded the statement to “We should reach out to ‘all classes of the population’ both as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers” (Lenin, 2018a: 83). These four concepts—theory, propaganda, agitation, and organization—constitute the essential links in the process of implementing the most advanced revolutionary theory into the broadest revolutionary masses. It is important to note that in Lenin's context, the term “organizer” has a specific meaning, essentially referring to an “exhorter”, that is, someone who calls on the masses to take concrete action on the ground. Despite the distinctions between these four roles, Lenin argued that theory belongs to and can be merged with the domain of propaganda, while exhortation (or organization) is a natural and inevitable extension of agitation and can thus be integrated with it as its pure execution aspect. To carve out a third distinct function beyond propaganda and agitation would be nonsensical.

After expanding on the mechanism of indoctrination, Lenin returned to Plekhanov's original distinction between propaganda and agitation, while further elaborating on their functions. A propagandist, Lenin explained, should impart “many ideas”—so many, in fact, that only a relatively small number of people can grasp them all at once and fully understand them. An agitator, on the other hand, need only highlight the most familiar and obvious examples for the audience, such as the death of a worker's family member from hunger or the worsening of poverty, and use these well-known facts to convey a simple idea to the masses: the injustice of the rich becoming richer while the poor grow poorer. The agitator's goal is to stir the masses’ discontent and anger at such extreme injustice, while the propagandist provides a thorough explanation of the underlying contradictions. Thus, the propagandist's activity is primarily written, while the agitator's is oral. The qualities required of a propagandist are different from those of an agitator (Lenin, 2018a: 68).

Lenin also compared the different conditions for indoctrination in Western Europe and Russia. In Western Europe, social democrats could legally engage in propaganda and agitation through parliamentary activities and freedom of assembly, opportunities that were unavailable in Russia. ³ While Lenin acknowledged the importance of gathering workers willing to listen to Social Democrats and agitating them, he placed greater emphasis on the role of covertly published newspapers in carrying out propaganda. He argued that “Only an all-Russian newspaper can serve as a tribune for mass exposure. ‘Without a newspaper for a political organ, there can be no political movement worthy of the name in modern Europe’. … At present, only a party capable of organizing genuine nationwide exposure can become the vanguard of revolutionary forces”. To this, he further noted that,

Besides the use of an all-Russian newspaper, there is no other means to cultivate a strong political organization. … To cultivate such leaders, there is no other way than constantly assessing all aspects of our political life, and evaluating every attempt by different classes to protest and struggle. … A newspaper not only acts as a collective propagandist and agitator but also as a collective organizer. In this regard, the newspaper can be likened to scaffolding. … The newspaper would become part of the great bellows of the revolution. (Lenin, 2018a: 84, 90, 161–162, 164, 170)

Considering this, the underground Marxist political newspaper Iskra (“The Spark”) played a crucial role in both the organizational and propagandistic functions of the RSDLP, particularly during the extended exile of its key leaders. Indeed, it served as both the scaffolding and the bellows of the revolution. Lenin specifically criticized Martynov, who overemphasized the importance of exhortation that directly calls for revolutionary action. For Lenin, “As for calling the masses to action, this will naturally follow if we carry out vigorous political agitation and vivid and striking exposure” (Lenin, 2018a: 72–73).

What changes occurred to the mechanism of “indoctrination” when it was introduced to China? In his 1943 essay “Some Problems of Leadership Methods”, Mao Zedong proposed two basic methods of the party's work, namely “the combination of the general and the specific, and the combination of leadership and the masses”. In this respect, he argued:

For any work task, the masses cannot be mobilized into action without a general, widespread exhortation. But if the leadership limits itself to general exhortation without implementing those tasks concretely and directly through specific organizations, making a breakthrough, gaining experience, and using that experience to guide other danwei, it will be impossible to verify whether the general exhortation was correct or to enrich its content, risking the general exhortation becoming ineffective. (Mao, 1991a: 897)

However, Mao did not explain why the exhortation might easily fail in China. Liu Shaoqi addressed this issue in his report titled “On the Party” at the Seventh Congress of the CPC, where he discussed amending the party constitution, asserting:

The Chinese peasantry is poorly educated, and so are other social groups (except intellectuals). Therefore, it is necessary in our work to combine general exhortation with specific guidance, meaning that overall progress can only be achieved by making a breakthrough. Simply issuing general exhortation will definitively fail in guiding the masses that are poorly educated. The masses, especially the peasantry, always approach issues from what they have personally seen and experienced, not from our general propaganda or slogans. We must make a breakthrough, create models for the masses to see and experience first-hand, and provide them with examples they can follow. Only in this way can we encourage the masses—especially those in an intermediate or backward state—to understand our message and give them the confidence and courage to act on the party's slogans, creating a mass movement. (Liu, 1991b: 443)

Liu's remarks were influenced by Lenin. After all, Lenin had asserted that “It is not enough to merely call ourselves the ‘vanguard’ or the leading force; we must act in a way that all other detachments can see and cannot help but acknowledge that we are leading the way” (Lenin, 2018a: 85). The specific conditions of Chinese society—especially the fact that the revolution's primary force was composed of peasants with low levels of education—prompts the question of how exactly the party should act. Liu astutely recognized that the key to indoctrination in the context of the CPC did not lie primarily in “theory” or “propaganda”, nor solely in “agitation”, but rather in the aspect that Lenin had dismissed as having limited value: exhortation. However, the CPC did not refer to this as exhortation, and Liu rejected the concept of “general exhortation” in his speech. Instead, it was termed “specific guidance” (gebie zhidao), which took the form of “setting up models” (shu dianxing) and “conducting pilot projects” (gao shidian). “Setting up models” involved providing an example for those not yet mobilized by demonstrating action at a specific point, while “conducting pilot projects” meant carrying out pioneering work to show others how to proceed. These are important expressions of the CPC's unique mass line, which remains one of the fundamental working methods implemented in Chinese society to this day (Ying, 2021).

“Revolutionary by trade”: The rise of the organization of professional revolutionaries

The fourth chapter of WITBD is the key focus of the analysis in this paper. In this chapter, Lenin begins by criticizing the “artisanal methods” of the Economists, whereby the workers’ movement was organized with virtually no equipment and minimal training. He mocks the Economists, saying that they “go into battle with a cudgel, like peasants working in the field” (Lenin, 2018a: 101). Lenin argued that, in a situation where “the growth of the workers’ movement has outpaced the growth and development of revolutionary organizations”, it was imperative to forge organization as a specialized weapon (Lenin, 2018a: 103). He called for the “creation of an organization of revolutionaries that would give political struggle strength, stability, and continuity” (Lenin, 2018a: 105). Lenin made a bold declaration: “Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we will overturn Russia!” (Lenin, 2018a: 126–127). He subsequently reiterated this in One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, asserting that “in the proletariat's struggle for power, organization is its only weapon” (Lenin, 2018b: 231). What kind of “organizational weapon” possesses the power to change the course of history? Lenin believed the key lay in distinguishing the concept of “political struggle” from “economic struggle”, and, consequently, in differentiating the organization of revolutionaries from that of workers. The difference between these two types of organizations is mainly reflected in three aspects. Given the importance of this issue, each of these differences is explored in its own section in this paper. This section delves into the first aspect: workers’ organizations are professional organizations. In Lenin's words, “an organization of revolutionaries should consist primarily and mainly of those who make revolutionary activity their trade”, “whether it is students or workers who become professional revolutionaries makes no difference”, and “any distinction between workers and intellectuals should be completely eradicated” (Lenin, 2018a: 112, 122).

First, it is important to consider Weber's analysis of the “professional politician” (Berufspolitiker) in his famous 1919 lecture “Politics as a Vocation”. According to Weber, modern politics has become a type of “enterprise” (Betrieb), requiring trained individuals capable of engaging in the struggles inherent in modern party politics. He outlined two ideal types of individuals for whom “politics is a vocation”: the first “lives off” politics, meaning they treat politics as a source of income and make it their profession; and the second “lives for” politics, treating it as their life's calling. The latter type finds either enjoyment in the exercise of power or a sense of fulfilment in serving a “cause”, which gives their life meaning, fostering a sense of inner balance and self-identity. Weber also proposed two basic ways of “practicing” politics: one is akin to bureaucrats, who do not take political positions but ensure the smooth operation of the bureaucratic machine; and the other is like political leaders, who hold clear political stances and pursue their political goals with strong moral convictions and charismatic authority (Weber, 1998: 58–77). The association between those who “live off” politics and administrative officials and those who “live for” politics and political leaders is not strict, but there is a certain affinity between them. Weber's analysis of political parties was largely limited to those in Western countries, which compete in the marketplace of votes through calm and “peaceful” movements to seek power within professional political organizations. He did not discuss revolutionary political organizations like the Bolsheviks, who seized power through “conspiration” and violence (Weber, 1998: 81–82).

In fact, Lenin had already addressed issues in WITBD that Weber did not discuss. Lenin was the first to point out that in Western countries the distinction between political organizations and professional organizations was very clear. That is, political parties that operate specifically in the realm of politics are entirely different from professional trade unions. However, under autocratic rule in Russia, where both the RSDLP and trade unions were banned, the distinction between them seemed to disappear. However, in Lenin's view, it was precisely under autocratic rule that the need to establish an organization of professional politicians aimed at overthrowing the autocracy was even more urgent. There were several reasons for this. First, the complexity and scope of the socialist revolution required specialized work. Second, the socialist revolution had to maintain a high level of secrecy under the repression of the gendarmerie, so revolutionaries needed to develop special survival skills. Third, maintaining the stability of the socialist revolution required overcoming the occupational fluidity of revolutionaries, particularly given the early phenomenon that most revolutionaries were students, which meant that the ebb and flow of revolutionary activity corresponded with their summer and winter holidays or graduation. All of this demanded that the organization of revolutionaries be highly professional and specialized (Lenin, 2018a: 112–122).

Lenin's analysis of the professional revolutionaries in the RSDLP bears similarities to Weber's analysis of professional politicians. The notion of the “revolutionary by trade” also had two meanings. The first meaning is “living off” the revolution: that is, instead of working 11-h shifts in a factory to make a living, they relied on party funds to sustain themselves. This meant they could promptly go underground and change their operational locations at any time. Without these abilities, they could not accumulate the necessary experience, broaden their horizons, or engage with the gendarmerie for several years. The second meaning is “living for” the revolution: that is, leading workers beyond the scope of economic struggle, the ordinary process of everyday struggles, and the realm of legal efforts, and leading the entire liberation struggle of the proletariat. These revolutionaries formed a tightly knit core leadership, consisting of only the most talented, reliable, experienced, tested, professionally trained, and highly educated individuals. They fulfilled the party's most secret functions and constituted the elite that emerged from the masses. Therefore, “our task is not to lower revolutionaries to the level of defending artisans, but to raise artisans to the level of revolutionaries” (Lenin, 2018a: 125–127). It is worth noting that when Weber distinguished between the two meanings of “politics as a vocation”, he argued that, in practice, it was impossible to fully separate the two types of politicians, although they represent different groups of people. For Lenin, however, the two meanings of “revolutionary by trade” were merely functional distinctions, with both referring to the same type or group of people. Lenin condensed his thoughts on the organization of professional revolutionaries into five propositions:

(1) No revolutionary movement can be sustained without a stable organization of leaders capable of maintaining continuity; (2) The broader the spontaneous participation of the masses in the struggle, forming the foundation of the movement, the more urgent the need for such an organization, and the more solid it must be (since demagogues find it easier to influence the undeveloped strata within the masses); (3) This organization should consist primarily of people who make revolutionary activity their trade; (4) In an autocratic state, the fewer members such an organization has—restricted to only those who make revolutionary activity their trade and have been professionally trained in the art of combatting political police—the harder it will be to “capture” this organization; (5) Moreover, the number of workers and others from different social classes who can join the movement and work actively within it will grow. (Lenin, 2018a: 124)

The first point emphasizes that the stability of the organization guarantees the endurance of the revolution. The second point highlights that the broader the mass participation, the more solid the organization must be. The fifth point, in turn, stresses that the strength of the organization enhances mass participation. The third point directly underscores the notion that the key to establishing such an organization lies in the “revolutionary by trade”, which is the most central proposition. The fourth point indicates that the professional skills of the organization's members in resisting enemies serve to guarantee its solidity.

There is one unresolved issue in Lenin's analysis. When professional revolutionaries are “revolutionaries by trade”, where do they obtain the funds necessary to sustain their livelihood and carry out their work? Lenin (2017c: 1–12) touched on this issue in his 1906 work Guerrilla Warfare.

As the CPC was established and developed under the direct leadership and financial support of the Communist International, controlled by Soviet Russia, it aimed to create an organization of professional revolutionaries from the outset. One illustrative example of this is that Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were the two most important leaders during the CPC's early efforts to establish the party, but their career paths diverged. After Chen Duxiu resigned from his post as the chairperson of the Guangdong Provincial Education Committee in 1921 and became the secretary of the Central Bureau of the CPC in Shanghai, he embarked on the path of a professional revolutionary. In contrast, Li Dazhao remained a professor at Peking University until October 1924 (Tang, 2013: 314–315; Yang, 2020: 535). ⁴ Although he actively carried out work for the CPC during this period and was the main leader in the northern region, his status and influence within the party could no longer compare with those of Chen Duxiu and others. While many factors contributed to this situation, it was influenced by the fact that Li did not become a professional revolutionary until the end of 1924.

It is important to note that, in the early revolutionary practices of the CPC, there were two types of professional revolutionaries: those who made revolution their sole profession; and those who had a cover profession. The former were mainly limited to the key leaders of central and local party organizations, while the latter were the large number of underground workers in the “white areas”, that is, the areas controlled by the Kuomintang (KMT). After the Sixth Congress of the CPC, the Central Committee called for the “professionalization of party members” to strengthen the party's proletarian foundation, improve the cover for underground work, reduce the burden on party apparatuses, and dispel the notion of “hired revolutionaries”. Starting in 1928, the CPC stipulated that:

every comrade (except those who must make revolution their sole profession) should acquire or learn a trade, integrate into society, particularly into factories, and embed themselves among the masses as leaders. A true Communist must devote themselves to the party in this manner. The party only needs a small number of professional revolutionaries to handle daily affairs. As for party members working among the masses, they should work for the party while maintaining their professions within society. This will enable them to reach deeper into the masses. However, some comrades hold the mistaken notion of “hired labor”, expecting to be paid for their work and refusing to work if they do not receive money. Some branch cadres even expect stipends, aiming to spread the benefits equally, which is a serious mistake. (Central Organization Department of the Communist Party of China, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, 2000: 232, 241)

The CPC's handling of the distinction between these two types of professional revolutionaries represents an enrichment of Lenin's ideas based on the CPC's own revolutionary practice.

A lean organizational core and differentiated organizational circles

The second key difference between the organization of revolutionaries and workers’ organizations lie in the fact that the former is an elite organization with rigorously selected members, whereas the latter aims to be as broad as possible. However, unlike the revolutionary populists, the organization of professional revolutionaries is not a self-contained, exclusive circle. Faced with the dual dilemma in revolutionary work that “there are no people [referring to capable leaders], yet there is a mass of people [referring to those discontented with or rebelling against autocracy]” (Lenin, 2018a: 128), this organization must be both elite and broad. How can these seemingly contradictory aspects be combined? Lenin provided a more detailed operational solution in “Letter to a Comrade”.

First, the core members of the organization, namely, the professional revolutionaries, must be carefully selected, ensuring they are few but elite. The broadening and professionalization of the organization are predicated on centralization. Lenin suggested that:

[the number of central] committee members should not be too many (these individuals must be highly competent and specialized in revolutionary work), but there must still be enough members to manage various affairs, ensure thorough consultations, and effectively implement resolutions. If the number of committee members is relatively large and regular meetings become risky, a smaller specialized command group (for example, five people or fewer) should be selected from the committee, which must include a secretary and those most capable of practically directing all activities. (Lenin, 2013: 9)

This effectively introduced a two-tier structure within the Central Committee: one for the general members; and another for the standing members. He also pointed out that maintaining leadership within the core does not rely on authority but on prestige, perseverance, rich experience, extensive knowledge, and outstanding abilities (Lenin, 2013: 9). This addresses a question left unresolved in WITBD: how do professional revolutionaries “emerge” from the masses?

Second, Lenin emphasized the division of labor among members of the organization, particularly the core members. He stressed that “the number of committee members should be reduced; as much as possible, each member should be entrusted with specific responsible tasks that require reporting; a specialized, elite command center should be established, along with a network of skilled agents capable of executing tasks.” He further suggested that “the entire art of building a secret organization lies in utilizing all available forces and ensuring that ‘everyone has something to do’, while at the same time maintaining leadership over the entire movement.” Furthermore, “revolutionary work requires people with various talents—sometimes, someone who is completely unsuited to organizational work may turn out to be an exceptional agitator; sometimes, someone who is not good at secretive work may be a very capable propagandist” (Lenin, 2013: 16, 9). This clarifies the meaning behind his statement in WITBD that the organization of professional revolutionaries should be “closely united”, that is, possessing a clear division of labor, each performing their duties, complementing one another's strengths, and working in coordination.

Third, Lenin proposed the establishment of differentiated organizational circles. In this regard, he asserted that:

If the leadership of the movement and the proletarian revolutionary struggle, both in theory and practice, requires maximum centralization, then the Central Committee (and thus the whole party) needs to be as decentralized as possible in terms of understanding the movement and being accountable to the party. … This decentralization is a necessary condition and an essential modification of revolutionary centralization. … This decentralization is nothing more than another side of the division of labor, which has already been recognized as one of the most pressing practical needs of our movement. … The leadership of the movement should be in the hands of as small and homogeneous a group of experienced professional revolutionaries as possible. The participation in the movement, however, should involve as many and as diverse groups from the proletariat (and other classes among the people) as possible. (Lenin, 2013: 14–15)

What types of organizations exist beyond the core? Lenin identified three basic types of groups: district groups, that is, groups of literature distributors; propagandist groups under the district groups; and factory groups. According to Lenin:

The groups of literature distributors must maintain strict secrecy and military discipline; propagandist groups, while also secretive, do not need to maintain such strict military discipline; and worker groups, which read legal publications or discuss the needs and demands of the workers, require even less secrecy, and so on. Members of the literature distribution groups must be members of the RSDLP, and they should know a certain number of party members and officials. Members of groups that study workers’ labor conditions and draft their various demands do not necessarily need to be members of the RSDLP. Study groups of university students, officers, and employees should have one or two party members participating, though sometimes it is better that their party membership remains unknown, etc. (Lenin, 2013: 13)

Lenin refined this classification in One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:

Generally, according to the degree of organization, and especially the degree of secrecy, organizations can be roughly divided into the following types: (1) revolutionary organizations; (2) workers’ organizations that are as broad and diverse as possible (here I am speaking only of the working class, though under certain conditions, this could also include certain elements from other classes). These two types of organizations constitute the party. Then, there are: (3) workers’ organizations close to the party; (4) workers’ organizations not close to the party, but in fact subject to the party's supervision and leadership; (5) unorganized elements within the working class, a portion of whom—at least in major class struggle events—are also subject to the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. (Lenin, 2018b: 71)

In other words, revolutionary organizations, together with the workers’ organizations directly led by the party (i.e. “red trade unions”), constitute the backbone of the party. This is followed by the workers’ organizations close to the party, and those under the party's influence (both of which were part of the so-called “yellow trade unions” that accepted the party's influence to varying degrees, although Lenin did not specifically explain the difference between “close to” and “in fact subject to”). The party's periphery comprises the unorganized workers who, during major events, follow the party's leadership. These various circles of organizations resemble what Fei (2011: 25) referred to as a “differential mode of association”, characterized by gradations. These circles extend outward in layers, based on both the degree of secrecy and their proximity to the organization's core, that is, professional revolutionaries (see Figure 1). The core layer, composed of professional revolutionaries, must remain highly secretive, while the outer circles gradually become more open, with a network of branches extending far and wide. In this way, the party can “reach far and wide into all areas”, uniting those who approach, assist, and are prepared to join the RSDLP (Lenin, 2013: 10).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

The differentiated organizational structure of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

It is worth noting that, through this stratification, the structure of “indoctrination” from the outside to the inside is transformed into an organizational structure that operates from the top to down, from secrecy to openness. The core and the periphery correspond to revolutionaries of different qualities and perspectives. Lenin (2018a: 130) repeatedly emphasized that “workers must be raised to the level of revolutionaries, rather than, as the Economists advocate, lowering ourselves to the level of the ‘mass of workers’, or … to the level of the ‘average worker’”. How can the connection between the core and the periphery of the organization be strengthened? Lenin proposed that the lower (peripheral) levels must submit regular reports to the higher (core) levels, while the core (upper) levels should inspect or oversee the lower levels. In this respect, he stressed, “Under autocratic rule, aside from submitting regular reports to the Central Committee, there are no other means or weapons we can use for internal party reporting” (Lenin, 2013: 18). The internal reporting and inspection systems of the Leninist party originated from this principle.

In its early days, the CPC generally followed Lenin's directives when establishing a rigorously selected and lean organizational core, but it learned some painful lessons when trying to establish differentiated organizational circles. After the failure of the Great Revolution (1924–1927), Liu Shaoqi, who was leading the workers’ movement at the time, argued that various auxiliary organizations should be established alongside the party and trade unions of the working class. He opposed “withdrawing from the yellow trade unions” and discouraged large-scale demonstrations and “flying meetings” (feixing jihui, i.e. brief and spontaneous collective events) in cities (Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee and All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 1988: 57–61, 88–93, 102–116). However, Liu's opinions were not accepted by the Central Committee at the time. Liu (1981: 62–63) later summarized the “leftist” errors in the “white areas” as follows:

In general, mass work should be conducted openly (although sometimes it can only be conducted semi-openly), while internal party work must be conducted secretly (and, if possible, partially in an open manner). However, the methods we use for internal party work should never be applied to the masses. For comrades working openly among the masses, all their actions and working methods should be “mass-oriented”, open, and without publicly revealing their Communist Party membership. … Internal party work and mass work, secret work and open work, must be conducted using entirely different methods, and different cadres should be dispatched for each. Organizationally, they cannot be confused, nor should the methods overlap. The past mistakes lay in precisely confusing these organizational lines and completely repeating the same methods. Work that should have been conducted openly was instead carried out in secret organs; work that should have been done secretly was recklessly conducted in the open (such as having leaders of secret organs also serve as officials in mass organizations). As a result, open work could not be conducted openly, and secret work could not be kept secret. The outcome was that both party work and mass work were destroyed.

The consequences of this destruction were extremely severe during the period when the “leftist” line dominated the leadership of the Central Committee and guided the work in the “white areas”. Mao Zedong estimated that, by 1936, the CPC had lost almost all its organizational strength in the “white areas” (Hu, 2014: 229–230). It was not until 1936, when Liu took over leadership of the work in the “white areas”, that the methods were thoroughly transformed. Liu clearly separated secret internal party work from open mass work, while ensuring that they coordinated closely. This approach guaranteed both the secrecy and continuity of the party organization in the “white areas”, as well as the legality and broad reach of the mass work.

In terms of the relationship between the organizational core and the periphery, there is a clear difference between the CPC and Soviet Russia. In Soviet Russia, the relationship between professional revolutionaries and ordinary revolutionaries (workers), as well as that between the organizational core and the periphery, was unidirectional from top to bottom. In many of his writings, Lenin reiterated that professional revolutionaries should not lower themselves to accommodate the demands of workers’ organizations or the masses. However, in the CPC, the relationship between the core and the periphery, between revolutionaries and the masses, was bidirectional: revolutionaries were expected to not only lead the masses but also learn from them. The CPC had to overcome both the tendency to merely follow the demands of the masses—referred to as “tailism”—and the dangers of “vanguardism” or “commandism”, whereby the party became detached from the people. This reflects the CPC's distinctive mass line approach. As Liu (1991a: 427) noted, “The mass line is our party's fundamental political line, as well as its fundamental organizational line”.

The stark difference between the Russian and Chinese approaches was due to the different social contexts. In Russia, industrialization was more developed, providing a solid social base for the working class, and the Bolsheviks regarded themselves as the vanguard of the working class. For the CPC, however, neither its leadership nor its revolutionary ranks were composed of a “naturally red” working class. Instead, they primarily came from the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. As Liu (1991a: 411) explained,

Within our party, the most fundamental contradiction is the contradiction between proletarian ideology and non-proletarian ideology, with the main conflict being that between proletarian ideology and the ideology of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. … Therefore, the most important issue in party building is the issue of ideological construction, which involves educating and transforming our party members—especially the petty bourgeois revolutionary elements—using Marxism-Leninism, the scientific ideology of the proletariat.

So, how was this transformation to be carried out? The CPC had to learn from and rely on the masses. Of course, this did not mean that the party should become the “tail” of the masses, but rather that it had to strike the right balance between relying on and leading the masses. The mass line thus became the CPC's essential path to purifying its class base (Ying, 2016a, 2016b; Ying and Liu, 2019).

The conspiratorial nature and centralization of the organization

The third key difference between the organization of revolutionaries and workers’ organizations is that the former is conspiratorial while the latter is open. Lenin (2018a: 135) argued that, for revolutionary organizations, “secrecy is the most essential condition, and all other conditions (such as the number of members, the selection of members, functions, etc.) must be aligned to this requirement”.

Conspiration was an important tradition in Russian revolutionary populism. Therefore, Lenin first discussed the relationship between the RSDLP and the populists. This issue is quite complex, and this paper only examines Lenin's views on the organizational question of party-founding in WITBD, particularly those regarding the revolutionary populists. Although Lenin criticized them for not grounding their revolution on Marxist theory or linking their actions to class struggle, he praised their efforts to build a strong revolutionary organization through conspiratorial means. In tracing the origins of this conspiratorial revolutionary tradition, Lenin corrected the tendency to attribute it to People's Will. Instead, he emphasized that the precursor, Land and Liberty, was a more important source of this tradition. However, Land and Liberty was not the ultimate origin. As Lenin (2018a: 134) noted ambiguously in WITBD, “The spontaneous mass workers’ movement has relieved us of the responsibility to establish a revolutionary organization as good as or even better than that of Land and Liberty”. The revolutionary organization that was “better than that of Land and Liberty” was the Society for the People's Liberation founded by Tkachev, which was the true source of the Russian conspiratorial revolutionary tradition. Why did Lenin not mention Tkachev by name here? Given political sensitivities surrounding Tkachev, Lenin deliberately avoided mentioning Tkachev and his organization in the context of conspiration, likely to evade censorship (Ma and Liu, 2013: 254). He only mentioned, seemingly incidentally, an instance of someone imitating Tkachev in the fifth chapter (Lenin, 2018a: 172–173).

Tkachev advocated for “direct revolutionary action” through conspiration and violence, aiming to establish a revolutionary combat organization. This organization was to operate under combat centralism, where a small elite group of revolutionaries led the masses. The functions of revolutionary activities were to be decentralized, but members of the organization had to be carefully selected, with lower ranks obeying higher ones and everyone obeying the central authority. They had to maintain unconditional discipline, preserve strict confidentiality, and communicate within the organization through one-on-one contact only. In terms of revolutionary ethics, Tkachev believed that anything that could contribute to the victory of the revolution was moral, placing revolutionary interests above all else. Revolutionaries were expected to combine “revolutionary fervor” with “calculated calmness” and demonstrate self-sacrifice akin to a religious spirit (International Communist Movement History Research Office of Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 1983: 337–373, 394–414; Ma and Liu, 2013: 137–147). Tkachev predicated this conspiratorial revolutionary thought on the argument that “Russia has none of the revolutionary tools possessed by Western countries, particularly Germany. We have no urban proletariat, no freedom of the press, no representative parliament—essentially, nothing that would allow us to hope to unite the always timid, fragmented, and ignorant masses into a well-organized, disciplined union”. Where the revolutionaries were empty-handed, the Tsarist government held the power of a “centralized organization”, equipped with material forces like millions of bayonets, a military, gendarmerie, police, and jailers. Hence, Tkachev declared in the Charter of the Society for the People's Liberation that “organized force must be used to resist the organized force of the autocrat”, and “such force can only be created through disciplined, tightly organized conspiration” (Рудницкая, 1997: 336). In the 1880s, Tkachev attempted to collaborate with People's Will. Although this cooperation ultimately failed for various reasons, People's Will absorbed significant elements of Tkachev's ideological program (Ma, 2022).

Lenin praised the tradition initiated by Tkachev and developed by People's Will, asserting that “the attempt to seize power, prepared by Tkachev's teachings and executed using ‘frightening’ and genuinely terrifying methods of terrorism, was remarkable”. To this he added, “The mistake of People's Will did not lie in their earnest efforts to recruit all the dissatisfied elements into their organization and direct this organization in a resolute fight against the autocracy. On the contrary, this was their great historical achievement.” On this matter, Lenin argued that he had:

always opposed reducing political struggle to conspiration, but that certainly does not mean denying the necessity of establishing a strong revolutionary organization. … In an autocratic state, such a strong revolutionary organization, by its very nature, can also be called a “conspiratorial” organization, because the French word conspiration (secret activity) corresponds to the Russian word for “conspiration”, and secrecy is absolutely essential for such an organization.

Lenin acknowledged that organizations under combat centralism might occasionally launch reckless offensives, but “precisely in order to ensure the stability of the movement and prevent the possibility of reckless offensives, a strong revolutionary organization is absolutely necessary” (Lenin, 2018a: 173, 134–136).

It is important to note that Lenin did not directly address a key organizational issue in WITBD and “Letter to a Comrade”, namely, how to define party membership and the relationship between party members and the organization. However, Lenin indirectly addressed this issue through praise for the organizational rigidity of Tkachev-style “conspiratorial” organizations. In the Charter of the Society for the People's Liberation, Tkachev stipulated: “A member can only be accepted with the consent of the association's Central Committee”; “Once someone becomes a member of the association, they cannot leave without permission from the Central Committee”; “Without the Central Committee's permission, it is strictly forbidden to join any other secret or public societies”; and “Members must strictly follow all orders from the Central Committee. Any member whose words or actions violate the rules of the association will be expelled immediately, and anyone who leaks the association's secrets will be executed” (Рудницкая, 1997: 376). Of course, Lenin would not fully endorse Tkachev's overly strict regulations, but he took from Tkachev and People's Will the crucial lesson that individuals must belong to an organization, obey its leadership, and adhere to its discipline.

This issue later sparked an exceptionally heated debate at the 1903 Second Congress of the RSDLP, which Lenin summarized in One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. The debate centered around the wording of the first article of the party constitution. According to the first article of the Social Democratic Party of Germany's constitution, “Anyone who accepts the principles of the party program and endeavors to assist the party may become a member”. This raised the question of how the first article of the RSDLP's constitution ought to be formulated. Lenin engaged in fierce debate with Martov and Axelrod on this issue. Martov and Axelrod argued that the rules should follow the organizational principles of the Social Democratic Party and the Second International, where anyone who accepted the party program and was willing to work for the party (including paying membership dues) could become a member. In contrast, Lenin insisted that the party should only admit those who not only accepted the program and supported the party financially but also personally joined one of its organizations. Clearly, for Lenin, one of the key markers of a vanguard member was personal involvement in the organization, becoming a member, and accepting the discipline of the organization. He adopted both a broad and a narrow definition of an “organization”: “In the narrow sense, it refers to the smallest cells of human collectives, at least those with a minimally determined structure. In the broad sense, it refers to the sum of such cells combined into a whole” (Lenin, 2018b: 62). Therefore, organization was expressed in terms of both collectivity and individuality. Only those with a sense of organization could form a fighting force. Although Lenin's proposal was rejected at the Second Congress by a vote of 28 to 22, it was eventually approved at the 1906 Fourth Congress and became a fundamental organizational principle of the communist parties under the leadership of the Communist International (Kolakowski, 2015: 365–378).

In short, guided by Marxist thought on class struggle, Lenin rescued the “conspiratorial” organization created by Tkachev from its radical populist framework, cleansed it of its old associations, and reconfigured it within the organizational machinery of the RSDLP.

Lenin then discussed the differences in organizational principles between the RSDLP and the various social democratic parties of the Second International. “Conspiration” has a long tradition, one that can be traced back to secret religious movements in early modern Western history, as well as to the adventurist currents of the workers’ movements that emerged after the French Revolution, particularly Babeufism and Blanquism (see Koenigsberger, 1955; Kingdon, 1958; Hutton, 1982; Darling, 1983; Gorski, 2021). However, as the prototype of the world's proletarian party, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Germany had always adhered to a bottom-up democratic principle as its basic organizational structure. At the 1869 Eisenach Congress of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party, the constitution stipulated that all decisions related to constitutional amendments, basic principles, political stances, and party dues must be submitted to all members for a vote within six weeks of the congress, with the decision based on a majority vote. The party's highest governing body consisted of a five-member committee and an 11-member supervisory committee (which monitored the daily work of the five-member committee), both of which were elected by the party congress. In his report on the party's program and organizational constitution, August Bebel specifically noted: “According to these articles, our party no longer has leaders. This is necessary, as long as a party acknowledges the authority of certain individuals, it will lose its democratic foundation” (Department of Scientific Socialism, Renmin University of China, 1983: 42). At the 1875 Gotha Unity Congress, the leadership structure of the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany was further expanded to include: an executive committee; a supervisory committee (which oversaw the executive committee); a party committee (which resolved disputes between the executive and supervisory committees); and a party newspaper. The supervisory committee could remove the executive committee according to election procedures, and the party committee could, at the request of the executive committee, remove the supervisory committee according to election procedures. The party's newspaper was elected by the congress, managed daily by the executive committee, but it could appeal to the supervisory committee if it disagreed with the executive committee. All committees were elected with term limits (Zhang, 2005: 10–18).

In Lenin's view, the two preconditions for applying broad democratic principles within the RSDLP were complete openness and election to all positions. Neither condition was feasible under the Tsarist autocracy and shadow of the gendarmerie's bayonets. As Lenin noted:

Since the basic conditions of the “broad democratic principle” cannot be implemented in a secret organization, what is the point of proposing this principle? Thus, the “broad principle” is nothing more than a resounding empty phrase. Moreover, this empty phrase proves a complete misunderstanding of the urgent organizational tasks at hand.

This demand for broad democracy was, to Lenin, a harmful game that “would only make it easier for the police to carry out widespread sabotage, perpetuate the prevailing artisanal methods, and distract practical workers from their urgent and important task of transforming themselves into professional revolutionaries”. For Lenin, in the Russia of his time, “something more important than ‘democracy’ is the full comradeship trust between revolutionaries”, which exists within “a small, narrow core of comrades who completely trust one another, constituting the internal democracy of the organization”. What, then, was the foundation for gaining and maintaining this comradeship trust? Lenin believed it was based on strict secrecy, the extremely rigorous selection of members, and the professional qualities required of revolutionaries (Lenin, 2018a: 137–140). This recalls the Catechism of a Revolutionary, penned by Sergey Nechayev in 1869, which also incorporated the ideas of Bakunin and Tkachev. According to this manifesto:

For a revolutionary, only those who engage in the same revolutionary cause as themselves can be considered friends and close associates. The sole measure for determining friendship, loyalty, and other obligations to comrades is their usefulness in the practical revolutionary work of total destruction. … The solidarity of revolutionaries is self-evident, for it is the entire strength of the revolutionary cause. Revolutionaries who share the same understanding and passion for the revolution should, as much as possible, jointly discuss and unanimously decide all major matters. Therefore, in carrying out the established plans, each person should rely as much as possible on their own strength. Everyone should independently carry out a series of destructive actions, and only when absolutely necessary for the success of the cause should they seek the advice and help of their comrades. (Рудницкая, 1997: 175–177, translation cited from Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1964: 472–476)

Evidently, Lenin drew on certain ideals of the revolutionary populists in stressing the importance of comradeship trust within a party.

The organizational principle of centralism that Lenin proposed in WITBD and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back sparked intense debate within the RSDLP (Trotsky, 2021: 131–143), as well as among the leaders of the social democratic parties of the Second International. One of the most prominent criticisms came from Rosa Luxemburg, a leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, who offered a frank and sharp critique of Lenin's views in her 1904 work Organizational Questions of the Russian Social Democracy. Lenin responded to Luxemburg's critique with a moderate rebuttal (see Luxemburg, 2012: 115–134; Lenin, 2017a: 35–46). Faced with both domestic and international criticisms and severe division within the RSDLP, Lenin maintained his basic stance but made certain adjustments and refinements according to the changing circumstances of the Russian revolutionary situation. What he initially opposed was the implementation of “broad democracy” in Russia, not democracy itself. For Lenin, democratic principles could and should be expanded appropriately when conditions permitted. At the Second Congress of the Mensheviks in November 1905, the concept of “democratic centralism” was proposed as an organizational principle for the first time. In December 1905, at the Tammerfors Congress of the Bolsheviks, which was attended by a Menshevik representative, the term “democratic centralism” was formally adopted (Guan, 2004). On 20 March 1906, Lenin (2017b: 214), in his Draft Resolution for the Unified Congress of the RSDLP, proposed the following:

The party's organizational principles are based on the following: (1) The principle of democratic centralism within the party, which is now unanimously accepted; (2) although the current political conditions make it difficult to fully implement democratic centralism, it can still be applied within certain limits; (3) it is extremely dangerous for the party to conflate its secret and public organs, as this would make the party vulnerable to government repression; therefore, we recognize and propose that the congress recognizes that: (1) the principle of election within the party organization should be implemented in a bottom–up manner; (2) only in cases where insurmountable police interference and exceptional circumstances occur should this principle be abandoned, resorting to two-tiered elections or the appointment of additional members to elected bodies; (3) it is urgently necessary to maintain and strengthen the secret core of the party organization; (4) to conduct various public activities (publishing, assemblies, associations, especially trade unions), specialized action groups should be established, but these groups must never jeopardize the integrity of the secret branches; (5) the central organs of the party should be unified, meaning that the party's Central Committee, elected by the party congress, should designate the editorial board of the party's central newspaper, etc.

This indicates that Lenin had shifted from the initial principle of centralism to democratic centralism, where election and oversight mechanisms were important components (Guan, 2005). Under the guidance of Lenin's earlier writings, “democratic centralism” was formally written into the party constitution at the Fourth Congress of the RSDLP held in April 1906, becoming the organizational principle followed by both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

When the CPC officially announced its affiliation with the Communist International at the Second Congress, the key aspects of democratic centralism—such as the emphasis on party membership criteria, election procedures, and adherence to discipline—were already embedded in the party constitutions from the Second to the Fourth Congresses. After the Fifth Congress in 1927, the revised constitution explicitly included the principle of “democratic centralism” for the first time. According to Liu (1991a: 235),

[The CPC] was, from the very beginning, subjectively following Lenin's principles and path, and many organizational principles of the Bolshevik Party were so well known among the majority of our members that they could recite them by heart. The traditions and customs of the RSDLP were absent in our party. In this respect, we took a direct route.

However, democratic centralism on paper and in speeches was one thing; embedding it firmly in practice was entirely another. The so-called “direct route” was more rhetorical. The CPC was not merely an organization relying solely on external influences. As is well known, it was a product of the modern Chinese radicalism of the May Fourth Movement, with “Mr Democracy” serving as one of the key slogans of the movement. The May Fourth youth took pride in their pursuit of democracy, freedom, and individuality. Not long after the May Fourth Movement, a general sense of “boredom” permeated the minds of the young intellectuals, who gradually gravitated towards ideologies and threw themselves into the creation of more powerful and disciplined organizations (Wang, 2018: 89–219). This provided a crucial background for why some of the May Fourth youth were drawn to the CPC. However, after joining the CPC, their democratic fervor did not completely dissipate, creating a latent tension with the strict discipline requirements of the nascent party. According to Zhang Guotao, a member of the core leadership of the CPC during its founding period, “most of my comrades were young students fresh from school, with utopian ideas and anarchist views in their minds. They looked down on real politics, thinking it unclean or full of sin, and did not like discipline, training, tight organization, or unity of thought and action” (Zhang, 1980: 214). The revolutionary youth who first went to study in Soviet Russia often found the relationship between command and obedience the most novel aspect (Zheng, 2004: 193). Consequently, the development of democratic centralism within the CPC underwent a long and tortuous process, reaching maturity only during the Yan’an period (1935–1948).

At the CPC's Seventh Congress, Liu delivered a lengthy report on amending the Party constitution, titled On the Party, in which he offered a unique interpretation of “democratic centralism”: “centralization on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance”. By “centralization on the basis of democracy”, Liu meant that:

[the] leadership organs of the Party are democratically elected by the Party membership and are entrusted with responsibility; the Party's guiding principles and resolutions are democratically derived from the masses and decided upon by the party membership or their representatives, after which they are upheld and implemented by the leadership in coordination with the membership. … The party's order is built upon the principles of the individual subordinating to the organization, the minority subordinating to the majority, the lower levels subordinating to the higher levels, and all parts of the party subordinating to the Central Committee.

By “democracy under centralized guidance”, Liu was referring to the idea that:

[all] party meetings are convened by the leadership, all meetings are conducted under the guidance of the leadership, all decisions and regulations are made after careful preparation and consideration, all elections involve carefully considered candidate lists, the entire party abides by a unified constitution and discipline to which all members must adhere, and all members are subject to the unified leadership organs of the party. … Democratic centralism within the party means the system in which the party's leadership core and the broad membership are combined. It is a system of centralizing from within the party membership and persisting through the membership. It reflects the mass line within the party. (Liu, 1991b: 457–458)

If we compare the CPC during the Yan’an period with the Bolsheviks of Soviet Russia, the CPC adhered to the basic organizational principles—emphasizing strict organization, stringent discipline, high centralization, and secretive activities, while combining the principles of democracy and centralization under certain conditions. However, at that time, the CPC's democratic centralism had developed three distinctive characteristics of its own. First, in terms of formal organizational systems, the CPC more clearly and systematically articulated the principle of “the individual subordinating to the organization, the minority subordinating to the majority, the lower levels subordinating to the higher levels, and all parts of the party subordinating to the Central Committee”. There was a greater emphasis on ensuring that while the party's leadership organs conducted their work under intra-party democracy, they should not undermine the principle of centralization within the party. The party also more resolutely opposed “extreme democratism” and any demands for “independence from the party”. Second, in the democratic dimension of democratic centralism, the CPC's approach differed from that of the Soviet Union. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union placed more emphasis on intra-party supervision mechanisms, whereas the CPC emphasized collective leadership and the mass line. The CPC also replaced the early “public debates and discussions” promoted by the RSDLP with “criticism and self-criticism”. Open political debates at party congresses had been viewed as manifestations of “extreme democratism” since 1929. Although the CPC's Seventh Congress restored and made specific provisions for the supervisory committees, they were elected by the party committee at the same level and worked under its guidance. This differed from the Soviet Union, where the supervisory committees were elected by the national congress of the party at the same level, which limited their ability to supervise the party committee at the same level. Third, the concept of “obedience” emphasized by the CPC had two specific layers of meaning: obedience in terms of ideological consciousness; and obedience in terms of organizational discipline. Both forms of obedience were unconditional and absolute. Liu (1991c: 319–360) used the traditional Chinese term “self-cultivation” to transform the notion of “obedience” from an external behavioral constraint to an internal conscious identification, resulting in the CPC placing greater emphasis on ideological transformation and party purity compared to the Soviet Union.

Centralization from the local to central levels

After discussing the three main differences between revolutionary and professional organizations, Lenin addressed the issue of the relationship between local and national work, a critical aspect of the organizational structure of a Leninist party. As newspapers were the main political organizational tool of the RSDLP in its early years, Lenin used the relationship between local and national newspapers to illustrate this point. According to Lenin (2018a: 143–146), “Since local activists are excessively immersed in local work, it is absolutely necessary to shift the focus slightly towards national work. This shift would not weaken but rather strengthen both the solidity of our connections and the stability of local agitation work”. This was, Lenin added, because

local newspapers often lack ideological resolve and political relevance, are too costly in terms of revolutionary resources, and are technically unsatisfactory (by this, I mean not the quality of printing but the frequency and regularity of publication). All these shortcomings are not accidental but are the inevitable result of decentralization. … Individual local organizations are simply unable to ensure that their newspapers are ideologically firm or raise them to the level of a political organ; they lack the means to collect and utilize sufficient material to reflect the entire political life of our country.

To this he added, “This decentralization allows our gendarmerie to easily capture local activists at the very beginning of their activities, before they can develop into true revolutionaries”. Here, Lenin hinted that there were still very few professional revolutionaries among the local leaders of the party and that these individuals lacked both the ideological breadth necessary to guide overall political life and the specialized training and experience to deal effectively with the gendarmerie. It is worth noting that, due to Tsarist political repression, the vast majority of the RSDLP's professional revolutionaries lived in long-term exile in Europe. Lenin did not discuss the potential issues arising from exiled professional revolutionaries leading the domestic workers’ movement (see Herzen, 1998; Miller, 2019; Hillis, 2021).

In “Letter to a Comrade”, Lenin proposed establishing two central leadership bodies within the RSDLP: the Central Committee; and a central party newspaper. While this arrangement is superficially like the structure of the central institutions of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party, Lenin's rationale was entirely different. In Germany, this structure was based on broad democracy and mutual supervision, whereas in Russia it was based on the need for strict secrecy and continuity of the movement. The central newspaper was responsible for ideological leadership, while the Central Committee handled direct practical leadership. If one committee were to be compromised by the gendarmerie, the other could immediately take over its responsibilities. The coordination between the two committees was ensured by a unified party program and regular joint meetings (Lenin, 2013: 2). When discussing the establishment of two central bodies through national party meetings, Lenin suggested a majority-vote electoral system since these meetings were held abroad. Within Russia, however, because of interference from the gendarmerie, “all kinds of congresses and meetings can only be held exceptionally and with great caution, and only ‘outstanding revolutionaries’ are allowed to attend” (Lenin, 2013: 7). Therefore, the formation of local institutions was primarily based on centralized decision making rather than broad electoral procedures. This again demonstrates that Lenin did not reject electoral systems outright; rather, he merely opposed the impractical use of “broad democracy” under the threat of gendarmerie surveillance. Once conditions changed, so too did Lenin's perspective. Consequently, in 1906, Lenin adjusted “centralism” to “democratic centralism”.

The relationship between the local and central levels held particular significance for the CPC. On the one hand, China is a large country, and the CPC was a large party facing substantial regional differences, poor transportation, and limited information flows. On the other hand, during the New Democratic Revolution Period (1919–1949), the CPC faced a long-term situation of a weaker position relative to a stronger enemy. The rural revolutionary bases established by the CPC were surrounded and divided from one another by heavily armed enemy forces, and the nature of warfare required swift responses to enemy actions and flexibility in military operations. Thus, it was necessary to establish a unified, centrally led party with strong discipline and uniform action, while also allowing local units sufficient autonomy. Striking a balance between the two was a significant test of the party's leadership skills. ⁵

Further issues raised by historical comparisons regarding WITBD

This paper has reinterpreted Lenin's classic work WITBD from the perspectives of comparative historical sociology and organizational sociology, comparing the RSDLP, the Russian revolutionary populists, the Second International social democratic parties, and CPC. This section discusses further issues identified in the historical comparison.

First, consider the organizational principles of the Leninist party in comparison with Western bourgeois parties. Sartori (2006) categorized political parties into two fundamental types: “party as part”; and “party as whole” (the Leninist party falls into the latter). He examined the term “party as part” through the lenses of etymology and the history of political thought, identifying three key features of this type of party: the party is not a faction; the party is part of a whole; and the party serves as a channel of expression. He also discussed the fundamental characteristics of the “party as whole”. Sartori's typology is insightful, and his analysis of the “party as part” is especially perceptive (see also Mansfield, 2022). However, his analysis of the “party as whole” lacks depth and precision; he merely views the “party as whole” as the mirror image of the “party as part”. In Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington (1989) suggested a comparative analysis between Lenin's WITBD and Madison's et al. (2008 [1787–1788]) The Federalist Papers, arguing that:

For Marx, the key was social class, but for Lenin, it was the party. Marx was a political primitive, incapable of developing a science or theory of politics, because he did not recognise politics as an independent field of activity, nor did he see political order as transcending the order of social classes. Yet Lenin elevated political institutions—that is, the party—to a position above social classes and social forces. … Lenin replaced an amorphous social class with a consciously created, constructed, and organized political institution. By emphasising the primacy of politics and the party as a political institution, and by stressing the need to build a “strong revolutionary organization” on the basis of a “broad revolutionary coalition”, Lenin established the prerequisites for political order. In this regard, the parallels between Lenin and Madison, and between The Federalist Papers and WITBD are striking. Both are major works by practically-minded political theorists who analyse social reality and propose theoretical foundations sufficient to construct a political order. Lenin's concern was with class, while Madison's was with factions. (Huntington, 1989: 308, 310)

Huntington's analysis offers certain valuable insights. However, we should note that he dismisses Marx's class politics, elevating Lenin to the status of a co-founder of a new political order alongside Madison. However, America's founding had a profound basis in new political science, involving much more than simply dealing with the problem of factions (see Wood, 2016). If the foundations of class politics were stripped away entirely, the Leninist party and its “organizational weapon” would be no different from Tkachev's conspiratorial organization. Using traditional Chinese terminology, such an analysis only touches upon the level of “technique” (shu) in the “organizational weapon”, entirely overlooking the level of “principle” (dao). Selznick (1952) provided an example of such an analysis. Today, just as Wood analyzed the founding of the American Republic, we should approach the “organizational weapon” with a fresh analytical perspective, integrating “principle” (dao), “potential” (shi), and “technique” (shu) in an organic manner.

Second, the organizational mechanisms of the restructured KMT and the CPC are also worth comparing. In 1924, the KMT restructured its organization by borrowing from the Bolshevik model, establishing a party structure fundamentally different from previous systems. Therefore, the KMT and CPC were somewhat comparable during the period of cooperation between the two parties. Overall, the KMT's adoption of Soviet Russian methods focused more on organizational techniques, but this adoption remained superficial. It failed to effectively internalize the essence of Bolshevik organization, lacking both a rigorous membership selection mechanism and a robust grassroots structure, resulting in little more than “new wine in old bottles”. The KMT prioritized the upper echelons over grassroots development, and the military over the party (Wang, 2010). In contrast, the CPC's approach to Soviet organizational models involved absorbing the fundamental principles of party structure and adapting them to the realities of the Chinese revolutionary experience. This ultimately shaped the CPC into a highly disciplined, deeply rooted, and formidable party.

Third, while this paper has already drawn several comparisons between the organizational structures of the two communist parties in Russia and China, it is worth extending the analysis further. From a revolutionary pathway perspective, both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPC pursued violent revolution. However, Soviet Russia's revolution was largely accomplished through urban uprisings, worker strikes, and military mutinies. The victory of the October Revolution was not achieved through large-scale revolutionary warfare, and the Soviet Red Army was established only in a top-down fashion after the revolution's success. In contrast, the CPC's revolution was marked by a prolonged and arduous peasant-led revolutionary war, centered around rural bases and the gradual development of red armed forces in a bottom-up manner, culminating in a nationwide victory by encircling the cities from the countryside. The CPC's growth was inseparable from the army and the rural revolutionary base areas, a difference that fundamentally shaped the CPC's organizational structure compared to the Bolsheviks. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Mao (1991b: 541–543, 547) emphasized that:

The most critical and highest form of revolution is the armed seizure of power, the resolution of issues through warfare. … In China, the primary form of struggle is war, and the primary organizational form is the army. … Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and we absolutely cannot allow the gun to command the party. But with the gun, we can indeed build the party … we can also create cadres, schools, culture, and mass movements.

The concept of “building the party through the gun” indicates that, during the New Democratic Revolution, the army served as the primary organizational form for the CPC, and it was primarily through the military that the party implemented its policies and shaped a new society. Mao, primarily a leader of the Red Army and the Soviet base areas during the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937), gradually became the CPC's overall leader during the Long March (1934–1936) and the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945). His lifelong attachment to the army meant that, even during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the military largely retained stability. Thus, when understanding the significance of democratic centralism in the history of the CPC's development, the military holds particular importance. Key relationships—between the party and the military, the military and local party organizations, different military units, and the base areas and the “white areas”—are all essential for comprehending the organizational evolution of the CPC. The CPC's four principles of democratic centralism—“the individual subordinating to the organization, the minority subordinating to the majority, the lower levels subordinating to the higher levels, and the local organizations subordinating to the Central Committee”—appear quite like Lenin's ideas of party-founding on the surface. However, only by situating these principles within the turbulent, arduous, and unique history of the CPC and its people's army can one fully appreciate their complex and distinctive meanings (Ying, 2016a).

Finally, it is important to revisit the study of the danwei system and organizational structures in contemporary China. A common shortcoming of current research is the tendency to overemphasize the technical, mechanistic, and administrative aspects, while overlooking the political dimension, as well as the lack of conscious effort to trace the origins and transformations of organizational systems. To paraphrase Hobbes (1985: 1), organizations are merely the “gears”, “mainsprings”, and “hairsprings” of the state and party machinery. Without research into the “soul” of this machine and how and when the various components—old and new—were “assembled” into an integrated whole, our analyses will remain trapped at the technical level. From the perspective of comparative historical sociology, using the event sociology of tracing roots (Ying, 2023) to integrate the histories of organizational systems and structures may provide a pathway to the political analysis of the danwei and organizational forms.