Shades of Homogeneity: Redefining Japan’s Narrative Through Refugee Acceptance

Background

In 2017, a woman from Sri Lanka came to Japan with great ambitions, but in 2020 she was forced to leave because of domestic violence. As a result, she was arrested and jailed for overstaying her visa. In March 2021, she died in Nagoya prison. Since 2007, she is the 18th foreigner to die in prison. In her last days, she vomited blood. A medical expert suggested that she be put on an intravenous drip or granted temporary release to relieve her stress, but immigration authorities ignored this recommendation (Sim, 2021). The issue has become a flashpoint for activists who criticise the harsh treatment that led to her death because she was treated like a Third World citizen in a First World country. It is common for foreigners to die in Japanese detention centres (Kamihigashi & Kin, 2021). One immigration official expressed his dissatisfaction with a colleague’s disdain for detainees. Over time, he became accustomed to witnessing brutal acts, and his initial concern began to fade (Kamihigashi & Kin, 2021). These tragedies raise some crucial questions: Why do such incidents continue to occur despite Japan’s reputation for respecting human rights? Or is this related to the country’s cruel colonial past? Why does Japan prefer to ignore the refugee situation, even though it is partly responsible for its creation?

At least 82.4 million refugees (20.7 million refugees under UNHCR + 5.7 million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA + 48 million internally displaced persons + 4.1 million asylum seekers + 3.9 displaced abroad from Venezuela) are forced to flee their homes worldwide (Ullah et al., 2021a; Ullah et al., 2021b; UNHCR, 2021). Japan accepted only 28 refugees in 2016, 20 in 2017, 40 in 2019 (Japan Association of Refugees, 2017; Regalado, 2020) and 47 in 2020, in a world where the number of refugees is growing rapidly (Nippon.com, 2021). Japan accepted only seven Syrian refugees out of 13 million between 2011 and 2016 (Japan Association for Refugees, 2017). Japan accepts only 2.7 million foreigners, including 36% Chinese, 21% Korean and 15% Vietnamese (Burgess, 2012; Kyodo News, 2021; OECD Library, 2019), and a total of 1,463 refugees. Although Japan is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it may seem puzzling why the country accepts such a small number of refugees. Some claim that Japan has the strictest asylum criteria in the world to keep refugees out. Maintaining this strictness has been politically feasible because Japan has always maintained a homogeneous culture devoid of diversity (Chan, 2018), making it difficult to accept ‘other’.

Japan continues to deal with the ambiguity of ‘multicultural coexistence’ and ‘multiculturalism’ (Demelius, 2020). However, Japan only accepted foreigners when the economy had a shortage of labour. In 1990, the government granted permits to the descendants of Japanese immigrants in South America (the Dekasegi) but not to others (Ullah & Haque, 2020). In 2019, over 200,000 Brazilians, along with Koreans and Chinese, made up 2% of the Japanese population (Coleman, 2019; Tsuda, 1998; Ullah & Haque, 2020).

However, migration is becoming a critical issue in Japan (Burgess, 2012) as foreigners have begun to reconstruct social reality and identity structures (Goodman et al., 2003; Graburn et al., 2008). The reconstruction of individual identity has far-reaching implications for national identity (Keith & Pile, 1993, p. 31). Japan’s homogeneity in terms of conservatism and cultural distinctiveness is an ideal example to examine how powerful representational regimes respond to the growing number of newcomers that threaten Japan’s image as a homogeneous country (Harvey, 2000). Whether religion, culture or politics, most of the Japanese hold closely to their traditional way of life. ‘We are not very open to change’ is ingrained in the culture and values of their conservative forefathers.

This article addresses the little-studied issue of how Japan has maintained its homogeneity and the ways in which this homogeneity repels newcomers. We believe that a homogeneous society fosters a rejectionist attitude among individuals and policymakers. Of course, policies reflect the desires of individuals. Homogeneity is comparable to white paper; therefore, the paper is assumed to remain white, and any other colour stands out, suggesting that the Japanese find it difficult to accept a different colour. The refugee issue has implications for the Japanese’s long-standing appreciation of this way of thinking.

Objective and Methodology

This article examines Japan’s reluctance to accept refugees. In doing so, the unwillingness to accept refugees is viewed through the prism of ethnicity and homogeneity. To reach this conclusion, we adopted a qualitative approach. Using the snowball method, 12 Japanese (students and professionals from three universities in Tokyo, Kochi, Osaka and Fukui) and 15 foreigners (students and professionals who have lived in Japan for at least 10 years) were selected. Interviews were conducted via a Zoom connection and WhatsApp.

We established a relationship with the interviewees and conversed with them. We used some unusual words to gauge their reaction. We addressed the problem of foreign residents in Japan. We also inquired about how they felt about accepting more migrants to compensate for the population decline. They were all asked about their feelings on the refugee problem. We talked to people who are not native Japanese speakers. We wanted to find out how people feel they are discriminated against, and if they are discriminated against, how. What is the nature of their contact with the Japanese? What actions do they take when they disagree?

We introduced our survey to the respondents and asked them to indicate their willingness to participate. The first set of questions was mainly aimed at assessing the respondents’ contact with foreigners and Japanese in Japan. We inquired about the frequency and nature of their contacts and the number of their non-Japanese friends. After noting the information, they provided, we asked if anything had changed. After getting the green light, we finished our narratives.

To ensure that the responses fulfilled the research goals, in-depth interviews were conducted using a well-developed interview guide. We began with some general questions such as name, age, profession and marital status, which were then followed by some specific questions like:

(To the Japanese nationals)

Do you have non-Japanese friends/colleagues in your workplace/college/University?

If yes, how many and what are their nationalities?

(To the Non-Japanese respondents)

For how long have you been staying here?

Ethnic Boundary-making: Theoretical Standpoint

Japan has a unique and complex history of defining ethnic boundaries, and this context raises several theoretical issues. Among the most important theoretical issues related to the definition of Japan’s ethnic boundaries are; Essentialism vs. Constructivism: The question of whether ethnicity is an inherent, essential property of individuals and groups or a social construct created and maintained through social practices and discourses is one of the fundamental questions in the study of ethnic boundaries (Mahalingam, 2007). Japan has a long history of essentialising ethnic identities, particularly in relation to the concept of ‘pure’ Japanese ethnicity, while also acknowledging the constructed nature of some aspects of ethnic identity, making this issue particularly complex. Assimilation vs. multiculturalism: Another central question in the study of ethnic boundaries is whether the goal should be to promote assimilation and the formation of a homogeneous national identity or to embrace multiculturalism and celebrate diversity (Ullah, 2022). In Japan, there is tension between these two approaches, with some advocating for a more inclusive, multicultural society and others arguing that maintaining a homogeneous national identity is necessary for social cohesion. Internal versus external borders: Ethnic boundaries can be both internal and external, that is, they define boundaries between different groups within a society or between a society and other societies. In the case of Japan, the focus is on both internal and external boundaries, discussing the status of minority groups within Japan and the country’s relations with other Asian nations. It is important to consider the historical context in which Japan’s ethnic boundaries were established and maintained. This history continues to influence discussions of ethnic identity and national consolidation today.

Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain Japan’s perceived homogeneity and unwillingness to accept refugees. Japan’s reluctance to accept refugees is attributed in large part to the country’s unique cultural and historical context. Some argue that Japan’s history of maintaining a relatively closed society has contributed to its cultural and psychological aversion to foreigners. Some argue that Japan should prioritise increasing its birth rate and attracting a highly skilled workforce over accepting refugees, who may require additional resources and support due to its rapidly ageing population and shrinking labour force. Political Factors: Japan’s conservative government has been criticised for its stance on immigration and refugee resettlement. Some argue that the government’s reluctance to accept refugees is due to a desire for social and political stability rather than a genuine concern for refugee welfare. Some argue that Japan’s relatively homogeneous society has contributed to a lack of understanding and compassion for refugees and other marginalised groups. It is also believed that accepting refugees could jeopardise Japan’s social cohesion and contribute to an increase in crime and social unrest. Legal Factors: Japan’s refugee laws are relatively strict, and the country has been criticised for its low recognition rates and lengthy asylum application procedures.

Homogeneity can be considered from two points of view: Uniformity of properties of a system or sameness of properties. In the context of ethnic, religious and political homogeneity, we use the term homogeneity. Rather than examining countries known for homogeneity, such as Japan, Korea and Bhutan, we will extend our debate to places known for homogeneity.

Barth’s theory of ethnic groupings and boundaries will be used to explain Japan’s homogeneity. Barth argues that ethnic groups are primarily biologically self-sustaining, share basic cultural ideals and are completely uniform in their cultural forms (Barth, 1969, pp. 10–11). This also reduces the number of possible explanations for cultural diversity: over time, each group has developed its cultural and social forms in relative isolation (Barth, 1969 cited in Ullah and Chattoraj, 2018). In the second half of the twentieth century, ethnicity became an important sociological research topic. This type of analysis has ended a long tradition dating back to Max Weber, Fredrik Barth and Pierre Bourdieu (Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018). Ethnicity, thus, becomes the process of constructing and reconstructing groups by drawing lines between them (Wimmer, 2008). Two schools of thought have emerged based on this concept: Earlier work was relatively static and focused on the features of the boundaries themselves and the processes of their maintenance, while more recent research focuses on the ‘making’ of the ethnic boundary, whether through political movements or daily individual interactions. This shift in emphasis from structural determinism to theories that emphasise ‘agency’ may reflect a larger shift away from structural determinism (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Scholars have asserted that additional research is needed to understand how ethnicity is ‘done’ and ‘not done’ in everyday human interactions (Barth, 1994; Brubaker, 2002; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Japan has long been considered a ‘homogeneous’ nation in which people share the same language, culture and traditions (Narzary, 2004). Japan’s national identity and what it means to ‘be Japanese’ are firmly established, as many Japanese view their culture as mono-ethnic (Okazaki, 2020).

According to Server and colleagues (2020), migrants used to rely on local communities for ideas, knowledge and employment opportunities, as well as consumer credit, investment and sales transactions. Most Japanese are accustomed to following their conventional path in religion, culture and politics, having adhered to strict laws for generations. Because of the culture and values of their conservative ancestors, they are reluctant to change and have built a firewall between themselves and the rest of the world. Based on this idea, we can consider Japan as a homogeneous nation.

Ethnicity, religion and politics are often intertwined. Nevertheless, racial or religious differences can lead to political conflict. Examples of ethnic conflicts include ethnoreligious conflicts in India (Ganguly, 1993; Hardacre, 1994). Ethnicities and religions are necessary for a country’s inhabitants to develop a common identity (Stewart, 2009). In governments that value homogeneity, it can be difficult to accept other views or cultures. Homogeneous nations value their past and historical background and try to prevent foreign cultures, religions and even political viewpoints from influencing their own. As a result, people from these countries seem to reject concepts they have never heard before. In our interviews, we found that people from Japan react to certain terms. They believe that these words should not be spoken. By not using these words in conversation, even though others do, they distance themselves. Japan and Korea are the most homogeneous nations, where nationalism and ethnicity are often intertwined and where policies regarding race or ethnicity can be extraordinarily complex (Lie, 2008). It is difficult to say which factors have led to which outcomes, if the absence of cultural diversity has influenced policy (Fisher, 2013). Individual behaviour, national policies such as immigration, and interactions with foreign countries all point to homogeneity.

To understand the complexity of Japan’s homogeneity, one must examine a range of homogeneity characteristics. Ethnic homogeneity means that a group of people has nearly identical customs and ancestry. In contrast, religious homogeneity means that most of a country’s population adheres to the same faith (Calhoun, 1993). Political homogeneity means that most of a country’s population holds the same political beliefs. The United Kingdom is an example of political homogeneity because the population accepts the welfare state, the right to abortion for women, the tax system and the retention of the monarchy system, among other things.

According to Durkheim’s (1995) thesis, religion serves to ‘revitalize the most basic components of community consciousness and conscience’, thus strengthening a community’s sense of belonging (Ebel, 2018). This can be seen in both a good and bad light. The ‘good’ effort to bring people together, especially within a community. The ‘negative’, on the other hand, would result from an extreme mindset where no religion other than one’s own could suppress a sense of community or influence society. This ‘negative’ radicalism ran throughout Japanese history and persisted for millennia (Japan Guide, 2021).

The influence of Portuguese merchants in the south of the island, as well as the presence of the Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier in 1549–1551, led to religious changes in Japan. After economically developing a city into an important port, a prominent Christian businessman exerted immense religious influence. The result was a remarkable increase in the number of Japanese converting to Christianity. In response, the feudal lord (Toyotomi Hideyoshi) banned all missionaries from entering the country in 1587. Hideyoshi murdered European monks and Japanese Christians in 1593. During the Edo period, Hideyoshi’s successors murdered thousands more Christians in Japan (1600–1868). In 1636, during the Edo period, a law was passed restricting the emigration of Japanese from the kingdom. For two centuries, foreigners were not allowed to enter Japan (Canter, 2011). Even in the twentieth century, most of the Japanese youth did not understand the fundamental meaning of the religions they practised, pretended to be atheists and adhered only to the festival practices of shrine and temple visits (Aoki, 2018).

Homogeneity and Alienation

In ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms, Japanese society can be said to be homogeneous both externally and internally. The fact that Japan is more homogeneous than other nations does not cancel out the country’s racial and cultural diversity. In Japan, minorities continue to advocate for social integration, political and economic equality. All aspects of race, ethnicity, language, culture, socio-economic status and citizenship are interdependent. As a result, the majority of ‘Japanese’ are prejudiced against ‘foreigners’ (Yamashiro, 2013, pp. 147–161).

Minorities are seen as racially different from Japanese, but some are marginalised in hierarchical ways (Yamashiro, 2013), and, for example, Othering is a long-standing phenomenon. About 98.45% of Japan’s 127.7 million people are Japanese nationals, including the indigenous Ainu, while only 1.55% are foreigners (Yamamoto, 2015). The struggle of the Ainu people, who are seen as something different from most Japanese, is a case in point. In Japan, the Waijin enslaved the Ainu people (Field, 2011; Webster, 2011). Therefore, it is also important to note that ‘returnee’ Japanese, some of whom grew up outside of Japan, may be perceived as ‘foreign’ if their Japanese language skills differ from those of native speakers and they are unfamiliar with Japanese social norms. Japanese citizens of Japanese descent with Japanese names and phenotypes are neglected (Yamashiro, 2013).

Japan’s position in the global context of refugees is no better. For example, since August 2017, the military in Myanmar has conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign and committed crimes against humanity by expelling over 730,000 Rohingyas from the country. Mass killings, sexual violence and widespread arson are just some of the atrocities committed in the process (Kasai, 2019; Ullah, 2011, 2016; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018). In contrast, the Japanese government has been largely indifferent to the plight of the Rohingyas. It has voted against all resolutions on Myanmar in recent years UN and has refused to use the term ‘Rohingya’ because ‘Muslims in Rakhine State’ is much more ‘neutral’ (Kasai, 2019, p. 2). Japan’s decision to support the Myanmar government’s political rhetoric is troubling. We agree with Kasai’s (2019) assessment of Japan’s contribution to world peace. According to him, Japan’s diplomatic approach to the Rohingya crisis resembles the Devil’s Pact of Omelas, in which the prosperity of the fictional town of Omelas is maintained at the expense of a young girl who was held captive underground (Kasai, 2019).

Japan and Myanmar jointly organised the Rakhine State Investment Fair in 2018, hoping to attract foreign and domestic investors while ignoring the heinous human rights abuses and massive displacement in the state (Kasai, 2019). The business of Rohingya blood is reminiscent of the atrocities committed by Japan against East Asians during the Second World War. Between 1937 and the end of the Second World War, the Japanese military killed between 3 and 10 million people, most of whom were Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, Indochinese and Western prisoners of war (Rummel, 1997). Nearly a century has passed since the first women were forced into sexual slavery in Imperial Japan (Ramseyer, 2021). According to records, an estimated 90% of ‘comfort women’ did not survive the Great War II (Blakemore, 2019; Ramseyer, 2021). Kasai (2018) addressed another facet of Japan in his article, which portrays itself as a country that practices ‘value-based diplomacy’ However, Japan has lost its image as a country that practices ‘value-free diplomacy’ in world affairs (Mahmud et el., 2020). Kasai goes on to mention that Nobel Peace Prize winner and human rights activist Desmond Tutu once said, ‘If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality.’

Foreigners are often discriminated against in Japan because of the strong ‘Japanese’ identity of the Japanese population. As a result, their cognitive evaluations of personal life rarely reach the same level as those of the Japanese population and are often lower than those of people in their countries of origin (Zhang, 2018). For example, Chinese and South Koreans openly express a sense of social alienation in Japan. Foreigners from other nations face similar challenges. The statement ‘discrimination is everywhere’ by a Brazilian teacher in Japan (see Coleman, 2019) says much about the perception of ‘exclusion’ in Japanese society.

While some Japanese support [Im]migration because it would increase cultural diversity and invigorate society, the majority are reluctant to accept [Im]migrants because of concerns about public safety and the likely increase in social security expenditures (UTokyo, 2021). Others have contributed to the spread of xenophobia by making derogatory remarks about foreigners (UTokyo, 2021). According to Zhang (2018), Japanese attitudes towards foreigners were the second biggest challenge. One of our Japanese interviewees stated, ‘Foreigners, especially those from Asia, are destroying our country. They are robbing us of money and jobs and polluting our country. They have an erogenous view of us. We do not understand why my government allows their entry.’

Due to language barriers, cultural differences, training costs and insufficient skills, many Japanese companies are reluctant to hire highly competent foreigners, and many foreign workers cannot stay in Japan permanently under current immigration policies (Kajimoto, 2019). Consequently, foreign talent is discouraged: Compared to Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and even China, surveys show that Japan is one of the least attractive Asian countries to work in (Hajari & Crook, 2018).

Regional politics and relations between China and South Korea are closely intertwined with xenophobic sentiments. In recent decades, diplomatic relations between these countries have deteriorated (Zhang, 2018). On the one hand, Japanese affinity for China decreased from 72.5% in 1985 to 14.8% in 2014, as reported by Gong and Nagayoshi (2019). In contrast, affinity for the United States increased from 73.3% in 2008 to 82.6% in 2014 (Gong & Nagayoshi, 2019). The Japanese have a contradictory attitude towards China and the United States. ‘We cannot and will not accept a kiss from an Asian, but we will accept a kick from an American,’ said one respondent.

They not only profess Japanese multiculturalism but also have a strong ethnonational identity that advocates equal rights for ethnic minorities (Nagayoshi, 2011). In contrast, belonging to the Japanese ‘nation’ is strongly tied to ‘blood’ heritage (Befu, 2001). According to Nagayoshi (2011), supporting multiculturalism does not mean rejecting the right of ethnic minorities to equal citizenship rights, implying that multiculturalism for them means coexistence between Japanese and ‘foreigners’. According to Tai (2007), the issue in Japan is not the degree of cultural deviation from the ‘national’ culture, but the rights of non-Japanese. Moreover, cultural integration is a prerequisite for naturalisation, even though this is not explicitly stated in Japanese citizenship law (Surak, 2008). Therefore, it can be assumed that the Japanese are marginalised due to the emphasis on their ‘otherness’ in diversity (Nagayoshi, 2011).

Long-established residents are concerned about the government’s reluctance to include minorities to build an inclusive society and its eagerness to build infrastructure to attract foreigners (Demelius, 2020). The government views older Koreans’ familiarity with Japan and their ability to adapt to Japanese culture as a threat to its ideology. Against the backdrop of Japan’s colonial past, the Japanese openly discuss citizenship, ethnicity and nationality, especially in terms of a unified national identity (Demelius, 2020). Japan’s ambiguous notions of race, nationality and ethnicity coexist with the country’s unitary identity. People in homogeneous societies share similar racial, cultural and historical experiences, while people in heterogeneous societies have different racial, cultural, and historical backgrounds (Itoh, 1991). People in homogeneous communities do not have to ‘ideologize’ their thinking or engage in debates with others because they share the same basic values, beliefs, languages and practices (Itoh, 1991).

Most Japanese agree with Nakasone that ethnic diversity leads to confusion and discord and that societies function best when people look alike, think alike and act alike. The uproar caused by the prime minister’s words (Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said in a 1986 speech that education and intelligence levels in the United States were low because of its predominantly black and Hispanic population) forced Japan to apologise to the United States the next day. Faced with angry speeches in Congress and calls to boycott Japanese products, Nakasone officially admitted that he had offended many Americans and apologised (Burgess, 1986). ‘We are not used to living with people of other races’, lamented Tadashi Yamamoto, president of the Japan Centre for International Exchange (Burgess, 1986). Indeed, this says everything about the intolerance of the Japanese, which many respondents believe they inherited from their ancestors. Smith (2020) mentions Taro Aso’s (then foreign minister) request that Japanese citizens view their country in this way. The phrase ‘one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race’ emphasises the desire to create homogeneity out of diversity through cultural and linguistic assimilation.

Homogeneity and ‘Othering’ Correlates

Japan’s immigration and refugee policies aim to exclude foreigners and refugees. However, these policies have implications for the Japanese government’s efforts to expand the economy in the face of a declining birth rate, an ageing population and a labour shortage in the country. Over the next decade, the Japanese economy will need at least 17 million migrants to function (Ullah et al., 2019). Currently, 81% of Japanese companies struggle to find ‘ideal’ employees (Ullah et al., 2019). In addition, gender inequality in Japan has led to the outsourcing of many brides and grooms.

Due to the strong cultural beliefs of its citizens, the Japanese government is unable to admit questionable individuals (Aoki, 2016; Glogowski, 2018). The reluctance to accept immigrants is evident in interviews with native Japanese who believe that foreigners (and refugees) who do not adapt to Japanese culture have little chance of surviving in Japan. Japan’s attitude towards immigrants reflects its distinct national identity, which has developed over centuries of suppression of foreign influences. Being Japanese involves more than just speaking and writing the elusive language. It also means following etiquette in public and in private, adhering to complicated waste disposal rules and eating with chopsticks from bento boxes. Many Japanese believe that their culture is so, unique that foreigners and refugees have difficulty adapting (Katz, 2019).

‘Japan is tolerant but not accepting’, one of our interviewees said bluntly. On the surface, people seem tolerant, but subliminally there is hostility towards those who do not fit into society. Some Japanese businesses, schools and landlords not only try to exclude foreigners, but can even be hostile. Nearly one-third of foreigners and refugees living in Japan report receiving derogatory remarks based on their ethnicity, and nearly 40% have experienced discrimination when seeking housing (Hurst, 2017; Ryall, 2017). However, due to growing criticism of its refugee policy, Japan amended its legislation on 19 February 2021 (Akimoto, 2021). The criticism stems from Japan’s refusal to acknowledge the global refugee crisis. In 2015, Japan accepted only 0.3% of refugees, compared to 41% in Germany (Japan Association for Refugees, 2016). In South Korea, the programme allowed 57 refugees to enter the country in the same year (Nippon Communications Foundation, 2019).

The refugee issue essentially boils down to ‘saving lives’. In Japan, the issue is not a high political priority. Japan has the capacity to deal with the refugee issue. Japan has also signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nevertheless, Japan’s indifference to the plight of millions of refugees is shocking. The Japanese Immigration Service regulates the examination procedures for refugee status. This means that the focus is on control rather than refugee protection (Japan Association for Refugees, 2017). In Japan, persecution is interpreted differently. In addition to threats to life and physical liberty, human rights violations are also considered persecution in the United States, Canada and Europe when recognising refugees. In Japan, persecution is usually limited to threats to a person’s life and physical freedom. And even if a person is deprived of physical liberty, persecution is not recognised (Japan Association for Refugees, 2017). Considering this, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which is part of the UN Human Rights Commission, has called on the Japanese government to reconsider its strict system for screening refugees and inhumane treatment of long-term detainees (Fujibayashi, 2012).

Japan’s fundamental views on critical concepts, such as perceptions of diversity, differ significantly from those of the rest of the world. As a result of Japan’s extremely low world rank in gender equality, the discourse on diversity gained momentum. When it comes to diversity in Japan, the primary concern is gender equality, such as the low percentage of women in political and economic leadership positions and the large wage gap between men and women. Given the much lower racial diversity in Japan compared to, say, the United States or Europe, the limited diversity is perhaps understandable. In Japan, racial differences in appearance are less pronounced (Ishikura, 2020).

Attitudes Towards Refugees

According to the surveys, most Japanese do not want to see immigrants with different skin colour. We asked Japanese respondents about their views on the global refugee population. What do they think Japan owes to refugees? Two of the respondents (university students) said they were not familiar with refugees. When asked if they were familiar with the term ‘migrants’, all gave the same answer. Two Japanese respondents (university professors) were asked about refugees, their status and Japan’s obligations. Although both respondents answered our questions eloquently, they were all opposed to accepting refugees. They feared that refugees would not be able to integrate into their system. When we suggested leaving the adjustment to the refugees, they agreed. As if to tell us their inner thoughts, they mumbled something to themselves. This shows that they were uncomfortable acknowledging the distinction.

A Japanese man then asked why it was Japan’s responsibility to accept the refugees. When we mentioned the 1951 United Nations Convention and the fact that Japan had signed it, the response was that Japan was generous and that was why we had signed. But that did not mean that Japan had to accept people without first checking their background, their desire to adopt Japanese culture and their ability to adapt to the Japanese way of life. Why do you think that is? In countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States, the refugee population is thriving. In Australia and the United States, ‘We are unique’, was their response. They added that it is they who are causing problems in these countries. ‘See what happened to the US due to 9/11? It is because they allow so many immigrants. We do not want our country facing so many troubles like USA faced then.’ It is important to keep in mind that the Japanese are concerned about the ability of immigrants to adapt to Japanese culture. Yet they are significantly less concerned about the severity of the refugee crisis.

We believe that these respondents acted with integrity. Their rejection, on the other hand, may be due to the inhomogeneity of their upbringing, which has made them averse to the suffering of others. When asked what you would think if someone sought asylum in the United States, your response was unexpected. You all agreed that there is no way for U.S. citizens to find refuge, regardless of their professional background. However, they would gladly accept them if that were the case. The respondents (professionals) believe that Americans can adapt to our culture relatively easily. They hold this view because the United States is Japan’s closest ally. According to one of the foreigners interviewed, there are 23 U.S. military bases in Japan, with about 55,000 U.S. military personnel stationed there. Even though the Japanese are not in contact with the rest of the world, they are exposed to these forces. This may have contributed to a positive impression of the United States.

According to our respondents (refugees), the Japanese are isolated from the rest of the world. They believe that the United States is the centre of the universe. What does that mean exactly? They emphasised that less than 1% of Japanese live outside Japan. They are afraid to venture abroad. Consequently, their view of the world is extremely limited. Some Japanese were asked about the current migrant population in Japan. What do they believe about them? They claim that these people are trying to become Japanese by speaking our language, but how can they change their skin colour? We inquired whether they think this is a racial slur. According to five respondents, the answer is yes, but that is the truth.

Another Japanese respondent, who has been exposed to diverse cultures and values, explained that Japan’s exceptionally homogeneous society is maintained by government policies such as the nationwide uniform education system. There are very few religious or cultural differences, as all Japanese have similar religious and cultural beliefs, and Japanese food, language and lifestyle are also very similar. Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accept anything from the outside world. However, when it comes to Westerners, these cultural barriers disappear.

Japan’s treatment of many of our foreign interlocutors has outraged them. Anyone who has lived in Japan for 20 years has an impeccable criminal record, has never received a traffic ticket, and does not cause trouble is not considered a human being there. Nearly all respondents indicated that they had experienced varying degrees of xenophobic treatment. They also indicated that the frequency and severity of xenophobia have decreased over time. According to some scholars, xenophobia in Japan is due to Japanese people’s fear of foreign cultures that could cause them to lose their Japanese identity (Befu, 2001; Ishiwata, 2011). Other researchers consider the economic threat to be significant, as Japanese fear losing their jobs to foreigners (Fetzer, 2000; Nukaga, 2006). Nevertheless, current discussions of xenophobia in Japan fail to address several crucial issues: First, anti-immigrant sentiments exist in Japan, but who harbours them and against whom? To gain a deeper understanding of xenophobia, the second objective of this study is to determine whether objective and subjective characteristics, such as demographic characteristics and personal experiences, influence Japanese citizens’ negative attitudes towards immigrants. According to 2009 data from the Ministry of Justice, one-third of those denied entry in 2008 were Chinese (Liu-Farrer, 2010). Anti-immigrant attitudes are a contentious issue, especially in the context of Sino-Japanese relations, where the term ‘anti-immigrant attitudes’ encompasses different histories, attitudes towards governments, policies and the voices of average citizens (Zhang, 2015).

Horiuchi and Ono (2018) found surprisingly similar results in their studies, noting that in this highly homogeneous society with limited contact with foreigners, Japanese attitudes towards refugee resettlement and reactions to media images may differ from those of American citizens. They may be less willing to resettle refugees if they receive information, suggesting that migrants pose a threat (Ullah et al., 2020). Because the Japanese have little contact with refugees in their daily lives, such media images could have a significant impact on their attitudes towards refugee resettlement (Horiuchi and Ono, 2018). Several minority groups in Japan are persecuted, including the Ainu, Koreans and Okinawans (Yamamoto, 2015). Although the Japanese government does not consider prejudice against these groups as ‘racial’ minorities, they are often cited as the epicentre of racism issues in Japan. Yamamoto (2015) goes on to state that these ‘mixed-race’ people are affected by racism and xenophobia.

Of course, some view ‘homogeneous Japan’ as rhetoric and argue that this is no longer possible in a globalised world where nations must be inclusive to maintain their identity. At first glance, according to Hage (1999), inclusion and exclusion seem to be equally represented in Japanese identity. Based on the ‘othering’ theories of Nakamatsu (2002, pp. 152–153) and Ang (1996), ‘kokusaika’, the creation of Japanese foreigners, can be used to illustrate othering. In his work Kokusaika and its offshoots, Suzuki (2000, p. 156) identifies attempts to monopolise, dominate and incorporate foreign forces through dominant political discourse. When stereotypical representations of difference serve as the basis for inclusion, individuals and groups can be marginalised and excluded from positions of power and social engagement. The use of difference as an inclusion strategy obscures similarities, which is why Japanese men prefer foreign brides for ‘abnormal’ men (Piper, 1997, p. 322).

Conclusions

The purpose of this article is to examine whether Japan’s controversial domestic policies towards foreigners and refugees (especially long-term resident foreigners) reflect the country’s homogeneous society. One example of a country’s homogeneity is its attitude towards immigrants and asylum seekers. Compared to other resettlement countries, Japan accepts only a small number of asylum seekers and refugees. We believe that cultural (homogeneity) and historical factors shape perceptions of and responses to immigrants in Japan. This ‘open versus closed’ worldview assumes societal homogeneity. Why is societal homogeneity so compelling in terms of refugee acceptance? Fear is a powerful motivating factor. Fear is directed against the unknown or those perceived as different, including minorities such as immigrants and refugees.

Japan acceded to the 1951 Convention UN in 1982. In practice, however, Japan has been reluctant to accept refugees in need of protection under the UB Convention. In 2018, nearly 10,000 people applied for refugee status, but only 42 were granted it. The UNHCR defines persecution as ‘threats to life or liberty based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group’, as well as other serious human rights violations. In contrast, the Justice Department incorrectly defines ‘persecution’ only as a threat to life and limb.

The Japanese government does not feel compelled to address the global refugee crisis because there is no public pressure to do so. Contrary to the wishes of its citizens, the government has been able to hide its atrocities against refugees by donating to the UNHCR to avoid international condemnation. The Japanese legislature is considering new laws that would mandate even stricter refugee policies (Chase-Lubitz, 2021). The Japanese establishment (including the Ministry of Justice) views the domestic refugee crisis as a political problem that must be solved in a political rather than a humanitarian manner. Because of its institutional rigidity on refugee policy, the state has two political interests: First, it wants to prevent refugees from entering Japan through a closed-door policy, and second, it wants to send a clear message of ‘no entry’ to migrants seeking refuge in Japan. We believe that their continued homogeneity has played an important role in their indifference to the plight of refugees.