Immigration Politics: Socio-economic Contributions and Securitisation of Immigration in Botswana

Abstract

Botswana has relied on migrant skilled labour since gaining independence in 1966. Migrant skilled labour was recruited worldwide, contributing to Botswana’s socio-economic development trajectory. Consequently, Botswana was classified as a developmental state and an upper-middle-income economy by the 1990s. Using immigration politics to frame the debate, this research argues that migrant skilled labour was instrumental to Botswana’s political and socio-economic development, albeit creating systemic challenges. It contends that some of Botswana’s key economic sectors are controlled by some immigrants who exert undue influence on Botswana’s political leadership and economic policies, while also igniting xenophobic sentiments from indigenous communities. The research further maintains that Botswana has securitised immigration and indiscriminately declared immigrants who are not politically connected as prohibited. In conclusion, this research proposes immigration laws and policies that are inclusive and balance the interests of indigenous people, the state and immigrants.

Keywords

Immigration security economy politics Botswana

Introduction

Botswana’s economic development from independence in 1966 is often cited as an example of prudent economic management and political stability. An often-unexplored dimension to this analysis is the contribution of immigrants to Botswana’s socio-economic and political establishment and how the dynamics of migrant labour developed within, and alongside, economic growth to date. Botswana’s economy is currently undergoing some scrutiny as indigenous citizens realise and explore the extent of integration and control that some non-indigenous citizens have on the economy, policies and political leadership. Therefore, this research examines the contributions of immigrants to Botswana’s socio-economic development. It also analyses how immigrants influence and are influenced by culture in Botswana. This research also investigates the impact of Botswana’s immigration policies in shaping public perception of immigrants and security. Moreover, the article assesses the implications of securitising Botswana’s immigration policies on immigrant communities and immigration flows. Lastly, it investigates the role of political networks on the success and growth of immigrant-owned businesses. It argues that there is politicisation and securitisation of immigration in Botswana, and explores the implications of that on socio-economic and political development. It contextualises the exclusion of indigenous citizens from some key sectors of the economy and how that exclusion is the source of immigration challenges in Botswana, including xenophobic sentiments. This article also contends that there are strong connections between Botswana’s political elite and some immigrant entrepreneurs, resulting in controversial and inconsistent immigration policies. The conclusion recommends immigration and economic policy reforms that are inclusive, less securitised and balance between the interests of immigrants and indigenous citizens.

This research used secondary sources of data that include journal articles, government reports, magazines, newspapers, official statistics, books and online sources. Document analysis was applied to the data collected from the sources. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), document analysis involves examining the data to identify patterns, themes and relationships. Analysis of the collected data yields the following four themes: contributions of immigrants to Botswana’s socio-economic development trajectory, cultural integration and immigrant dynamics, securitisation of immigration, and political capital and immigrant enterprises. These themes are discussed as subheadings in this article under the section ‘Findings and Discussion’.

Immigration in Botswana

Immigration in Botswana is subject to the Immigration Act and related legislation, including the Citizenship Act, Employment Act, Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges Act, National Security Act and the Refugee (Recognition and Control) Act. Immigration refers to the process of becoming a citizen or permanent resident of another country (Parry, 2021) or a prolonged stay in another country. Section 18 of Botswana’s Immigration Act prescribes that a person who may reside in Botswana shall be anyone: who is a citizen of Botswana, has a valid visitor’s or residence permit or is exempted by the minister or entitled to diplomatic immunities and privileges (Republic of Botswana, 2011). The Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges Act determines who is entitled to such immunity and privileges. The employment of a non-citizen is primarily subject to the Employment Act and Immigration Act. Meeting the requirements of the two Acts makes a non-citizen eligible to be considered for both residence and work permits, after the approval of which, one becomes an immigrant in Botswana. Immigrants in Botswana are restricted from engaging in certain activities such as working without a valid work permit or exemption certificate (Republic of Botswana, 2011).

According to the Immigration Act (Republic of Botswana, 2011), a non-citizen may stay in Botswana as a visitor for an aggregate of not more than 90 days per calendar year, while a migrant worker or investor may be issued with a residence permit not exceeding 5 and 10 years, respectively. Applications for visitor’s permits are managed by the immigration officers at the ports of entry, while permits for longer stays of more than 90 days per year are considered by the director of immigration or the Immigration Selection Board and/or the commissioner of labour. Both work and residence permits are renewable at the discretion of the officer(s) in charge. A non-citizen who has resided in Botswana lawfully for at least 5 years qualifies to apply for permanent residence according to Section 28 of the Immigration Act (Republic of Botswana, 2011). Permanent residence is granted by the minister responsible for immigration, who also has the power to reject or exempt the application or even withdraw the permanent residence status without providing reasons (Republic of Botswana, 2011). The minister also has the power to cancel any permit where an immigrant is in violation of Botswana laws or terms of the permit or has completed the task for which the permit was issued.

Immigration in Botswana also includes the declaration of immigrants as prohibited in the country. The Immigration Act describes a prohibited immigrant as someone who has been sentenced to prison without an option of a fine either in Botswana or outside or anyone declared so by the president of Botswana (Republic of Botswana, 2011). According to the Act, a person declared prohibited is to be removed from Botswana. However, a person protected by the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act cannot be declared a prohibited immigrant. Furthermore, Section 41(2)(b)(5) states that a person declared a prohibited immigrant by the president of Botswana cannot challenge such a decision in any court of law or appeal it. Sections 48(1) and (2) state that

A person shall not have the right to be heard before or after a decision is made by the President in relation to that person under this Act, (2) A person affected by any decision made under subsection (1) shall not have the right to demand any information as to the grounds of such decision nor shall any such information be disclosed in any court. (Republic of Botswana, 2011, A.27)

The Immigration Act and the National Security Act have been instrumental in the detention, deportation and prohibition of some immigrants by the government of Botswana. From the 1960s to 2020, a significant number of immigrants were either declared prohibited immigrants or deported from Botswana (Good, 2008; Grant, 2005; Taylor, 2006). Reasons for the deportation and declaration of immigrants as prohibited are often not disclosed, except in a few cases where security concerns are cited, without specificity. Undocumented and illegal immigrants in Botswana are often detained and deported to their countries of origin at the expense of the government of Botswana (Global Detention Project, 2020). Additionally, Sections 50 and 51 of the Immigration Act deal with undesirable immigrants. According to the Act, an undesirable immigrant is anyone who is mentally or physically incapacitated, has no sufficient means to care for themselves, is a dependent of an undesirable immigrant, is a prostitute or lives on the earnings of prostitution knowingly or is infected with a disease (Republic of Botswana, 2011). The minister may order the deportation of such a person.

Botswana is a party to most international conventions on refugees and migrants. These include the 1951 Refugee Convention; the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. Accordingly, Botswana enacted the Refugee (Recognition and Control) Act that focuses on refugees and asylum seekers. All refugee and asylum matters in Botswana are handled by the Ministry of Justice, whereas all immigration matters are managed by the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. Notwithstanding the foregoing, refugees are subject to the provisions of the Immigration Act (Republic of Botswana, 2011).

According to the Refugee Act (Republic of Botswana, 1967), any immigrant considered to be a political refugee is eligible to reside in Botswana subject to the approval of the minister of justice. The Act defines a political refugee as any person who comes to Botswana from their country of origin due to a fear of persecution based on their political opinion, race, religion, or nationality. Furthermore, Botswana’s Refugee Act protects the refugees in the country from prosecution without the written consent of the attorney general. Since its enactment in 1968, the Refugee Act has made it possible for Botswana to accommodate refugees, especially during the liberation struggles in Africa. In 1968, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Botswana was 3,600, before increasing to 8,890 in 1971 and rising sharply to 23,290 in 1979 (World Bank, 2023), possibly due to the political instabilities and liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The numbers of both refugees and asylum seekers in Botswana dropped drastically to less than 300 in the 1990s (World Bank, 2023), following the end of liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. However, the numbers increased again in the early 2000s and stood at 2,833 refugees by 2014 (UNHCR, 2015), before dropping to 688 in 2021 (World Bank, 2023).

Moreover, Botswana also experienced a flow of legal, illegal and undocumented immigrants (Morapedi, 2007; Oucho et al., 2000; Schapera, 1947). According to Macro Trends (2022), Botswana received 7,199 documented immigrants in 1960 (CSO, 1988; Statistics Botswana, 2015, 2021). The number of immigrants at that time could have been higher as the statistics did not include undocumented and illegal immigrants from the liberation struggles in Africa at that time. The number of immigrants to Botswana rose to 10,404 by 1970, then to 15,036 in 1980 and 40,168 in 1995 before growing significantly to 160,644 in 2010 (Macro Trends, 2022). The growing numbers of immigrants to Botswana, though seemingly small, are significant given the country’s population, which is less than 2.4 million people as per the 2021 national population census. Immigrants into Botswana come mostly from other African countries and other parts of the world, such as Europe, Asia and North America. By 1981, Botswana had 4,985 immigrants from Europe, 75% of whom were from the United Kingdom (CSO, 1988), and the number increased to 5,606 in 1991 (CSO, 1991). The number of Asian immigrants to Botswana increased from 940 in 1981 to 4,190 in 1991 (Oucho et al., 2000). Furthermore, immigrants come to Botswana for various reasons, including employment, investment or other economic opportunities or as refugees (CSO, 1988; Macro Trends, 2022; Oucho et al., 2000; Statistics Botswana, 2018a; UNHCR, 2015).

The immigrants in Botswana get various reception depending on their country of origin, race or nationality. Immigrants from Europe and North Africa enjoy warm public reception, while those of Asian descent get mixed reactions from the public. The latter is often perceived to be exploiting both economic opportunities and political leadership at the expense of the citizens (Mbaiwa, 2017; Ontebetse, 2017). On the other hand, some credit Asian immigrants for Botswana’s infrastructure development (Baaitse, 2019a; Ndlovu, 2011; Tawiah et al., 2022; Zi, 2015). Immigrants from other African countries have also been received with mixed views by indigenous citizens, but generally welcomed. More importantly, immigrants have contributed significantly to Botswana’s socio-economic development since 1966. Botswana relied heavily on immigrant skilled labour, especially in the education sector between the 1960s and 1990s (CSO, 1986, 2003; Suping, 2021). The country continues to rely on immigrant personnel in private and public health sectors, as well as mining, construction and retail sectors (CSO, 1986, 2009; Statistics Botswana, 2017). Botswana’s agricultural and informal sectors also rely on unskilled migrant labour (legal and illegal) from the neighbouring countries working as farm labourers and domestic workers (Betts, 2013; Lesetedi & Modie-Moroka, 2007; Maphosa & Ntau, 2021; Oucho et al., 2000).

The Concept of Immigration Politics

Immigration is a highly political issue as it determines who gets what, how and when. Immigration laws and policies are products of contentious political processes in both high-income and lower-middle income countries. Political debates on immigration determine immigration policies and regulations, migration flows and the rights of immigrants. The economic value of immigrants is a consideration in high-income and lower-middle income countries, wherein special immigration statuses are granted to non-citizens who bring in much-needed skills such as talented sportspersons, investors, engineers, health workers and other professionals (Borjas, 1995; Groenhout, 2012; Parry, 2021; Pol, 2006). Some countries rely on unskilled and cheap migrant labour in their socio-economic development (Harington et al., 2004; Lucas, 1985; Suping, 2022). Countries also forge agreements on the supply of migrant labour, and such agreements are often products of tense political debates on the costs and benefits of migration flows (Söllner, 1999). In some cases, the migrant workers must make an undertaking that they will not settle permanently in their country of employment. Congruous with this was South Africa’s agreement with Botswana and other countries in Southern Africa on the supply of migrant mine workers and farm labourers during the twentieth century (Breytenbach, 1972; Suping, 2022; Taylor, 1987).

Immigration has also triggered some controversies and political–economic challenges in some countries. Immigration management has proved to be paradoxical. The debates on the socio-economic benefits of immigrants are politically divisive, and often centre on economic equity and the distribution of wealth between indigenous citizens and immigrants (Legrain, 2006; Pritchett, 2006; Riley, 2008). As much as countries welcome immigrants for the possible benefits they can accrue from them, they also struggle to manage immigration-related issues such as xenophobia, discrimination and abuse of immigrants (Matsinhe, 2011; Morapedi, 2007; Moses, 2009; Nagar & Saunders, 2011). Moreover, immigration can also create some political governance challenges. In some cases, immigrants are accused of introducing ‘new cultures’ that negatively impact the existing ones in the host countries, resulting in the enactment of anti-immigration laws and policies (Chanika et al., 2013; Mooketsane & Suping, 2018; Pavlik et al., 2019; West, 2011).

The politics of immigration also includes illegal and undocumented immigrants. Discourses on these types of immigrants have focused on their economic costs, as some argue that a lot of resources are spent on searching for illegal and undocumented immigrants, building immigrants’ detention centres, caring for them during detention and repatriating them to their countries (Borjas, 1995; West, 2011). Others argue that undocumented and illegal immigrants are usually employed, especially in the informal sector, but do not pay taxes, although they utilise social services (Borjas, 1995; West, 2011). In other instances, immigrants are discriminated against and perceived to be criminals or potential terrorists (Aslan, 2022; Moses, 2009), ultimately securitising immigration. The counter-debates have centred on the value of undocumented and illegal immigrants, that they provide much-needed unskilled labour cheaply, especially where citizens are not willing to work (Moses, 2009). While the politics of immigration has been used as a framework of analysis in other countries like the United States (Simpson, 1984), that has not been the case with Botswana, hence this study.

Findings and Discussion

As mentioned in the ‘Introduction’ section, the analysis of data yields results that are summarised into four themes, discussed in the following sub-sections.

Contributions of Immigrants to Botswana’s Socio-economic Development Trajectory

When Botswana got independence in 1966, its human development was incredibly low. The country was undeveloped and drained of its unskilled labour by neighbouring South Africa’s mining industry (Breytenbach, 1972; Harington et al., 2004; Jeeves, 1986; Suping, 2022). There was also a serious deficit of skilled labour, resulting in Botswana introducing and depending on immigrant labour in developing major sectors of the economy from then to date, hence forming what Mogalakwe (2008) would later refer to as ‘labour aristocracy’ in Botswana’s working class, wherein immigrant workers are given preferential treatment at the expense of those of its citizens. Botswana’s education sector is one of those that depended on immigrants to develop. Between 1966 and 1990, Botswana’s education system had more than 60% immigrant teachers (Suping, 2021). The immigrant teachers were recruited from all over the world, but mostly from Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa. Since the early 2000s, the number of immigrant teachers has decreased significantly, especially in public schools (Statistics Botswana, 2013, 2018b; Suping, 2021). Immigrants have also contributed to the development of Botswana’s health sector. In 1970, Botswana had 500 immigrant doctors, before increasing to 3,000 in 1990 and then to more than 6,000 in 2018 (CSO, 1986, 1997; World Bank, 2018). Most of the country’s specialised medical services are still provided by immigrant medical personnel (Statistics Botswana, 2018b, 2021). Some of the immigrant teachers and medical personnel successfully applied for permanent residence and citizenship in Botswana during or post their service contracts (Macro Trends, 2022; Statistics Botswana, 2021; Suping, 2021).

Furthermore, Botswana’s manufacturing, transport logistics and mining sectors have also heavily depended on immigrant skilled labour over the past five decades. Most of the companies doing major infrastructure projects such as national roads are owned by immigrants. More than 30% of the skilled personnel in the mining industry are immigrants (Statistics Botswana, 2018a, 2021). According to official statistics, the retail, trade and tourism sectors have also attracted immigrants (CSO, 2009; Statistics Botswana, 2012, 2021, 2022). The immigrants in the aforementioned sectors come into Botswana as either workers or investors and are given 5- and 10-year residence permits under the Immigration Act, respectively. Additionally, Botswana’s agricultural sector continues to rely on immigrant labour, especially illegal and undocumented migrants who are often preferred over citizens (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021; Morapedi, 2007). Preference for immigrant labourers is largely influenced by the tendency of some farmers and households to exploit them due to their illegal immigration status (Akinola, 2018; Maphosa & Ntau, 2021; Oucho et al., 2000). The role of immigrants in the informal sector working as hairdressers, hawkers, cleaners and artisans or offering some technical services such as plumbing, electrical and mechanical jobs is also significant. Consequently, complaints have been raised by some indigenous citizens against immigrants, arguing they are taking their opportunities, resulting in the enactment of some discriminatory laws or policies to protect and reserve certain aspects of the informal sector for indigenous citizens (Daily News, 2014; Sunday Standard, 2022).

Cultural Integration and Immigrant Dynamics

Immigrants have contributed to Botswana’s sociocultural development. Botswana’s music industry reflects the influence of exogenous genres from hip-hop, kwaito-kwasa, afro-pop/jazz, RnB, rock, house, disco and gospel. Most indigenous citizens prefer exogenous genres, especially from South Africa, and some of the local radio stations are even often accused by local artists for giving priority to international music content over the local one (Kaelo, 2021; Motsumi, 2021; Sunday Standard, 2011; Yarona, 2020). Since the 1970s, some prominent South African music artists have frequented Botswana on temporary immigration status or visitor permits issued under the Immigration Act to conduct music concerts. These include popular artists and groups among Botswana, such as Miriam Makeba, Yvonne Chaka Chaka, Brenda Fassie, Peta and Forsta Teanet, Splash, Stimela and Johny Mokhali (Kgamanyane, 2022; Olaoluwa, 2016; Seretse, 2010). The reception of such music artists, measured by their popularity and citizens’ attendance at their festivals, has always exceeded that of the indigenous citizen artists (Mzansi Scenes, 2022). South African contemporary music artists also feature prominently in Botswana’s music and art industry in the twenty-first century, inspiring and influencing the younger generation’s taste in music. The likes of Ndivhudzannyi Ralivhona (popularly known as Makhadzi), Cassper Nyovest, Kabza De Small and the exogenous genres like ‘amapiano’ are popular amongst the young people of Botswana and well received locally.

Some migrant artists have also been accused of challenging some of Botswana’s traditional cultural values, in the process triggering controversy and legal interventions. A case in point is the temporary visit of Zodwa Rebecca Libram (popularly known as Zodwa Wabantu). Zodwa is a South African artist popularly known for dancing half-naked in her festivals, thus attracting large crowds, especially the males whom one Zimbabwean radio station described as ‘inquisitive men’ (Ndlovu, 2017). Her festivals and stay in Botswana were cut short by the Botswana Police in December 2021, blaming her for public indecency (Tlhankane, 2022). Similar complaints were raised in Eswatini, Zambia and her home country of South Africa, resulting in the former two banning her from their territories (Lusaka Times, 2018; Nehanda Radio, 2019; van den Heever, 2021). Furthermore, there is a wide perception among indigenous citizens that an increase in crime rates and other social ills come with immigrants (Maphosa & Ntau, 2021; Morapedi, 2007). However, no substantive evidence has been provided to that effect, even though such perceptions shape the reception of immigrants in Botswana and result in some xenophobic sentiments.

Securitisation of Immigration

Immigration in Botswana is securitised. The non-indigenous citizens who criticise the government of Botswana often get declared prohibited immigrants under the Immigration Act and the National Security Act. In 1969, Phillip Matouane, a South African who was a secondary school teacher in Kanye and president of the Botswana Teachers Union, was deported for being vocal about poor development initiatives in Botswana (Grant, 2005). Some newspaper editors, Mxagashe and Gwen Ansell, were also deported from Botswana in the 1980s for undisclosed reasons (Grant, 2005). Braam le Roux, a missionary and the then director of Kuru Development Trust, which promoted the rights, culture and inclusion of the Bushmen or Basarwa, was deported from Botswana in 1993 (Armstrong, 2010; Grant, 2005; Taylor, 2006; The Guardian, 2010). le Roux brought awareness to the world about the plight and marginalisation of Basarwa in a country of abundance that had been classified as a middle-income economy by the World Bank in 1986 (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Armstrong, 2010; Good, 2008; Leith, 2005; Samatar, 1999). Some immigrants in Botswana, amongst them Sam Mbaiwa and Naz Kader, were also declared undesirable and deported from Botswana (Grant, 2005).

Many other immigrants in Botswana continue to face uncertainty, deportation and discrimination during their stay in the country because of the indiscriminate use of the Immigration Act and National Security Act. The National Security Act is often used unfairly to detain and declare immigrants as undesirable or prohibited in Botswana, claiming security reasons without providing details. Amongst the victims of the National Security Act was Professor Kenneth Good. Professor Good was an Australian national teaching at the University of Botswana since 1990, and was declared a prohibited immigrant and deported in 2005 (Taylor, 2006). The government of Botswana did not disclose the reasons for declaring Professor Good a prohibited immigrant, except to mention that he was a security threat. Speculation became rife that he was deported for being critical of the government and the one-sided success narratives that Botswana enjoyed at the time (Taylor, 2006). Professor Good had written several publications that challenged the prevalent socio-economic and political success narratives on Botswana before his deportation. His writings drew attention to unpopular and marginalised issues in Botswana’s democracy, such as the exclusion of minorities, high inequalities despite Botswana’s developmental state status, prevalent poverty and elite corruption in the country (Good, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999).

The deportation of Professor Good marked the beginning of an era that would politicise and intensely securitise immigration in Botswana more than ever before. Many immigrants were declared prohibited immigrants, and some refugees were deported between 2005 and 2018 (All Africa, 2016; Mooketsi, 2010; OCHA, 2019; Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 2015). Gordon Bennett, a British national, had visa restrictions imposed on him and technically denied entry into Botswana in 2013 at the time when he was representing Basarwa in their case against the government’s decision to forcefully and unlawfully relocate them from their ancestral land of Central Kalahari Game Reserve (All Africa, 2016; Sunday Standard, 2013a, 2013b). Bennett, like many others, was said to be a security threat. Many critics of the government of Botswana, like South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters president, Julius Malema, also had visa restrictions imposed on them for what was termed ‘security reasons’ after criticising the government and suggesting the need for regime change in Botswana (Sunday Standard, 2013a). Both Bennett and Malema were required to obtain visas to enter Botswana, while ordinarily, South African and British nationals do not require an entry visa into Botswana.

The securitisation of immigration and the institutionalisation of discrimination against immigrants were reported to be enabled by some state agencies. The Botswana Directorate on Intelligence and Security (DISS) was reported to have admitted to making some immigration decisions (Masokola, 2017; Sunday Standard, 2015a), instead of leaving it to the immigration department as prescribed by the laws. In some instances, some immigrants who sought asylum were deported to their countries of origin without considering the possible dangers they faced back home. An example is the deportation of two Ugandan nationals, Musa Isabrye and Timothy Tamin, in 2015 without disclosing the reasons (Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 2015; Sunday Standard, 2015b). Some refugees at Botswana’s Dukwi refugee camp were accused of engaging in political and criminal activities, and deported to their countries of origin without much investigation into allegations against them (The Gazette, 2018). Some illegal immigrants are often detained at the Francistown Centre for Illegal Immigrants, with the state alleging they are a security threat (Centre for Investigative Journalism, 2017; Sunday Standard, 2015c). The application of both the National Security Act and the Immigration Act has been selective and used to justify xenophobia under the guise of a national security threat, in some instance.

Political Capital and Immigrant Enterprises

Some immigrant entrepreneurs in Botswana are often accused of relying on political capital to influence decision-making and serve their profit-making interests. Political capital refers to social power derived from networks and political connections intended to gain access to resources and influence public policy (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000). Botswana’s business is best described as a synergy between immigrant business interests and those of some political elites, especially some self-serving politicians who use their political office or influence to benefit themselves, their families or associates. These connections and associations have resulted in unprecedented wealth creation for some immigrants. Consequently, Botswana’s economic elite is made of some politicians and non-indigenous citizens, most of whom have naturalised and become citizens. As the two groups have intersected, so have their interests. For example, in 2017, Forbes magazine listed Botswana’s 10 ultra-wealthy individuals and most of them were non-indigenous Batswana, who had joint business ventures with some political leaders (Mfonobong, 2017).

Furthermore, some of Botswana’s retail successful companies are owned by families of naturalised Batswana and have been the preferred investment establishment for the country’s political elite. One of those companies has enjoyed the shareholding of one of Botswana’s former presidents, Festus Mogae. Mogae acquired his shareholding in the retail group towards the end of his presidency in 2008 (Market Screener, 2023; Newel, 2019). The company has had bad publicity concerning its poor treatment of indigenous citizen workers, both in a general sense and also in comparison to its workers in its franchises in neighbouring countries (Kgamanyane, 2019; Sunday Standard, 2014), but there has been no government intervention. Furthermore, Botswana’s President Masisi has also been tied to the same retail enterprise, fuelling sentiments of the undue influence of the company on Botswana’s presidents and the possibility of state capture (Centre for Investigative Journalism, 2017).

The connections between the immigrant business community and the political elite in Botswana got institutionalised and protected in some sectors such as tourism, and that has ignited xenophobic sentiments. For example, during Ian Khama’s presidency from 2008 to 2018, his brother served as the minister responsible for tourism, where his family had great interest. Mbaiwa (2017) and Kiema (2010) found that Botswana’s tourism sector has a few players, including the Khama family, who exclusively benefit from its million-dollar revenues. Mbaiwa and Hambira (2018) noted that there is an unofficial partnership between exogenous tourism companies and Botswana’s political elite that breeds and sustains both monopoly and corruption. The consequence of this interconnectedness between the immigrant business community and Botswana’s political elite often borders on corruption and double standards. Some immigrants who are not part of this political capital are often accused of being national security threats and get deported or declared prohibited immigrants. However, other immigrants who are accused of corruption, fraud and embezzlement of money, amounting to millions of dollars, are not deported because of their connection to some ruling party elites (Baaitse, 2019b; Lute, 2018; Malema, 1999). Some of the immigrant companies have exploited their connections with the political elites and failed to deliver quality projects at the end of their tender contracts, resulting in complaints from the public (Ndlovu, 2014; Sunday Standard, 2015d). Some of the classical cases of corruption, mismanagement and waste of public resources enabled by immigrants–political elite connections are the Morupule B Power Station and the Palapye Glass Plant, both of which were awarded to some immigrant companies under dubious circumstances (Sunday Standard, 2015d). Millions of dollars of the taxpayer’s money were spent on these projects, but never operated, and no one was held accountable.

Conclusion

Immigrants and naturalised Batswana have an undeniably privileged position in Botswana’s economy, justly and unjustly. The country’s economic elites are composed mainly of them and the political elites who are roped into business ventures to ensure survival using their political power and influence. The connection between Botswana’s political elite and immigrants or their companies has been part of the country’s political and economic history since the 1970s. That has disadvantaged, marginalised and excluded indigenous citizens while creating and sustaining systemic inequalities, inequities and high poverty rates in a country of economic abundance celebrated as one of Africa’s longest-stable democracies. Botswana also faced some criticism from the international community for some wholesale deportations and prohibited immigrants’ declarations, but not much attention was being given to its possible long-term implications, such as institutionalising xenophobia. Botswana’s stance on handling immigration and deportation issues is evidence of policy contradictions as the country committed to integration, at least regionally, but embarked on indiscriminate securitisation of immigration. The good contributions of immigrants to Botswana’s sociopolitical landscapes are undeniable. However, the citizens’ perceptions and analysis of this contribution need better management by the government to avert possible political governance challenges, such as xenophobia. There is an imperative need for policy reforms that are inclusive, balanced, constituent and not clouded by political interests.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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