What is the trend in rentierism in the Middle East and North Africa? Defining a rentier state as one that extracts a significant share of its revenues from rents extracted from international transactions, we examine a range of such transactions that together constitute a third or more of the Middle East/North Africa economies. Outlining a rentierism index that is based on the share of GDP stemming from oil/mineral exports, foreign military and economic aid, worker remittances, and international tourism, we show that rentierism is growing and that 18 of the 22 Middle East/North Africa states depend for over a third of their GDP on these international transactions. Some depend on direct rents stemming from oil/mineral exports and foreign aid, while others rely increasingly on indirect rents from remittances and tourism. This split between direct and indirect rents has implications for the political stability of these states, because it creates states that are more or less able to maintain control in the face of popular resistance and insurgency.
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