Abstract
This article emphasizes how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of windows of opportunity can play a decisive role for major changes in the foreign policy of states by conducting two case studies. The first case is the change that occurred in Denmark’s foreign policy in August 1990 when its government dispatched a warship to the Persian Gulf to participate in the monitoring of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. The second case is the change that occurred in Australia’s foreign policy in April–May 2003 when its government abandoned Australia’s long-standing “hands-off” approach toward Solomon Islands by leading a multinational military intervention. The article demonstrates that individual decision-makers, with a long-standing desire to change policy, perceived structural changes as a window of opportunity for initiating the desired policy changes. The article concludes that, had it not been for these particular individuals, and their perceptions of the world around them, events would most likely have unfolded in a different way.
Keywords
When Australian Prime Minister John Howard received a letter from the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands in April 2003, yet again asking for assistance, he did not dismiss the request as he had done several times before. Instead, he consulted with his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who said: “Look, the situation is just dire. I think we should take this very seriously and have a look at what we can do” (O’Callaghan, 2003b). Howard perceived the Prime Minister’s letter as his window of opportunity on his long-standing desire to increase Australia’s influence in the South Pacific and to solve the long-time deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands. The perception of Howard of an opportunity window was what ultimately led to an Australian military intervention in Solomon Islands in April–May 2003.
This article sets out to highlight how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of windows of opportunity can play a decisive role for major changes in foreign policy. 1 Foreign policy change as a specific phenomenon within Foreign Policy Analysis has received increasing scholarly attention since the end of the Cold War. Most of the previous research has given primary explanatory power to structural factors, such as changes in international or domestic political circumstances, while overlooking the importance of decision-makers (Cason and Power, 2009; Hermann, 1990; Huxsoll, 2003; Lee, 2007; Meernik, 2011; Niklasson, 2006; Rosati et al., 1994; Skidmore, 2005; Volgy and Schwarz, 1991). However, there is a small but expanding literature examining how individuals matter for policy change (Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996; Stein, 1994; Ziv, 2011, 2013). In line with this research, the article demonstrates that the process of policy change can start with the decision-maker, and not with structural change, thus placing the individual in the center of the analysis. As a contribution to this literature, the article revisits the old notion of the window of opportunity, which has previously been used in studies of armed conflict and of domestic institutional change, but which has not figured prominently in studies of foreign policy change.
The article elaborates on what a window of opportunity is and illustrates empirically how a leader’s perception of an opportunity window can lead to policy change. More specifically, the article shows that policy change can be the result of the determined efforts of an individual decision-maker, who perceives a structural change in the international environment as a window of opportunity and acts on it in order to initiate desired policy changes. 2 As demonstrated here, leaders not only change their desires in response to structural changes, but they can also exploit such changes in order to realize pre-existing desires. When leaders perceive the opening of opportunity windows, it is essential that they act quickly, since a window may not be open for long and the conditions can quickly change again.
We demonstrate the explanatory relevance of the window of opportunity in two cases of major foreign policy change. The first case is the change that occurred in Danish foreign policy in August 1990 when its government decided to dispatch a warship to the Persian Gulf to participate in the United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq. 3 The second case concerns the change that occurred in Australian foreign policy in April–May 2003 when the Howard Government abandoned its long-standing “hands-off” approach toward Solomon Islands by leading a military intervention. The subsequent empirical analysis shows that previous research on foreign policy change cannot provide a sufficient explanation of these two policy changes.
The article is divided into four sections. The first discusses the agency-structure issue and how the window of opportunity has been conceptualized in previous research as well as elaborating on the theoretical argument of the article. In the following two sections, policy change in Denmark and Australia are investigated. Each empirical section starts with a discussion of the extent of the policy change. Then it identifies the key decision-makers and their desires to change policy. After that, it demonstrates how the decision-makers perceived an opportunity window and exploited it in order to initiate the desired policy changes. The final section summarizes the main findings of the case studies and discusses the need for further research.
Windows of opportunity and policy change
A central issue in the study of foreign policy change concerns the relationship between structure and agency. Structural approaches hold that policy change occurs as a result of governments (as unitary actors) adjusting their behavior in response to changes in the international and/or domestic political environment (Cason and Power, 2009; Huxsoll, 2003; Lee, 2007; Meernik, 2011; Niklasson, 2006; Rosati et al., 1994; Skidmore, 2005). These approaches are based on the assumption that decision-makers perceive environmental constraints and opportunities relatively accurately and similarly. Agency-based perspectives, however, argue that structural approaches have obscured the autonomy that decision-makers often exercise in bringing about policy change (Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996; Stein, 1994; Ziv, 2011, 2013). One problem with the structural approaches is that decision-makers may perceive the environment differently than indicated by objective measures. Agency-based perspectives doubt that the scholar’s view of the situation and the actor’s view of the situation are likely to be the same. Another problem with the structural approaches is that perceptions about the “same” environmental circumstances may vary between different leaders and between different decision-makers within the same government. Therefore, we need to place primary emphasis on the identification of the perceptions actors have about the environment, rather than searching for explanatory factors in an objective incentive structure of the environment.
Accordingly, in the study of foreign policy change, some scholars argue that, in order to have any impact on policy, structural change needs to be perceived by individual decision-makers (Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996). In addition, agency-based scholarship has also included the notion of learning in their explanations of policy change (Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Stein, 1994; Ziv, 2011, 2013). In essence, the concern of the learning perspectives is the relationship between decision-makers’ changing beliefs and self-correcting policy change. What agency-based perspectives have assumed so far is, thus, that changes in the desire or in the beliefs of decision-makers is a necessary condition for policy change. However, this article investigates two cases in which there was no significant change in the desires of the decision-makers prior to the policy change. In order to explain such cases, we need to include the notion of opportunity windows.
This concept has mostly been used in studies of armed conflict (Lebow, 1984; Smith, 2007; Van Evera, 1999; Zartman, 2001) and of domestic institutional change (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010; Kingdon, 1984). The concept most often refers to a moment in time in which some kind of structural change occurs, which either creates a situation in which a state possesses a significant military advantage (as conceptualized in the literature on armed conflict) or creates a moment of opportunity which can be used by leaders for introducing new policy proposals. Some scholars define the occurrence of a window objectively, thus, from the outside, not taking into account whether the actors recognized the window or not. We argue that it is crucial to look at the perceptions of actors, since the window cannot be exploited by the actors unless they recognize its existence. A weakness in the literature is that the individual and the state are often used interchangeably, thus making it unclear whether windows are perceived by states or individuals. We argue that it is important to look at how the individual must perceive the window, in order for policy change to occur.
Our conceptualization of the opportunity window is based on the works of Kingdon (1984) and others working in his footsteps (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010). Kingdon (1984) illustrates how policy entrepreneurs pursue a particular policy and wait patiently for their opportunity to arrive to push it on to the agenda, thus already having the desire for a policy change before the timing is right. In the study of foreign policy change, the concept has not been used in this way. Gustavsson (1999) incorporates some of Kingdon’s basic ideas into a model of foreign policy change. 4 In this model, the decision-maker interprets the structural changes as an opportunity window and then acts within the decision-making process to launch a political proposal. However, Gustavsson writes that the beliefs of the decision-makers have to change as a result of the structural change. In his study of the Swedish reorientation on membership in the European Community (EC), Prime Minister Carlsson suddenly becomes interested in EC membership after perceiving the end of the Cold War as an opportunity, and proceeds to apply on behalf of Sweden. In contrast to Gustavsson, we argue that a structural change needs to be perceived by decision-makers as a window for initiating policy changes that they already desire, and that without these particular individuals, the policy changes would most likely not have occurred. Gustavsson argues that Sweden would have applied for EC membership even without Carlsson, but earlier or later. The decision-maker Carlsson was only important for the timing of policy change, not for the change to happen at all.
As defined here, a window of opportunity opens when an individual decision-maker perceives a change in international or domestic political circumstances as an opportunity for initiating desired policy changes if he/she acts quickly. This view of windows can be related to Zartman’s (2001) concept of ripeness, which he uses to explain the timing of peace initiatives. Ripeness, just like opportunity windows, must be perceived and seized by the agents, according to Zartman (2001: 9). Thus, even if a decision-maker is willing to change policy, he/she may not have the opportunity to do so (Most and Starr, 1980). Crucial to whether there will be a policy change is whether the decision-maker recognizes the window. Timing is of the essence here. As Kingdon (1984) has shown, before too long, the window might close and the opportunity be missed.
Previous research would explain the changes in Danish and Australian policy as being the result of one of the following causes: a unitary government adapts to structural change; a single decision-maker becomes willing to change policy after perceiving a structural change; or, a single decision-maker becomes willing to change policy after experiencing a learning process. This article argues that previous research cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the two cases, since the initiative to change policy in both countries can be linked to the determined efforts of key decision-makers, who perceived changes in the international environment as an opportunity window and acted on it in order to initiate changes that they already desired. In Denmark, the key decision-maker was Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, while in Australia there were two key individuals: Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer, who worked together to initiate the policy change. For Ellemann-Jensen, the international changes were the end of the Cold War, the rise of new security threats in its aftermath, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and, most importantly, the initiation of the American-led coalition to combat Saddam Hussein. For the Australian decision-makers, the international changes were the onset of the war-on-terror combined with deteriorating conditions in Solomon Islands and, most importantly, the letter sent by the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands. The argument here is that structural, international change by itself cannot explain the cases, since a necessary condition for the policy changes was that the structural change was perceived by the key decision-makers as a window of opportunity for initiating policy changes that they already desired. Thus, the particular way in which Denmark and Australia responded to the structural changes cannot be explained without reference to the decision-makers and their perceptions and desires.
In order to demonstrate that the perception of decision-makers of an opportunity window was a necessary factor, and that the particular individual(s) was/were the main initiator(s) of the policy change, several methodological conditions are required. First, before the structural change occurred, the key decision-maker should have in his speeches, interviews and remarks expressed a desire for policy change. Second, other members of the decision-making process should not have expressed similar ideas at this point in time, which indicates that the original idea of changing policy came from the key decision-maker only. Third, the structural change should be recognized as an opportunity to change policy by the decision-maker in his statements and remarks.
The Danish participation in sanctions against Iraq
When the UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned a naval blockade against Iraq on 25 August 1990, Denmark decided to send a warship to the region to participate in the sanctions. In order to understand the significance of this policy change, Denmark’s role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Denmark’s relationship to the USA during the Cold War must first be described.
During the Cold War, Denmark was often seen as a reluctant NATO member, since Denmark at times demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in specific NATO programs and had a tendency to diverge from the particular policies of the alliance (Holbraad, 1991: 108f). The reluctant NATO policy of Denmark culminated with the so-called “footnote policy”, which started in 1982 when a weak center-right coalition under the leadership of Prime Minister Poul Schlüter of the Conservative Party came to power. This minority government enjoyed parliamentary support in economic policy, but in the area of foreign policy four opposition parties (the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, the Left Socialists and the Socialist People’s Party) established an “alternative majority” in Parliament. This alternative majority began to adopt resolutions on foreign policy against the will of the government, forcing the government to include dissenting footnotes in NATO communiqués (Holm, 1989: 180). 5
Between 1982 and 1988, Denmark’s official foreign policy, which was formulated by Parliament, was characterized by deep skepticism toward NATO and the USA. This infuriated especially Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen of the Liberal Party, who desired Denmark to play a more active role in international affairs and develop a closer relationship to the USA (Petersen, 2004: 223). Since the Prime Minister’s major area of interest was in domestic politics, the Foreign Minister became the most vocal opponent of the parliamentary opposition within the government (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 233ff; Petersen, 2004: 222f).
The final confrontation between the government and the alternative majority took place in April–June 1988 when the government managed to put an end to the “footnote policy” after calling parliamentary elections on one of the policy issues that had divided the government and parliament (Doeser, 2011; 229f; Engell, 1997: 234f). 6 After the elections the Social Liberals joined the government and as a result the parliamentary opposition was split.
Although the fall of the “footnote policy” was a victory for the pro-NATO government, Denmark was still perceived by other NATO members as a reluctant partner. The decision in August 1990 was an important step in changing the status of Denmark within NATO. First, this decision constituted a major turning point in support to the USA, which the Danish government perceived as the informal leader of the UN-sanctioned “coalition of the willing”. As noted by Hækkerup (2002: 94), the operation had a UN mandate, but it was not a UN operation. Second, the decision entailed the first Danish “out-of-area” operation with an element of coercion (Petersen, 2004: 455). 7 During the Cold War, Denmark’s security perspective was “strictly regional, confined to the Western Baltic and the North German plain, and as a consequence, Denmark was reluctant to envisage any geographical expansion of NATO’s missions” (Petersen, 1996: 179). Even though the warship’s presence in the Gulf was circumscribed by a ban on involvement in shooting operations, it constituted a major change in foreign policy, “especially in consideration of the country’s long tradition of pacifism and skepticism toward the effectiveness of military means” (Petersen, 1996: 180).
The change qualifies as a program change, since it introduced a new instrument of statecraft, that is, military out-of-area operations, and it significantly improved Denmark’s relationship to the USA. For Denmark, in contrast with other small NATO countries participating in the sanctions, this decision was a major deviation from previous policy, because of Denmark’s reluctant NATO policy during the 1980s. The decision did not affect the goals of foreign policy or other issue areas, which are requirements for being considered as a goal or international orientation change (see Note 1).
The key decision-maker
Long before the Cold War ended and the Gulf Crisis erupted, Ellemann-Jensen had desired that Denmark should be a “core state within NATO” and “pursue a more active foreign policy” (Petersen, 2004: 223). When Ellemann-Jensen became Foreign Minister in 1982, he wanted to root out the cautious and passive ideas of two former Foreign Ministers, Peter Munch and Erik Scavenius, from the Foreign Ministry (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 15f, 30). It thus became vital for Ellemann-Jensen to get rid of Denmark’s image as a footnote country, along with its traditional pacifist foreign policy, and to improve Denmark’s standing within NATO (Hækkerup, 2002: 40, 97f; Jakobsen, 2005: 45n; Larsen, 1997: 230–235). In May 1987, for instance, he said to Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee that he would no longer place footnotes in NATO communiqués, irrespective of what Parliament might decide (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 272).
As the Cold War international structure started breaking down with peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, the Foreign Minister became even more active in arguing officially for a change in foreign policy. On several occasions in 1988–1989, Ellemann-Jensen noted that, because of the changes in the international system, Denmark should start to take more responsibility for its own foreign policy and pursue a more active foreign policy (Ellemann-Jensen, 1988a: 148–151, 1988b: 200, 1989: 210–213, 1990d: 35–40). The challenge for Denmark, Ellemann-Jensen said, is “to strengthen West European cooperation in order to create a Europe than can reinforce the ties across the Atlantic … Our destiny is inextricably bound up with that of North America” (Ellemann-Jensen, 1988a: 151). However, the international changes did not cause a change in the Foreign Minister’s view of Denmark’s international role, as he already had this view. Rather the international changes were used as an argument to change policy. In a meeting of the Foreign Policy Commission in April 1989, the Foreign Minister used the term “active internationalism” to describe the new policy under development, and referred to NATO as the “unchallenged anchor” of Danish security (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990d: 35–40; Report from the Foreign Policy Commission, 1990). 8
As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Foreign Minister started to perceive increasing possibilities for changing Denmark’s foreign policy, since the country’s low-profile NATO policy was motivated by most Danish politicians on the basis of the Cold War international structure. During the Cold War, the possibility of pursuing an active foreign policy by using military force out-of-area was perceived by most Danes to be constrained by the threat of a Soviet invasion. The Danish defense forces were, thus, assigned the role of territorial defense (Petersen, 2004). When the Soviet threat began to disappear, Ellemann-Jensen started to argue that new types of threats would emerge, such as regional and local conflicts between ethnic, national and religious groups. These external developments created increasing opportunities for the Foreign Minister to lead Denmark into closer security cooperation with NATO and to project military force in operations outside the European theater (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990a: 254–257; Wivel, 1990). However, the window would not open until August 1990 when Ellemann-Jensen perceived the Gulf Crisis as an opportunity to act on his desire.
The window of opportunity
On 6 August 1990 (four days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), the UNSC passed Resolution 661 to embargo trade with Iraq, and the next day, the USA and other NATO members initiated a naval blockade of Iraq. The naval blockade, however, was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Ellemann-Jensen perceived these developments as “a possibility for Denmark to improve its reputation after the footnote period”. He believed that this objective could be achieved by contributing militarily to the naval blockade (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 299). As demonstrated below, Ellemann-Jensen acted quickly in an attempt to get domestic support for involving Denmark in the operation at an early stage, since it was widely believed that Iraq would withdraw its forces from Kuwait sooner rather than later, and when that happened, the window would close.
At first, the Foreign Minister was not able to muster the political support for such action, since Prime Minister Schlüter was hesitant toward participating in the naval blockade without a UNSC mandate (Schlüter, 1999: 248). Moreover, the Social Democratic Party, which was the biggest party in opposition, and the Social Liberal Party, which then was part of the government (together with the Conservatives and Liberals), made it clear they were strongly against participation in a naval blockade without a UNSC mandate (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 241). The Foreign Minister was thus forced to assure that Denmark would not participate in a military operation without a UNSC mandate. However, in a NATO meeting on 10 August, he informed his allies that Danish military units could take over assignments in Europe from NATO forces operating in the Gulf if requested by NATO. He also noted that Denmark was ready to participate in the blockade with naval units if sanctioned by the UNSC (Petersen, 2004: 451).
In an article published in a Danish newspaper on 10 August, the Foreign Minister discussed both a possible role for Denmark in the Gulf and out-of-area operations. He argued that there were threats to Denmark that lay beyond the borders of Europe. In order to prevent such threats Europe must act in concert. He also raised the question of whether it was “reasonable for the Europeans to continue to rely on the willingness of the USA to solve Europe’s security problems” (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990b).
On 16 August, the government received a letter of inquiry from the Americans asking whether Denmark would aid Egypt with a transport vessel, which could carry an Egyptian division to Saudi Arabia. Ellemann-Jensen immediately began to explore the possibilities of reaching a decision on this matter within the cabinet and the opposition. However, the Social Liberals made it clear that they would not support involvement in an American-led operation without a UNSC mandate. Owing to the lack of support from the Social Liberals, the Foreign Minister was not able to commit the resources of Denmark to this endeavor (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 240–244).
A couple of days later, the Americans asked Ellemann-Jensen whether Denmark could assist in the shipping of war material to the Gulf. Rather than discussing the matter with Parliament, Ellemann-Jensen approached the ship owner Maersk McKinney Møller with this proposal. McKinney Møller immediately decided that his company would supply the Americans with a number of transport vessels (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 244). During the following days, Ellemann-Jensen discussed the possibility of sending a warship to the Gulf with Vice Admiral Hans Garde. The Vice Admiral made it clear that a warship would be available if requested by the government (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 299).
On 25 August, the UNSC approved Resolution 665, which sanctioned the naval blockade. Immediately after receiving informal support from the Prime Minister for dispatching a warship, Ellemann-Jensen stated to the media that the government would send a warship to the Middle East. This statement was made before the proposal had been presented to the Social Liberals and a formal decision had been agreed, which infuriated the Social Liberals and the Prime Minister (Schlüter, 1999: 248). By making this statement Ellemann-Jensen tried to create a fait accompli, which made it difficult for the Social Liberal Party to block participation in the sanctions. In the words of Schlüter (1999: 248), Ellemann-Jensen tried to “monopolize” foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis and make it a “one-man show”. However, in order to implement the new policy, Ellemann-Jensen needed the support of his government and of a parliamentary majority. He was, nonetheless, the main initiator of the policy change, since the original idea of sending the warship can be traced to him. Agreement within the government was then facilitated by Resolution 665, which provided the Prime Minister and the Social Liberals with UNSC authorization to use force (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990c: 188; Schlüter, 1999: 248).
The following day, a unanimous government proposed to send the corvette Olfert Fischer to the Gulf. Both Schlüter and Ellemann-Jensen declared that Denmark needed to show solidarity with the USA (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990c: 185–188; Lyngby, 1990; Schlüter, 1999: 248). The government’s proposal was debated in Parliament between 27 and 31 August. The Social Democrats were dissatisfied with the Foreign Minister, who, in their view, had pre-empted the decision-making in a dishonest way. On the other hand, the situation had changed owing to the UNSC mandate (Petersen, 2004: 453). During the parliamentary debate, Social Democrat Hans Hækkerup demanded that there be several conditions on Danish participation in the Gulf, including that it be under Danish command and not be coordinated by NATO (Hækkerup, 1990: 379).
Together with Schlüter and Hækkerup, Ellemann-Jensen then managed to persuade the remaining skeptics within the opposition to accept the deployment of the warship under the conditions suggested by Hækkerup instead of limiting the Danish participation to humanitarian aid (Jakobsen, 2005: 41). The decision to send the corvette was the first major foreign policy decision after the footnote period that was implemented on the basis of a broad majority in Parliament (Parliamentary Records, 1990). Defense Minister Knud Enggaard called the decision “a milestone in Danish defense and security policy” (Svensson, 1990), while Ellemann-Jensen (1990c: 185) called the decision “a radical break with previous Danish policy”.
When allied forces commenced the bombing campaign of Iraq in mid-January 1991, the Foreign Minister tried to get parliamentary support for expanding the Danish mission, arguing that the corvette should take part in the war (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 301). However, during the remainder of the Gulf War, the government had to settle for a policy that stated that the corvette should avoid the war zone but continue to operate under Resolution 665 (Petersen, 2004: 456). 9
The Australian-led intervention in Solomon Islands
Australian foreign policy toward Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003 has been referred to as a “hands-off” approach, which had been the defining characteristic of Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands since its independence in 1978. This period was characterized by the Howard Government’s fear of being seen as “neo-colonialists” and consisted of aid, technical assistance and a persistent argument that the Pacific Islands had to be in charge of their own future (Monk, 2003). This approach persisted despite Solomon Islands’ deteriorating economy and law-and-order post-1998 and several calls for Australian assistance.
Solomon Islands’ descent into chaos began in December 1998 when the Itsabu Freedom Movement, consisting mainly of people of Guale background, violently harassed settlers on the island of Guadalcanal, mainly Malaitans. The Malaitan Eagle Force was formed in response to these attacks in mid-1999. About 80 people were killed in the ensuing conflict and there were numerous reports of torture and rape. Somewhere between 20,000 and 35,000 people were displaced (Fraenkel, 2003; Kabutaulaka, 2002: 12). Despite repeated requests for Australian police and military assistance, Australia limited its engagement to aid and technical assistance (Moore, 2004: 196ff).
A coup d’état on 5 June 2000 by the Malaitan Eagle Force and parts of the police force led to the government being overthrown. The previous government had asked for 50 armed police officers from Australia to help with the law and order situation before the coup and Prime Minister Howard declared two days after the coup that Australia would not be sending police or military troops, stating that Australia would not be “the policemen of this part of the world” (Howard, 2000). In addition, Foreign Minister Downer stated on 2 November 2000 that “Australia is not a neo-colonial power. We are not going to take over countries in the Pacific and run their affairs for them” (Downer, 2000). Australia did, however, help negotiate a peace agreement between the main parties to the conflict, which resulted in the Townsville Peace Agreement (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001) and contributed with observers to the International Peace Monitoring Team that was to set up to oversee the agreement (Moore, 2004: 149).
The situation in Solomon Islands deteriorated further. Despite Australian aid, gross domestic product fell by 24% between 1998 and 2002 and formal government debt increased by over 40% (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004: xi–xii). Meanwhile, law and order followed in the economy’s footsteps. By 2003, Prime Minister Kemakeza had stopped going to his office for fear for his safety (O’Callaghan, 2003a).
Downer sent a High Level Mission to Solomon Islands on 1–4 October 2002 amid continued concerns of the situation there (Downer, 2002a). More requests had been made by the Solomon government for assistance but they were all declined. Downer returned to Solomon Islands on 17–18 December 2002, expressing “deep concern” of the state of affairs. However, he yet again re-emphasized the Australian policy of restricting assistance to aid and economic advice (Downer, 2002b). The final re-affirmation of the “hands-off” approach came in an article in the daily newspaper The Australian, written by Downer on 8 January 2003:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that it would not work—no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. (Downer, 2003a)
Despite his strong defense of the current policy, Downer later admitted that, during his Solomon-visit in December 2002 (about two weeks before this article was published), he had already become “uncertain that just by continuing the policy we were pursuing we were going to achieve the breakthrough that I wanted” (see below; Downer, 2003b). The DFAT White Paper launched on 12 February 2003 reaffirmed the official policy, stating that “Australia cannot presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries” (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003: 93). It was therefore all the more surprising when, over the next few months, the Howard Government made a complete turn-around and decide to lead a multinational force into Solomon Islands in July 2003. However, as demonstrated below, this U-turn can be explained by a previous desire on the part of Howard to increase Australia’s influence in the South Pacific consistent with previous policies toward the region, and by his perception of the opening of a window of opportunity in April 2003.
In sum, the policy change in April–May 2003 from the “hands-off” approach to a much more “hands-on” approach through the intervention and use of police and military troops on the ground represents a program change according to Hermann’s (1990) typology of change, as the goals remained the same—a secure, safe and economically viable Solomon Islands.
The key decision-makers
The key decision-makers in the foreign policy decision-making process were Howard and Downer. After leaving government, Downer admitted in an interview that he and Howard essentially conducted foreign policy themselves without necessarily running it by Cabinet at all times (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2008). In relation to Solomon Islands, Downer handled the day-to-day affairs in the years leading up to the intervention. Only when the decision to change policy had to be made did Howard step in; however, his view as Prime Minister clearly was the most important—Downer did not have the authority to make this decision himself.
While Howard officially supported Australia’s “hands-off” policy between 1998 and March 2003, he also had a long-standing desire to increase Australia’s influence in the South Pacific and to solve the deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands (Ayson, 2006; Brenchley, 1999; Eidenfalk, 2009; Leaver, 2001; Woodard, 1999/2000). Howard’s previous policies in the region had served to ensure stability in the region and within its neighbors. The East Timor intervention in 1999 can be seen in this light, as the destabilizing and deteriorating situation after the pro-independence ballot led to the Howard government leading a multinational force to stop the violence and ensure East Timorese independence (Eidenfalk, 2009). This followed from a previous intervention in Bougainville, during the so-called “Sandline Affair” in 1997. It was discovered that the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Prime Minister had used mercenaries to stop an uprising in Bougainville that had lasted for 10 years and with more than 10,000 people dead. The Howard government put pressure on the PNG government, which led to them ceasing the use of mercenaries and allowing an Australian-led force to oversee the peace deal, thereby restoring stability in Australia’s region and ensuring Australian influence (Barker, 2011: 20–21). It is also indicative of Howard’s desire to ensure stability in the region that more money was put in to the defense budget from 2001 onwards, “enabling the Australian military to intervene more decisively in its near region on its own and in the wider South-East Asian area in tandem with US forces” (Dixon, 2001). Howard just had to await an appropriate window to open before continuing the Australian policy of stability through intervention in the region.
As the situation in Solomon Islands deteriorated from 2002, Howard and Downer began to perceive that the “hands-off” approach was failing. However, fear of being seen as a “neo-colonial” power stopped them from acting earlier. Howard in particular was scarred by the reactions to an interview in late September 1999 (soon after the Australian-led intervention in East Timor), in which the journalist Fred Brenchley (1999) used the words “deputy sheriff to the United States” to describe Australia’s role in the region. Howard himself never used those words, but the label was ascribed to him and this created an angry reaction from several Asian countries (PM’s “doctrine” angers Asia, 1999). Howard quickly distanced himself from this label and strongly denied it (Ayson, 2006: 252). However, the impression had been made and came to influence the Howard Government’s policies in the region for years to come.
Howard has been described as a pragmatist (Murray, 2006) and as someone who could wait for an opportunity to rise in order to promote a policy that has previously been seen as impossible to implement. Walter (2006) argues that Howard was “prepared to defer, to await a better climate, but he will never give up”. Howard desired an increased interventionist role for Australia in the South Pacific immediately after the East Timor intervention, as reflected in the Brenchley article. When Brenchley referred to Australia as a “deputy to the United States”, Howard did not deny it and appeared to see such a role for Australia in the region. It took, however, six days until the backlash from the article forced him to back down and abandon any plans of an increased influence for Australia in the South Pacific for the time being (Leaver, 2001: 18; Woodard, 1999/2000: 8). The window would not open until April 2003 and any attempts for a “hands-on” approach in the region were for the time being effectively made politically impossible.
It could be argued that the time for a more “hands-on” approach had arrived in late 2002; however, the Howard Government’s attention instead turned to Iraq, resulting in Australia participating in the US-led invasion. In the meantime, several things occurred that created increasing possibilities for an interventionist Australian role in the South Pacific. First, several commentators began arguing for a policy change toward Solomon Islands and the South Pacific as a whole (Dobell, 2003; Windybank and Manning, 2003). Second, the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 killed 202 people, including 88 Australians, and brought the “war-on-terror” home to the Australian public (Kabutaulaka, 2004: 4). Third, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) soon thereafter argued in their report “Beyond Bali” that the “hands-off” approach did not work and a more direct engagement with the countries in the South Pacific was needed. This, if implemented, would be “nothing less than a change of policy paradigm” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002: 29). ASPI pointed to the possibility of failing states in the South Pacific becoming a security threat against Australia, as they could potentially be used as bases for terrorist and criminal networks (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002: 28–29). This was a new approach by the ASPI that fitted with Howard’s earlier view of the weak and failing states of the South Pacific.
The window of opportunity
What opened the window of opportunity was the letter that Prime Minister Kemakeza sent to Howard on 22 April 2003, asking to meet and for help with the dire situation in his country. Rather than dismissing it as had previously been the case, Howard and Downer perceived an opportunity window to change the previous policy toward Howard’s desire.
An invitation was immediately sent to Kemakeza to visit Australia and discuss what could be done, which he did on 5 June 2003 (Downer, 2003c). Around the same time, Downer began to explore options through his department, where there was a ready-made proposal waiting for him, courtesy of the Director of ASPI, Hugh White, who had for months been supplying the relevant departments with drafts of the next ASPI report on Solomon Islands. Before that, in December 2002, White had initiated “consultative sessions with all the relevant ministries, departments, and organizations to workshop some new ideas on the Solomon’s”. White played a role in persuading the bureaucracy of a policy change even before Downer came asking for suggestions (O’Callaghan, 2003b). Downer himself launched the ASPI report “Our Failing Neighbour” on 10 June 2003, indicating how much stock he put into this new policy. He referred to it in his speech as a “very timely report” and as a “key contribution” (Downer, 2003d).
In the end, the Howard Government decided on a more military version of the ASPI plan that included a total force of 2225 personnel, out of which 1500 were Australian Defense Force personnel (Howard, 2003b), having learned by the “shock-and-awe” approach favored by the US-led coalition in Iraq. The ASPI proposed only 150 police in their report (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2003: 4, 41–43), which indicates that Howard and Downer were necessary individuals for the specific way in which the intervention was organized. The Howard–Downer plan was an Australian-led multinational intervention—eight countries in total—named the Regional Assistance Mission into Solomon Islands, and was launched on 24 July 2003 (Fraenkel, 2004).
The window of opportunity was finally perceived by Howard and Downer in April 2003 when a number of events coincided to alter the political climate. First, it became increasingly clear that the “hands-off” approach did not have the desired effect (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004: 6–7). Corruption in Solomon Islands escalated and the law-and-order situation deteriorated with Solomon Islands quickly moved toward “failed state” status (Dobell, 2008: 56–57).
Second, soon after the Bali Bombing, the ASPI Report was released, arguing that the “hands-off” approach did not work and that to have failing states in the region could threaten Australia’s security. Therefore, the report argued, a new “hands-on” approach was needed (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002: 28–29).
Third, ASPI Director White had for months been working on a proposal for such a “hands-on” approach and had involved large parts of the bureaucracy in developing it. When Downer began to look around for alternative policy approaches, the ASPI report was ready to be used as a framework for the government’s new policy toward Solomon Islands (O’Callaghan, 2003b).
Fourth, the lead-up to the war in Iraq had taken up most of the focus of both Howard and Downer between December 2002 and the end of major combat operations in April 2003. Howard met with President George W. Bush on 3 May 2003 (Howard, 2003a), which can be seen as the point where Howard moved away from Iraq and toward Solomon Islands. As Fraenkel (2004: 161) stated: “The US has long encouraged greater Australian strategic engagement in the Southwest Pacific.” Finally, and most importantly, the letter from Prime Minister Kemakeza on 22 April 2003 asking for assistance gave them the invitation that they needed to avoid perceptions of Australia as a “neo-colonial” power if they were to change policy.
Arguably, the window had been open since 2000 when the Solomon government first asked for police to assist them; however, it was not perceived as such by Howard or Downer until April 2003. It is crucial that the window is perceived by the decision-makers, or there will most likely not be a policy change. Downer had already in December 2002 perceived that the current policy was not working and that something would have to change. Indeed, Downer had been working hard to help solve the situation in Solomon Islands in previous years as well; however, he did not perceive an opportunity window for a more “hands-on” approach until April 2003 when the Kemakeza letter arrived. The above-mentioned reasons were all pieces of the puzzle and they finally came together in April 2003.
The change in policy was justified primarily for reasons of Australian security. It fitted with the new “war-on-terror” environment and the Bali bombing, and thus made it easier to “sell” to the public. Such threats needed to be fought through strength and with decisive action, according to Howard (Walter, 2006: 3–4). Howard (2003d) stated on 1 July 2003: “we know that a failed state in our region, on our doorstep, will jeopardise our own security. The best thing we can do is to take remedial action and take it now”.
As demonstrated above, the policy change can be linked to an earlier desire of Howard to enhance Australia’s strategic position in the South Pacific. The earlier indicated desire to act as a “deputy sheriff” in 1997 and 1999 was abandoned after the harsh backlash from its Asian neighbors (Leaver, 2001). However, it can be argued that, having been unable to act on his desire for a few years, it could now be justified again and the previous approach continued. The international environment was not conducive to any Australian forward actions in the area until the policy change in 2003. Once Howard decided on the policy change, he repeatedly began referring to the South Pacific area as “our patch” (Howard, 2003c, d), in a clear reference to Australia being the main power in the area and his desire for it to remain so. In the meantime, Downer’s desire to stabilize Solomon Islands and stop the conflict there was clear in the year leading up to the policy change. A change in instruments can be seen as a continuation of this desire but with new means.
Howard’s desire to enhance Australian influence in the area was further displayed when it was announced that Australia and PNG had reached an agreement—the Enhanced Cooperation Package—in December 2003. However, negotiations had begun already in May 2003, at the same time as plans to intervene into Solomon Islands were finalized. The package included a more direct approach by Australia, including sending 230 Australian police to PNG to help with law and order (Fry and Kabutaulaka, 2008: 7). This new “hands-on” approach to PNG shows Howard’s desire to enhance Australia’s influence in the region, and not just in Solomon Islands.
Conclusions
This article has highlighted how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of opportunity windows can have a decisive impact on changes in foreign policy. Both case studies demonstrated that key decision-makers, with a long-standing desire to change policy, perceived an opportunity window and acted quickly on it in order to initiate the desired changes in policy. The desires and perceptions of the decision-makers were necessary factors for the specific way in which Denmark and Australia reacted to the international changes. It seems very unlikely that Denmark would have sent a warship to the Gulf had Ellemann-Jensen not been the Foreign Minister. Without the Foreign Minister, the participation would most likely have been limited to humanitarian aid. It also seems unlikely that Australia would have intervened in Solomon Islands with such a large military deployment without Howard and Downer. In fact, the policy change fits with their previous policy actions that had been temporarily interrupted in 1999 and re-visited when Howard and Downer perceived the window in 2003.
The importance of opportunity windows should, however, be investigated further in other cases of policy change. A possible case would be the USA’s opening toward Myanmar after the regime implemented political reforms, resulting in a visit to Myanmar in 2012 by President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton to further promote such reforms through meeting not only with the Myanmar President but also with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. This policy change had been previously desired but could only now be acted on. The actual visit to Myanmar could be seen as an effort to seize the opportunity window. Another case to consider is the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, reflecting a long-standing desire by Vladimir Putin to enhance Russia’s influence in its Near Abroad. The Georgian attack on South Ossetia in August 2008 opened the window for Putin to do just that and Russia responded accordingly, thereby enhancing their standing in the region through force.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.