Understanding Ethnicity-based Autonomy Movements: A Study of Manipur

Introduction

Manipur can broadly be divided into two geographical regions—the valley and the hills. The former, comprising one-tenth of the state’s area is inhabited by around 65 per cent of population especially the Meiteis. The valley is ringed by the hills with nine-tenth of the area where around 35 per cent of the tribes (33 recognized and other non-recognized tribes) reside. Meitei being a majority community, Meiteilon/Manipuri is used as lingua-franca in Manipur.

Due to discontent over the forceful annexation of the kingdom in 1949 and the delay in granting statehood, several Meitei organizations with separatist leanings emerged in the 1950s (CDPS, 2015; Singh, 2010). The armed movement for secession/sovereignty from India was kicked off in 1964 with the formation of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and intensified in the 1980s when other like-minded organizations joined it. This had landed the state in a situation of unrest. However, in the 1990s, following the upsurge of Naga ethnicity-based autonomy movement within the state and its counter movements by other groups including the Kukis, the secessionist movement, although did not fully die down, but shifted towards internal feuds among the ethnic groups over the issues of exclusivity, dominance and integration (Oinam, 2003). Meiteis, living in the valley being a majority community and also holding economic and political power, have created a string of hegemonic political and cultural expressions towards the tribes. As a medium of democratic movement and to put pressure on the state or Meiteis/valley, economic blockades on the two National Highways (NH 39 and NH 53), which connect the state with the rest of the world, have become a common feature in Manipur. For instance, Manipur witnessed the longest ever economic blockade that cut-off the state from the rest of the world for 123 days in 2011, spearheaded by the Kuki ethnic group demanding the creation of Sadar Hill district and its counter blockade by the Nagas against its creation. In this manner, in the 1990s, Manipur has been the worst affected state in the country’s Northeastern Region (NER or region hereafter) due to its various internal movements and counter movements (Lacina, 2009). Its resultant conundrum hobbles the state’s socio-economic condition in the long run (Singha & Singh, 2016, p. 18).

While analyzing different autonomy movements in the region, especially in Manipur, the larger questions we always ask are about their transformation into inter-group hostilities from the erstwhile armed movement for secession and the state’s responses to it. Is this purely a tactical shift by the insurgents or a strategic re-calibration by the competing ethnic groups? Why has the state failed to contain the inter-group hostilities so far? With these questions in mind, the present article analyzes the processes and consequences of autonomy movements bolstered by different ethnic groups in Manipur. In this article, the term ‘autonomy movement’ refers to various insurgency movements that include the secessionist movements, internal autonomy movements and the movements for reorganization of the existing state. Similarly, the ‘insurgent group’ will interchangeably be used with the non-state actor, armed group, extremist group or militant.

Ethnic Identity Formation

In a true sense of the term, ethnicity is only a construct, resulting from the interaction of the state, political and economic processes (Nag, 2003; Nagel, 1994). It sometimes finds expression in political domination, economic exploitation and psychological oppression. This negative meaning often creates ethno-nationalism and politicizes certain ideological goals that give birth to an ethnic community. Nevertheless, ethnic identities that shaped frequent violence in Manipur are more of a creation of political necessities (Oinam, 2003).

As for the genesis of ethnic identity construction, after the kingdom/Manipur was colonized by the British in 1891, for administrative convenience, the tribes were categorized into two broad ethnic groups—the Kuki and Naga (Kom, 2015; Piang, 2015), based on their place of habitats (Oinam, 2003; Sharma & Arunkumar, 2010). The tribes living in the northern hill tracks, bordering erstwhile Naga Hills of the undivided Assam (present Nagaland) were termed as Nagas (Oinam, 2003) and those living in the southern hill tracts, bordering Myanmar and erstwhile Lushai hills of the undivided Assam (present Mizoram) were termed as Kukis. According to a few scholars (e.g., Kipgen, 2013; Kom, 2011; Oinam, 2003; Singh, 2009), though the Kukis were vaguely recorded after British colonization, the Chin–Kuki communities who had migrated recently to Manipur from Chin state of Myanmar and settled in the southern hill tracts of the state were clubbed together as Kuki ethnic group. On the other hand, ‘Naga’ is a highly contested term (Baruah, 2003); it connotes an amalgamation of different tribes and came into existence only in the late nineteenth century (Ghosh, 2008; Kom, 2015). The Naga identity construction went through a perpetual shift in the 1940s when the Karbis and Nepalis were included, but the present Naga tribes of Manipur were excluded (Nag, 2003; Singh, Sharma & Thangjam, 2016). Therefore, the present Naga identity in Manipur is more a functional category created by British in the 1880s (Oinam, 2003), not one based on linguistic lines (Baruah, 2003; Kom, 2011). Similarly, the ethnonym of Meitei was originally known as ‘Ningthouja/Meitei’ salai (clan dynasty), which was one of the seven salais that ruled seven independent principalities in the valley in the early part of the recorded history. Later on, it overruled other principalities, thereby absorbing the different groups to form ‘Meitei’ ethnic identity and over the years, many highlanders also got absorbed in Meitei confederation (Oinam, 2003).

Shifting from Secessionist Movement to Infighting

To understand the contextual realities, the conflicts that have been haunting Manipur for long can be broadly studied under two groups—(i) conflict between the state and non-state actors or secessionist movements and (ii) ethnically driven conflicts or internal feuds.

Today, Manipur is probably the only state in India where nearly 30 small and big insurgent groups operate and the state administration is often held hostage by these groups (Roy-Chaudhury, 2006; Shivananda, 2011). Though the seed of sovereignty movement in Manipur was sown by Hijam Irabot in 1930s, the armed movement against the state started with the formation of UNLF in 1964. Several other outfits joined hands with the UNLF, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for the same cause. Initially, these groups engaged in mobilizing cadres, imparting military training and creating social awareness. In the 1980s, almost all of them intensified armed campaigns against the state, and the Government of India (GoI) suddenly realized its negligence and ignorance of this border state for a long time. As an immediate measure, GoI deployed a large number of security forces, much higher than that of the national average. In 2010–11, the security force to civilian ratio in Manipur was 1:20 (one security personal for every 20 Manipuri), compared to 1:126 at the national level (Begum, 2012), which shot up from the ratio of around 1:500 in the 1950s. Despite this measure, not much respite from armed-conflict was visible; this rather escalated the conflicts between the state and non-state actors; consequently, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA) was imposed in 1980. It further worsened the situation in Manipur, multiplied armed conflicts and emerged as the human rights violation issue. Almost 50 per cent of the region’s total insurgency related fatalities were contributed by Manipur in the 2000s (Singha, 2015). During this period, on an average, 135 insurgents, 65 civilians and 26 security personnel were killed annually (RAP, 2015). As a result, a large section of people is living in a web of insecurity. However, since the late 1990s, the direction of the conflict has shifted to internal feuds and the sovereignty movement is now in abeyance (Lacina, 2009); they are now engaged in balancing the ever-increasing internal autonomy movements.

While tracing the genesis of internal conflicts, one can link it with the rise of ‘Southern Nagaland’ demand in Manipur. In fact, after Phizo’s self-exile to London in 1960, the Naga National Council (NNC) became less active and its moderate leaders signed ‘Shillong accord’ in 1975, and agreed to settle the dispute within the Constitution of India. But, it disappointed the leaders from outside the Naga Hills who had joined Phizo’s Naga integration (to consolidate Nagas across the Naga Hills) project recently. The breakaway group formed National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980, led by Mr. Th. Muivah (a Tangkhul tribe of Manipur) and Mr. S.S. Khaplang (a Hemi tribe of Myanmar). Within no time, the two leaders developed an internal rift. The majority of the rank and file in the NSCN were from the Konyak tribe of Nagaland, while the command structure was dominated by the Tangkhuls of Manipur. The Konyaks had an apprehension about the Tangkhuls/Muivah leadership that they were about to accept the GoI plan for Manipuri Nagas (Kotwal, 2000). ‘Allegations and counter allegations on the basis of tribal identity or origin dominated the political struggles of the faction. While Khaplang described Muivah as a Manipuri, not a Naga, Muivah, in turn, termed Khaplang as being of Myanmarese origin’ (Sashinungla, 2005, p. 93). This resulted in a vertical split in the NSCN in 1988—NSCN Isak and Muivah (NSCN-IM) and NSCN Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) (George, 2012). The NSCN-IM continued to fight for the Naga integration/sovereignty, proved to be one of the powerful groups and created the largest number of armed attacks in the region.

However, the 60 years of armed movement for an independent Nagaland or Greater Nagaland/Nagalim did not benefit Nagaland/Nagas much, rather fractured the Naga society and produced internal autonomy movements within Nagaland (e.g., separate state demand of the Eastern Nagas). Therefore, they do not want outsiders, especially the Manipuri tribes (who considered themselves as Nagas) to interfere in their internal matters (Ravi, 2014). Consequently, a series of anti-Manipuri Naga drive had been launched in Nagaland since the 1990s (Bose, 2013; Ghosh, 2008; Singh, 2007). The NSCN-IM, considered to be a powerful insurgent group, claiming to represent all Nagas, retained little credibility in Nagaland (George, 2012). For instances, the proposal of recognition of Mao and Kabui/Rongmei (Manipuri tribes) as indigenous tribes of Nagaland was vehemently opposed by the Nagaland Tribal Council (Singh et al., 2016). Quit notices were served to Tangkhul and Mao tribes to leave Nagaland in 2006 and 2015, respectively (The Morung Express, 28 September 2016). The then Chief Minister of Nagaland S.C. Jamir requested NSCN-IM to leave the Naga issue to the Nagas/Nagaland and labelled the outfit’s leader Muivah as outsider (Baruah, 2003). From these instances, the Manipuri Nagas also came to realize the impracticality of Nagalim project (Bose, 2013; Singh et al., 2016); consequently, their movement has slowly shifted from ‘Nagalim’ to ‘Southern Nagaland’, a separate state for the Manipuri Nagas by amalgamating four hill districts of Manipur (Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel) (Oinam, 2014), which was very much doubted by the Nagas of Nagaland. For instance, the Konyaks, one of the major tribes of Nagaland had an apprehension about the Manipuri Naga, especially the Tangkhuls/Muivah leadership during the undivided NSCN that the latter were about to join hands with the GoI for a separate plan for the Manipuri Nagas (Kotwal, 2000). Since then, Naganization process in Manipur was intensified by the Muivah-led NSCN-IM (Singh et al., 2016). But this movement became a direct challenge to other communities, both in the hills and valley (Baruah, 2003; Lacina, 2007; Oinam, 2003). To counter the increasing influence of NSCN-IM, a Kuki insurgent group—the Kuki National Front (KNF)—was formed, which was later on joined by other Kuki groups (CDPS, 2015). Smaller communities are caught in the crossfire and compelled to consolidate themselves either with the Naga or Kuki fold through political means or intimidation (Kom, 2015). For instance, in August 2015, Mr. Walunglua (former Assistant Chief of Aimol Ngairong village, Chandel district) was shot dead by NSCN-IM for opposing attempts to co-opt Aimol tribe within Naga fold (The Sangai Express, Imphal, 22 August 2015). Through this process, some Kuki tribes (e.g., Anal, Moyon, Maring and Monsang) have merged with Naga fold (Haokip, 2013; Kipgen, 2013; Kom, 2011), shifted from Kuki to Naga fold (Gangte, 2009; Haokip, 2008, pp. 185–208) and Naga to Kuki fold (EPW, 2005, pp. 3699–3700). Still, many of them (e.g., Hmar, Kom, Gangte, Paite and Vaiphei) are reluctant to consolidate either with the Naga or Kuki fold (Kumar, Kamei, Khuraijam & Homen, 2011; Oinam, 2003).

This rhetoric of ethnic identity formation bolstered by the exclusivity, integration and dominance often results in internal conflicts and greater autonomy demands (Baruah, 2003; Kipgen, 2013; Kom, 2011). For the objective of separate state of the Nagas in Manipur, NSCN-IM started ethnic cleansing in 1992, continued till 1997, to drive Kukis out of the four hill districts (Kipgen, 2013) and it became the ever greatest displacement and intervention in demographic equation in Manipur. Altogether 800 people were killed, 480 injured and 5,713 families displaced during this ethnic cleansing (Hussain & Phanjoubam, 2007). In reality, it cost both the groups dearly and loomed large over Manipur as turf war began anew following demand for an ‘alternative arrangement or Kuki-homeland/Zalengam’ by the Kukis. This proposed Zalengam map released by the Kuki insurgent groups is also a direct challenge to the demand for ‘Southern Nagaland’ propelled by the Nagas (Kipgen, 2013; Kom, 2015). This has raised serious concern among the communities and the two groups spelt doom for Meitei secessionist groups’ dream for sovereign Manipur (Lacina, 2007; Rupachandra, 2012). However, some other tribes (e.g., Paite, Hmar and Simte), who did not consolidate themselves either with the Naga or Kuki fold, were grappling between the two. To protect themselves, the Paite tribe initiated unification of the seven tribes (e.g., Gangte, Hmar, Paite, Simte, Sukte/Tedim Chin, Vaiphei and Zou) and adopted ‘Zomi’ as their common identity. Eventually, their armed wing, the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) was formed in 1997 and started the movement for ‘Zogam/Zomiland’. After the Kuki–Naga, the second greatest ethnic conflict that took place in Manipur was the ‘Kuki–Paite’ clash in 1997 and 1998. The Kuki militants attacked Paites on the charge that the latter did not support the former during the Naga–Kuki ethnic conflict and Paites did not adopt Thadou language (Thadou tribe is the majority in Kuki ethnic group) as link language (Shashikumar, 2007; Singh, 2010). This clash took 162 lives, injured 93, kidnapped 71 and burnt 3,521 houses (Hussain & Phanjoubam, 2007). One must remember that the Zomi ethnic group had not emerged during the colonial period.

Nevertheless, the biggest and covert turf war, besides two ethnic clashes (Kuki–Naga and Kuki–Paite) that happened in Manipur, is the conflict between the Meitei and the Naga. It came to the forefront in June 2001 when Delhi decided to extend the GoI–NSCN ceasefire to Manipur, beyond Nagaland. This decision was perceived by the majority Meitei as a threat to the territorial integrity of Manipur. Thousands of agitators came out on the streets to protest against the decision. The protest turned violent, burnt down the Manipur state legislative assembly building and 18 protestors lost their lives. In this manner, communities have been polarized into four broad ethnic groups—Meitei, Kuki, Naga and Zomi. All of them have been at the loggerheads, fighting for different forms of autonomy, ranging from the complete secession to internal autonomy. In the hills, when the insurgent groups are waging armed movement for a separate arrangement/state, some other groups are demanding for devolving adequate powers to enable the Autonomous District Councils (ADC) that function under the Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution. In fact, for safeguarding the hill areas and protection of tribal communities, the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act 1971 was passed. But, with the attainment of statehood in 1972, its functioning was left to the mercy of the state government and it could not function under the Sixth Schedule as was originally meant to be. As a result, hill people boycotted the ADC election for 21 years. After a gap of 21 years its election were held in 2010 with faith and trust in the government, but the promise is not met. On the other hand, the ruling community perceived that the ADC demand is equivalent to the statehood demand (Phanjoubam, 2002), which was supported by the past experiences of how Meghalaya and Mizoram separated from the then undivided Assam. How the institution of ADC was misused by the Bodos to exploit non-Bodo communities in the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) area of Assam is also witnessed.

State’s Response

To contain armed conflicts and autonomy movements, in the initial stage, the state generally employs coercive measures (Lacina, 2009). When the aspirants do not give in to the state and start taking to arms, it employs conciliatory approaches (Inoue, 2005, pp. 16–31). In the 1980s, when the secessionist movements escalated, Manipur was declared as ‘disturbed area’ and subsequently the AFSPA was imposed. Understandably, there were allegations of the Act being misused by the state forces. After implementing AFSPA, altogether 5,665 persons were killed from 1992 to 2010 (The Sangai Express, 14 April 2014). According to Lisam (2014), since the 1980s, at least 315 persons were killed annually in Manipur. Many civilians were killed and human rights violations have been evident. To mention a few, in 1987, following an attack on an Assam Rifles camp by NSCN-IM, the Oinam village in Senapati district was taken hostage by the former and 15 residents died in the military concentration camp and even a pregnant woman was forced to deliver her baby in public as the army personals jeered (Begum, 2012, pp. 266–283). On 2 November 2000, Assam Rifles, operating in Manipur, massacred 14 civilians waiting at a bus stop at Mallom (Imphal) after army personnel were attacked by an insurgent group little away from the bus stop. Since then, the ‘Iron Lady’ of Manipur (Irom Sharmila Chanu) went on hunger strike for 16 years against the atrocities perpetuated by the security forces (she has broken her hunger strike on 9 August 2016). Besides killings, there are a number of cases of forced disappearance (Manoharan, 2012). For instance, in December 2014, eight human skulls were unearthed from the erstwhile Tombisana High School in the heart of Imphal city (capital of Manipur), opposite the state legislative assembly building. The site was occupied by the security forces.

In terms of the second measure, apart from the annual budget in a federal structure, the GoI extends economic packages to wean people away from the insurgent activities. Under the state government’s special scheme Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation, one-time grant, monthly stipend and incentives for weapons they bring at the time of surrender were offered to those who gave up arms and opted to join mainstream. Slowly, it became an employment avenue for the unemployed youths and it was misused by the politicians. Of course, this scheme was withdrawn after June 2015 when insurgents attacked security forces and killed 20 of them at Chandel district. The central government has been pumping funds for physical infrastructure and for social and rehabilitation packages to contain conflicts. Unfortunately, a very negligible share of it reached the target, while some of the social groups and leaders benefited from the high levels of subsidies paid out by the GoI (Harriss, 2002). For instance, at present, most of the contract works are jointly carried out by the leaders of insurgent groups, politicians, bureaucrats and contractors (Shivananda, 2011). This nexus and localized autocracies hampered development activities, infrastructure and livelihood of the people (Lacina, 2009). In another rehabilitation programme, the surrendered militants were recruited in the state forces and deployed in the counter-insurgency operations (Rammohan, 2002). Unfortunately, when they were engaged in the counter-insurgency operations, a number of heinous crimes and unethical activities were perpetrated. Consequently, they were targeted by their former cadres.

As for the political measures, most of the insurgent groups, barring valley-based, have now entered into ceasefire agreements with the GoI. Of the total 30 insurgent groups that entered into peace process till 2013 (Ahanthem, 2014; Cline, 2006), the most contentious one is the accord signed between the NSCN-IM and GoI, starting from the 1997 to 2015 Framework Agreement. According to Kipgen (2013), the very agreement was signed by ignoring major stakeholders. Similarly, Ravi (2012) termed it as ‘hush-hush’ agreement. Its outcome has been catastrophic and brought unrest back to the state (George, 2012). The peace agreements gave the outfits a free hand to regroup, recruit, mobilize finance and rearm (George, 2012; Rammohan, 2002; Ravi, 2012). Having seen this political opportunity, many smaller insurgent groups have also followed this strategy, inciting ethnic movement, resorting to extortion and violence to demonstrate their presence, supremacy and dominance over their region (Singh, 2010). Many civil society groups, student organizations, human rights groups and non-government organizations (NGOs), who are expected to bridge the gap between the state and insurgent groups, are often being used by the insurgent groups and politicians to push their agenda.

Discussion

As discussed above, Manipur is riven by internal conflicts. The Kukis blame Meiteis, the majority community, for not favouring them in the Sadar Hills district demand issue, which was vehemently opposed by the Nagas. At the same time, the Nagas blame Meiteis for leaning with the Kukis (Kipgen, 2013) and the Kukis blame Paites for not supporting them at the time of Kuki–Naga ethnic cleansing. When Meitei insurgent groups are engaged in the protection of territorial boundary of Manipur, different tribal groups have been persistently trying for separate arrangements within the state (Ngaihte, 2013). This made the Meitei insurgent groups’ armed movement against India ineffective, weakened by the ever-growing internal autonomy demands (Lacina, 2007).

As regards, the ethnic identity formation, the call for Naga independence was initiated in the 1940s from the Naga Hills of the then undivided Assam under the banner of NNC, led by A.Z. Phizo. To strengthen the Naga movement, Phizo called for Naga integration to form ‘Nagalim/greater Nagaland’ across the Naga Hills, not because of any empathy with other tribes (Nag, 2003). Phizo met Maharaj Kumar Priyobarta (who became first Chief Minister of Manipur) for a common movement against India, but the proposal could not materialize (Singh et al., 2016). Thereafter, Phizo proposed to the Mizo/Lushai leader, Mr. Laldenga, that the Lushais and Nagas could launch a joint struggle against India to establish a sovereign state comprising the Lushai and the Naga Hills; he even agreed that the Lushai could be the state language (Nag, 2003). Though the NSCN-IM became very powerful group because of their strategic support and training to other smaller groups in the region (Kotwal, 2000), they could not take NNC’s mission (Naga integration/independence) forward due to their covert Manipur project. They have also come to realize the impracticality of Nagalim dream, and consequently, started focusing on Manipur project. In the 1960s, some of the Manipuri tribes, mainly the Mao and Tangkhul leaders, joined Phizo’s project, re-christened themselves as Nagas with the dream of making a Naga nation by merging with the Nagas/Naga hills. After realizing its impracticality, they have now given up the erstwhile Greater Nagaland/Nagalim dream and reduced to ‘Manipuri Naga integration’ for a separate state from Manipur. According to Ngaihte (2013), the much talked about peace agreement of NSCN-IM is more about Manipur and there is no denying the fact that all Nagas do not share the same view of Naga history and territoriality (Baruah, 2003). The GoI also understands it well that the Manipuri Nagas (new Nagas) are pushing for a separate state from Manipur (Bose, 2013). This may be the reason why the demand for Naga integration, propelled in the sixteen-point agreement in 1960, was not fructified in the Naga inhabited areas of Manipur (Suan, 2009). The Naga tribes of Manipur were neither a signatory of the memorandum submitted to the Simon Commission, nor did they take part in Phizo’s plebiscite for Naga nation in 1951 (Sharma, 2015; Singh, 2011). The present pan-Naga project is primarily to keep the support alive from the Nagas of Nagaland and other constituent Naga tribes of Manipur who have merged to Naga-fold recently (George, 2012). Therefore, the Manipuri Nagas welcomed the Framework Agreement of August 2015, not the Nagas of Nagaland (Sharma, 2016; Singh et al., 2016). Ravi (2014, p. 2) termed it as ‘a gun-inspired political enterprise to forge a collective political identity on a desperate sociological base merely on the fiction of a common enemy was fraught and foredoomed’. George (2012, p. 25) commented on the present movement of Manipuri Nagas as follows:

The prolonged conflict with the Indian Army and the changed circumstances has morphed the original demand for independence into (an ambiguous) sovereignty and integration of all Naga areas into one administrative entity … The impracticality of both these demands has been explicitly conveyed to the leadership of the NSCN (IM), although some individuals and groups continue to espouse the cause of total independence. The NSCN (IM) has recognised this reality, even if not having publicly stated the same as yet. The continued proponents of independence are those who find themselves marginalised and attempt to gain relevance through statements harking back to the past. …Key to the demand for influence in other Naga areas outside Nagaland is to accommodate Muivah and much of the leadership of the NSCN (IM), who are from the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur and lack acceptability within the state of Nagaland.

Since the ethnic identities, which have been constructed in recent past, are primarily for the economic and political interests, Roy-Chaudhury (2006) calls it as a fight for economic resources, not an ‘ethnic movement’. According to Singh et al. (2016, p. 5), it is ‘more about bargaining than a process for honourable settlement’, bargaining for economic and political opportunity. This might plausibly be the reason why different internal autonomy aspirants have been sequentially recalibrating their demands—from a complete secession to separate state, then ADC and further to a separate revenue district. At present, Manipur is stalled by economic blockades, spearheaded by the Nagas against the state government’s initiative for alleviation of two subdivisions into full-fledged districts—Sadar Hills and Jiribam.

In the real sense of the term, since the state reorganization process is not a new one in the country, there is no harm in granting separate states to the autonomy aspirants. However, in view of the non-homogeneity and dispersal of ethnic settlements, whether the movements of hybrid ethnic groups will serve the aspirations of the different tribes is a big question. If the demand of a separate arrangement for the Nagas is accepted, a large number of Kukis have to be relocated from the districts they demand for. On the other hand, if the separate Kuki-land is given, it will be seen by the Nagas as an encroachment on their land, especially the Sadar Hill area of Senapati district and Chandel district. When we talk about the ethnic identity, the element of identification of a tribe in Manipur as Naga, Kuki or Zomi is also not fixed and this ethnic assertion may continue to remain indeterminate (Kom, 2011). Since the autonomy movements in the state have been primarily based on the economic and political interest (territorial interest), not on the ethnic lines, there is no guarantee that the new states will not suffer further split. There is no guarantee that one or the other constituent member/tribe of the larger ethnic group will not get severed. For instances, the Mao tribe preferred to consider themselves as Naga and were desperately trying for integration with Nagaland, called for a 24-hour total Manipur blockade on 22 May 2015 when Nagaland extended border fencing over Manipur’s Dzuko valley in Mao area. The strike was called to register protest against the Manipur government, for not reacting actively on purported encroachment of Dzuko valley by the Southern Angami tribe of Nagaland (The Morung Express, 2 June 2015). When the movement for integration was at its height, the Poumai tribe severed ties with the Mao in 2003, detaching from the Mao tribe identity. Similarly, the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) has been formed in 2011 to protect socio-economic and cultural rights of the Kabui-led Zeliangrong group from the NSCN-IM’s Naganisation process (Sharma, 2015). In the words of Singh, Sharma and Thangjam (2016, p. 2), the ‘unique history of Nagas is just a political response of the GoI. If demanded, the GoI may also declare the unique history of Manipuri Nagas as well.’

In terms of state response, after the 1990s, the GoI has been very successful in persuading almost all the hill-based insurgent groups to get on board for a peace process, but it failed to do so with the Meitei insurgent groups. To weaken the rigid secessionist groups, state used other insurgent groups who had already entered into peace accords with them (Rammohan, 2002). When the GoI tried to appease the powerful insurgent groups and attempted to balance secessionist movements by using rival groups, there was a backlash from different ethnic groups. This, consequently, unleashed a series of counter movements (George, 2012; Lacina, 2009). The state’s measure failed to bring peace in Manipur, rather it aided in bullying ethnic groups living in the state for generations. For instances, the ZRA was used to crack down one of the powerful Meitei insurgent groups, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Conversely, to weaken the NSCN-IM, government encouraged Kuki National Organization (KNO) to set up an armed group, the Kuki National Army (Rammohan, 2011, p. 114). The same NSCN-IM was given free hand to exploit Meitei insurgent groups (Ravi, 2012). In fact, GoI turned a blind eye when the insurgent groups with whom peace accords were signed, committed heinous crimes within the state (George, 2012). On 17 December 2016, heavily armed NSCN-IM militant group stormed Manipur Rifle camps located in Nungkao village of Tamenglong district and snatched a large number of arms and ammunitions. According to Lacina (2009), the centre prefers to allow the most powerful group to consolidate control as local autocrat, so as to bring them to negotiating table. To appease the powerful insurgent groups, development initiatives have been reduced to corruption and diluted in the local politics. Therefore, the peace accords that have been signed till date could only reduce armed confrontation between the state and non-state actors, but it failed to bring any respite to the internecine infighting. According to Ahanthem (2014, p. 8)

the political gains if any of the ongoing ‘peace process’ in Manipur with various armed groups of the hills and the valley are yet to emerge but already the fissures arising out of the overlapping demands by the Kukis; Nagas, in terms of carving out territorial areas with the Meiteis insisting on their territorial integrity has changed the tone of various civil society groups on community lines.

The manner through which the peace accords have been signed is not appreciable because the major stakeholders have been excluded (Rammohan, 2002). In the words of Ravi (2012, p. 2), ‘Delhi’s hush-hush deal with the NSCN-IM has devastated Manipur and brought untold miseries to its people.’ Similarly, Sharma (2015) believes that the exclusionary policy of the centre failed to bring peace in Manipur. For instance, the Chief Minister of Manipur was kept in the dark when the centre and NSCN-IM signed the Framework Agreement in August 2015 (Sharma, 2016). Similarly, the Meitei secessionist groups have now engaged in local politics, extortion and contract works for raising their funds (George, 2012). The politician–insurgent–bureaucrat nexus has siphoned-off the funds meant for development programmes in the state. The centre prefers to keep this trend alive so that the issue of secession from India does not arise and direct confrontation with the insurgent groups can be avoided. In this context, Prabhakara (2011, p. 2) portrayed the opinion of Delhi on insurgency problem in Manipur as ‘corrupt them; yaar, corrupt them. Send more money, corrupt them, insurgency khatam ho jayega’ (corrupt them friends, pump money, insurgency can be wiped out). It has distorted the meaning of developmentalism.

Concluding Remarks

Though larger hill–valley divide on religious line was created by the Meiteis, the present complex dynamics of inter-group hostilities and unrest plaguing the state can be seen as movements for economic and political space. It is more of a bargaining then specific solution. The Manipuri Nagas, who were demanding free Naga nation by integrating all the Naga inhabited areas including Manipur’s northern hill tracts, have now got embroiled in the internal movement for a separate state and engaged in local politics—district council election. Since their demand is a direct challenge to the Kukis, the latter launched counter movements and it led to Naga–Kuki ethnic cleansing. Thereafter, the Zomis were attacked by the Kukis on the ground that the former did not support the latter during the Naga–Kuki ethnic conflict in the 1990s. All these three groups are now demanding for a separate state each within the state, but their overlapping claims of area convoluted the situation further. In addition, these internal autonomy demands weakened the Meitei insurgent groups, and they are now compelled to engage in balancing internal autonomy movements arising from different tribal groups. Meitei secessionist groups must also understand Indian state shaped by integrating a large number of princely states/kingdoms. Therefore, movement for overall development of the state must be emphasized by educating their elites. On the other hand, the state has been very successful in reducing armed confrontation with the secessionist groups, but has failed to contain internal conflicts; it rather compounded the situation, gave rise to hybrid ethnic identities and led to the recurrence of internal autonomy demands. The GoI must be very honest in handling this delicate situation, hush-hush policy may rather anger and ignite the people of Manipur. Using one insurgent group to weaken other will simply multiply internal conflict. Internal boundaries should not be disturbed for the sake of containing secessionist movement. Secessionist groups may be dealt accordingly.

In fact, demands from different tribal groups for their socio-economic development and protests against discrimination are very legitimate. Tribal communities are still lagging behind in development fronts. They must be protected because it upholds the principle of ethnic diversity in a democratic set-up. But demands for separate states and inciting violence merely on the ground of perceived deprivation and weak socio-economic condition may not be justified. There is no guarantee that the movements for a separate state or greater autonomy will not suffer further split. Integration or peace accords sound very sweet, but it has failed in Manipur because it is used for a greater mission of disintegration or autonomy. The present movements arising from different tribal ethnic groups require more cementing ethnically, culturally or linguistically before the territorial autonomy demand is made. Artificial theory of exclusivity and distorting age-old history of togetherness for the sake of greater autonomy and economic benefit may not be appreciated. Granting ADC under the Sixth Schedule in the name of a tribe has a great possibility of exploiting other smaller groups within the council area, which was well-exhibited in the BTC. Nevertheless, a modified ADC, which gives the provision of sharing equal power among the communities living in the area, based on the population, may be a viable solution. Present initiative of the state government to create seven new revenue districts is a welcome move for decentralizing power. Manipur must not be divided as Meitei-land, Zomi-land, Kuki-land or Naga-land. If such leverage is given, there will be endless demands for autonomy. On the other hand, the majority community should also accept the need for decentralization of power; Imphal-centric development policy must be done away. Leaders must understand that the internal movements cannot be resolved by the exogenous factor(s), policies from outside or the state’s ad hoc measures mentioned above. The insurgent leaders, civil societies and community leaders, especially the Meiteis must educate their own people before opting violent means. Cleaning internal dirt should be the first step.