Mitigating Cross-Border Biological Threats: An Animal Health and Law Enforcement Perspective on One Health

Abstract

Cross-border biological threats are increasing both in frequency and complexity. Whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin, they pose serious risks for public and animal health, economics, and national security. They can also create vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by malicious actors, worsening health crises, and undermining trust in response efforts. Although both the health and security sectors share a common interest in mitigating these threats, they often operate in silos. The One Health approach, which aims at optimizing the health of animals, people, and the environment, has gained momentum in recent years; however, its implementation faces challenges such as weak governance, lack of resources, and, notably, the exclusion of security actors whose roles and capacities remain underrecognized. Security actors play a vital role in preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal activities related to biological incidents as well as supporting health actors with biological threat response. There is a general lack of understanding of the One Health approach within the security community and health is often predominately viewed through a human safety viewpoint often omitting animal and environmental health. This commentary advocates for the mutual integration of One Health and security approaches to strengthen resilience against cross-border biological threats. Concrete examples and recommendations to foster integration are discussed such as updating legislation, formalizing information sharing mechanisms, and undertaking joint capacity building, all while recognizing common challenges in mutual integration. To protect people, animals, and the environment alike, it is time to act to ensure coordinated efforts to mitigate cross-border biological threats.

Keywords

One Health Agroterrorism Infectious diseases International coordination National strategy/policy Veterinary medicine

Introduction

In today’s interconnected world, cross-border biological threats are becoming increasingly frequent, complex, and difficult to contain. These threats, whether natural, accidental, or deliberate, pose serious risks to human and animal health as well as economies, livelihoods, and national security including public order. For example, African swine fever has decimated pig populations, costing billions in economic losses and threatening food security and livelihoods, particularly among smallholders, where African swine fever can push families into poverty.^1,2 Foot-and-mouth disease, one of the most contagious animal diseases, is estimated to reduce the gross domestic product by 0.3% and 0.6% in countries that are free from the disease and suffer from an outbreak.³ The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the fragility of global systems and the speed with which a disease can cross borders, strain health systems, and disrupt governance structures. Climate change, globalization, conflict, and geopolitical instability can further exacerbate these threats.⁴

Cross-border biological threats create vulnerabilities that criminals can exploit for various illicit purposes. During health crises, criminals take advantage of overwhelmed systems to traffic counterfeit medicines, smuggle essential goods, and spread misinformation.⁵ During the COVID-19 pandemic, criminal networks have exploited strained healthcare systems by trafficking counterfeit medical products and smuggling essential goods. In 2020, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)’s Operation Pangea XIII, conducted across 90 countries, led to the seizure of over 4.4 million illicit pharmaceuticals and 37,000 counterfeit medical devices worth more than US$14 million.⁶ Similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 10% of medical products in low- and middle-income countries are substandard or falsified, with the global market for these illicit products estimated to exceed US$30 billion annually.⁷ Criminals also capitalize on border disruptions to conduct fraud and cyberattacks on healthcare infrastructure. These actions worsen public health emergencies and undermine trust in health responses.

Responding to these threats is challenging and warrants a coordinated and multisectoral approach. The One Health approach offers a practical solution for coordinated action. Defined as “an integrated, unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people, animals, and ecosystems,”⁸ it promotes cooperation between human, animal, and environmental health,⁹ which can occur locally, nationally, and internationally, such as through the Quadripartite agreement.¹⁰

Security is a fundamental human right that can be defined as measures taken to protect populations, information, infrastructure, or organizations against threats.⁹ State security actors are diverse and include stakeholders such as police, border and customs agencies, intelligence services, and military forces.¹¹ However, the security dimension is often absent from One Health, just as One Health is often absent from security frameworks.

In this commentary, we advocate for mutual integration of security and One Health approaches with a focus on the animal health and security interface. We explore the challenges of integration and present concrete solutions for strengthening resilience to cross-border biological threats in an increasingly unstable world.

Integrating Security Into One Health

One Health has garnered attention since the COVID-19 pandemic; however, its implementation remains inconsistent and faces numerous challenges. Operationalization of the One Health approach requires strong governance, political willpower, and sustainable financing, which are often lacking.¹² In addition, government ministries and agencies often operate in silos hindering coordination during emergencies and day-to-day activities.¹³ For example, a 2020 study reviewed 86 national emergency management plans from World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) members and found only one third of them mentioned veterinary services, thus highlighting a significant omission in emergency preparedness.¹⁴ Furthermore, after-action reviews almost consistently identify gaps in interagency coordination and communication that delay responses and increase costs.¹⁵ An often overlooked gap is the significant underrepresentation of the environmental sector in One Health, as demonstrated in a scoping review that found only 1 in 5 One Health initiatives integrated environmental concerns despite the role of environmental drivers in disease emergence, such as land-use changes, deforestation, and climate change.¹⁶ Addressing these gaps offers a critical opportunity to build more resilient and inclusive health systems under the One Health approach.

Security actors are often absent from One Health governance and implementation.¹⁰ When they are involved, it is usually during emergencies such as during the COVID-19 pandemic where law enforcement enforced disease control measures such as lockdowns, border controls, and maintained public order.¹⁷ Risk assessment tools are designed from a health perspective; therefore, few national and regional agencies have included security criteria in their health emergency risk assessments and disease prioritization exercises.¹⁸ This could lead to gaps in prevention, preparedness, and response to the spread of diseases linked to illicit or malevolent activities. This is also true at the international level where, despite WOAH and WHO maintaining global disease lists and prioritization frameworks, such as WOAH’s list of diseases, infections, and infestations¹⁹ and WHO’s criteria for declaring a public health emergency of international concern,²⁰ they primarily reflect animal and public health priorities and do not consider national security threats or the risks of the intentional misuse of pathogens. The omission of security considerations in these frameworks may leave critical gaps in preparedness where health and security concerns overlap.

Integrating security actors into One Health is vital for tackling cross-border biological threats. Security cooperation can support stronger border controls to prevent and detect the importation of illegal animals and plants and/or their products, as well as falsified, substandard, or illegal medicinal products. Illegal animal products originating from wild animals are of particular concern given the link to the emergence and/or spread of zoonotic diseases, especially given that it is estimated that over 75% of emerging infectious diseases in humans originate in animals and that 80% of biological agents with bioterrorism potential are zoonotic or animal pathogens.²¹ A 2010 study estimated that approximately 5 tons of African bushmeat, many of which are from Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora-listed species, is smuggled weekly in personal baggage through Paris’ Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport for personal use and to be sold in commercial markets.²² Smuggling not only undermines international wildlife regulations but also poses risks of introducing pathogens, including zoonoses, across borders, bypassing sanitary controls.²³ Considering these threats, the command and control capabilities of security and their investigative capacities and logistical expertise could help support early warning systems, tackle illegal trade and smuggling, and enhance the emergency response of health agencies.

However, integrating security into One Health presents challenges. There could be resistance to this integration, such as concerns over the “securitization of health” and its perceived negative impacts serving state-centric interests rather than the needs of communities.²⁴ Communities with histories of marginalization, conflict, or coercive health measures may mistrust the involvement of security in health responses. Framing health through a security lens may also lead to the prioritization of diseases that are perceived as economic, national, and international security risks, compared to structural determinants of health such as poverty. Although not a security organization, WOAH, formerly OIE, maintained 2 lists of notifiable animal diseases until 2004: List A, diseases that have the highest potential for international spread and serious socioeconomic and/or public health concerns; and List B, which focused on diseases that were deemed still significant for trade and animal health but considered less urgent.²⁵ The 2 lists have now been combined into a single list; however, this previous codification of priority based on risk to trade demonstrates how health agendas can be shaped by economic and geopolitical concerns.

While there is limited awareness of One Health risks for security professionals, One Health frameworks currently lack practical multisectoral tools to facilitate security engagement, making efforts to collaborate with the security sector a lower priority.²⁶ Furthermore, in some countries, veterinary legislation lacks provisions for law enforcement involvement in disease control compared with public health legislation.²⁷ Internationally, health and security intergovernmental organizations may face challenges when negotiating cooperation agreements due to sensitivities around information sharing.²⁸

Despite these barriers, there are examples of successful integration of security into One Health. At the national level, law enforcement have supported veterinary services in efforts to tackle illegal trade, such as the smuggling of illegal meat and veterinary products, which can pose risks to public health and animal health.^29,30 In environmental crimes, such as wildlife trafficking and illegal logging, security actors’ involvement has contributed to an expanded operational definition of One Health and a holistic approach to biological threats, especially in border areas where state oversight is limited and security actors are often the first line of defense. For instance, in 2021, the Center for the Investigation of Transnational Environmental Crimes in Thailand was established as a platform to embed disease surveillance personnel alongside the police to enhance responses.³¹ The COVID-19 pandemic has also demonstrated the critical role of the security sector in supporting One Health approaches. Law enforcement agencies supported public health by implementing movement restrictions at border-crossing points, maintaining order at hospitals and laboratories, supporting contact tracing, and securing the delivery of medical supplies. Moreover, law enforcement played a preventive role in addressing the rise in illegal activities during quarantine periods, including domestic violence, cybercrime, and distribution of counterfeit medical products. Guidelines provided by INTERPOL supported and complemented national strategic actions to the pandemic.³²

At the international level, collaboration between health and security international organizations has been demonstrated to address cross-border biological threats. In 2021, WOAH and INTERPOL collaborated in response to the African swine fever outbreak in the Dominican Republic, promoting cooperation between animal health and security by providing key messages about the virus, its socioeconomic impact, risks of cross-border spread, and the role of law enforcement in monitoring, reporting, and preventing illegal animal and animal product movements.³³

Integrating One Health Into Security Frameworks

State security actors, including police, customs, intelligence, and military play diverse roles when intersecting with health, depending on their mandates, jurisdiction, and national legislation.¹¹ They not only support health services in emergency response³⁴ but also prevent, deter, and investigate illegal activities related to the spread of diseases, for example, by preventing the introduction of infected animals.³⁵

Although security actors play various roles in preserving health and collaborating with health sectors, most are unaware of the One Health concept and its relationship to their work. This reflects a lack of understanding of the concept in civil society.³⁶ Moreover, for the security sector, preserving health is usually considered from a human safety standpoint and does not imply an understanding of underlying health or disease spread issues, except for some specific public health issues.³⁷

Unlike the health sector, where actors are overseen by a limited number of authorities, security actors are managed by different ministries, with varying priorities for human, animal, and plant health. In this regard, the lack of data and research linking disease spread to illegal activities rarely highlights the importance of the security sector in mitigating animal and plant health security threats. The expertise to connect health and security at the national level often lies outside of the security sector, leaving this perspective overlooked.

With such gaps, the current engagement of One Health in security remains globally low and generally perceived as part of a zoonosis response to stop the spread of disease into the human population, as demonstrated by the appeal to strengthen One Health through security following the spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into humans.³⁸ However, the One Health concept in security is more developed in some countries with a specific interest in preserving animal and/or plant health for economic reasons, biodiversity, and wildlife preservation,³⁹ as exemplified by the involvement of security in the foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks affecting several European countries in 2025.⁴⁰

However, even among countries that have placed animal and/or plant health on their security agenda, only a limited number have developed the capability to conduct a structured threat assessment for suspicious animal and plant health incidents.⁴¹ This process is essential for engaging security and health resources to achieve more efficient responses. Integrating a One Health perspective into security would benefit both the security and health sectors. Security actors would be more efficient in limiting disease exposure and spread during regular duties and disease outbreak responses. This would also contribute to mitigating security threats from animal pathogens associated with illegal activities, including the smuggling of animals and animal products.²³ Creating greater awareness of One Health will increase the detection of vulnerabilities and indicators of health threats. This would enhance early reporting, communication, and coordination with veterinary services for both disease control and criminal investigation.⁴²

From a purely law enforcement view, analyzing the nexus of crimes with a One Health lens could provide a different perspective and new investigative leads or evidence linking different criminal activities or groups with one another, even at the transnational level. However, One Health is not considered a matter of national security and, consequently, is usually not part of the government security agenda. This makes it difficult for national authorities to prioritize health issues, including biological threats, in their security-loaded agenda. Moreover, even security entities concerned with health usually focus on human, animal, or plant aspects. The demand for results from their authorities often favors siloed approaches to health issues.

Where criminal investigations are concerned, limited security clearance for health officers and trust in the health sector’s ability to maintain confidentiality often limit collaboration. This is further exacerbated by the lack of or limited mechanisms for secure intelligence sharing and joint investigation as well as legal frameworks that limit the way veterinary or other health services cooperate with law enforcement in the investigation of biological incidents.

Nevertheless, efforts are ongoing to better integrate One Health into security. It starts with raising awareness and advocacy efforts, which are increasing at the national, regional, and international levels⁴³ with concrete actions. For example, the United Kingdom includes human, animal, and plant health in its national risk register, an external version of the National Security Risk Assessment.⁴⁴ INTERPOL is increasingly adopting a One Health approach to support its membership. Last year, it updated its list of biological agents and toxins of concern for animal and human populations with the support of both national and international One Health partners.⁴⁵ Through this approach, the INTERPOL list aims to support the biopreparedness efforts of law enforcement agencies, health authorities, and policymakers in taking various health and security perspectives when prioritizing health threats.

Common Challenges and Collaborative Solutions

Despite differences in their priorities and mandates, One Heath and security actors can face overlapping challenges and have common opportunities to cooperate to tackle cross-border biological threats.

Effective information sharing between security and One Health actors depends on strong relationships and trust. Building this trust takes time and can be hindered by differing mandates, institutional cultures, and concerns regarding data confidentiality. Formal information-sharing mechanisms, such as secure communication platforms and standard operating procedures, are critical for overcoming these barriers. At the international level, memoranda of understanding between INTERPOL and health organizations such as WOAH⁴⁶ and WHO⁴⁷ provide foundational frameworks for cooperation, enabling joint activities and rapid communication during health security events. Under the WOAH and INTERPOL memorandum of understanding, INTERPOL is working on the integration of data coming from WOAH’s World Animal Health Information System into BioTracker, INTERPOL’s information sharing platform on biological threats. However, the operationalization of these cooperation agreements at the national and international levels requires clear triggers for engagement. WOAH’s guidelines for investigation of suspicious biological events⁴⁸ identify such triggers, including unusual patterns of animal illness or deaths, that should prompt law enforcement involvement.

Legislative gaps and institutional silos often hinder effective collaboration between security and One Health stakeholders, particularly when health events require criminal investigation. Health officials may lack legal mandates to share information with law enforcement, or vice versa, leading to fragmented responses. However, solutions are emerging. For example, Tunisia aims to amend its legal framework to enhance coordinated responses between veterinary services and security agencies. WOAH’s Veterinary Legislation Support Programme offers tailored assistance to countries seeking to align their laws with international standards, facilitating cross-sectoral collaboration.⁴⁹ Similarly, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre’s Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database lists laws and regulations at the national level, which can inspire reforms to support joint investigations.⁵⁰ In Uganda, a national One Health platform was developed in 2011 to develop and coordinate national One Health activities through a legal framework and memorandum of understanding between sectors.⁵¹ Despite challenges such as limited resources, the platform provides a mechanism to enable cross-institutional cooperation through information sharing and joint activities, including between health and security. These efforts illustrate how legislative clarity and harmonization can pave the way for a more cohesive One Health–Security integration.

In addition to opportunities to strengthen information sharing and legislation, capacity building can foster multisectoral collaboration. In 2023, WOAH, INTERPOL, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, organized an international agroterrorism simulation exercise aimed at improving preparedness and coordination of veterinary services, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations.⁵² In 2023, INTERPOL, WHO, and WOAH held an interagency exercise to explore the interoperability processes between the 3 organisations in terms of signal detection and information sharing during a deliberate biological event in the specific context of a disruptive cyberattack. Such exercises can foster trust and mutual understanding between sectors to be ready to respond to cross-border biological threats. Another model demonstrating cooperation between health and security is the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Department of Agriculture “Animal-Plant Heath Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Course,” which brings together actors in health and security at both the state and federal levels to learn and practice the core concepts of joint criminal and epidemiological investigations.⁴¹

At the international level, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction have made significant efforts to foster collaboration between health and security, notably through funding, technical assistance, and coordination of projects and initiatives. This includes the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa, which aims to enhance regional capacities to detect and respond to biological threats by promoting cross-sectoral cooperation.⁵³

Conclusion

Cross-border biological threats are a multifaceted challenge that demands integrated solutions. As health and security actors operating in silos will not address the range of cross-border biological threats, action is needed to integrate security into One Health and One Health into security. This can provide tools and capabilities for early detection, information sharing, and response to these threats.

The 2019 Global Forum on Scientific Advances Important to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention highlighted the importance of integrating scientific advancements into border security strategies to enhance detection and response capabilities.⁵⁴ By implementing integrated surveillance systems and coordinated response protocols at points of entry, countries can identify and mitigate potential health risks before they spread. The effectiveness of such measures depends on international cooperation and information sharing. Strengthening border controls not only acts as a physical barrier and deterrent but also as a strategic component in a multilayer defense against biological threats.

As highlighted in this commentary, examples from various countries worldwide as well as efforts by organizations such as INTERPOL and WOAH demonstrate the feasibility of cooperation between animal health and security. These efforts are also applied by and are applicable to other One Health actors. To protect people, animals, and the environment alike, it is time to act to ensure that coordinated efforts exist to prevent, detect, and respond to cross-border biological threats.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

WOAH’s contribution was supported by Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program. INTERPOL’s contribution was made possible thanks to its Global Biosecurity Enhancement Program for Law Enforcement supported by Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program, the United Kingdom’s International Biosecurity Programme, and the United States Department of Defense Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative Threat Reduction Program’s support of project HDTRA1-23-1-0015 “INTERPOL Global Biosecurity Enhancement Programme for Law Enforcement.”

The authors declare that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. The designations and denominations employed and the presentation of the material in this commentary do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WOAH or INTERPOL concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. The views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the authors. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by WOAH or INTERPOL in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. This publication is partly sponsored by the United States Department of Defense Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The content of the information does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the federal government of the United States, and no official endorsement should be inferred.

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