Abstract
In avoiding the topic of morality, sociologists have weakened our own capacity to advance the public understanding of one of our root ideas—namely, that society is an important force—and have largely ceded control of public dialogue to ideologues. In this article, I call for a renewed effort in sociology to explicitly take up the topic of morality and not shy from using value-oriented terms in our work and in public engagement. To illustrate this point, I examine the implications of the ever-expanding market culture. I use moral foundation theory to formulate key questions around this topic and, more broadly, offer a framework that sociologists might draw from in attending to the societal consequences of current social practices and trends.
Keywords
Does sociology matter? We certainly hope so, but recent commentary suggests impact outside the discipline is uneven (Aggers 2007; Clawson et al. 2007; Gans 1997; Jeffries 2009; Kristof 2014; Longhofer, Golden and Baiocchi 2010; Nickel 2010, 2012; Nyden, Hossfeld, and Nyden 2012). Most sociologists recognize the entanglement of collective well-being and self-interests, yet remain reluctant to engage moral terms. Consequently, that the collective good matters has been challenged, vilified, and coupled in public discourse with allusions to “collectivism,” “communism,” and even “fascism.” The one explicitly moral imperative prevalent in public dialogue centers around sexual regulation. Even here, however, discourse is dominated by the religious Right. As a consequence, such conversations are consistently slanted and lead to the neglect of a broad range of other pressing social issues.
Constricted consideration of morality and the collective good, of course, cannot be fully attributed to the actions (or inactions) of sociologists. We have, nevertheless, had a role in it. Despite a rich tradition extending from Emile Durkheim, the sociology of morality nearly became extinct (see Abend 2010, 2011; Lukes 2010) owing to various external and internal challenges. The recent revival of the sociology of morality, the most substantial achievement of which is the recently published Handbook of the Sociology of Morality (Hitlin and Vaisey 2010), however, offers important guideposts worth consideration. Following a brief overview of external and internal challenges below, I highlight key insights from work grappling explicitly with morality and offer, as an application and case in point, our expanding market culture.
External Challenges
A starting place is the recognition that public discourses surrounding inequality and social problems are in need of the insights of our field. Currently, however, the feint voices of scholars cannot be heard amid the loud chatter of advertisers, commentators, politicians, bloggers, and other nonexperts who drive public conversation. Distrust of public institutions—skepticism partially driven by the neoliberal turn in international political economy (Harvey 2005; Noah 2012)—has also grown. That makes the substantive study of such institutions—a fundamental concern of sociology—suspicious too. These circumstances constitute genuine external challenges to those of us who see what we do as relevant, if not fundamental, to contemporary public issues.
Internal Challenges
The internal problem revolves around the need to balance scientific integrity with the imperative to make our work available, practical, and intelligible. The system of producing sociology in this country—including undergraduate and graduate curricula, pedagogy, personnel procedures, criteria for grants, the mission of journals, the mission of professional societies, criteria for rankings, defining audiences, identifying outlets and modes of communication, epistemological parameters, and so on—in fact, comes with great promise and various risks (see Aggers 2007; Clawson et al. 2007; Nickel 2010). Yet, endemic challenges internal to academic sociology—that is, indifference, insularity, and parochialism—persist and must be met head on.
Such intent does not, I believe, inevitably result in the politicization of methodology, the end of scholarly integrity, or the perception of dogmatic rigidity. Think of the work of Bellah et al. (1985), Alan Wolfe (1989), Robert Wuthnow (1987), or Amitai Etzioni (1996), for instance, each of whom engages in sociological study of morality that transcends these risks. Some will understandably worry about combative declarations of the worst dogma, reflecting narrow, progressive political correctness evident in some corners of our discipline (see Brint 2007; Stinchcombe 2007; Turner 2007). “As long as the public’s opinions on most issues are so divergent from those of sociologists, we need to tread lightly,” Jonathan H. Turner avers. “It is far wiser to offer our knowledge in as objective manner as possible; and if we do so, we will gain credibility and be invited back by the public and key decision-makers” (Turner 2007:270). Treading lightly certainly makes sense in some circumstances, but not all. However, there are, in fact, many viable ways, depending on methodology, substantive topic, and public audience, to effectively communicate sociological ideas and in a manner that is neither timid nor shrill. Engaging explicitly in, rather than shying away from, moral assessments offers one crucial communicative bridge between sociological insights and public dialogue.
On Morality and Sociology
Sociologists often subsume the question of morality into the topic of justice (Berger 2002)—a pattern undoubtedly related to the trepidation some have about any claim that smacks of moral universalism (see Lukes 2010). We know that certain cultural patterns (e.g., slavery, sex trafficking) are destructive. There is some aversion among our colleagues, however, toward developing a rubric for evaluating social behavior in any kind of value-laden terms.
The question “whose morality?” is a good one (see Appiah 2010; Lamont 1992; Powell 2010). Who gets to decide what is moral? Those who control the means of material and mental production are better positioned to create and disseminate dominant moral claims. That problem notwithstanding, society still has collective interests that can be conceptually separated from what powerful actors define the priorities of an era to be. Sociology is well suited to distinguish genuine collective interests from ruling ideas that are self-serving.
Moreover, as an idea that is pondered, experienced, and enacted by regular people every day, morality is completely appropriate for sociological analysis. Just because the concept is difficult to define and problematic in application does not mean it is not important or that we should abandon it. Indeed, most every important concept in sociology has the same character. Think of race, family, religion, or culture, to name a few. Each is meaningful to sociologists and the public writ large, and all of them are inherently complex and disputed in their connotation. Yet, rather than abandoning them, we embrace their complexity and relevance within our sociological agendas.
Moral Truth
The conditions of society shape the dominant moral ideals at any given moment. Yet some moral claims are more credible, healthy, and enduring than others. The contours of moral order change along with other changes in society (see Abend 2008) and may, in fact, take on an ambivalent, common-sense character (Bellah 2006b; Wolfe 1989). This does not mean, however, that sociologists should be indifferent to what is good for society (Durkheim [1893] 1984:xxvi).
While the goal of overtly advancing a particular moral framework is certainly not popular in many sociological corners, there is an implicit commitment to a moral agenda in the vast majority of social scientific analysis (see Hirschman 2013). That is, much sociological research not only has moral implications but also has moral objectives. Whether it is an argument about whether a particular institution is good or bad (e.g., the “traditional family”) or can be reformed (e.g., education, medicine, media), most sociology holds assumptions, explicit or implicit, on what is best for societies, institutions, groups, and individuals. Ideals of equality, health, personal relationships, and educational achievement, for example, are used as benchmarks. Science more generally is an inherently moral project insomuch as learning about the world represents concern for the human community. Otherwise, why bother? With this in mind, Wolfe (1989) suggests that successful sociology of morality will (1) interrogate the ontological status of the concept, (2) examine the context for the construction of morality, and (3) assess the viability of moral claims.
Ontological Status of the Concept
A core starting point is asking whether morality actually exists and, assuming so, what its defining qualities are. In this vein, some claim that morality is largely innate, completely cultural, or basically unimportant. See, for example, the burgeoning research in neuroscience on the “moral brain,” the Weberian tradition of sociology, or most of the field of sociocultural anthropology. In each case, some form of empirical evidence informs the presumption. However, ontological assumptions are ultimately not empirically falsifiable.
Amid these various orientations, I have found the ontological premises of moral foundation theory to be the most sensible. Drawing from different streams of research in biology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology, Jonathan Haidt (2012) has identified six clusters of long-term adaptive challenges that confront human beings, positing that each is associated with an area of moral dilemmas that people hold in every culture: (1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) liberty/oppression (4) loyalty/betrayal, (5) authority/subversion, (6) sanctity/degradation. Each represents a collective quandary. How does the group attend to the issue? How is the dilemma framed? How does the collective facilitate viable patterns in terms of one category without undermining workable behavior in another? These dilemmas are arguably universal among human collectives while the responses are culturally determined and in many cases, such as modern industrial society, contested.
Context for the Construction of Morality
As I have previously argued (Brueggemann 2012), current market-oriented logics and associated cultural arrangements have made habits of behavior increasingly unsustainable relative to moral order. The economic sphere intrudes into most other domains of social life, and the historical balance between the market, the state, and civil society has been disrupted. Instead of three domains with enough coherence and power to contain the logic and pressures of others, most institutional milieu are increasingly dominated by the economic (see Harvey 2005; Persell 1994; Wolfe 1989). One result is that the market has colonized morality. If it is profitable, it is “good” (see Sandel 2012; Satz 2010).
Viability of Moral Claims
Among sociologists interested in morality, the third task—assessing moral claims—is especially controversial. Some believe sociology is ill equipped for conversations about how people ought to behave (see Abend 2008). However, as Wolfe (1989:211) suggests, “The distinctive contribution of a sociological approach to morality . . . is not to tell people what they ought to do in situations of moral complexity, but rather to help individuals discover and apply for themselves the moral rules they already, as social beings, possess.” The key is to demonstrate that all people are social beings with moral significance. This is related to sociology’s root idea: society matters. That is, how groups are organized, how individuals are situated therein, and what they collectively believe and do have long-lasting implications for health, justice, peace, happiness, and other social goods integral to moral order. To be clear, I am not arguing that sociologists are (or should be) seeking universal truths. Rather, I am suggesting that despite “value free” claims in much of our work, a lot of sociology is morally charged. “[B]oth the choice of what to study and what to do with the results of one’s study,” Bellah (2006a:16) explains, “are not, should not, and cannot be value free.” I contend that moral agendas veiled in neutral language of “objectivity” are often visible as such. I correspondingly advocate for more candor and assertiveness relative to such value-laden agendas in moral terms.
The Spread and Dominance of Market Culture as a Case in Point
Extending from arguments in my book Rich, Free, and Miserable: The Failure of Success in America (Brueggemann 2012) and using the categories of moral foundation theory discussed above, I offer here an application of a morally explicit sociology to the case of expanding market culture.
Historically speaking, several key institutions in civil society (e.g., religion, organized labor, media/journalism, education) and sometimes government served as countervailing forces against the inherently expansive logic and symbolism of the market. Such institutions, what I call moral hardware, have done so by fostering a broad concern for both universality and difference (see Appiah 2007) and attention to social capital and community engagement (see Putnam 2000). The increasing domination of the market as the center of an institutional order and symbolic sphere, however, has now weakened such countervailing institutions, the collective values they espoused, and what I refer to as moral software—that is, the capacity for individuals to make wise decisions about how to spend their time, energy, money, and other resources in ways that are healthy for society and themselves in the long run.
One consequence is that much public commentary tends to focus on relatively minor, divisive issues while glossing over or distracting from the most serious problems in our moral order (see Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Wolfe 1998, 2006). Below, I review empirical patterns of disorder endemic to market-oriented culture and in relation to key moral concerns derived from moral foundation theory. The main point is this: unrestrained market culture affirms the idea that everything is for sale and that individuals should get as much as they can. Through countless institutional and normative channels, this is compromising the viability of how we collectively respond to the fundamental moral foundations of social life.
Care/Harm
Many on the lower end of the American stratification system have been harmed in numerous ways, including harsh working conditions, exploitation, and marginalization. Market culture, though, also affects affluent, “successful” people in destructive ways. Think of workaholism, overscheduling, hyper-competition, sleep deprivation, divorce, debt, substance abuse, unhealthy consumption patterns, unhealthy working conditions, vulgar content in the media, and environmental degradation (see Brown 2012; Brueggemann 2012a; Greenhouse 2009; Nestle 2002; Rosenfeld and Wise 2000; Schor 1992).
Fairness/Cheating
A serious problem made worse by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling is how money now flows relatively freely through the political system. Tax loopholes, lobbying, false advertising, and untruthful political rhetoric all foster public cynicism and discourage civic “buy-in.” There is growing perception that multinational corporations do not play by the same rules as everyone else (e.g., insider trading, bonuses unconnected to performance, bonuses on the heels of government bailouts, surreptitious data mining). Lower- and middle-class families feel they have to work harder to maintain quality of life at the very same time that wealth concentration at the top grows more extreme (see Bakan 2004; Kalleberg 2011; Pugh 2009; Schor 2004).
Freedom/Oppression
Economic and political elites suppress input from ordinary citizens. Corporations repeatedly demonstrate uneven concern for the communities in which they operate. Citizens feel vast frustration in their dealings with large institutions, especially government and corporations, which is partly what has motivated, respectively, the Tea Party and Occupier movements. The intense concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small number of elites weakens the majority of citizens’ sense of freedom from such control and degrades the minority of poor citizens’ freedom to realize their life chances. Internet profiling and sharing of personal information allows for unseen manipulation of consumers. The shift from voluntary use of digital technology to basic dependence combined with the constant presence of advertising on the Internet constitutes a kind of unencumbered access of corporations into our homes, children’s lives, and the public square (see Bakan 2004; Domhoff 2009; Gitlin 2002; Klinenberg 2007).
Loyalty/Betrayal
Multinational corporations generally prioritize the interests of shareholders and executive managers over those of consumers and citizens, local neighborhoods and municipalities, sustainable resources and ecosystems, or national security and patriotic ideals. Sometimes the short-term interests of upper-level management even outweigh the long-term interests of shareholders (see Bakan 2004; Bogle 2005; Domhoff 2009; Putnam 2000).
Authority/Subversion
Widespread corporate advertising contributes to selfishness and isolation. The loss of public trust for those in positions of authority is especially problematic. We want social institutions to serve us. Yet, many of us are skeptical of anyone in charge. And, of course, many who are in charge of important institutional responsibilities are beleaguered. This characterization applies in different ways to teachers, police, civil servants, journalists, doctors, lawyers, managers, and other professionals. Market culture fosters narcissism and greed, as well as disrespect for traditional authority (see Bellah 1999; Gitlin 2002; Putnam 2000; Tannen 1998).
Sanctity/Degradation
All Americans care about health. Most believe the family is an important institution. And a lot of us agree that our current institutional arrangements and cultural practices are not very feasible relative to protecting the physical and psychological well-being of citizenry. I do not mean to minimize genuine disagreements in this category (or any of the others). But the best evidence reflects widely shared discontent on this issue, even if the question about how to resolve things is unsettled. The debate about homosexuality, which dominates the public discourse about family values, is substantively important. But it has little to do with the main problems most families face. Again, new patterns of workaholism, debt, overscheduling, poor nutrition, sleep deprivation, and anxiety—all trappings of market culture—are much more consequential issues for most American families, not to mention genuine health concerns (see Rosenfeld and Wise 2000; Lane 2000; Schor 1992, 1998; Whybrow 2005).
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted to outline and integrate key points relevant to the sociology of morality for several audiences internal and external to the formal practice of sociology. This particular application of moral foundation theory is appropriate for several reasons. This perspective is informed by substantive biological, psychological, anthropological, and sociological analyses. Moreover, it overlaps in real ways with the common-sense ambivalence (which is neither absolutist and universalistic nor completely relativistic and nihilistic) with which many lay people regard the topic of morality.
The ways different societies (and subgroups) negotiate the foundational dilemmas are necessarily varied. Successful responses to them are dependent on a range of idiosyncratic circumstances of different settings (e.g., geography, technology, history, positioning in global political economy). Therefore, there is no single set of moral rules extending from this theory. That does not mean that anything goes, all norms have equal value, or that morality is not important. Rather, the categories of moral foundations suggest goals that every human collective ought to pursue; every group needs to be concerned with finding the right balance relative to each dilemma and its own values.
With this type of framework, sociologists can evaluate specific claims made within a society (or subgroup) relative to these categories. Such assessment can be tricky because there are always questions of framing, ideology, and vantage point, and the project is inherently incomplete. The conceptual categories of moral foundation theory will no doubt be further refined in the future. For now, they are imperfect but useful. The value of this framework is providing some context for what society needs to guide the appraisal of specific claims. For instance, in the case of market culture, despite all the interested pronouncements of advertisers, politicians, commentators, and bloggers asserting otherwise, we see that moral foundations (i.e., fairness, freedom, loyalty, authority, sanctity) in American society are languishing. Those with vested interests will likely be unmoved by this critique. But large segments of the public can both benefit from and contribute to the critique of these problems developed by sociologists.
This application suggests that neither value-free detachment nor the appearance of neutrality on the part of sociologists is helpful in public discourse. Any moral vacuum in public life is eagerly filled by interested ideologues—as it is in the case of market culture. In spite of, or rather precisely because of, the complexities and uncertainties pertaining to the topic of morality, sociologists must actively stake out moral turf on public terrain. Again, this is a difficult task fraught with risks. But like the topics of nutrition, working conditions, medical ethics, criminal justice, and ecological sustainability, for example, the issue of expansive market culture has moral significance that should be illuminated by the analyses of engaged sociologists. We can be circumspect about the prospect of conclusively resolving all the complexities of these matters and still be confident that society is better off for that public engagement.
My own engagements with different publics, drawing on the analysis summarized above and dealing with current trends surrounding market culture, have included communication with religious groups, labor organizers, farmers, physicians, artists, executive managers, continuing education students, scholars in other fields, as well as graduate and undergraduate students, and professionals in sociology. Along the way, I have (1) grown to appreciate how esoteric debates in the academy appear from outside, (2) found more common ground among conservatives and liberals than I expected, and (3) been guided in productive ways toward new empirical questions worth exploration. My willingness to engage in and use moral language helped, rather than hindered, the bridging of sociological work and public understandings.
“Cultures change,” Hunter (2010:43) contends, “but rarely if ever without a fight.” Such a fight is most often waged by networks of people with some power, he argues, yet seldom those at the very top. This could be the intelligentsia, including public sociologists of morality. Insofar as such engagement is pertinent to and can be informed by a broader audience than academic colleagues, our scholarly endeavors must, indeed, include modes of communication intelligible to relevant publics. Who is in a better position to illuminate the relevant linkages between personal troubles and public issues than scholars of our discipline? Sociologists should not shy away from morality as a topic or the public arena as a venue.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for helpful comments from Walter Brueggemann, Richard Chrisman, Steven Hitlin, Joya Misra, Pat Oles, Vinnie Roscigno, Marta Rose, Sheldon Solomon, Alan Wolfe, and two anonymous reviewers at Social Currents.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.