The Impact of Armed Conflicts on Forced Migration Crises in Nigeria and Mali

Abstract

Forced migration crises caused by non-state actors such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram insurgency, Tuareg Armed Group, herders-farmers’ armed groups, bandits, separatists, and other local tribal militias have forced many in West Africa to flee to other countries or to become internally displaced persons (IDPs). This paper focuses on the effects of armed conflict on forced migrants in Nigeria and Mali. It finds the major causes of armed conflicts in Nigeria and Mali to be social injustice, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, poverty, illiteracy, bad governance, and religious extremism. It also finds that climate change and political instability contribute to forced migration in these two countries. IDPs in Nigeria and Mali have little to no access to basic necessities. The article finds that policymakers and local authorities are not fully committed to either returning or resettling refugees and IDPs and that most of the refugees are unwilling to return to their homes because of safety concerns. The study finds that refugees and IDPs are not integrated into the local communities due to stigmatization, which further affects their social and psychological well-being. It recommends that the governments of Nigeria and Mali tackle the root causes of armed conflicts, including poverty, religious extremism, and social injustice. These governments and other stakeholders should also ensure that the human rights of forced migrants are protected in terms of their identity and access to social services. Finally, they should ensure the safety of forced migrants who are willing to return to their ancestral homes.

Keywords

armed conflict forced migration crisis Nigeria Mali

Introduction

Population displacement has become a significant problem in developing nations in the last few decades, most of which is due to violent conflicts. Reports have shown that from 2000 to 2020, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) associated with armed conflicts increased from 21 million to 41 million (World Migration Report 2020). Today 55 million people are displaced worldwide as a result of violent conflict and natural catastrophe, with 59 countries accounting for 49 million of those displaced persons (Migration Data Portal 2021). Over five million of these refugees and IDPs live in West Africa (UNHCR 2021a). The discriminatory policies of national governments in the West African sub-region, including Nigeria and Mali, prevent refugees and IDPs from accessing government subsidies, education, and employment (African Rights Action 2021).

The armed conflict in West Africa, particularly in the Lake Chad Region has resulted in the mass displacement of people with serious consequences for the security, social, political, and humanitarian conditions of people in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. Of the region's more than three million IDPs, two million had returned to their places of origin, by November 2021 (IOM DTM 2021). In the Sahel, armed conflicts have been on the rise, negatively impacting millions of people, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger; more than 13 million people in the Central Sahel are in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2022b). In Nigeria there are three million IDPs, 82,000 refugees and 1,600 asylum-seekers due to the armed conflicts in Cameroon (UNHCR 2022b). In Mali, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has identified 1.36 million persons “of concern” (UNHCR 2022a).

Promoting access to social, political, and economic welfare for vulnerable groups like IDPs not only enhances their access to essential services, but also increases their economic engagement with the aim of lowering poverty, dependency, and vulnerability in society (World Bank 2017). This is the case despite international, regional, and national frameworks on internal displacement, such as the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, known as the Kampala Convention 2009, and the Banjul Plan of Action of the Economic Community of West African States on the Eradication of Statelessness 2017 – 2024 (ECOWAS 2017). Recent reports suggest that forced migrants struggle to integrate due to stigmatization, lack of acceptance in host communities, and lack access to social networks, employment, and shelter, as well as the fear and uncertainty of not being able to return to their homes (ECHO 2021).

Previous studies have found that there is a major deficit in already depleted infrastructure, including housing, hospitals, and schools which has a significant impact on the lives of forced migrants in Nigeria. For instance, Musa, Liberty and Daksiri (2019) found that the main obstacles to IDP integration in camps in areas in Borno State, Nigeria were diminishing sources of livelihood, and lack of shelter, food, water, and access to schools and healthcare. In North-Central and North-West Nigeria, IDPs lived in communities that were socially and economically closed off. For example, 84 percent of IDPs, inhabited host communities, while 16 percent lived outside of them in situations like camps (IOM DTM 2021).

A number of theories have sought to explain forced migration within the framework of economic, political, environmental, and ecological viewpoints by focusing on economic underdevelopment, weak states, and severe societal fragmentation (Birchall 2019). However, these theories fall short of fully addressing the problems with population displacement in complex contexts like West Africa. Aside from focusing on resettlement and integration as possible durable solutions to displacement, research in Africa reveals significant gaps in our understanding of how sustainable solutions are achieved (Kuwali 2014). It is against this backdrop that the paper seeks to examine the impact of armed conflict on forced migrants in Nigeria and Mali.

The paper focuses on Nigeria and Mali given the high levels of conflict and forced migration crises in the two countries. It includes cases from both Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. Data was derived from the UNHCR Mali Fact Sheet (UNHCR 2022a), MINUSMA (2021), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2022a) and African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD 2021). Other sources include the Nigerian Humanitarian Needs Overview, IOM Global Crisis Response Plan for Nigeria (IOM 2022b), Lake Chad Crisis Response Plan, (IOM 2022a), and UNHCR Nigeria Population Statistics (UNHCR 2022b). These sources were selected based on both the availability of data and the high level of coordinated humanitarian operations in Nigeria and Mali by the cited institutions.

Conceptual Clarification and Definition of Terms

Conflict

Conflict can be seen as the violent manifestation of disagreements and disappointments, often arising from unfulfilled goals. Conflicts are not always violent, but the ones in Nigeria and Mali have been characterized by violence and brutality (Annan 2014). Specifically, armed conflict can occur between states or between government authorities and non-state actors. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention defines armed conflict as a situation that occurs within the territory of a contracting party or state and assumes that a situation has reached a level that distinguishes it from other forms of violence such as riots, sporadic and isolated forms of violence.¹

Forced Migration

Forced migration is the movement of people from their homes due to natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, drought and/or human actions such as wars and conflicts. People are also forced to move because of economic hardship and hunger. According to Giovetti (2019), forced migration has to do with the movement of migrants, displaced persons and refugees within and across international borders. The major causes of forced migration include wars and conflict, environmental change, and social and economic conditions. Given the above definitions, forced migration and population displacement are seen as one and the same phenomenon, involving the forced movement of people from their homes to other places.

Internally Displaced Person

According to the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) internally displaced persons are “people who have been forced or obliged to flee their home or place of habitual residence as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, violence, and violations of human rights, natural or man-made disasters, and have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (UNHCR 2021b).

Refugees

Refugees are people facing persecution who have fled their home countries in search of safety in another country. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees are persons “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”²

Asylum Seekers

Asylum seekers refer people who have crossed a recognized state border into another country in search of protection and assistance as refugees from a foreign country other than their own.

Returnees

Returnees are former IDPs, refugees, or asylum seekers who have returned to their homes or places of habitual residence. They may be at risk of not being accepted into their respective communities if root causes are not properly addressed and return, reintegration, or resettlement processes are not properly facilitated.³

Social Inclusion

Social inclusion refers to the process used to ensure that everyone, regardless of background, has the opportunity to realize their full potential in life. These initiatives include laws, policies, and practices that support equitable access to (public) services and make it possible for citizens to participate in the decision-making that has an impact on their daily life (UN DESA 2022).

The idea offers a framework for understanding how forced migrants might interact with or integrate into society as citizens after being uprooted from their homes. According to Bulger (2018), the fundamental components of social inclusion are economic involvement, health and access to services, education, personal independence and self-determination, interacting with society, and carrying out social tasks. Evidence suggests that governments’ strategies regarding IDP solutions have not produced the anticipated outcome in terms of meeting the needs of the most vulnerable people (Boswell 2002).

According to social inclusion theory, forced migrants who are compelled to leave their homes, where they previously experienced social cohesion and solidarity with friends, family, and neighbors, must struggle to forge new types of relationships in displacement that do not always lead to inclusion in the new locations. In order to carry out their agricultural productivity and obtain an education in displaced settings, forced migrants face the challenge of accessing farmlands in the host community. Regarding the central tenet of social inclusion, Musa, Liberty and Daksiri (2019) observed that those who lack access to even the most basic necessities of life are forced to focus on survival. The lack of basic needs leads many IDPs to fall victim to dehumanizing circumstances such as sexual exploitation in exchange for food, rape, forced marriage, and other detrimental situations, either at the hands of their host communities or armed militants. (Inwalomhe 2021).

Forced Migration in West Africa

Several studies carried out on the forced migration crisis in West Africa find that displaced persons experience psychological repercussions or mental health problems as a result of both the trauma which gave rise to their displacement and lack of access to essential services. A study by Musa, Liberty and Daksiri (2019) in a few IDP camps in Borno State, Nigeria attributed the psychological trauma among the state's IDPs to sexual violence, extreme poverty, and total dependency. According to a study in Nigeria by the Center for Community Development and Research Network (CCDRN 2018), livelihood support was a key inclusive, stable, and sustainable source of income generation that had a significant impact on reducing the level of unemployment and social and economic inequality in conflict zones. This study revealed that a lack of equal economic opportunities, such as farmlands for cultivation, arising from increased population was responsible for competition and the major source of conflicts between displaced persons and their host communities (ibid.).

Similarly, the Global Crisis Response Platform of the IOM (IOM 2022b) in qualitative interviews with affected individuals in north-east Nigeria, reports that food (93 percent), livelihoods and income production (68 percent), and health care (41 percent) were the top three priorities. Food assistance (89 percent), physical cash (55 percent), and in-kind non-food items (43 percent) were the most popular methods of receiving aid. The majority of respondents (71 percent) admitted they had not received any assistance in the preceding three months. Thirty-seven percent of those who received assistance were dissatisfied, while 62 percent of those who received it were satisfied. The impacted individuals believed that the humanitarian community had ignored or was unable to address their needs. This is consistent with the study from CCDRN (2018), which found that 31.3 percent of IDPs were willing to engage in petty trading, and 31.3 percent were content with cap-making (traditional hats) as a source of income.

A recent study conducted by Iorbo (2022) in Benue State, north central Nigeria, shows that IDPs have a difficult time adjusting to life in their new locations and getting their bearings. They suffer from severe poverty and significant barriers to social inclusion. IDPs lament gnawing hunger, a lack of access to healthcare, education, and housing (for those in unofficial camps), insufficient housing and a lack of privacy (for those in official camps), a lack of means of subsistence, and lack of access to farmland to help them meet their daily needs. The report shows that there were no windows in their shelters and inadequate protection from rain. The major social inclusion issues IDPs faced in their new communities were lack of access to education, healthcare, and lack of or inadequate accommodation, livelihoods, and farmlands. The latter was due to the unwillingness of the host communities to lease or donate a piece of land to the IDPs. In a similar report in North Central and North-west Nigeria, 74 of the 101 camps and camp-like environments were labeled as four transitional camps, 22 collective settlements, and centers. Additionally, 64 percent of the camps and camp-like settings were placed on government-owned land or public land, while 30 percent of the environments were camps or camp-like structures situated on private land. On ancestral land, 6 percent of camps and camp-like situations were found. Land ownership is primarily classified as privately owned in host communities, accounting for 76 percent of the places evaluated. The remaining 19 percent was categorized as ancestral land, with 5 percent being government- or publicly-owned (IOM DTM 2021).

Salami et al. (2020) pointed out that IDPs face structural challenges to education, including lack of access to public education in host communities as well as lack of food, poor living conditions, lack of care and exposure to increased vulnerabilities as a result of the loss of or separation from their parents. Studies also establish a correlation between mental health challenges and education.

A Case Study of Mali's Forced Migration Crisis

Mali, a country with nearly 23 million persons (World Population Review 2022), has suffered heavy incidences of violent conflict in recent times. The activities of several armed groups such as the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and other similar armed groups, particularly in the north and central parts of the country, have escalated the level of insecurity in the region. The state seems unable to curtail violence against the civil population by the jihadist movement (MINUSMA 2021). According to the UN Expert, Alioune Tine jihadists in Mali are spreading into many parts of the country, which has resulted in serious human rights violations and the loss of lives of civilians in Goa, Menaka, and Timbuktu in the north; Bandiagara, Douentza, and Mopti DDsegou in the centre; and Koutiala, San in the south (ibid.).

Reports by MINUSMA (2021) have shown that displaced populations have suffered from several extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses, especially from the Malian security forces. Between April and June 2021, four extra-judicial killings and 258 rights abuses were reported. At least 435 documented cases of kidnapings and violence against women by armed gangs and local militia have also increased. In another report by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD 2021), violent conflicts in Mali have accounted for 2,070 deaths and the displacement of 300,000 people since May 2020. These displacements were largely attributed to conflicts revolving around poverty, marginalization, limited livelihoods and political instability.

Non-state actors have contributed immensely to worsening the humanitarian crisis in Mali. Aid workers have been repeatedly attacked and killed, including two Red Cross workers and one non-governmental organization staff person in the Kayes region. One Jordanian and two Egyptian peacekeepers from MINUSMA were also killed. Martin Griffiths, a spokesperson of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), described Mali as the “most dangerous environment for humanitarians and peacekeepers alike” (OCHA 2022a). The Humanitarian Response Plan of 2021, launched by OCHA on March 2, showed that 5.9 million people were in need of humanitarian services in Mali and $563 million was needed to assist 4.7 million vulnerable people (OCHA 2022b).

OCHA has also expressed concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Mali. For instance, since January 1, 2022, at least 599 people have been killed. Civilian unrest has displaced more than 370,000, of which more than half were recorded in the Mopti region alone. OCHA (2022a) expressed concern about the poor conditions of IDPs, particularly relating to living conditions and livelihoods. Armed militia have destroyed and blocked access to farmlands and basic infrastructure in Mali. It added that more than 1,700 schools are closed due to insecurity, denying children the right to education. Women and girls are the most vulnerable population with many reported cases of sexual harassment, rape, and early marriages, which has been described as the “hidden crisis” (OCHA 2022a).

Forced Migration Crisis: Nigeria

Nigeria is a country in West Africa with a population of rough 218 million persons (National Population Commission 2022). It borders the Gulf of Guinea on its western border with the Benin Republic; to the east with Cameroon; to the north with Chad; and to the south with Niger. Nigeria is one of the largest producers of crude oil in the world. Nigeria has a high poverty rate, with 53.5 percent of the population living on less than $1.90 a day and a severe multidimensional poverty rate (defined along the dimensions of monetary poverty, education, and basic infrastructure) of 26.8 percent (UNDP 2020).

Nigeria has been devastated by violent conflicts, mainly from the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east, banditry and kidnaping in the north-west, and farmer- herder conflict in the north-central parts of the country. Attacks and insecurity, particularly in the north-east, have displaced millions of people, devastated agricultural production and other livelihoods, cut off essential services, and resulted in food insecurity and the outbreak of diseases such as cholera with no end in sight (OCHA 2022b). The IOM Global Crisis Response Platform Nigeria (2022b) also reported that non-state armed groups in the north-east have perpetrated violence, causing a major humanitarian crisis, heightened insecurity, and waves of forced displacement and human rights violations.

The World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the unhealthy living conditions and vulnerability of displaced populations and reported that the large number of displaced persons has made COVID-19 response difficult in Nigeria (WHO 2020). Similarly, IOM's Global Crisis Response Platform (2022b) stressed that the COVID-19 pandemic further worsened the already fragile living conditions of people in need of humanitarian services in north-east Nigeria, with an increase from 7.9 million to 8.3 million in the first quarter of 2020 (IOM DTM 2021).

According to OCHA, 8.4 million people in the north-east were in need of humanitarian services in 2022, of whom 2.2 million were IDPs; 1.5 million returnees who lack access to likelihood and essential services; and 3.9 million members of communities affected by the hosting of IDPs, including an estimated one million people who were inaccessible to humanitarian workers (OCHA 2022b). Like in Mali, the OCHA reported that conflict and insecurity have made humanitarian operations difficult and dangerous in the north-eastern Nigeria.

The forced migration crises in north-central and north-west Nigeria results from tension and violence between farmers and herders due to competition over natural resources, increasing population and expanding human settlement, environmental degradation, and climate change (IOM 2022b). Conflicts over livestock theft, crop damage, increased competition over land use and other multifaceted dimensions of poverty and kidnaping have worsened human security in the north-central and north-west regions of Nigeria. The conflict persists due to weak systems of conflict resolution and perceived bias and inaction from authorities have made the conflict linger on (IOM 2022b).

Benue State in north central Nigeria alone accounts for over one million of the IDPs in the country (Duru et al. 2021). In northwest Nigeria, a committee set up by the governments of Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina States in 2019 headed by Muhammad Abubakar, a former Inspector-General of Police, estimated that between 2011 and 2019, a total of 4,983 women were widowed, 25,050 children orphaned, and over 190,340 people displaced in Zamfara State due to armed banditry (WANEP 2020). About 210,354 people have been internally displaced in 171 villages in the northwest out of which 144,496 people were from 77 villages in Zamfara State (UNHCR 2020). The situation has been getting worse in recent times.

The Nigeria National Commission for Refugees, Migrants, and Internally Displaced Persons (NCRMIDP) has begun the construction of settlement cities for IDPs in Nigeria. Out of the 3.2 million IDPs, only 84, 803 have registered and only 17, 334 are ready to return home. The states of Borno, Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Nasarawa, and Edo were selected for the pilot scheme for the construction of the settlement cities (Suleiman-Ibrahim 2022).

Discussion

Based on the findings of the study, forced migration in west Africa is caused by violent crises fueled by non-state actors such as Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), farmer-herder conflict, and banditry in Nigeria. This is similar to the situation in Mali, where armed groups such as the Tuareg and other non-state actors have unleashed mayhem on Mali. From the reports by various organizations as highlighted above, the armed conflicts in the sub-region may not be contained unless the root causes of conflicts are addressed. These causes include the high level of poverty in these countries – 40 percent in Nigeria in 2018 and 42 percent in Mali in 2019 (World Bank 2020).

The perceived inability of the leadership to solve important issues impacting the nation, such as employment creation, resource allocation, and infrastructure development, exacerbates insecurity in Nigeria (Mukhtar et al. 2017). Other issues associated with bad governance revolve around poverty and political instability (as recently evidenced in Mali's coup d’état) among others (ACCORD 2021). Religion has also played a pivotal role in escalating conflicts in Nigeria and Mali, as evident in the operations of ISWAP, Boko Haram and other religiously affiliated armed groups in Nigeria and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in Mali (Targba 2017; MINUSMA 2021). These crises are likely to intensify as there is no sign of improvement in the security situation in these countries.

There are many factors driving conflicts in Nigeria and Mali. Most of these factors are common not just to the aforementioned countries but to the entire West African sub region. According to ACCORD (2021), the drivers of conflict in Mali are not unfathomable. They revolve around political instability, weak governance, marginalization, poverty, and lack of livelihood opportunities.

Reports consistently show that there is a large-scale humanitarian crisis occasioned by forced migration in West Africa, as evidenced by the large number of refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers. This corroborates with the report by OCHA (2022b) that devastated agricultural production and other livelihoods and cut off essential services, have resulted in unhealthy living conditions, physical and mental well-being, food insecurity, and the outbreak of disease such as cholera with no end in sight. The responses of national governments with respect to the forced migration crisis have been slow and unable to meet the demands of IDPs and refugees in west Africa. This corroborates with a study conducted by Iorbo (2022) in Benue State, Nigeria, that found that the government and partners’ efforts remain largely insufficient to meet the needs of IDPs. IDPs engage in the provision of direct labor to farm owners but lament the poor remuneration they receive from their employers, adding that when they are hired as farm laborers their low wages are insufficient to meet their needs.

Recommendations

Forced migration in Nigeria and Mali due to armed conflict has caused severe humanitarian crises in these countries. These conflicts, largely perpetrated by non-state actors, were driven by factors such as bad governance, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and religious extremism. They have resulted in the loss of livelihoods and untold hardship to women and children in Nigeria and Mali. The number of IDPs is expected to increase if far more is not done to curtail these conflicts. IDPs are socially excluded from accessing the basic necessities of life such as shelter, healthcare, education, and other means of likelihood. The efforts by national governments and internal humanitarian agencies are inadequate in light of the humanitarian crises in Nigeria and Mali. Based on the foregoing, the paper makes the following recommendations:

The governments of Nigeria and Mali and concerned international agencies working in these countries should speed up the process of the safe return of IDPs to their ancestral homes. However, in situations where they cannot return, IDPs should be settled and integrated into their host communities. This will require making adequate funds available for the provision of shelter and other basic needs so as to restore human dignity and allow IDPs to improve their means of livelihood.

The governments of Nigeria and Mali should make concerted efforts to empower IDPs through entrepreneurial skill acquisition programs and the provision of startup capital in order to improve their economic status and standard of living.

The governments and other stakeholders in Nigeria and Mali should tackle the root causes of armed conflicts such as poverty, climate change, weak institutions, bad leadership, and lack of political will to establish pro-people policies. By doing so, the burden associated with displaced populations could be greatly minimized.

The governments of Nigeria and Mali should guarantee the safety of forced migrants who are willing to return to their ancestral homes.

The authorities in Nigeria and Mali should ensure that the rights of refugees and asylum seekers are protected especially by granting nationality/citizenship to refugees who may be unable to return to their places of origin, to avoid a situation of statelessness in reference to the 2017 Banjul Plan of Action on the Eradication of Statelessness.

The Response Plan for Mali should be fully funded. The plan appealed for $686 million in 2022 to assist 5.3 people million, but only 11 percent of this amount was funded by May 2022 and only $30 million was released early from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) for the Sahel. Moreover, only $8 million of this amount was destined for Mali as reported by the (OCHA 2022b).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Aondowase Targba

Notes

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