Racial Ignorance and the Electoral Cycle: Understanding Changes in Colorblind Frames during the Obama and Trump Eras

Abstract

We use data from the American National Election Study (ANES) collected between 1986 and 2020 to examine trends in colorblind frames, identifying cognitions that deny or downplay the persistence of racism. We use hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models to investigate whether ascription to colorblind frames varies across age, periods, and birth cohorts, examining period changes while controlling for changes in cohort composition. Following the Theory of Racial Ignorance’s (TRI) proposition that actors’ interests in promoting racial ignorance vary, we disaggregate our analyses by race and political affiliation. Our findings reveal little change across cohorts and small but substantial period changes. Specifically, our results show that colorblind frames increased during the Obama period and decreased in the Trump era. Separating trends by race and political affiliation, we observe that different groups drove the change observed in each period in a way aligned with the strategic interest of each group. These results reaffirm the value of TRI for understanding how the electoral cycle and key political events shape broad changes in racial ignorance frames.

Keywords

race racism racial ignorance colorblind racism racial attitudes trends

Context and Argument

The last few electoral cycles have brought a renewed discussion about race and racism in the United States (Bobo 2017, 2019; Bonilla-Silva 2015, Bonilla-Silva 2019a; Jardina 2021; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Tesler 2016). The election of the first African American President seemed to signal that a post-racial society was possible (Bonilla-Silva 2017). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Victor Ray (2009:181) suggested that Obama’s election epitomized the advance of the racial ideology of colorblind racism. Minority individuals were welcome into positions of power provided they were “mainstreamed and racially vetted” to not constitute a threat to the “white power structure.” Vocal conversations about the enduring character of racism in the United States that would require bolder stances and reforms were thus effectively silenced (Bonilla-Silva 2015; Cottom 2019).

At the start of Trump’s second presidency, the myth of post-raciality is clearer than ever (Bobo 2017; Bonilla-Silva 2019a; Wise 2020). Scholars have documented how Trump’s rhetoric departed from a long-standing “colorblind” consensus that condemns explicit displays of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2019a; Ray 2018). Still, his election paved the way for a new fantasy that blamed the “individual racists” and obscured once again the “practices, mechanisms, institutions, and behaviors that reproduce racial domination” (Bonilla-Silva 2019b:17). By tacitly absolving everyone else of their roles in the reproduction of the racialized social order, it advanced the ideology of colorblind racism.

Research examining change in racial attitudes and identifying what groups have shifted their views remains elusive, especially regarding the extent to which individuals embrace colorblind ideas (Bobo et al. 2012; Hopkins and Washington 2020; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; McDermott and Belcher 2014; Ruisch and Ferguson 2022). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2018, 2019a, 2019b) acknowledged the increased visibility of openly racist rhetoric. However, he insists on the persistence of colorblind racism, highlighting the need to not divert attention from the widespread colorblind ideology that sustains the structure of racial dominance. While Bonilla-Silva’s colorblind theory (CBT) explicitly emphasizes White individuals’ agency and their active role in producing racial domination, Jennifer C. Mueller (2022) noted that studies of colorblind racism usually conceptualize racial ideologies as largely reinforcing and reproducing the racial structure in a patterned and uniform way. CBT’s structuralist emphasis detracts attention from the contingent, contradictory, and creative cultural processes that give expression and specificity to racial ideologies. In her view, this renders CBT limited in providing analytical categories able to empirically depict how racial cognitions are formed, how they change, and whether, how, and when they produce change.

Jennifer C. Mueller’s (2020) TRI overcomes this limitation by providing an analytical framework to understand how racial cognitions change. Racial cognitions are anchored in material relations and produced by agents that are not passive in their misunderstanding. Rather, they produce ignorance to comfortably reap the rewards of their privileged position in the racial order (see Mills 2007). Based on interest convergence and divergence across time (Bell 1980), TRI is better suited to understand why racial cognitions change and to identify differences across groups. Certain events or social conditions make ignorance less profitable for certain actors and facilitate allegiances between differentially located actors.

Borrowing from TRI, we examine individuals’ subscription to colorblind frames over time. Specifically, we explore potential Obama and Trump effects in colorblind frames in the United States. We use data from the American National Election Study (ANES) from 1986 to 2020 to study these trends, identifying cognitions that deny or downplay the persistence of racism and blame Black individuals for their disadvantaged place in the social stratification (Mayorga 2025). Following TRI’s proposition that actors’ interests in promoting an ignorance framework vary, we disaggregate our analyses by race and political affiliation to examine different groups’ ascription to colorblind frames change across periods.

A Shift in Anti-Black Views?

Research shows a decline in White support for “traditional” racism—the belief that Black individuals are inherently inferior, support for formal patterns of segregation, and for a legalized pattern of discrimination in political and socioeconomic rights (Bobo et al. 2012; Nteta and Greenlee 2013). These expressions of racism declined steadily since the 1940s (Bobo et al. 2012; Jayadev and Johnson 2017; Moberg, Krysan, and Christianson 2019). Still, this rejection of “traditional” racism does not reflect an overall decline in racist attitudes but their morphing into views aligned with the frames of a colorblind ideology.

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s (2017) CBT describes this as a shift in racial ideologies that sustain a renewed system of racial domination in the post-Civil Rights era, where a colorblind ideology became dominant. His view is anchored in an understanding of racism as embedded in the social structure that creates a racialized social (Bonilla-Silva 1997) order. Racial ideologies are “the racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify (dominant race) or challenge (subordinate race or races) the racial status quo” (Bonilla-Silva 2017:9). Analyzing the content of this new racial ideology, Bonilla-Silva (2017) identified four different frames that express its main views: abstract liberalism, naturalization of racism, cultural racism, and minimization of racism.

Bonilla-Silva recognizes his perspective as broadly compatible with similar traditions that term this “new” form of racism as “symbolic” or “modern” racism; they all blend liberal notions associated with classic individualism and meritocracy to justify racial inequality on individual terms, appealing to cultural tropes to seemingly explain Black individuals’ disadvantaged positions while minimizing the enduring role of racial discrimination and systemic racism (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Simmons and Bobo 2018). Bobo et al. (1997:16) contend that this new form of anti-Black affect involves “a tendency to blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in socioeconomic standing, and resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate United States racist social conditions and institutions.” Lawrence D. Bobo et al. (2012:68) added that symbolic racism “identifies a moral shortcoming of Black individuals that threatens to impinge upon the well-being of putatively hard-working white Americans.”

Bonilla-Silva (2017) conceptualized these views as reflecting different groups’ locations in the racial structure and their interests in maintaining the racial status quo (see Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Anchoring racial ideologies on a structural understanding of racism illuminates the continuities of racial domination, albeit with a change in the content of the ideologies that sustain it. Bonilla-Silva (2017) is thus weary of studies that celebrate racial progress by emphasizing changes in racial prejudice over time. He states that these studies fail to depict how changes in the content of racial ideologies—the emergence of a colorblind ideology—contribute to maintaining the structure of racial domination intact.

Researchers empirically assessing colorblind views have also labeled them “racial resentment,” “modern racism,” or “symbolic racism” (Dovidio and Gaertner 2004; Sears and Henry 2003; Simmons and Bobo 2018). Overall, research shows little changes in this type of racism across time (Bobo et al. 2012; Jayadev and Johnson 2017; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). Importantly, Oscar J. Mayorga (2025) showed how questions from the ANES in much of this research tackle the main racial frames identified by Bonilla-Silva in his conceptualization of colorblind racism.

The Obama and Trump Eras

Scholars have investigated whether Obama’s election impacted racial views from conflicting perspectives (Schmidt and Axt 2016). Some studies started with the premise of Obama as a “Black exemplar,” arguing that Obama epitomizes a counter-stereotypical narrative of Blackness that would reduce anti-Black biases and improve racial attitudes. These studies show at most mild short-term effects that fade quickly (Lybarger and Monteith 2011; Plant et al. 2009; Schmidt and Axt 2016; Welch and Sigelman 2011). Studies have also found that Obama’s ascension and the post-racial world it envisioned indeed increased views consistent with a colorblind ideology (Gaither, Wilton, and Young 2014; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Pasek et al. 2014; Schmidt and Axt 2016). Other researchers reveal inconclusive trends. For example, Vincent L. Hutchings (2009) reported slight declines in beliefs about fair treatment but also on support for government policies supporting Black individuals.

A few years later, Trump’s election was seen as a clear sign that embracing the myth of a post-racial society had been at least premature. Trump embodied the backlash against Obama’s post-racial promise and made its unfulfilled achievements more visible (Bobo 2017; Wise 2020). Scholars have highlighted Trump’s openly racist rhetoric and his affective appeal to a White racist base (Bonilla-Silva 2019a; Ray 2018). Several studies show that racial animus was a core feature explaining support for Trump (Buyuker et al. 2021; Shafer 2017; Tolbert, Redlawsk, and Gracey 2018).

However, studies suggest a decline in anti-Black attitudes after Trump’s election. Hopkins and Washington (2020) found that anti-Black prejudice likely declined following Trump’s emergence as a relevant political figure across the political spectrum. Analyzing data from 13 studies, Benjamin C. Ruisch and Melissa J. Ferguson (2022) showed overall declines in prejudice despite increases within Trump supporters. Looking at trends in different racial attitudes, Jardina and Ollerenshaw (2022) found a declining trend in anti-Black attitudes for White individuals, with sharper declines for White Democrats.

The literature also seems conclusive about the increased relevance of racial attitudes in the electoral cycle, both in explaining party adherence, support, and candidate evaluation (Drakulich et al. 2020; Tesler 2016; Valentino and Brader 2011; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2018; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022). Studies also show how electoral cycles can have consequences in different domains. For example, Samuel Thomas Donahue (2023) showed how police officers’ bias increased both for White Republican and Democrat officers in the aftermath of Obama’s reelection and encompassing Trump’s presidency. However, whether and how the Obama and Trump elections have shaped broad racial attitudes remains unclear.

Racial Ignorance, Polarization, and Interest Convergence

Mueller’s (2020) TRI provides important insights regarding racial cognitions that allow a better understanding of shifts in racial views (see Mills 2007). Mueller builds on CBT’s view of a new ideology of racism as a privileged contemporary mechanism sustaining and reproducing racial dominance. TRI highlights racial domination as an active process in which dominant actors engage in racial ignorance to willfully unknown what is apparent and maintain their dominance. Colorblind ideas that distort and negate racism are not the unavoidable result of society’s inability to see but the strategic decision of privileged actors in a racialized system to maintain their position (Mueller 2020). This view is aligned with Lawrence D. Bobo and Vincent L. Hutchings’ (1996) expansion of Blumer’s (1958) theory of prejudice as rooted in a “sense of group position,” anchored in a group’s material self-interests that changes according to the threat that the out-groups seemingly pose.

Mueller’s (2020) theory allowed us to examine racial cognitions through a similar lens, understanding collective ways of thinking about race and the production of racial consciousness no longer relying on a prejudiced view of out-groups. Jennifer C. Mueller (2017) identified maneuvers used by White students to maintain ignorance after a course on racism. Students simultaneously demonstrated understanding of the intricate mechanisms that sustain racial oppression (e.g., housing discrimination, intergenerational transmission of wealth) but actively unlearned them or ignore their practical implications for understanding their backgrounds and life prospects (see Mueller and Washington 2022).

Mueller describes five tenets of TRI: the epistemology of ignorance, ignorance as an “ends-based” technology, corporate White agency, the centrality of praxis, and interest convergence, which focuses on when racial ignorance frames change and are questioned. It is precisely interest convergence which proves especially useful for examining and historicizing shifts in racial attitudes across groups. According to Mueller (2020:148), “progressions and regressions in White racial consciousness are patterned by whether or not White interests align with subordinate group interests. Progressions are never settled, and they often regress toward ignorance when conditions allow.” TRI is thus deemed better suited to understanding how racial cognitions emerge and are sustained, identifying fractures and changes in racial cognitions and making agency more visible (Mueller 2020).

In his foundational analysis of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, Bell (1980) highlighted the importance of interest convergence for understanding its passing. The determinant factor was not White individuals’ rejection of segregation as immoral and harmful for Black individuals. Instead, what moved the needle was upper- and middle-class sectors’ conviction that they would not lose much from it. Indeed, the ruling would benefit them by advancing the U.S. legitimacy abroad, giving material meaning to freedom and equality principles to Black individuals, all while contributing to industrialize a segregated South. Self-interest was fundamental for promoting allegiances between those in favor of desegregation on moral grounds and those convinced by pragmatic reasons and the reassurance that their material privileges would remain intact. Other policy developments such as support for austerity policies in times of recession (Gillborn 2013), diversity initiatives in higher education (Starck et al. 2024), and racialized organizations (Ray 2021) have also been examined through the interest convergence/divergence lens.

Borrowing from these insights and despite continuities in racial hierarchies over time, it is likely that the electoral cycle would shape and reflect different levels of investment in racial ignorance and collective understandings about the extent of racism. While views expressed through survey questions reflect only the surface of racial cognitions, they nevertheless illustrate the main frames depicted by CBT that are readily available to the population and easily shared in social interactions (Bonilla-Silva 2017; Mayorga 2025). Examining changes in people’s ascription to colorblind frames can thus help understand shifts in racial consciousness, identifying groups that become differentially invested in promoting racial ignorance over time. Observing changes in the adoption of colorblind frames allows us to assess the interest convergence tenet set forth by TRI. Black and White individuals occupy different position in the racial hierarchy and are conceptualized as differentially invested in adopting racial ignorance frames. However, the notion of interest convergence theorizes this investment as not homogeneous across and within racial groups and amenable to change over time. The electoral cycle might facilitate or hinder different racial and partisan allegiances, which is precisely what we examine in this study.

This is particularly so in a period of increasing racial polarization. Michael Tesler (2016) characterized this period as “most racial” in contraposition to expectations of Obama’s presidency initiating a “post racial” era. In his view, the racialization of Obama’s presidency reshaped the political debate and polarized both traditionally “racial” issues and issues formerly seen as “non-racial.” Trump furthered polarization by pandering to his White working-class base’s fears. Kirill Zhirkov and Nicholas A. Valentino (2022) argued that these shifts are the product of changing coalitions that reshaped the racial makeup of each party’s electorate, with Democrats becoming a multi-racial and multi-ethnic coalition and Republicans consolidating a White majority party. Portrayed as the “ultimate proof” of Black achievement, Obama’s election might have allowed many individuals to minimize the pervasiveness of racism and neglect what remains to be done, facilitating the adoption of colorblind frames (Kaiser et al. 2009).

Based on the tenet of interest convergence, this strategy might have proven particularly rewarding for Republicans when antagonizing with Obama, doubling down on the idea that Black individuals do not need special favors to succeed. Reinforcing colorblind frames might set the basis to oppose policies aimed at curbing racism more strongly embraced by Democrats. Trump’s candidacy and presidency, on the contrary, likely made it harder for individuals to sustain colorblind ideas, and made it profitable—especially for Democrats—to oppose Trump by pointing out his racist rhetoric and his opposition to policies seeking to curb racial disparities, cementing a multiethnic alliance instrumental for mobilizing its base.

In short, TRI may prove key to understanding racial shifts in attitudes and differential ascription to colorblind frames across groups and periods; how the electoral cycle may shape the availability of colorblind frames; and how certain sectors can be differentially invested in constructing ignorance over time, following Mueller’s (2020:156) idea that “[i]nterest convergence defines and predicts how white ignorance evolves and persists interpersonally, institutionally, and across society and history more broadly.”

Data and Methods

Data

We use ANES data, a nationally representative survey conducted during Presidential elections and some mid-term elections. We included data from non-Hispanic White and Black individuals from 1986 through 2020. Our analytic sample comprises 22,119 cases nested in 11 periods¹ and 20 cohorts defined by year of birth in five-year intervals from 1900 to 1995.

Dependent Variables

A colorblind frames scale was constructed averaging across responses asking agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the following statements: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Black individuals to work their way out of the lower class (reverse coded)”; “Black individuals should work their way up without special favors, like the Irish, Italians, and Jews have”; “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Black individuals would only try harder they could be just as well off as White individuals”; and “Over the past few years, Black individuals have gotten less than they deserve (reverse coded)”; (alpha=.82). This measure has also been referred to as symbolic racism and racial resentment and overlaps with measures of a colorblind ideology (Bobo et al. 2012; Knuckey and Kim 2016; Mayorga 2025; Simmons and Bobo 2018; Tarman and Sears 2005). According to Mayorga (2025), the first three questions cover the minimization of racism, abstract liberalism, and cultural racism frames, respectively. Mayorga (2025) did not include a fourth variable (“Black individuals have gotten less than they deserve”) that most studies of colorblind racism or related concepts using ANES data include. Because this question also tackles the minimization of historical racism we include it in our analyses.

Independent Variables

We disaggregate trends and period effects by race (White = 0, Black = 1) and political affiliation (Democrat = 1, Independent = 2, Republican = 3). We control for individual attributes such as gender, education, civil status, and income percentiles.

Statistical Analysis

Research design

We based our analysis on a repeated cross-sectional sample survey design and construct synthetic cohorts to disentangle age, period, and cohort effects (Yang 2008; Yang and Land 2006). Micro-data from multiple waves allows the inclusion of covariates and estimating random slopes across time (Yang and Land 2013). This design is usually based on larger samples than panel studies, extends over a larger period, and overcomes the problem of attrition.

Missing data

We used listwise deletion and included only complete observations (n = 22,119). We examined the mean of the complete and incomplete sample for each variable. The mean colorblind frames in the complete sample (3.21) and incomplete samples (3.22) are virtually identical, and their confidence intervals overlap. The same is observed for all covariates considered. Histograms also reveal similar distributions.

Modeling strategy

We estimate hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models. These are cross-classified random-effects models in which individuals are nested simultaneously in cohorts and periods. There is still debate regarding whether HAPC models reliably estimate age, period, and cohort effects (for a critical discussion see Bell and Jones 2014; Reither et al. 2015). Still, HAPC models are increasingly used in social sciences research, disentangling age, period and cohort effects in studies of verbal ability (Frenk,Yang, and Land 2013; Yang and Land 2006), happiness (Yang 2008), voter turnout (Frenk et al. 2013), support for the death penalty (Anderson, Lytle, and Schwadel 2017), and the public salience of crime (Shi, Lu, and Pickett 2020).

Results

Period and Cohort Effects

First, period-only and cohort-only models were compared with HAPC models using maximum likelihood (ML) tests and Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The HAPC model provided the best fit (Table 1). The period variance accounts for roughly 3 percent of the overall variance, while the cohort variance is less than 0.5 percent of the total variation, showing modest changes across period and little variation across cohorts. The age coefficient (b = 0.01) suggests that people become more ascribed to colorblind frames as they age. The squared term is not significant.

Table 1.

Age-only Variance Components and Fit Statistics.

Model	Period-only	Cohort-only	HAPC
Cohort	—	0.147	0.006
Period	0.033	—	0.032
Residual	1.144	1.174	1.140

LL	−32,899.40	−33,208.26	−32,869.03
BIC	65,808.80	66,466.54	65,798.08

Colorblind Frames (n = 22,119).

Period and Cohort Trends

Second, we estimated HAPC models adding individual-level controls. Figure 1 shows cohort and period-level random intercepts. While the cohort-level variance is small, there is a slight but significant increase in colorblind frames for the cohorts born in the 1960s and 1970s. The younger cohorts show lower than average values, suggesting an incipient intergenerational change in the use of colorblind frames. The period-level random intercepts suggest more substantial (albeit relatively small) variation across periods, with an overall increase in colorblind frames until 2008, followed by a sharp decline, particularly in 2016 and 2020.

Period Effects by Race and Party

Third, we examine period trends by race and party affiliation (Table 2). We estimated random coefficients by race (Model 2), partisan affiliation (Model 3), and race and partisan affiliation (Model 4). Our final model added a fixed-effects interaction between race and party affiliation (Model 5).² The fixed-effects coefficients show lower levels of colorblind frames for Black individuals and higher levels of colorblind frames among Republicans and Independents. Model fit statistics also show significant variation in the period effects across race and party.

Table 2.

HAPC Models.

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
Age	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)
Age sq.	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)
Men	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)
Income	−0.04**	(0.01)	−0.04**	(0.01)	−0.03**	(0.01)	−0.03**	(0.01)	−0.03**	(0.01)
Married/partner	0.05**	(0.01)	0.05**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)
High school degree	−0.17**	(0.02)	−0.17**	(0.02)	−0.16**	(0.02)	−0.16**	(0.02)	−0.17**	(0.02)
Some college or more	−0.64**	(0.02)	−0.64**	(0.02)	−0.60**	(0.02)	−0.60**	(0.02)	−0.59**	(0.02)
Independent	0.46**	(0.02)	0.46**	(0.02)	0.37**	(0.06)	0.36**	(0.06)	0.41**	(0.07)
Republican	0.85**	(0.01)	0.85**	(0.01)	0.61**	(0.11)	0.60**	(0.12)	0.62**	(0.12)
Black	−0.66**	(0.02)	−0.65**	(0.03)	−0.67**	(0.02)	−0.72**	(0.05)	−0.66**	(0.06)
Black#Independent									−0.29**	(0.07)
Black#Republican									−0.31**	(0.11)
Constant	3.22**	(0.06)	3.21**	(0.06)	3.31**	(0.09)	3.31**	(0.10)	3.30**	(0.10)
Var (residual)	0.812		0.811		0.771		0.768		0.766
Var (cohort)	0.004		0.004		0.003		0.004		0.003
Var (period)	0.031		0.028		0.090		0.099		0.100
Var (period#Black)			0.008				0.022		0.029
Var (period#Independent)					0.035		0.038		0.040
Var (period#Republican)					0.131		0.146		0.015
Var (period#Independent#Black)									0.016
Var (period#Republican#Black)									0.069
BIC	58391.04		58384.97		57336.13		57293.19		57271.70

Period-level random slopes. Colorblind Frames (n = 22,119). Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

Figure 2 shows the period effects by race. Trends are similar up to 2008, when Black individuals saw a sharp uptick in their ascription to colorblind frames followed by a steady decline until 2020, the last data point. White individuals increased their colorblind frames more smoothly through Obama’s election and first presidency and sharply declined them when Trump was on the ballot. Thus, there seems to be a disconnect between White and Black individuals during Obama’s first term.

Period trends by party reveal a similar pattern (Figure 3). Republicans steadily increased their colorblind frames until 2012, with a sharper increase during the Obama era. After Trump’s candidacy, they tempered their views and even decreased them slightly. Democrats see an increase in colorblind frames during the Obama election and a slight decline during his presidency, followed by a sharp drop afterward.

Figure 4 plots party trends by race. The trends for White individuals closely mimic those observed for the general population, with a sharper uptick in Independents’ and a less marked decrease in Democrats’ use of colorblind frames in 2012. For Black individuals, the increase in colorblind frames during the Obama era is accentuated. For Black Democrats, after an increase in 2008, there seems to be a disconnect with their White counterparts in 2012, where the marked decline in colorblind frames starts. This trend continues throughout the period in sync with that for White Democrats.

Obama and Trump Effects

Finally, we incorporated period-level fixed effects in the estimations. We added dummy variables capturing the years that Obama (2008 = 1, 2012 = 1) and Trump (2016 = 1, 2020 = 1) were on the ballot. We interacted them with race, party, and race and party in different estimations, each including random coefficients of the individual-level variable interacted (Table 3). We computed marginal effects for the different groups considered (Table 4) and tested whether there were significant Obama and Trump effects for each group using pairwise tests (Table 5).

Table 3.

HAPC Models with Obama and Trump Effects.

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 4
Age	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.00**	(0.00)
Age sq.	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)	−0.00**	(0.00)
Men	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)
Income	−0.04**	(0.01)	−0.04**	(0.01)	−0.04**	(0.01)	−0.03**	(0.01)	−0.03**	(0.01)
Married/partner	0.05**	(0.01)	0.05**	(0.01)	0.05**	(0.01)	0.04**	(0.01)	0.05**	(0.01)
High school degree	−0.17**	(0.02)	−0.17**	(0.02)	−0.17**	(0.02)	−0.16**	(0.02)	−0.16**	(0.02)
Some college or more	−0.64**	(0.02)	−0.64**	(0.02)	−0.64**	(0.02)	−0.60**	(0.02)	−0.59**	(0.02)
Independent	0.46**	(0.02)	0.46**	(0.02)	0.46**	(0.02)	0.28**	(0.03)	0.28**	(0.04)
Republican	0.85**	(0.01)	0.85**	(0.01)	0.85**	(0.01)	0.39**	(0.05)	0.36**	(0.05)
Black	−0.66**	(0.02)	−0.66**	(0.02)	−0.66**	(0.04)	−0.67**	(0.02)	−0.82**	(0.04)
Obama			0.20*	(0.08)	0.17*	(0.08)	0.07	(0.10)	−0.02	(0.10)
Trump			−0.27**	(0.08)	−0.27**	(0.08)	−0.70**	(0.10)	−0.79**	(0.10)
Obama#Black					0.11	(0.07)			0.28**	(0.07)
Trump#Black					−0.06	(0.07)			0.43**	(0.07)
Obama#Independent							0.04	(0.05)	0.13*	(0.06)
Obama#Republican							0.30**	(0.11)	0.39**	(0.11)
Trump#Independent							0.46**	(0.05)	0.56**	(0.05)
Trump#Republican							0.89**	(0.11)	0.99**	(0.11)
Independent#Black									−0.09	(0.10)
Republican#Black									−0.05	(0.10)
Obama#Black#Independent									−0.24⁺	(0.14)
Obama#Black#Republican									−0.25	(0.16)
Trump#Black#Independent									−0.49**	(0.14)
Trump#Black#Republican									−0.69**	(0.16)
Constant	3.22**	(0.06)	3.23**	(0.05)	3.23**	(0.05)	3.42**	(0.05)	3.45**	(0.05)
Var (residual)	0.812		0.812		0.811		0.771		0.766
Var (cohort)	0.004		0.004		0.004		0.003		0.003
Var (period)	0.031		0.010		0.010		0.015		0.015
Var (period#Black)					0.005				0.005
Var (period#Independent)							0.000		0.000
Var (period#Republican)							0.017		0.016
BIC	58391.04		58399.37		58410.46		57337.17		57276.27

Colorblind Frames (n = 22,119). Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

Table 4.

Period Marginal Effects by Group.

Model	Pre-Obama		Obama		Trump
Race
White	3.41*	(0.043)	3.58*	(0.076)	3.14*	(0.075)
Black	2.49*	(0.057)	2.77*	(0.092)	2.16*	(0.094)
Party
Democrat	3.00*	(0.051)	3.07*	(0.089)	2.30*	(0.089)
Independent	3.44*	(0.058)	3.55*	(0.096)	3.20*	(0.094)
Republican	3.55*	(0.071)	3.91*	(0.129)	3.74*	(0.128)
Party and Race
White Democrat	3.21*	(0.051)	3.19*	(0.090)	2.42*	(0.089)
White Independent	3.56*	(0.058)	3.67*	(0.095)	3.33*	(0.093)
White Republican	3.57*	(0.070)	3.93*	(0.127)	3.76*	(0.126)
Black Democrat	2.39*	(0.062)	2.65*	(0.103)	2.03*	(0.105)
Black Independent	2.65*	(0.100)	2.80*	(0.131)	2.36*	(0.133)
Black Republican	2.69*	(0.119)	3.08*	(0.177)	2.63*	(0.176)

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05.

Table 5.

Pairwise Comparisons of Marginal Effects by Group.

Model	Obama vs. Pre-Obama		Trump vs. Obama		Trump vs. Pre-Obama
Race
White	0.17*	(0.085)	−0.43*	(0.104)	−0.27*	(0.084)
Black	0.28*	(0.106)	−0.60*	(0.130)	−0.33*	(0.108)
Party
Democrat	0.07	(0.101)	−0.77*	(0.124)	−0.70*	(0.101)
Independent	0.11	(0.110)	−0.35*	(0.132)	−0.24*	(0.109)
Republican	0.36*	(0.146)	−0.17	(0.180)	0.19	(0.145)
Party and Race
White Democrat	−0.02	(0.102)	−0.77*	(0.124)	−0.79*	(0.101)
White Independent	0.11	(0.110)	−0.34*	(0.131)	−0.23*	(0.108)
White Republican	0.37*	(0.144)	−0.17	(0.178)	0.19	(0.143)
Black Democrat	0.26*	(0.118)	−0.62*	(0.145)	−0.36*	(0.120)
Black Independent	0.15	(0.164)	−0.44*	(0.185)	−0.29	(0.166)
Black Republican	0.39	(0.212)	−0.46	(0.249)	−0.07	(0.211)

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05.

Model 2 (Table 3) shows significant Obama (b = 0.20, p < .05) and Trump (b = −0.27, p < .05) effects of opposite signs for the overall sample. The interactions by race (Model 3) are non-significant. Still, t-tests reveal a larger decline in colorblind frames for Black individuals from the Obama to the Trump eras.

The interactions by political party (Model 4) reveal important differences across groups. While there was no difference in the Obama effect between Democrats and Independents, the increase in colorblind frames was significantly higher for Republicans than for Democrats (b = 0.30, p < .05). The decline in colorblind frames during the Trump era was lower for Independents (b = 0.46, p < .05) and Republicans (b = 0.89, p < .05). Table 5 shows that colorblind frames significantly increased only for Republicans during the Obama era (b = 0.36, p < .05). In contrast, the Trump effect was significant for both Independents (b = −0.35, p < .05) and Democrats (b = −0.77, p < .05). Additional t-tests show significantly higher declines for Democrats than Independents (t = 0.42, p < .05).

Model 5 (Table 3) includes interactions by race and party. Period and party interactions are all significant, while interactions between period and race remain non-significant. Three-way interactions achieve statistical significance in the Trump but not the Obama period. The pairwise comparisons (Table 5) help clarify these effects. The results show a significant (positive) Obama effect only for White Republicans (0.37, p < .05) and Black Democrats (0.26, p < .05). Furthermore, White (−0.77, p < .05) and Black (b = −0.62, p < .05) Democrats and White (b = −0.34 p < .05) and Black (b = −0.44, p < .05) Independents saw significant decreases from the Obama to the Trump era, ending with levels significantly lower than those pre-Obama.

Sensitivity Analyses

We checked the robustness of our results, using full HAPC Bayesian estimations. The variance components were slightly larger (period-level 0.05 percent and cohort-level 0.01 percent). The residual variance was almost the same (0.813 vs. 0.812). Cohort and period trends and individual-level parameters remained similar, with Bayesian estimations yielding slightly larger standard errors (Yang and Land 2006). This only affected two two-level interactions—Obama period and Republican and Independent affiliation—making them non-significant in the Bayesian estimations.

HAPC models have been criticized for being dependent on the cohort specification (Bell and Jones 2014). We estimated HAPC models with two alternative cohort specifications: 10 birth cohorts grouping subjects in five-year intervals and Tatishe M. Nteta and Jill S. Greenlee’s (2013) six exclusive birth cohorts. The estimations yield similar results. The cohort-level variance is slightly smaller for the specifications with 10 (var = 0.002) and 6 cohorts (var = 0.004). The period-level and residual variances remained substantially the same. The individual-level coefficients and period and cohort trends did not change.

Finally, we estimated models with different dependent variables. First, we examined different specifications of our colorblind frames variable separating attitudes (e.g., “Black individuals should try harder”) from beliefs (e.g., “Black people had gotten less than they deserve”). While the trends are similar, colorblind attitudes peak in 2008, while colorblind beliefs increase up until 2012. Beliefs increased only slightly during the Obama period while attitudes sharply peaked in 2008 and steadily decreased after then. This is likely driven by Black individuals decreasing their colorblind attitudes after Obama’s first election but not their beliefs, which increased only slightly during the Obama period while attitudes sharply peaked in 2008. This is also observed within Democrats. While the sharp peak in colorblind attitudes followed by a steady decline is observed for Black Democrats, attitudes slightly increase in 2008 for White Democrats and decline first slightly and then abruptly after Obama’s election. Colorblind beliefs increase steadily until 2012 for White Democrats and sharply decline after. They remain the same from 2008 to 2012 for Black Democrats and then decline.

The racial stereotyping measure, capturing pejorative stereotypes about Black people traditionally associated with essentializing notions of Black inferiority (“rate Black people as hardworking or lazy”) showed less variation over time and a steadier but flat declining trajectory even during the Obama era. No significant Obama period effects were observed for any group. Support for race-based policies (“the government should help Black individuals”) shows a pattern similar to that observed for colorblind frames, suggesting a close entrenchment between colorblind frames and policy preferences.

Discussion

Despite the promise of racial advances that Obama’s election represented, the dream of a post-racial society remains unfulfilled. Trump’s emergence as a key political figure seems to crystallize a doubling down in racial polarization and increasing racial tensions (Bonilla-Silva 2019a; Tesler 2016). Despite the stark contrast between Obama and Trump, and the narrative about racial relations they promote, the extent to which racial frames have changed in the population remains somewhat unexplored. Discussing Trump’s presidency, Bonilla-Silva (2019b) acknowledged his departure from the tacitly agreed-upon rules in the political discourse or the post-Civil Rights era. However, Bonilla-Silva criticizes reading Trump’s ascension as a return to old forms of racism, emphasizing continuity by arguing that colorblindness remains the prevalent ideology that sustains the racial order.

Our study, using public opinion data to explore changes in colorblind frames over time, brings new approaches to this topic. First, our data span from 1986 to 2020 including both of Obama’s presidencies and Trump’s first one. In addition, we used HAPC estimations to tease out the usually confounded effects of age, period, and cohort on colorblind frames. Finally, because actors are differentially situated in the racial hierarchy and have different interests facing the electoral cycle, we examined trends across racial and partisan groups. Thus, we moved beyond general understandings of racial ideologies to identify how different actors produce and reproduce racial frames that sustain or contest racial domination across periods. This analysis proves key to understanding how the electoral cycle may shape racial frames and help build or disrupt alliances in an increasingly racially polarized polity (Tesler 2016).

Trends in Colorblind Frames in the Obama and Trump Eras

We found no clear long-term trend in people’s ascription to colorblind frames. Our findings reveal little cohort changes and small though more substantial period changes throughout the post-Civil Rights period. Consistent with Bonilla-Silva’s claim that Obama’s election cemented a colorblind ideology in the United States, we found a significant increase in colorblind frames during the Obama era. Thus, our study aligns with Bonilla-Silva’s (2018) assertion of Obama’s role in consolidating a colorblind ideology and adds to the literature that points out the “irony” of Obama’s presidency on racial and social justice attitudes (Kaiser et al. 2009; Valentino and Brader 2011; Valentino et al. 2018) and with Monika L. McDermott and Cornell Belcher’s (2014) findings of polarizing sentiments emerging immediately after Obama’s election. Obama’s election helped advance the myth of post-racialism, making it easier for individuals to deny racism by highlighting examples of successful Black individuals.

Furthermore, our analyses reveal substantial decreases in colorblind frames during the Trump period, a decrease that might be seen as paradoxical but is not surprising based on TRI’s tenets. This decrease counteracted a steady increase leading up to Obama’s election and encompassing his reelection campaign, when colorblind frames peaked. While colorblind frames remain prevalent during this period, as Bonilla-Silva (2018) would claim, Trump’s election seemingly prompted people to publicly condemn individual racism. Importantly, it also opened some cracks in racial ignorance frames, making ignorance harder—or less rewarding—to maintain.

Our race-specific analyses suggest that Obama’s reelection further encouraged White individuals to blur the racial barriers they perceive Black individuals face. Instead, Black individuals were already lowering their ascription to colorblind frames during Obama’s reelection, probably picking up on the racial tensions occurring during Obama’s presidency that led to the emergence of the Blacks Lives Matter movement and the backlash that contributed to Trump’s election as President (Bonilla-Silva 2019a). James D. Unnever, Shaun L. Gabbidon, and George E. Higgins (2011) found an important racial divide in perceptions of criminal justice injustices and on the relationship between such perceptions and beliefs about the racial progress elicited by Obama’s election. Our study suggests that this divide deepened. Thus, while the dashed promises of Obama’s post-racial society became readily apparent to Black individuals after Obama’s honeymoon period, White individuals could still rely on the symbolic impact of his presidency to reaffirm their post-racial beliefs and discount still prevalent racial injustices.

The drop in colorblind frames observed in 2016 and 2020 shows an apparent second irony related to Trump’s election and presidency. Scholars point out that Trump’s presidency changed the political landscape and enabled a type of openly racist rhetoric that used to be rejected (Shafer 2017; Valentino et al. 2018). Overt racism likely polarized racial frames, making it more difficult for many White individuals to be oblivious about the challenges faced by Black individuals—even while validating anti-Black sentiments from a portion of the electorate.

Our race and party affiliation analyses suggest that different groups guided the changes in each period. In other words, the groups driving the increases in colorblind frames during the Obama era were different from those leading the drop during the Trump period, in a way aligned with the strategic interest of each group. The increase during Obama was significant only for Republicans, while the decline in colorblind frames observed during the Trump era was significant for Democrats and Independents—and stronger for the former. Our results not only show an increasing polarization in how individuals understand the extent of racism but also suggest that the political cycle itself may enable some of those changes. These results reaffirm the value of TRI for better understanding how the electoral cycle and key political events may shape broad changes in racial ignorance frames.

Understanding Shifts in Racial Frames through a TRI Framework

TRI provides important cues to understand the observed trends. Consistent with TRI, Obama’s election and presidency facilitated White Republicans’ adoption of a view that blamed Black individuals for their subordinate position in the racial hierarchy, antagonizing with Obama but capitalizing on his presidency to further neglect the enduring influence of racism. Note that our additional analyses show that this group also increased their rejection of policies supporting Black individuals. The denial of racism and appeal to abstract liberalism, in which race-conscious policies and even mild attempts to diversify historically White institutions are seen as violating the equality rule and generating “reverse racism,” are core components of colorblind frames (Bonilla-Silva 2018, 2019b) and become important issues in the “defensive racism” upon which the Republican agenda was built (Gaddini 2023). While scholars have highlighted how Trump’s ascension enabled the return to old-fashioned racism (Bonilla-Silva 2018; Tesler 2016; Wise 2020) less attention has been paid to how the mobilization of colorblind frames during Obama’s presidency was likely instrumental in energizing the White Republican base and facilitating the backlash that Trump’s election represented.

Scholars discuss how the racist rhetoric embraced by some Republicans during that time coexists with a more subtle approach to race relations that strategically cements colorblind frames through the denial of racism and the appeal of White victimhood in a context of perceived unfair advantages given to minoritized individuals (Kelly 2020; Pimentel 2019). Norris and Inglehart (2019) described this “cultural backlash” as a global phenomenon that has facilitated the ascension of populist right-wing leaders in Europe and the United States, who strongly capitalize on the racial resentment and xenophobia of White sectors that feel that other groups’ advances undermine their place in society. Our study suggests that White Republicans indeed reacted to Obama’s presidency by doubling down of their ascription to colorblind frames, which strategically strengthened their position and racial interests.

Remarkably, no significant changes were observed for Black Republicans. However, the visual trends show first a slight and then sharp increase in their colorblind frames in 2008 and 2012. A minority within the Black and the Republican electorate, Fields (2016) notes how Black Republican activists navigate a complex conundrum in which they actively work to define an identity that aligns their Blackness with their Republican affiliation—oftentimes seen as conflicting—developing different strategies to do so. Some activists embrace a colorblind racial ideology, downplaying the role of racism in precluding Black advancement. This group endorses a pathological view of the Black community—seen as too obsessed with racial discrimination grievances to work their way up the social ladder—and supports “race-neutral” policies regardless of whether they collectively benefit Black individuals. Race-conscious Black Republicans align their identities by asserting that conservative values and policies are indeed the best vehicles for Black advancement, which recognize as hindered by systemic racism. These two visions generate deep divisions within Black Republican activists, undermining their ability to politically organize and generate a sense of belonging.

Our findings suggest that these ideas might resonate differently within the Black Republican electorate across periods. Colorblind frames appear to have been readily adopted by Republicans not during Obama’s first election as president—when they only marginally increased—but during his reelection campaign. Obama’s first election campaign magnified uplifting messages about the Black community, limiting the appeal of colorblind Black Republicans’ narrative based on negative stereotypes of Black people and a strong denial of racism. The “Black exemplar” trope that Obama’s success as a major candidate represented was mostly “owned” by Black Democrats and not too emphasized by their Republican counterparts. Race-conscious Black Republicans perhaps offered a view of Black individuals that allowed them to antagonize with Obama’s proposed policies and emphasize conservative principles while still asserting the centrality of a Black political identity—even downplaying Obama’s own Blackness.

The context had changed by Obama’s reelection campaign. Increased racial tensions during his first term complicated Black Republicans’ attempts to reconcile a strong racial identity with their partisan affiliation. It became easier to articulate a colorblind narrative that deemphasized the relevance of race and framed Black individuals as stalled in a pathological sense of victimhood and ultimately to blame for their problem. Colorblind “frames might have allowed Black Republicans to distance themselves from their Black peers and highlight their individual virtue, reinforcing their allegiance with their White co-partisans and narrowing the racial gap in colorblind frames within Republicans. A symmetrical reaction reverting this trend is observed during the Trump period, with a first a sharp decrease in colorblind frames during Trump’s first election and a milder one in 2020. This trend suggests that the race-conscious narratives likely regained traction within Black Republicans and served as the basis of Trump’s agenda and outreach campaign for Black Americans, emphasizing issues such as job creation, school choice, criminal justice reform, and funding for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) (Peters and Woolley 2020).

Additional analyses examining colorblind attitudes and beliefs separately showed that these changes were mostly driven by colorblind beliefs. Corey D. Fields (2016) noted that Black Republicans largely share colorblind attitudes affirming that Black individuals should work harder without expecting special favors but disagree in their view of the pervasiveness of racism and its contemporary impact—their colorblind beliefs. Research using larger samples of Black Republicans should further investigate how these two distinct Black identities coexist within the Republican party and blend over time.

Notably, the opposite is observed for Democrats. Besides White Republicans, Black Democrats are the only group who significantly increased their colorblind frames in the Obama period. However, this increase was not sustained throughout Obama’s reelection. Contrasting with the meager increase in colorblind frames observed for Black Republicans, Black Democrats reacted to Obama’s election with an uptick in their colorblind frames, aligned with Bonilla-Silva’s assertion about Obama’s election cementing colorblind views and fully committing to the idea of a post-racial society that Obama envisioned. Black Democrats somewhat “caught up” with their White co-partisans, who had been steadily but less sharply buying into these frames. However, after Obama’s election, Black Democrats quickly picked up on the unfilled promise of a post-racial society, evidenced by the backlash that Obama’s presidency brought on the broader conversation about race and the highly visible racist events that marked his presidency, such as Trayvon Martin’s killing. Contrary to the alignment between within Republicans, Obama’s reelection marked a divergence between White and Black Democrats, with White Democrats maintaining their ignorance—“unseeing” cracks in the post-racial myth—and Black Democrats rejecting the reality of this promise. Note that Black Republicans saw their sharpest increase in colorblind frames during this period.

Trump’s ascension revitalized the alliance between Black and White Democrats, prompting both to downgrade their ascription to colorblind frames and “see racism.” This decline is furthered during Trump’s first reelection campaign, in which denouncing the enduring presence of racism became a key strategy for promoting Biden’s candidacy. White Democrats disinvested in their colorblind frames to oppose Trump’s openly racist rhetoric, cementing their allegiance with their Black co-partisans. Criminal justice issues likely played a determinant role in this process, being at the forefront of racial discussions during Obama’s presidency and beyond with publicized cases that revitalized criminal justice conversations and marked the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement (Tesler 2016). Kevin Drakulich and colleagues (2020) showed how criminal justice issues operated as “dog whistles” in the 2016 election, strongly correlated with racial resentment and voting choice and aligned along partisan lines and their strategic racial allegiances. Clinton’s stances aligned with the Black Lives Matter movement. Acknowledging the existence of systemic racism and calling for police reform resulted in higher turnout from Black Lives Matter-supporting Democrats. Trump antagonized with this movement and mobilized his base with a pro-police rhetoric that functioned as a “dog whistle,” affecting voting turnout only for those high on racial resentment.

Police brutality during Trump’s presidency, personified in the killings of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd ignited existing racial tensions and further evidenced racial injustices within the criminal justice system, promoting a racial reckoning and widespread anti-racism demonstrations (Mills 2022). Our findings align with previous literature suggesting that criminal justice events are experienced differently across racial groups (McGowen and Wylie 2020; Moberg et al. 2019; Pickett, Graham, and Cullen 2022; Unnever et al. 2011). Rejecting colorblind frames seemed politically rewarding for White Democrats and allowed them to build allegiances around reforms not seen as politically viable before. Further research should investigate whether White Democrats adjusted their colorblind frames during Biden’s presidency and Harris’ campaign, when policies such as bail reform, defunding police agencies, and progressive prosecution lost traction and became less politically rewarding. Interest divergence could explain the apparently short-lived allegiance between the Democratic Party and racial justice movements. Examining shifts in White and Black Democrats’ colorblind frames reveals how material interests not only shape racial relationships but can prove fundamental for sustaining or hindering reform efforts.

Limitations

There are limitations to our analysis. First, scholars should replicate our findings across other longitudinal datasets. Second, the ANES only collected data every presidential election and in some mid-term elections. Yearly data would help visualize the continuous trends in the adoption of colorblind frames and identify cyclical changes in election years.

Finally, survey measures do not depict the complex ways in which individuals use different strategies to make sense of—and feel good about—their own social position in racialized societies (Bonilla-Silva 2017; Mueller and Washington 2022). These measures suffer from social desirability bias, in the context of increasing rejection to open expressions of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2017). However, though inherently limited, our measures align with the frames identified by CBT and convey how much they penetrate in the larger population, allowing us to identify cleavages in the ascription to a colorblind ideology over time. The quantitative nature of our measure allows us to identify degrees in such ascription and look at how different groups adopt these frames with different intensities, making inferences based on a representative sample large enough to meaningfully—despite limitations—examine differences across groups. Qualitative research should expand on our findings, providing insight into the specific ways in which certain frames are given meaning, used, and advanced by distinct actors.

Conclusion

Seeking to better locate agency when understanding reproduction and change in racial ideologies, Mueller’s (2020) TRI identifies different mechanisms through which racial ignorance actively reinforces racial domination, based on a “unique capacity to explain and predict changes in dominant logics” (p. 142). Thus, it becomes useful to identify how historical changes differentially shape people’s racial views and groups’ reactions to the same historical events. The current study reaffirms the value of TRI in this very task. Our study shows the widespread adoption of colorblind frames within the population, as predicted by CBT, while calling attention to its mutability. Consistent with TRI, our study shows meaningful variation in the adoption of racial frames over time and across partisan and racial lines, giving credence to TRI’s insights regarding how interest converge/divergence can help us understand those dynamics. Particularly, our findings highlight how the interest convergence mechanism patterns when ignorance is harder or less rewarding to maintain, illuminating how the electoral cycle might shape racial views across racial and partisan groups.

Importantly, aligned with CBT’s precepts, our study shows the continuing relevance of colorblind frames to explain the racial ideologies of the post-Civil Rights era and their widespread adoption in the population, across both Obama and Trump’s eras. Thus, our study builds on both TRI and CBT frameworks, showing that they can work alongside each other and provide explanatory frameworks of immense value to advance our understanding of racism. Our study also reaffirms the importance of public opinion surveys to identify broad changes and important continuities in racial views, providing insight into how certain periods present opportunities for reshaping understandings of race and racism, shedding light or obscuring “cracks” in dominant racial frames (see McDermott and Belcher 2014).

In closing, we concur with Bobo et al. (2012:36, 38) that “racial attitudes are important in their own right” as they reveal the “bases for often fraught, tension-filled, and conflictual interactions along the color line.” Research shows that individuals who embrace anti-Black sentiments are more likely to support polices that disparately negatively affect Black individuals such as the death penalty, the drug war, ending affirmative action, and cutting welfare programs (Bobo et al. 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2017a). Hence, the value of understanding changes in racial frames and their relationship with the electoral cycle to identify windows of opportunity for policy change. However, scholars point out the creative ways in which many White individuals militantly maintain ignorance to protect their privileged position in the racial hierarchy and justify their praxis (Mueller 2017).

Our study shows little change in ascription to colorblind frames across cohorts and small but substantial changes over periods. These findings illustrate how alliances might become fraught if they are not sustained in time and accompanied by policies that recognize and target the institutions that produce and reproduce racial inequalities. Jennifer C. Mueller and Anna K. Washington (2022:4) criticize the notion that “education and consciousness-raising are sufficient to bring White people to the work of racial liberation,” asserting the “ends-based orientation of white thinking.” Short-lived moments of racial consciousness can be easily washed away when racial ignorance becomes strategically rewarding again. Symbolic gains are vulnerable to strong backlash if they are not accompanied by policies that promote Black advancement and undo White individuals’ “possessive investment in racial domination” (Mueller 2022:5, see, also, Mills 2022). The shifting nature of individual’s ascription to colorblind frames during the electoral cycle reaffirms the need to build stronger alliances that reimagine “anticipated futures” for Black and White individuals, promoting material disinvestment in White supremacy.

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Cecilia Chouhy

James D. Unnever

Notes

Author Biographies

Cecilia Chouhy is an associate professor at Florida State University. Her research focuses on public opinion about punitiveness and related attitudes and their broader social and political consequences, the study of race, racism, and the racialized social processes shaping crime and justice, and criminological theories, often incorporating an international perspective. Her work appears in Social Problems, Justice Quarterly, Criminology & Public Policy, Race and Social Problems, and the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, among others.

James D. Unnever is a research fellow at the University of Cincinnati. His work is recognized within Black criminology, including his publications: A Theory of African American Offending, Race, Racism, and Crime, and Building a Black Criminology. His research examines the racial invariance thesis, the effects of racial discrimination on Black offending, global and cross‑national punitiveness, and public views on corporate crime and penal policy. He received the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences’ Donald A. J. McNamara Award.

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