Abstract
State action is an important form of strategic communication and therefore significant to countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives on and offline. While non-state actors often use state action (and sometimes inaction) as a motivation to incite and legitimize violence against the state as well as its citizens, generating such negative sentiment does not always require instigation. This is especially so when the action(s) of a state are extremely controversial. As many violent extremists (including lone actors) have been radicalized as a result of state action (or in action), it is necessary for the state to not only carry out positive actions but also have them widely publicized. This is envisaged to counter adverse narratives and address tangible issues that push individuals towards violent extremism.
Introduction
In September 2016, a senator from the Democratic Party in the USA, Ted Lieu, wrote a letter to the US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, urging her to support the ‘United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ call for an international, independent investigation into the civilian deaths and war crimes in Yemen’ (Lieu, 2016). Lieu argued that ‘The repeated killing of civilians by the Saudi coalition, done with US assistance, violates not just our [the US’] moral conscience but degrades our reputation and standing in the world [author’s emphasis]’ (Lieu, 2016). He also noted that ‘many people in Yemen hold the US responsible for the actions of the Saudi military coalition’ and that the US was ‘potentially creating numerous recruiting opportunities for terrorists with every US-enabled bomb that drops in children and civilians [author’s emphasis] in Yemen’ (Lieu, 2016).
The senator’s arguments and observations are important for three reasons: first, civilian casualties validate violent extremist narratives and can directly and indirectly aid terrorist recruitment. The speed at which news of such incidents is disseminated (via traditional or social media), as well as how these incidents are framed, suggests the following: (a) individuals do not require instigation (by a jihadi firebrand or preacher) to feel outraged; a news report on either of these mediums will suffice; and (b) the state often cannot respond to such reports in a timely manner, which enables misinformation and negative sentiments to spread easily. Second, the state no longer has to be directly involved in a military conflict/campaign to be held responsible for human casualties; it is presumed to be ‘guilty by association’. Third, a state’s existing countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives (on and offline) can be severely undermined because of its actions/involvement in the conflict, especially when casualty rates are high. These observations arguably apply to situations where the state is involved in armed operations (domestic or international) that result in a humanitarian crisis.
How then should a state respond in a situation where engaging in armed confrontation is necessary, but is likely to cause human casualties/fatalities as well as inevitable public backlash? How can the state minimize negative public sentiment in the long term?
It is argued that undertaking positive state action at the macro- and micro-levels can help address these challenges. Providing or increasing humanitarian assistance in times of peace, or as part of rebuilding efforts following armed conflict, could be viewed as an undertaking at the macro-level in that it caters to a larger segment of affected society. An undertaking wherein the state provides assistance at the unitary, family or local community levels multiple times as part of an ongoing programme could better serve as an example of micro-level service provision. Such interventions are envisaged to improve the state’s overall image, thereby minimizing public backlash, especially when the state has to carry out controversial action in the future, and bolstering existing CVE efforts. However, it must be acknowledged that the proposed strategy may not be as effective if mistrust of the state already exists at elevated levels.
In support of this argument, this article will first discuss how state action can be understood as strategic communication. Next, it will examine how human casualties affect audiences and why news media tend to focus on such stories. How such stories feed radicalization, contempt for a state and overall impact on a state’s CVE efforts will also be discussed. Several macro- and micro-strategies of different countries will be analysed to identify useful learning points. Finally, the article will conclude with some thoughts for the future.
Strategic Communication and State Action
Strategic communication or ‘communication through words and deeds in pursuit of national strategic objectives’ has, in recent times, become more prominent across the globe (Cornish, Lindley-French, & Yorke, 2011, p. ix). In terms of ‘communication’, many countries have established or will be establishing specialized departments/ministries to handle public communication functions. 1 Some countries like the USA have even gone so far as to establish units that focus on niche areas such as counterterrorism communications (e.g., the Global Engagement Center 2 ).
A key element in effective strategic communication is the ‘potency of action’ (Cornish et al., 2011, p. 21). As ‘all action has a communicative value and conveys a message’, ‘words and actions are inseparable’, therefore ‘efforts should be made to minimise … disparities that might undermine the … narrative’ (Cornish et al., 2011, p. 21). The same rationale holds true for state [‘state’, in this context, is defined as ‘the civil government of a country’ (Oxford Dictionaries)] action especially since ‘governments will be judged as much on what they can deliver as on the promises they make and the vision they provide’ (Cornish et al., 2011, p. 21).
The potency of action is highly relevant and applicable to situations involving non-state actors. This is especially so when non-state actors exploit state action (e.g., drone strike that causes significant collateral damage) or state inaction (e.g., refusing to intervene in a conflict to prevent escalation of humanitarian crises) to incite and legitimize violence against both the state and its nationals. In February 2015, for example, the Islamic State (ISIS) justified its brutal execution of a Jordanian Air Force pilot as ‘retribution for his crimes against Islam and the Muslims, including his active involvement in crusader airstrikes against Muslim lands’ (Dabiq, 2015, p. 5).
Discussions about positive state action have, traditionally, been associated with international relations and diplomacy. In particular, positive state action can generate soft power, which in turn, enables a state to ‘get the outcomes … [it] … want[s] without tangible threats or payoffs’ (Nye Jr., 2004). Nye also contends that soft power ‘is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence’ (Nye Jr., 2004). Hence, most states actively attempt to develop ‘assets that produce such attraction’ around and beyond their borders. Notwithstanding, it is unreasonable to expect that all state actions result in positive outcomes. Counterterrorism operations, particularly those carried out against non-state actors in another country/territory, are a case in point.
Counterterrorism Operations as Negative State Action
Airstrikes have become a popular tactic in counterterrorism operations against ISIS as well as other terrorist/militant organizations. However, the risk of collateral damage in terms of fatalities and casualties is also high. ‘Rapid response airstrikes have meant higher civilian casualties, while every bomb dropped in populated areas amplifies the chance of a mistake’ observes Brad Adams, Asia Director at Human Rights Watch. ‘Mistakes by the US and NATO have dramatically decreased public support for the Afghan government and the presence of international forces providing security to Afghans’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
Some of the incidents where airstrikes have inadvertently killed civilians include: (a) the July 2008 attack on a wedding party where 47 Afghanis, mostly women and children, were killed (BBC, 2008a). The group was reportedly escorting the bride to the wedding ceremony in the groom’s village in Dih Bala district of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan; (b) the August 2008 airstrike on a Taliban commander in the village of Azizabad, killed over 90 civilians, many of them children (BBC, 2008b); and (c) the 2013 airstrike in Yemen that killed 15 wedding guests who were mistaken for al-Qaeda operatives (The Guardian, 2013).
More recently in August 2016, Saudi-led coalition jets carried out an airstrike on a potato factory in Yemen that killed over a dozen people (mostly women) and injured several others (Dehghan, 2016). The airstrike was part of a military campaign in Yemen’s ongoing civil war between parties loyal to (deposed) president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Houthi forces (Orkaby, 2015). This was not the first time a civilian target was attacked. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a scathing report in the same month criticizing such air strikes against civilian targets [e.g., power grids] (OHCHR, 2016). It was reported that ‘the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein called for an international investigation into the violations committed by the Saudi-led coalition, saying that a national commission had failed to succeed in pursuing those responsible’ (RT, 2016).
The use of drone strikes by the USA against terrorist targets is equally controversial. The USA has argued that as drone strikes are more precise, collateral damage will be minimized significantly. 3 However, this has not always been the case. In October 2006, a drone strike killed approximately 82 people (including children) when a madrassa in Bajaur near the Afghan border was hit (Amnesty International, 2006). In March 2011, a series of drone strikes killed about 40 people in Datta Khel, North Waziristan, during a tribal council meeting (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 14).
Expectedly, such missteps do not improve the standing/image of countries involved in these operations, even when such strikes are carried out as part of wider counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, the unintended fatalities and casualties from air and drone strikes can have a radicalizing effect on those directly and indirectly affected by the strikes.
A 2013 PEW survey reported that anti-US sentiment was high in communities directly affected by drone strikes (PEW, 2013). Neda Najibi, an author associated with the Huffington Post, cautioned that ‘the use of drones is often justified by the fact that they (occasionally) take out some very bad people, but they actually do more harm as innocent people die and the ones they leave behind resort to terrorism as revenge for their loved ones’ (Najibi, 2013).
Radicalizing Effect of Negative State Action
Radicalization can also occur in individuals who are not directly affected by negative state action. They can either be made aware of the incident via regular news feeds (on traditional and social media) or via human informants (e.g., friends, preachers, ideologues, relatives and so on). In any case, stories about casualties/fatalities are, by nature, emotionally provocative, and can in certain scenarios have a radicalizing effect on the individual(s).
Although an individual can experience one of many different emotions when learning of casualties/fatalities, feelings of compassion for the victim(s) is very normal. ‘Compassion’ in this context is defined as the ‘painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 31, cited in Heywood, 2015, p. 40). This is due in part to the recognition that the strangers they learn about in these stories are also part of the human race ‘regardless of where, or who, they are’ (Heywood, 2015, p. 41), and the tendency of people to empathize with the ‘undeserved misfortune’ of others. In addition, ‘an element of morality’ is imposed on the viewer/reader ‘to engage with [the] ethics of care, or to imagine putting ourselves in the position of the victim’ (Silverstone, 2007 cited in in Heywood, 2015, p. 41), such that some viewers/readers would be strongly motivated to do something to help (Borum, 2003).
The media, too, contributes to the motivation to take action by the way crises/conflicts are framed in the news. As academic Emma Haywood observes, ‘the media plays a key role here as they have the ability to determine not only what is shown to viewers but how it is portrayed and the extent of the graphic nature of the suffering’ (Heywood, 2015, p. 41). Some journalists, for instance, subscribe to an approach known as the ‘journalism of attachment’. 4 This approach maintains that when reporting on conflicts/crises, ‘journalists should record the human and emotional costs of war rather than acting as “transmission vehicles” for governmental or military [interpretations of events]’ (Bell, 1998, cited in Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey, & Richardson, 2005). It also maintains that ‘reporters cannot remain detached or neutral in the face of modern evils like genocide in Bosnia or Rwanda but must side with the victims and demand that something-must-be-done’ (Hume, 1997, p. 4, cited in cited in Franklin et al., 2005). Hence, news about crises/conflicts are sometimes framed to elicit compassion and prompt action by the viewer/reader.
The prevalence of such human interest news stories suggests that in extreme cases, a viewer/reader may sometimes be motivated to take violent action to ‘solve the problem’. He/she may arrive at this conclusion for several reasons such as: (a) lack of action by others/those in power; (b) vengeance; and (c) belief that violence begets violence (Samuel, 2012, pp. 40–51).
Many violent extremists (especially single actors) have been radicalized from learning about humanitarian crises from social and/or traditional media. In 2015, for instance, the North Carolina teenager who was arrested for terrorist-related activities claimed that ‘he was angry about US airstrikes and planned revenge that would force them [the US] to stop’ (Field, 2015). In 2016, Wang Yuandongyi a non-Muslim Singaporean was issued a Restriction Order under the Internal Security Act for attempting to ‘to travel to Syria to join a Kurdish militia group that is fighting against the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’. He had
… first learnt about the Kurds through newsfeeds in November 2015 and subsequently looked up information online about ISIS’ attacks against the Kurds in Syria. He began to empathise with the plight of the Kurds and to detest ISIS. At the same time, he was looking to escape from personal setbacks, like his financial liabilities arising from a failed business venture. (Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, 2016)
In Russia, an Uzbek nanny killed a child in her care to ‘avenge Muslims killed in the Kremlin’s campaign of air strikes in Syria’ (Tsvetkova & Osborn, 2016). As these examples show, some individuals may decide to target the state, its interests and/or its citizens when they reach the tipping point.
CVE Efforts Undermined by Negative State Action
A state’s CVE initiatives and support of such initiatives at the non-governmental and/or grassroots levels could be undermined as well (Field, 2015). The following examples illustrate.
The USA
The USA has, to date, spent considerable resources on CVE initiatives in recognition that these encompass ‘the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence’ (The White House, 2015).
Community engagement formed the core of such programmes and consisted of (The White House, 2015):
Building awareness—This includes identifying the drivers and indicators of radicalization and recruitment to violence.
Countering extremist narratives—This is done by directly addressing and countering violent extremist recruitment narratives and encouraging civil society-led counter-narratives online. Essential the approach entails ‘working to weaken the legitimacy and resonance of violent extremist messaging and narratives’ by identifying ‘concrete ways to build upon ongoing initiatives aimed at countering extremists’ perverse message and new and innovative solutions to the challenges posed by violent extremists, especially online’ (The White House, 2015). Some of the initiatives include: (a) establishing a digital communications hub that will counter ISIL’s [ISIS] propaganda and recruitment efforts, both directly and through engagement with civil society, community and religious leaders; (b) developing a Peer-to-Peer Challenge to empower university students in the USA, Canada, North Africa, Middle East, Europe, Australia and Asia to develop digital content that counters violent extremist messaging; (c) organizing multiple ‘technology camps’ in which social media companies will work with governments, civil society and religious leaders to develop digital content that discredits violent extremist narratives and amplifies positive alternatives (The White House, 2015).
Emphasizing community-led intervention—Communities are empowered through various efforts designed to disrupt the radicalization process before an individual engages in such activity. 5
In addition, a whole-of-nation approach to CVE was also adopted. Some of the highlights included (The White House, 2015):
The appointment of a senior level, full-time CVE Coordinator at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Establishing the Los Angeles-based Office for Strategic Engagement which deploys dedicated staff to: (a) facilitate information sharing; (b) seek engagement with local partners; (c) strengthen community and law enforcement partnerships; and (d) establish prevention and intervention frameworks at the local level. Plans to extend this programme to other municipalities across the country are already in place.
Leading a workshop with the creative arts community and community leaders to develop innovative, scalable and implementable programmes and tools to counter violent extremism. These new programmes and tools will include film training for disadvantaged youth and a ‘CVE Hub’ that will be operated by an NGO to connect, network, organize and drive community groups, funders, academics and the tech sector towards long-term, sustainable, creative and nimble solutions for domestic CVE.
Sponsorship of a joint DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) symposium for local partners to collaborate and share best practices on intervention and prevention framework development and implementation.
Externally, CVE efforts involved collaborating with international partners to ‘develop actions to counter the most immediate threats, including ISIL [ISIS], and stop the spread of violent extremism’. Such partners include other governments, international NGOs and private sector companies (The White House, 2015). For example, collaboration with Canada and the UK aims to bring together researchers from research programmes to deliver practical, timely and plainspoken results to practitioners (The White House, 2015).
The USA also works
… with religious leaders and faith communities around the world to address both religious and non-religious causes of violence and extremism, including by working with religious leaders on projects emphasising peace, tolerance, and coexistence at the community level and training religious leaders on outreach to at-risk youth. (The White House, 2015)
There are also plans to actively engage with youth around the world. The USA will support
… young leaders in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, through projects that provide youth a sense of belonging, as well as technical skills and vocational training, scholarships, opportunities for civic engagement, and leadership training. As part of these efforts, the United States trains, mentors, and provides seed funding to young leaders, for example, who are working to counter extremists’ narratives, reintegrate former violent extremists, and promote tolerance and non-violent dispute resolution. (The White House, 2015)
These are undoubtedly very holistic and ambitious plans for CVE and involve multiple stakeholders directly and indirectly. The debates surrounding if and how well such initiatives were carried out under the Obama administration is beyond the scope of this article but suffice to say that the results appear ‘mixed’ (Rosand, 2017).
Notwithstanding, many observers have cautioned that such CVE efforts may be seriously undermined by the USA’s actions in the past as well as present. For example, Mark Juergensmeyer, Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, opined in an article that the USA had made a serious error by declaring a global ‘War on Terror’ and invading Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks (Nirmala, 2014). He argued that the ‘War on Terror’ only served to validate Osama bin Laden’s view of the USA as an enemy of Islam in the light of the human casualties and atrocities that were committed as part of this campaign (see also Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 3).
In an evaluation of why counter-messaging emanating from the DHS had not been entirely successful against ISIS’ narrative, Alberto Fernandez, former Coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, argued,
It is important to remember that ISIS propaganda does not happen in a vacuum. Western governments, including the current administration, would be well served by starting from a position of humility and recognise that the problem of ISIS messaging is fundamentally a political problem reflected in social media and not the other way around. All too often the press, policymakers, and legislators have focused on the ‘slickness’ of the message and not on the power of the content. ISIS propaganda succeeds—when it does and it doesn’t always—because a good part of it is based on real events. The best propaganda is the truth. (McCants, 2015)
Fernandez also remarked in another interview that ‘saying ISIS is bad is not good enough. There has to be change on the ground. Messaging can shape and shade, but it can’t turn black into white’ (Cottee, 2015).
Indonesia
Indonesia has employed both hard and soft measures to deal with terrorism and violent extremism over the last decade. The
‘hard’ approach is defined as measures that are employed by the state that focus on the function and role of the security apparatus (primarily the National Police and Military) and their use of force, which includes, among other things, tactical raids, arrests, infiltration and killings. The ‘soft’ approach, on the other hand, is seen as the function, role and activities of the non-security state apparatus (such as the Ministry of Education, as well as non-state actors (such as Islamic mass organisations), which do not resort to force. (Hasan, 2012, p. 15)
This dual approach has met with some measure of success. Jamhari Makruf and Mutiara Pertiwi from the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta observed that
… by 2010, Indonesian Police claimed to have arrested 452 jihadi terrorists and killed some key leaders of JI, such as Dr. Azahari, Noordin M. Top, Saefudin Djaelani and Dulmatin. Additionally, the police were successful in paralysing a new al-Qaida funded-jihadi training camp in Aceh [that year]. (Makruf & Pertiwi, 2010, pp. 142–143).
Nevertheless, the use of hard measures has resulted in fatalities and casualties (e.g., death of suspects), and if these numbers grow, could undermine Indonesia’s overall CVE efforts (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Several manifestations of public discontent are already observable: (a) protests against law enforcement agencies calling for their disbandment; (b) attacks on police stations; (c) spreading rumours/conspiracy theories that besmirch the reputation of law enforcement agencies (Yang, 2012); and (d) portrayal of suspects killed in counterterrorism operations as innocent victims (Taufiqurrohman, 2013, p. 9).
Positive State Action
It stands to reason that states must carry out positive action to negate the backlash from counterterrorism operations that result in human casualties/fatalities, as well as help its CVE efforts. It is argued that such positive action can be done at the macro- and micro-levels. Admittedly, however, positive state action may be less effective if mistrust/distrust of the state is already high. Even in such dismal circumstances, it is still useful for the state to carry out and publicize its initiatives as this would help challenge/counter-negative sentiment as well as narratives about the state in both online and offline spaces. The following case studies illustrate.
Macro-level: Minimizing Collateral Damage—Israel
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has grown more complex since the Palestinian group Hamas assumed control of the Gaza Strip when it won the 2006 legislative elections. The conflict occasionally escalates into violent confrontations, with militants belonging to Hamas and other Palestinian groups firing rockets at Israel, and air and ground offensives carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against Gaza in retaliation.
In Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, the IDF, in anticipation of a possible backlash over its retaliatory strikes, provided details on their approach to minimize civilian casualties during the fighting. These included: (a) phone calls to warn Gazans of impending airstrikes; (b) dropping leaflets to ‘warn civilians to avoid being present in the vicinity of Hamas operatives’; (c) diverting missiles in mid-flight when civilians were in close proximity of the target; (d) ‘roof knocking’ whereby ‘a building is targeted with a loud but non-lethal bomb that warns civilians that they are in the vicinity of a weapons cache or other target. This method is used to allow all residents to leave the area before the site is hit with live ammunition’; and (e) pinpoint targeting ‘where strikes will endanger few or no bystanders’ (Israel Defense Forces, 2012).
Moreover, the IDF admitted that ‘despite all precautions, IDF forces may have mistakenly targeted sites and hurt Palestinian civilians’ and it is ‘fully committed to ensuring that every allegation of wrongdoing be fully and fairly investigated, though this will happen after the conclusion of the operation’ (Israel Defense Forces, 2012). Three important learning points of the IDF’s approach can be extracted:
Providing specific details of how civilian casualties are minimized;
Acknowledgement that civilian casualties will occur; and
Identification of avenues of recourse for victims to make complaints and investigations into wrong doing. 6
Macro-level: Engagement with the Enemy—Thailand
Over the last decade, the secessionist conflict in Thailand has, at times, escalated into violent confrontations between separatists from the South and the state. Approximately 4,000 people have been killed and about 10,000 injured to date (Bangkok Post, 2015). Violence against the Thai state has been justified not only on ideological/ethno-religious grounds but also as retaliation against the state’s hard approach to quell the rebellion. As Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan observe:
A major, if understated, motivation for violence has been the principle of reciprocity, where attacks have taken place in response to perceived injustices and crackdowns by security forces. Given that the Thai Government continues to take a heavy-handed approach in their operations in the south, it should be no surprise to find ready pools of aggrieved recruits among youths who have either loss family members or were themselves subject to abusive interrogation procedures. Not a few locals have their own vendetta against the state, and have been drawn into the insurgency, not by grandiose visions of the liberation of Patani, but by profound enmity and a quest for personal revenge. (Liow & Pathan, 2010, p. 46)
Although draconian measures were initially employed to address the problem, the use of a softer approach in recent times seems to be more effective. For instance, the Thai government has shown its willingness to negotiate with the separatists and address some of the key issues/grievances such as ‘handing over limited powers’ to the three provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani (Asia One, 2013). That is not to say, however, that the government has totally abandoned the use of force when dealing with the separatists. However, its willingness to negotiate could potentially build trust and make it easier for them to win hearts and minds. For example, in February 2013, 16 separatists attacked an army base in Narathiwat Province. As the military had been tipped-off, they were prepared for the attack. All separatists were killed in the ensuing firefight. It was reported that the tip-off had actually come from members of the Southern Thailand community, who were usually unfriendly and hostile towards the state. Speculating on this apparent ‘change of heart’, a Thai security official opined: ‘We are seeing a change in attitude and sympathies among some in the Muslim community. They have had enough of the violence and the killing of innocents’ (Horn, 2013).
Macro-level: Increasing Economic, Development and Humanitarian Aid—Canada
The Canadian government (under Stephen Harper) introduced several soft power initiatives as part of a broad strategy to combat violent extremism particularly in relation to ISIS. The government was also explicit in detailing how the assistance was distributed, what form it was in and who received aid.
Humanitarian Assistance
Canada pledged over C$100 million in humanitarian assistance for Iraqis affected by the violence. This included: (a) food to 1.7 million people; (b) shelter and relief supplies (such as hygiene kits, cooking materials and blankets) to 1.26 million people; and (c) improved access to education opportunities for up to 500,000 children including providing education and protection assistance for up to 150,000 conflict-affected children (Government of Canada, 2015a).
It also supported humanitarian efforts in Syria and its neighbouring countries. For instance, those in Syria were provided with funds, relief items, food, clean water and school materials (Government of Canada, 2015a). In Jordan, ‘52,000 conflict-affected children and youth were able to attend child and adolescent friendly spaces, and 36,980 conflict-affected women and men were provided awareness sessions on preventing and responding to violence, protection, referral, and sexual and gender-based violence’ (Government of Canada, 2015a). ‘In Lebanon, Canada supported non-formal education for 9,170 conflict-affected school-aged children and life skills education, as well as literacy and numeracy to 7,140 at-risk adolescents’ (Government of Canada, 2015a).
Refugee Resettlement 7
Canada expanded its commitment to help Syrian refugees by planning to resettle an additional 10,000 Syrians by the end of 2017. It is also working with humanitarian partners and private sponsors to resettle these Syrian refugees in Canadian communities (Government of Canada, 2015b). In response to the ongoing violence in Iraq, Canada also expanded its commitment to help Iraqi refugees by resettling an additional 3,000 by the end of 2015 (Government of Canada, 2015b).
Developmental Programmes
In terms of development assistance in Iraq and the region, Canada’s contributions to this effort include: (a) $10 million to strengthen accountability for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) crimes and to support victims of SGBV in ISIS-affected areas; (b) programmes to protect the rights of religious minorities in Iraq and the region; and (c) programmes to build resilience and social cohesion in communities affected by conflict and to address longer term needs, including inclusive governance (Government of Canada, 2015c).
Non-lethal security assistance is also being provided to Iraqi forces in the form of ‘personal protective gear, vehicles, global positioning systems, and robots to detect and disable improvised explosive devices’ (Government of Canada, 2015c). For countries that host significant numbers of Syrian refugees, such as Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, Canada committed more than $230 million in aid. ‘This assistance is focused on building resilience in refugee-hosting communities, providing basic services such as education, municipal services, water and sanitation, and fostering social cohesion’ (Government of Canada, 2015c). In Jordan, for example, ‘approximately 1 million Jordanians and Syrian refugee students are benefiting from improved access to quality education, water, sanitation, and hygiene initiatives’ (Government of Canada, 2015c). Also, ‘support for the provision of municipal services to approximately 1.1 million Jordanians and Syrian refugees’ is also being offered (Government of Canada, 2015c).
Positive State Action at the Micro-level
Positive state action can also be carried out at the micro-level. Some examples include: (a) civilian management training for law enforcement and (b) helping converts.
Civilian Management Training for Law Enforcement
As law enforcement and counterterror units from the military, police and paramilitary are effectively the visible faces of the state when dealing with the public in crisis or conflict situations, it is imperative that they undergo specialized training to help them deal with crowds, especially when policing/dealing with civilians and communities.
As the military, police and paramilitary have different roles, the treatment of civilians in different crisis/conflict scenarios is expectedly different. A tongue in cheek conceptualization of the issue was summed up as ‘police officers … [are] … better prepared to work with a population to help it achieve internal security; soldiers … [are] … trained … to break things and kill people’ (Marten, 2007, p. 242 cited in Heiduk, 2015, p. 72).
The police in many jurisdictions are mandated to engender public trust and relationship building, as such, many officers undergo training for these purposes. For instance, in the USA, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) ‘have developed guides, publications, webinars, checklists and tools for law enforcement agencies on community policing, building community trust, diversity training, privacy protections, and safeguarding first amendment rights’ (Department of Justice, 2014).
The DOJ further acknowledges that trust building has to be done before a crisis occurs and takes considerable time; hence, regular activities are organized to keep the police engaged with communities. As a Department of Justice News Release states: ‘Building strong police-community relations requires a sustained effort over time, yet maintaining these relationships is exceedingly difficult during and in the aftermath of a high-profile incident or civil unrest’ (Department of Justice, 2014). While the effectiveness of such activities can be contested, the attempts to foster better relationships between the police and the civilian population are extremely helpful.
The changing functions of the military in some countries suggest that training to properly manage civilian populations, especially on overseas missions, is necessary. The US Army, for instance, includes Civilian Casualty Mitigation in its Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-37.31 doctrine. This prescribes how officers and other ranks should treat civilians and combatants in foreign conflict zones and suggests techniques/approaches. For instance, with regard to change mindsets: ‘during training and exercises, effective commanders avoid focusing exclusively on fighting against a hostile enemy, as this could reinforce a ‘shoot first’ mentality’. And ‘Negative attitudes, such as perceiving host-nation civilians as inferior, must be avoided because they lead to thinking that civilian casualties (CIVCAS) are not too regrettable’ (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 2). Training programmes are, however, only effective as the ‘code of conduct’ they are meant to instil is internalized, supported by senior ranks, enforceable to a certain extent and dependent on self-discipline. Nevertheless, civilian management is increasingly becoming a necessary skill for law enforcement.
Helping Converts
Muslim converts in the West, who have professed extremist beliefs, have come under the spotlight for terrorism-related activities in and outside their home countries. In 2014, there were several attacks linked with converts including: (a) the attack on the Canadian Parliament perpetrated by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau; (b) the attack on New York Police Department officers by Zale Thompson; and (c) the brutal slaying of Lee Rigby, an off-duty soldier in south-east London by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. In 2016, a British Indian, Siddhartha Dhar (aka the New Jihadi John), who converted to Islam in his ‘late teens’, was identified as ‘the masked executioner’ responsible for ‘killing five hostages in a [2016] ISIS video’ (John, 2016).
The motivations behind these acts are, arguably, personal and differ from individual to individual. However, what was common was that they were converts who subscribed to a hard-line interpretation of Islam. According to psychologists, religious conversions usually happen when an individual is forced to develop a ‘new meaning system’ to replace the existing one as the latter has failed to adequately explain or validate the ‘discrepancies’ of life (e.g., the sudden death of a loved one) (Paloutzian & Park, 2005, p. 334). As conversion involves significant changes to a person’s meaning system, it will naturally result in observable changes to his/her ‘self-perception, identity, life purpose, attitudes, values, goals, sensitivities, ultimate concerns and behaviour’ (Paloutzian & Park, 2005, p. 334). The behavioural and attitudinal changes are stressful enough, and personal circumstances (e.g., conversion to facilitate marriage), environmental and situational factors (e.g., reaction of family and friends), as well as societal dynamics (e.g., discrimination against Muslims) may potentially add to the complexity of the conversion process.
Islam, like many other religions, is not monolithic; ‘its form and expression vary from one Muslim to another and from group to group’ (Kusuma, 2010). For example, Indonesian Islam, while sharing similar tenets with say Pakistani Islam, is still different in many fundamental ways. This plurality can cause confusion in the convert, and in some cases, alienation, if the convert, while Muslim, is still excluded because he/she belongs to a different ethnic group.
In fact, a 2013 Oxford Analytica report identified feelings of personal emptiness and social isolation as a major causal factor of radicalization among Muslim converts. The study also argued that the resentment of ‘modernity, globalization and secular society’; the absence of formal education and training in Islamic doctrine and theology; and the interpretation of ‘Islamic ideology as a form of protest’ were key push factors towards radicalization (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2013). The study found that ‘radicalisation is usually the result of social interaction; it is less common for converts to self-radicalize in isolation. The process, which involves the convert developing a more extreme interpretation of his/her faith to legitimize or justify violence, generally takes months or years’ (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2013). It is for these reasons that increased psychological and community support for converts is necessary, as it can enable them to become more knowledgeable about their new faith, more confident about their place in the world and, most importantly, more discerning about alternative interpretations of religious doctrine.
The findings suggest that positive community intervention in terms of increased guidance and support is essential to help converts deal with the challenges they encounter on the religious, social, personal and sometimes financial fronts. In addition to community support and guidance, supportive counselling for converts is another avenue that communities can introduce to help converts during their conversion process. Supportive counselling entails a one-on-one session whereby the counsellor uses techniques to reduce the anxiety (e.g., stress arising from the conversion process) faced by the client. Such an approach may enable the counsellors to better reach out to the converts’ needs and establish rapport. More importantly, it may divert the converts from turning to radical ideology to address their needs. Counselling can therefore help alleviate some of the personal, situational challenges and stress associated with conversion.
However, supportive counselling would be useful only if converts are motivated to participate in the counselling process. Collaboration with religious authorities and/or specialists can certainly help in this regard. For instance, a possible approach would be to explore the use of techniques that incorporate Islamic concepts into the counselling process. The common appreciation for Islam may create a facilitative platform for converts to address their needs and concerns.
The creation of organizations to help converts is extremely useful and would benefit greatly from state support. Several countries have already taken steps in that direction. In the light of how ‘as a community, new Muslims face unique challenges and have a distinct set of needs compared to Muslims who are born into the faith’, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) organized a New Muslim Summit in January 2014 (Shaaban, 2014). The summit aimed to ‘develop effective strategies and systems to cater to the needs of new Muslims’ by raising awareness, educating and providing direction to new converts (Shaaban, 2014).
Similarly, in New Zealand, the New Muslim Project was founded in 2012 by a group of volunteers. It was initiated as ‘people in a non-Muslim country like New Zealand can be exposed to a wide range of information about Islam, (But) not all is right or authentic’ (New Muslim Project NZ, 2016). The project attempts to ‘find ways and means to provide help and support for all those who are new to or are interested in learning more about Islam’ (New Muslim Project NZ, 2014). It also organizes social events, conducts religious courses and provides useful information and literature about Islam.
In Singapore, the Muslim Converts’ Association of Singapore (aka Darul Arqam), established in 1979, aims to ‘provide religious guidance and render assistance (including financial assistance) to members; organize religious, literary and/or recreational activities; publish Islamic articles and/or literature; participate and provide welfare services for the community; and represent the interests of all Muslim converts residing in Singapore’ (The Muslim Converts’ Association of Singapore, 2014).
Conclusion
Undertaking positive action can improve the state’s overall image, which in turn enables it to: (a) minimize backlash, especially when it has to carry out negative action; and (b) bolster existing CVE efforts on and offline. With regard to minimizing backlash, positive state action does not eliminate public anger directed against it for carrying out negative action, it simply helps manage the anger. In relation to bolstering existing CVE efforts on and offline, positive state action helps bolster counter-narratives. As extremist narratives are often framed and premised on real-world problems and crises, counter-narratives should similarly be premised on tangible solutions that have resulted in positive outcomes. Positive state action is therefore critical in this regard as lives of individuals and communities can, may or have been improved because of the state’s programmes/interventions (e.g., Canada’s refugee programme that has helped individuals who have fled Iraq/Syria).
While the state may take great pains to carry out positive state action, there is no guarantee of immunity from attack, or that violent extremists will not target its citizens. However, not doing so increases the risks significantly as individuals or groups can use the absence of action as a pretext to perpetrate acts of violence. In this regard, individuals do not require instigation by another person; he/she simply learns about negative or controversial state action from news sources on and offline. A point alluded to by former Coordinator for Strategic Counter-terrorism Communications Alberto Fernandez: ‘Syrian Muslims have been slaughtered in large numbers by the Assad regime. From 2012–2014 that was the single major factor that mobilised thousands worldwide to the war zone. But you didn’t need to watch ISIS videos to see this carnage ...’ (McCants, 2015).
Finally, an important and related aspect to positive state action is that that states should attempt to minimize inconsistencies between rhetoric and action. This is by far the most difficult for states to accomplish because of the ever-changing dynamics in the political and diplomatic realms, which ultimately affect its interests and priorities. Yet, reducing (as opposed to eliminating) such inconsistencies is vital in improving a state’s image and in some cases, rebuilding and/or building trust. As Kirsten Mogensen of Roskilde University writes: ‘Just as is the case in corporate branding and public relations, public diplomacy is only perceived as convincing and can only create soft power if the country behaves in accordance with what it says it does’ (Mogensen, 2015, p. 320).
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
1
For instance, the Government Communication Service in the UK.
2
The Global Engagement Center replaced the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications in 2016.
3
Former Director of the National Security Agency, Michael Hayden argues,
The [drone] program is not perfect. No military program is. But here is the bottom line: It works. I think it fair to say that the targeted killing program has been the most precise and effective application of firepower in the history of armed conflict. It disrupted terrorist plots and reduced the original Qaeda organization along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border to a shell of its former self. And that was well before Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011 … Unmanned aerial vehicles carrying precision weapons and guided by powerful intelligence offer a proportional and discriminating response when response is necessary. Civilians have died, but in my firm opinion, the death toll from terrorist attacks would have been much higher if we had not taken action. (Hayden, 2016)
5
The ‘Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States’ is an example of how such community engagement programmes are operationalized. This initiative was started in 2011 and premised on two key factors: ‘(a) communities provide the solution to violent extremism; and (b) CVE efforts are best pursued at the local level, tailored to local dynamics, where local officials continue to build relationships within their communities through established community policing and community outreach mechanisms’ (White House, 2015).
6
Here, it is important to stress that if investigations reveal wrong doings, disciplinary or punitive action must be taken against the perpetrators to demonstrate that available recourses do, in fact, work.
7
It should be acknowledged that refugee resettlement is a contentious issue, and not all countries can do so. Resources, domestic politics and other factors are major considerations. For example, Joanne Van Selm notes: ‘One of the reasons behind the relatively small number of places offered for resettlement is the challenge, and costs, of integration. Different resettlement countries handle integration in different ways, reflecting cultural and sociological norms and standards that prevail in their domestic settings’ (Van Selm, 2014).