An Investigation into North Korea’s ‘Real’ Nuclear Strategy: A Comparison with Pakistan’s Case

Threat of Retaliation

The United States and the Soviet Union, as nuclear superpowers and pioneers in the development of nuclear weapons and strategies, adopted the concept of threatening to destroy the other side with their catastrophic retaliation (second strike) capabilities if the other side initiates a nuclear attack (the first strike). This concept, however, could not be applied to other nuclear-weapon states that lacked the necessary second-strike capability. As a result, France, seeking to defend its people against the Soviet Union’s nuclear threat, developed its own nuclear weapons and the concept of ‘minimal deterrence’, which was to threaten to inflict minimal but painful damage on the Soviet Union with its limited but still catastrophic nuclear weapons (Nalebuff, 1988, p. 416). Based on this concept, France and the United Kingdom maintain between 200 and 300 nuclear warheads, the majority of which are planned to be delivered via SLBMs in their SSBNs, which are the most survivable and reliable delivery system in any time and circumstance (Kristensen & Korda, 2022). The two nuclear states tried to make sure that at least one SSBN is operational in the ocean for retaliation by possessing four SSBNs each, even under the situation of concurrent occurrence of training, maintenance and an unexpected accident. The Soviet Union may not be willing to exchange the catastrophic destruction of Moscow and/or other cities for the total destruction of France or the United Kingdom (Bundy, 1969, p. 11). The logic behind this minimal deterrence appears to be persuasive.

‘Indirect or triangular nuclear deterrence’ is one of the nuclear deterrence concepts developed by a scholar to help a more limited nuclear state. According to Robert E. Harkavy (1998, p. 64), a small nuclear state that lacks the nuclear capabilities necessary for minimal deterrence could threaten to attack a third non-nuclear nation in a way to deter a nuclear superpower’s threat to itself. In this triangular deterrence, the nation holds a third country hostage and threatens the nuclear superpower to back down, much like a person threatens policemen not to attack him if they do not want to harm the hostage. According to Harkavy (1998, pp. 66–75), Israel prepared to implement this concept against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and devised a plan to attack its Arab neighbours in the event that the Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack on Israel. He even explained that Iraq attacked Israel during the 1991 Gulf War as this triangular deterrence concept, albeit with conventional missiles, and the United States developed a contingency plan to deal with the possibility of an attack on its allies in the Middle East by either Iraq or Iran. To ensure survival at all costs, this triangular deterrence concept should not be ruled out by a nuclear underdog that has to deal with a superpower with a lot of nuclear weapons.

Threat of Escalation

The small nuclear-weapon state that lacks reliable retaliatory capabilities such as SLBMs or a hostage state for triangular deterrence is unable to pursue strategic concepts based on retaliation. The only concept available to this nuclear state is to demonstrate its strong will to fight to the death and the relevant capabilities to inflict serious damage on a stronger potential nuclear attacker. It may be analogous to the concept employed by a weak animal to deter or prevent a stronger predator from attacking. The combination of a strong will and limited but lethal retaliation capabilities may make the stronger attacker to hesitate. The concept of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ (Pakistan used the term ‘minimum’ instead of ‘minimal’) was adopted by Pakistan. Pakistan emphasises its unwavering commitment to risky escalation without regard for the lethal consequences (Kulkirni & Sinha, 2011, pp. 2 and 4).

A critical component of the threat of escalation is the lack of commitment to the so-called ‘no-first-use policy’ of nuclear weapons. The international community has urged nuclear states to announce their decision not to use nuclear weapons before their opponents use them in order to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. However, the small nuclear states cannot agree to the policy because they must demonstrate a strong will to fight in order to deter the stronger nuclear states. They must emphasise their willingness to use nuclear weapons because they have to compensate for their limited nuclear retaliation capabilities. The nuclear superpower states, which have declared a ‘no-first-use policy’ to the world, must consider the possibility of a pre-emptive or preventive nuclear attack by these small nuclear states, and thus be more cautious in dealing with them. If a small nuclear state wishes to increase the deterrent effect of its limited arsenal of nuclear weapons, it should be more willing to use them.

Vipin Narang spent considerable energy developing nuclear deterrence concepts for small nuclear states. He (Narang, 2014, pp. 14–23; 2015, pp. 75–79) categorised them into three nuclear deterrence postures. The first is referred to as the ‘catalytic posture’, the second as the ‘assured retaliation posture’ and the third as the ‘asymmetric escalation posture’. The catalytic posture is similar to the triangular deterrence strategy, while the assured retaliation posture is similar to the minimal deterrence strategy and the asymmetric escalation posture is similar to the credible deterrence strategy. According to Narang (2015, p. 78), small nuclear states minimum should demonstrate their possession of nuclear weapons and increase their credibility in the use of their nuclear weapons when necessary. For example, the weaker nuclear state should demonstrate its offensive will and capabilities to instil fear in the stronger nuclear state. As a result, dealing with a weaker nuclear adversary that employs the asymmetric escalation strategy would be very risky for even a nuclear superpower. If the nuclear superpower decides to confront the small nuclear adversary, which could be a nation with almost nothing to lose, it should be prepared to accept extremely painful damage to itself.

Discussion

The small nuclear state, lacking reliable retaliatory capabilities such as SLBMs or a hostage state for triangular deterrence, is incapable of pursuing the concept of retaliation. The only deterrent concept available to this nuclear state is to demonstrate its determination and limited but lethal nuclear capabilities to fight to death and to inflict unacceptable damage on a stronger potential nuclear attacker. Narang calls this concept asymmetrical escalation. As the number of nations willing to take the asymmetrical escalation strategy grows, so does the likelihood of catastrophic nuclear war, because there appear to be few effective measures to compel the desperate small nuclear state to refrain from lethal escalation.

Another significant issue with the concept of asymmetrical escalation is the indefinite build-up of nuclear weapons. As demonstrated by France and the United Kingdom, which maintain only 200–300 nuclear weapons, the minimal deterrence concept has a cap on capabilities, which should be able to annihilate a few cities of a nuclear superpower in any circumstance. Because it is intended to attack a non-nuclear third country, the concept of triangular deterrence does not require a large number of nuclear weapons. However, the asymmetrical escalator must demonstrate its ability to resist being easily defeated by a nuclear superpower, and thus, the small nuclear state cannot help but strengthen its nuclear forces continuously. It should not be afraid of an escalation of the situation and should continuously increase its lethal power in the name of deterrence. Therefore, when a nuclear confrontation between the asymmetrical escalator and a nuclear superpower begins, there may be no viable de-escalation option for the escalator. A confrontation between a desperate small animal and a larger predator can be stopped only by the restraint or giving-up of the latter. In other words, the asymmetrical escalator may be the most dangerous to deal with and should be thoroughly analysed and prepared for, with Pakistan and North Korea as possible candidates.

Background

Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programme in the 1950s. The programme was accelerated during the tenures of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was minister of fuel, power and natural resources in the 1950s, foreign minister in the 1960s, and president and prime minister in the 1970s. He managed to bring Pakistani leaders together for nuclear armament, especially in the wake of Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in the 1971 war with India. Then he pressed Pakistani scientists to develop a nuclear weapon within five years and selected the highly enriched uranium (HEU) route, which could be easily concealed (Fair, 2014, p. 205). Notably, he appointed A. Q. Khan, a nuclear physicist and metallurgical engineer, to take the leading role in the uranium enrichment project (Ahmed, 1999, p. 184). Khan, often called ‘the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development’, contributed significantly to Pakistan’s nuclear development (Izuyama & Ogawa, 2003, p. 64). Most importantly, Prime Minister Bhutto got assistance from China in developing nuclear weapons for his country (Small, 2015, p. 31).

The Chinese assistance was critical to Pakistan’s nuclear armament and has developed into the ‘heart’ of the Pakistan–China relationship (Small, 2015, p. 29). In the mid–1980s, China supplied weapons-grade uranium, technical assistance for uranium enrichment and critical assistance in establishing the Kahuta ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment plant (Ahmed, 1999, p. 186). Pakistan is suspected of obtaining nuclear warhead blueprints from China (Izuyama & Ogawa, 2003, p. 65) and of requesting China to conduct a nuclear explosion test on Chinese soil in 1990, prior to Pakistan’s official test in 1998 (Small, 2015, p. 41). Since the 1980s, China has also provided critical technical assistance to Pakistan’s missile development and improvements (Small, 2015, pp. 39–41). China played a key role in Pakistan’s remarkable achievements in nuclear armament.

India’s nuclear weapons programme stimulated Pakistan to focus on the development of nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India viewed each other as an existential threat, and they fought numerous wars (in 1947–1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999) and had numerous crises (in 1987, 1990 and 2001–2002, to name a few). Both countries have accused one another of providing support to terrorist and insurgent groups operating within their respective borders (Fair, 2014, p. 136). In this context, India’s development of nuclear weapons could not help but compel Pakistan to rapidly acquire nuclear weapons. For example, despite possessing the capability, Pakistan did not conduct its official nuclear weapons test. However, Pakistan accelerated its nuclear weapons programme just after witnessing India’s nuclear explosion tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Pakistan conducted six explosion tests between 28 and 30 May, less than three weeks after India conducted nuclear explosion tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state following the tests (Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022d).

Pakistan has concentrated on increasing the number of nuclear weapons, improving their quality, and upgrading the capabilities of missiles and aircraft that could be used to deliver its nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s strong ties with China have provided significant help in its nuclear build-up. As a result, Pakistan’s military even started to develop tactical nuclear weapons and declared its success in October 2015 (Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022d). Pakistan proclaimed that it would not give up its nuclear weapons unless India did so (Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022d).

Ends

Pakistan has suffered from ontological insecurity since its partition from India, a Hindu state whose religion may not be able to co-exist with Islam or Pan-Islamism, Pakistan’s ideology. Pakistan emphasised the ‘two-nation theory’, which argued for the separation of Islam and Hinduism in the region. It asserted that ‘Muslims would not or could not live in a democratic secular society in which non-Muslims were a majority and so needed a separate nation’ (Loomba, 2019, p. 131) and demonstrated its resolve to defend its existence and religion against India. Pakistani leaders believed they had been given the mission to ensure their country’s ‘ontological security’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2018; Suboti, 2016). They pursued nuclear armament to further their ‘jihad’, as it was evaluated that their nuclear programs were more ideological than security-driven’ (Fair, 2014, p. 5).

Because Pakistan perceives India as an ‘eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but also to destroy it if and when the opportunity arises’ (Fair, 2014, p. 1), the primary goal of Pakistan’s nuclear armament is to defend itself and its religion from India. Pakistan’s military, which volunteered to be the ‘guardian’ of jihadist ideology (Haqqani, 2005, p. 15), could not help but pursue nuclear armament in order to defend its country from a stronger India. Pakistan’s army, in particular, adhered to ‘Islam and the two-nation theory as its institutional ideology’ (Fair, 2014, p. 174). In this sense, Pakistan’s military could not select a path of compromise or give up the nuclear armament and become willing to use them when it could not fulfil its guardian mission without their use.

Pakistan may have had additional goals in mind when it began its nuclear weapons programme: enhancing the Islamic world leadership and national pride (Pattanaik, 2003). Indeed, Pakistan happened to be the only Islamic state that possessed nuclear weapons. It could volunteer to serve as the nuclear vanguard for the Islamic world. In addition to that, Pakistan may have felt the necessity for nuclear armament to reclaim Kashmir, which India has ruled since 1947 and for which Pakistan has fought three conventional wars with no success (1948, 1965 and 1999). As a Pakistani strategist has demanded that nuclear weapons be used against India if India does not change its stance on Kashmir (Pande, 2019), some Pakistani leaders see nuclear weapons as a decisive option in reclaiming Kashmir.

Means

According to American scientists, Pakistan possessed 165 nuclear weapons by February 2022, slightly more than India’s 160 (Kristensen & Korda, 2022). Pakistan may have more nuclear weapons than 160, as this figure was calculated based on observed delivery systems and Pakistan has steadily increased its fissile material production (Kristensen et al., 2018, p. 350). It is estimated that Pakistan seems to be able to produce 10 to 15 nuclear warheads per year by 2021 (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2021) and will have 200 to 250 nuclear warheads by 2025 (Toon et al., 2019, p. 1). Pakistan appears to have the minimum number of nuclear weapons required to attack most strategic targets in India.

Pakistan has various aircraft and missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons. It possesses nuclear-capable aircraft (F–16A/B and Mirage III/V) with a range of up to 2,100 km. It developed the JF–17 Thunder to replace F–16s and Mirages and has produced more than 100 aircraft since 2009. In December 2020, it began acquiring JF–17 Thunder Block II aircraft, which have a combat radius of 2,200 km and can carry up to 3,630 kg of weapons. Pakistan began manufacturing the JF–17 Thunder Block III, an advanced variant of the JF–17 Thunder (Sajuid, 2000). It is also equipped with eight distinct types of land-based ballistic missiles with a range of 2,750 km and two types of cruise missiles that fly 350 km (Toon et al., 2019, p. 1). Pakistan has been improving its tactical nuclear weapons capabilities as it conducted tests of its short-range ballistic missile, Ghaznavi (Hatf-III), in February and August 2021.

Pakistan possesses five diesel attack submarines capable of launching nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM; Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022c). Pakistan has also been developing an SLCM known as Babur–3 and conducted its first test-fire with a range of 450 km in December 2016 (Defense.info, 2021). The SLCM was also tested in 2018 and 2020. As a result, Pakistan now possesses a triad of nuclear strike platforms from the ground, the air and the sea (Kristensen et al., 2018). Pakistan may feel compelled to develop SLBMs because India has 14 diesel-electric submarines and two SSBNs equipped with SLBMs (Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022a).

Ways

Pakistan has made no commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Pakistani leaders did not rule out the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes, though they stressed that such strikes should be a last resort. Both Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan’s president from 1971 to 1973 and Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977) and Pervez Musharraf (a former military general and Pakistan’s president from 2001 to 2008) stated in December 1974 and April 2002, respectively, that nuclear weapons could be used if Pakistan’s existence was threatened, without mentioning Pakistan’s position on no-first-use of nuclear weapons (Fair, 2014, pp. 215–216). Pakistan seems to keep its nuclear policy ambiguous in order to make India prepare for all possible scenarios.

Indeed, Pakistan added the adjective ‘credible’ to the ‘minimal deterrence’ concept of France and the United Kingdom. The word ‘credible’ may be intended to replace the SLBMs, which are the main element of minimal deterrence, with a willingness to accept an escalation into nuclear war. In this context, Pakistan has been producing more nuclear weapons and developing tactical nuclear weapons in order to ensure its escalation dominance in the event of a conflict with India (Fair, 2014, p. 217). It even demonstrated a strong willingness to escalate the conventional conflict with India to a nuclear level if necessary (Tasleem, 2016). The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan can be summarised as follows:

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific.

Recently, Pakistan emphasised ‘full spectrum deterrence’, which may imply deterring an adversary from all types of aggression, as a critical concept of its credible minimum deterrence strategy (Ali, 2017, p. 103). It appears to believe that it can achieve escalation dominance in a crisis with India by exploiting India’s reluctance to escalate any conflict into nuclear war. Pakistan has even begun to engage in various forms of low-intensity conflict, including implicit and explicit assistance to various terrorist groups, as a way to accomplish its national goal (Fair, 2014, p. 221). Pakistan once discussed ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ as a strategy (Web Bureau, 2018). It is integrating its nuclear strategy with conventional forces and/or various low-intensity conflict scenarios.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons appear to bolster the country’s policy toward Afghanistan as well. Pakistan thought of Afghanistan as its ‘strategic depth’, and it worked hard to keep Afghanistan free from foreign influence (Parkes, 2019, p. 188). Pakistan has nuclear weapons, so it can keep Afghanistan free from foreign influence. The United States had to exercise caution in dealing with Pakistan due to a concern that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be proliferated to Islamic terrorist groups (Kalb, 2021). Indeed, Pakistan has supported Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan as well as the Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement, which seized political power in Afghanistan again in 2021. Pakistan seems to enjoy greater freedom of strategic action than it did previously.

Background

Just after the Korean War ended in 1953, North Korea began developing nuclear weapons. North Korea sent tens of scientists to the Soviet Union to study atomic science and gained the cooperation of the Soviet Union on nuclear energy research. In the 1960s, Russia provided North Korea with a research nuclear reactor, the IRT–2000. North Korea accumulated its technologies for nuclear weapon development in the 1970s, and it built and operated its indigenous nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in the 1980s (Nuclear Technology Initiative, 2022b). It may have received assistance from Pakistan with regard to nuclear technologies and materials in the 1980s (Fair, 2014, p. 210).

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme was exposed to the world in 1993 when it refused to accept the request of the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) for a special inspection. The IAEA demanded the inspection by claiming that there was a discrepancy in the amount of plutonium extracted from North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor between the IAEA’s estimation and North Korea’s report. Instead of complying with the IAEA’s demand, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Surprised by this unexpected move, the United States negotiated with North Korea not to withdraw from the NPT. As a result, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in 1994, only acquiring North Korea’s promise to freeze its nuclear weapons programme.

North Korea, however, did not stop its nuclear weapons programme. The United States had to decide to withdraw from the Agreed Framework in 2002 by claiming that North Korea had continued its nuclear weapons programme via another route, the HEU route (Arms Control Association, 2022). Although Six-Party Talks (the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea) began to handle the situation in 2003, North Korea deceived other nations again in 2005. On 18 September, North Korea agreed to ‘abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and return, at an early date, to the NPT and IAEA safeguard’ in exchange for the US’s assurance that it would not possess nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and would refrain from attacking North Korea (The National Committee on North Korea, 2005). However, North Korea did not keep the promise and eventually conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006. Regardless of international sanctions since its first test, North Korea has continued its nuclear weapons programme and conducted its second test in May 2009.

North Korea eventually succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon through its third nuclear test on 13 February 2013. It conducted two additional tests until 3 September 2017, when it demonstrated its success in making a hydrogen bomb at its sixth test. The explosive power of the hydrogen bomb was estimated to be between 108 and 250 kilotons of TNT, which was enough to destroy Seoul or Tokyo with a single bomb (Zagurek, 2017). North Korea already possessed a large number of Scud (300–600 km) and Nodong (1,300 km) missiles, which could be used to strike South Korea with nuclear warheads. Furthermore, it began developing intermediate-range missiles, ICBMs, and SLBMs in 2016 and 2017 by conducting aggressive test-fires. With the successful test-fire of Hwasung–15 on 29 November 2017, North Korea came to have the capability to attack the US mainland with its nuclear missiles. It started to improve its short-range missiles by frequent test-fires just after its second denuclearisation summit meeting with the United States in February 2019 in order to upgrade them so they would not be intercepted by South Korean missile defence systems.

Despite denuclearisation negotiations with the United States during the 2018–2019 period, North Korea did not stop its nuclear build-up, and continued to produce more nuclear weapons and improve its missiles. It even demonstrated new versions of its ICBMs and SLBMs during military parades on 10 October 2020 and 14 January 2021. North Korea further boasted that it was developing a SSBN, super-sized nuclear warheads, hypersonic gliding flight warheads and solid-fuel-engine-propelled ICBMs and SLBMs during its 8th Party Congress, which took place in January 2021 (Lee, 2021). North Korea participated in the denuclearisation negotiations not to stop its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for something but to acquire time for the strengthening of its nuclear forces to the level it had planned.

Ends

The nuclear weapons programme is so serious that no country can pursue it without a close connection to its national goal, which is the ultimate criterion for deciding the relevance of most key national projects. When it comes to the national goal, North Korea’s could be more explicit than that of most other countries. Since its inception in the aftermath of the Pacific War, North Korea has yearned to reunify the whole Korean Peninsula by claiming itself to be ‘the only legitimate government of Korea’ (U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 1991). It actually invaded South Korea in 1950 to achieve unification by force, and now it is the armistice status of the war. However, due to the participation of the United States in repelling North Korea’s goal invasion, along with 15 other countries under the flag of the United Nations (UN), North Korea had to make the United States leave the Korean Peninsula. As soon as the United States leaves, North Korea will resume its attack on South Korea in order to achieve its goal—the reunification of Korea. In other words, North Korea’s primary national goal has been ‘to drive the United States out of Korea and then resolve the inter-Korean conflict between the two Korean states’ (Robinson & Platte, 2021, p. 330). North Korea started to develop its nuclear weapons just after the Korean War, because it thought that only nuclear weapons could make the United States leave and allow it to accomplish reunification on its terms.

Some scholars argue that North Korea adjusted its national goal from reunification to regime survival because of its dire economic situation and/or the uncertainty of its regime (Byman & Lind, 2020; Lee & Lee, 2020; Snyder, 2000–2001). Most progressive South Korean scholars and policymakers came to have this kind of perception and recommended and conducted negotiations with North Korea, as demonstrated by the so-called ‘sunshine policy’ of the late 1990s to early 2000s and the Moon Jae-in administration’s denuclearisation negotiation efforts since 2018. They asked the US government to ensure the North Korean regime’s survival as a means of opening it up to the world and to provide a few more incentives to encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. However, the policies based on this perspective have not achieved anything except for emboldening North Korea to pursue more aggressive nuclear build-ups and postures.

Actually, the regime survival argument, which could be a revisionist view regarding North Korea and North Korea’s nuclear armament, did not have any undisputable evidence. It was merely a guess based on rationalism in a democratic society: North Korea is too poor to conduct a reunification war and needs to worry about its own survival. However, North Korea seems to be too strange a country to be correctly understood through rationalism in a democratic society. North Korea never actually requested to ensure its regime’s survival or to exchange regime security for nuclear disarmament. It only demands the United States to give up its hostile policy toward North Korea, which is ambiguous but definitely not a demand to ensure its regime’s survival. North Korean leaders may think that their regime is very solid and will not be influenced by their economic situation. Furthermore, this revisionist view conflicts with North Korea’s continued nuclear build-up, which includes the development of hydrogen bombs, ICBMs, SLBMs, possibly SSBNs and even solid-fuel multi-warhead missiles.

Actually, key US policymakers believe that North Korea has not abandoned its original national goal. In his book that was published shortly after his resignation from the job, H. R. McMaster (2020, p. 375), President Trump’s second national security advisor, wrote that North Korea’s ‘final victory’ would be ‘red-colored unification’. In her recent book, Jung Pak (2020, p. 235), who worked as an intelligence analyst on North Korea from 2009 to 2017 and is the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific in the Biden Administration, analysed that Kim Jong-un’s vision could be ‘the unification of the Korean Peninsula, which is his grandfather’s dream’.

North Korea’s Juche (주체, 主體, the owner) ideology may function as a more profound goal than the unification of South Korea. The ideology was developed by the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, and has been used as the key indoctrination subject for North Koreans since the 1950s. It has served as a fundamental guideline for North Korean decisions and judgments in all areas. It served as ‘North Korea’s organizing principle of both state and society’ and its ‘raison d’être’ (Lee & Lee, 2020, p. 381). As demonstrated by its literal meaning ‘owner’, the Juche ideology has emphasised people’s loyalty to North Korean style communism, which is loyalty to the Kim dynasty. North Korea explains that Juche ideology is ‘the creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in North Korea’ (Lee, 2003, p. 105). While the Juche ideology may not be as fundamental as the Islam of Pakistan, North Koreans are taught to protect it at all costs. In other words, North Korean leaders may decide to use nuclear weapons if they believe their Juche ideology is threatened or humiliated.

Means

Due to its extreme isolation from the outside world, there is no credible way or source for determining the precise strength of North Korean nuclear forces. As mentioned in the introduction section, American scientists estimated that North Korea possessed 20 nuclear weapons as of February 2022 (Kristensen & Korda, 2022). However, a joint report by two prominent research institutes in the United States and South Korea estimated in April 2021 that the North possessed 67–116 nuclear weapons in 2020, with the capacity to produce 12–18 nuclear weapons per year, and it would possess 151–242 nuclear weapons by 2027 (Bennett et al., 2021, p. 37). North Korea has consistently increased its nuclear arsenal.

North Korea also possesses various missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons. It was armed with SCUD-C (500-km range), SCUD-ER (1,000 km), Nodong (1,300 km) and Musudan (over 3,000 km) missiles. It also developed the Hwasong–12 (5,000 km) and Hwasong–15 (greater than 10,000 km) missiles to attack US territory in the Western Pacific and the US mainland (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2021, p. 62; Ministry of National Defense, 2019, p. 34). North Korea also unveiled a new and larger ICBM during its 10 October 2020, military parade. Between May 2019 and March 2020, North Korea conducted a series of short-range missile tests (designated by the US military as KN–23, KN–24, and KN–25). These systems are road-mobile and solid-fuelled in order to launch as soon as possible and not to allow South Korea’s pre-emptive strike (Suh & Claeys, 2020). On 15 September 2021, North Korea even conducted a successful test of a new ‘railway-borne missile system’ (Smith, 2021). As it test-fired missiles sixteen times from January to mid-May 2022, North Korea has been improving the capabilities and quality of its missiles so as not to allow interception in the air. With nuclear missiles, North Korea can successfully attack South Korea, Japan, Alaska, Hawaii and even the US mainland.

More significantly, North Korea has been developing SLBMs. It succeeded in the first launch of the SLBM under the sea on 24 August 2016, and continued testing. It fired the Puguksong–3 and demonstrated the SLBM’s capability to fly 1,900–2,000 km on 2 October 2019 (Elleman, 2019). It even demonstrated new versions of SLBM at military parades on 10 October 2020 and 14 January 2021, and it conducted test firings of one on 19 October 2021 and 7 May 2022. North Korea has been developing submarines to transport and deliver the SLBMs as well. On 23 July 2019, it released a photo of a 3,000-ton submarine under construction, and experts even analysed it to have three launch tubes for SLBMs (Shim, 2021). North Korea is believed to complete the construction of it in 2021. Kim Jong-un announced in January 2021 that the country had completed the design research for its SSBN (Kim, 2021). If North Korea succeeds in developing the SSBN, it will be able to attack US cities without being detected or intercepted by the US missile defence systems. By possessing second-strike capabilities, North Korea has been moving toward the minimal deterrence level of nuclear forces like France and the United Kingdom.

Ways

Due to their notorious secrecy and isolation, it is nearly impossible to obtain reliable information regarding North Korea’s nuclear doctrine or strategic concept. All we could do is infer the general strategic concept of North Korea (Ways) based on North Korea’s goal (Ends) and capabilities (Means), as explained in the introduction section. Additionally, the inferences could be reinforced by corroborating analyses of other experts or reports.

Considering North Korea’s interim goal of making the United States withdraw from the Korean Peninsula and the level of nuclear forces, North Korea can implement the ‘credible minimum deterrence strategy’ or the ‘asymmetrical escalation posture’ against the United States. Indeed, North Korea did not agree to the no-first-use policy. Kim Jong-un once ordered his forces to maintain nuclear warheads on standby and prepare for pre-emptive strikes in 2016 (Choi & Kim, 2017, p. 503). Kim also stated in his 2018 New Year’s address that the button to launch a nuclear attack on the United States was on his desk (Jeong, 2018). North Korean media outlets have repeatedly emphasised the country’s determination to fight to death and lauded martyrdom for national defence (Suh & Claeys, 2020). North Korea intends to ‘achieve and maintain escalation dominance in the Korean region’ (Khan, 2017, p. 147).

However, North Korea’s nuclear forces now or in the near future appear to be more powerful than the ‘asymmetrical escalation posture’. Indeed, North Korea has declared its intention to attack the continental United States, demonstrated its capability to carry out a second strike and emphasised its unwavering determination to carry out the attack (Suh & Claeys, 2020). It has been developing ICBMs and even SLBMs, which are the key components of the minimal deterrence concept. North Korea has even stated its intention to develop multi-warhead nuclear missiles to avoid the interception of the US missile defence systems, as well as an SSBN that could sail to the United States without refuelling or surfacing (Cheong, 2021, p. 1). If North Korea manages to acquire these capabilities, the cost of American action against North Korea will outweigh the benefits of defending its ally, South Korea. North Korea appears to be pursuing the minima deterrence concept against the United States.

Most importantly, North Korea may use the threat and/or use of its nuclear weapons as a tool for blackmailing the United States in peacetime. With its ICBM and/or SLBM to strike a few US cities with hydrogen bombs, North Korea could ‘compel the United States into signing a peace treaty and ending the U.S.–South Korea alliance’ (Robinson & Platte, 2021, p. 331). If such a threat materialises, the United States cannot afford to ignore it.

If it believes the United States will not implement its extended deterrence promise to South Korea, North Korea may attempt to conduct a reunification war against South Korea. It could threaten to use its tactical nuclear weapons to force US forces out of South Korea and annihilate South Korean defence forces. South Korea, as a non-nuclear state, will be an easy target for North Korea’s nuclear threat or attack. North Korea may have developed various warfighting concepts for South Korea in a way to integrate its nuclear forces with its conventional forces.

Ends

Both Pakistan and North Korea may have very fundamental national goals: defending Islam for Pakistan and defending Juche ideology for North Korea. While Juche ideology cannot be compared to Islam in terms of recognition in the world, it has functioned similarly in North Korea and will continue to do so as long as the Kim family retains power. As Pakistan regards Islam or Pan-Islamism as a ‘jihadi ideology’ (Haqqani, 2014, p. 3), North Korea demands complete loyalty to its Juche ideology from its people ‘as human muscles obey brain commands’ (Lee, 2003, p. 111). Pakistan and North Korea cannot easily make concessions, such as decisions to abandon nuclear weapons, because they are ideologically committed. The militaries of both countries act as guardians of their respective ideologies.

Based on their commitment to defending their ideologies, Pakistan and North Korea have to defeat India and the United States, respectively. Pakistan sees India as an ontological threat, as does North Korea to the United States. Pakistan fought three wars with India in 1948, 1965 and 1999, and North Korea fought against the United States in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. They think that they have to defeat their respective adversaries to protect their respective ideologies, territory, people and identities. Defeating India for Pakistan and defeating the United States for North Korea seem to be the practical goals of their nuclear armament.

Notably, North Korea’s goal of defeating the United States could be easier than Pakistan’s goal of defeating India because the United States is not a geographical neighbour of North Korea. India views Pakistan as an ontological threat and cannot easily concede anything, whereas the United States views North Korea as a minor threat in the Western Pacific and may concede certain things if necessary. In other words, the United States could leave the Korean Peninsula if its strategic calculus becomes extremely risky, as it did in Indochina in 1973 and Afghanistan in 2021. All North Korea should do is threaten to inflict more damage than the United States is willing to accept.

Pakistan and North Korea have another and eventual goal in mind: Kashmir for Pakistan and South Korea for North Korea. Pakistan’s past wars against India were aimed at reclaiming Kashmir, while North Korea’s war in 1950, which drew US involvement, was aimed at reunifying South Korea. Both countries are revisionist in this regard, unwilling to accept the current status quo. It seems that North Korea sees South Korea as a threat to its existence and wants to reunite South Korea more than Pakistan wants to get back Kashmir.

Means

Pakistan developed nuclear weapons earlier than North Korea, as it transferred some related technologies to North Korea. Pakistan and North Korea have 165 and 20 nuclear weapons, respectively, according to American scientists as of February 2022 (Kristensen & Korda, 2022). Given the 30-fold difference in national power (Pakistan’s GDP is $1,061 billion, while North Korea’s is only $40 billion. Central Intelligence Agency, 2022), Pakistan has the capability to produce more nuclear weapons than North Korea. Pakistan’s nuclear-capable aircraft, such as the F–16A/B, Mirage III/V and JF–17 Thunder, are more advanced than North Korean aircraft, which may not be qualified to conduct nuclear missions. However, North Korea is able to focus most of its resources on nuclear weapons and missile enhancements thanks to its autocratic rule. In fact, a joint report from RAND and ASAN estimated that North Korea could make 12–18 nuclear weapons a year, more than Pakistan’s 10–15 nuclear weapons a year. By 2027, North Korea could have a similar number of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, North Korea appears to possess more ‘strategic’ nuclear capabilities than Pakistan, including ICBMs, SLBMs and SSBNs, all of which are required for the second strike. Its Hwasung–15 and improved versions of it are capable of striking targets on mainland United States, whereas Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are delivered via short and medium-range missiles and aircraft. North Korea has successfully developed SLBMs through several underwater tests and has been constructing larger diesel submarines to deliver them, even announcing its plan to build SSBNs at its 8th Party Congress in 2021. Pakistan has developed SLCMs rather than SLBMs and does not seem to have a plan for SSBNs. In terms of the necessary capabilities for the minimal deterrence strategy, North Korea appears to be making faster progress than Pakistan.

Ways

Pakistan and North Korea should both be defensive in nature, as they face extremely powerful adversaries—India in the case of Pakistan and the United States in the case of North Korea. However, their defence strategy should be offensive or aggressive, as they must demonstrate their unwavering commitment to overcome enormous disparities in national, military and nuclear power. They are like small predators that must be extremely aggressive in order to defend themselves against larger predators. Actually, Pakistan has consistently demonstrated its willingness to fight to the death and to use all available means, as demonstrated by its concept of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’. North Korea has also threatened the United States with harsh words and irrational provocations. For example, it kidnapped the US warship ‘Pueblo’ and its 83 crew members in 1968, murdered two US military officers by axes at the demilitarised zone between the two Koreas in 1976, and tortured and killed a young US college student, Otto Warmbier, for minor violations in 2017. In order to be offensive, Pakistan and North Korea used asymmetric escalation strategy against their respective larger adversaries—India and the United States. This strategy seeks to escalate any conflict to a nuclear war. Additionally, North Korea adopted a ‘minimal deterrence strategy’ and threatened to destroy a few cities on the US mainland if the United States provided South Korea with a nuclear umbrella. Notably, Pakistan and North Korea do not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate a strong willingness to escalate a crisis or conventional war into a nuclear war. They appear willing to use nuclear weapons if they believe that doing so will ensure victory.

Both Pakistan and North Korea allowed their militaries, particularly the army, to play a dominant role in the development and implementation of their nuclear policies. The Pakistani army has, with a few notable exceptions, set the country’s key foreign and domestic policies (Fair, 2014, p. 6). North Korea has also assigned a primary role to the military in pursuing its national goal as demonstrated by its ‘¼±±º (military-first) policy’. In fact, a military-centred nuclear policy tends to be aggressive, especially when the military should face world-class adversaries such as India and the United States, respectively.

Pakistan and North Korea are both willing to engage in nuclear warfighting in order to achieve their respective ultimate goals: reclaiming Kashmir for Pakistan and reunifying Korea for North Korea. However, there appears to be a slight difference. Pakistan should deter and fight India to reclaim Kashmir, while North Korea should deter the United States but fight South Korea. If the United States decides not to follow through on its promise of extended deterrence due to North Korea’s nuclear attack on its cities, North Korea will attack and annex South Korea. North Korea is very likely to have detailed operational plans for unifying South Korea through the integrated use of nuclear and conventional forces. There was a report that North Korea had made a ‘seven-day war plan’ against South Korea involving the use of its nuclear weapons (Jeong & Ser, 2015).

Implications for the United States and South Korea

The nuclear strategic concept of North Korea must be as aggressive as that of Pakistan in order to compete with the United States, the strongest nuclear and military power in the world. At the same time, North Korea’s national goal, the reunification of South Korea, may be more urgent than Pakistan’s, reclaiming Kashmir, due to North Korea’s persistent and dire economic hardship and the possibility of regime instability. Given the gravity of the situation, a few scholars in the United States and South Korea predicted that North Korea could use nuclear weapons from the start of the war (Bennett et al., 2021, pp. 49–50). The United States and South Korea should be prepared for the worst-case scenario, in which North Korea uses nuclear weapons to compel US forces to withdraw from South Korea and unify South Korea by force.

North Korea could also benefit from low-intensity conflict, as Pakistan has done under the implicit threat of escalation into nuclear war. North Korea may believe that the United States and South Korea are incapable of dealing with its provocations effectively for fear of escalation into nuclear war. In other words, North Korean nuclear weapons may provide the country with greater freedom of action than ever before. North Korea, for example, could start minor skirmishes along its border with South Korea or attack and/or occupy one or two South Korean islands in the western sea. It would threaten to use nuclear weapons if South Korea and/or the United States respond militarily. It could even launch a limited attack on Seoul, South Korea’s capital city and only 40 km from the border, by posing the same nuclear threat as part of a piecemeal approach to reunifying the country. The United States and South Korea should discuss how to deal with such scenarios without precipitating a nuclear war.

The United States and South Korea’s urgent task at this point is to prevent North Korea’s concept of minimal deterrence from becoming a reality. If North Korea completes minimal deterrence capabilities, including the successful development of SSBNs and multi-warhead solid-fuel missiles, as announced at its Party Congress in January 2021, the US–South Korea alliance will have to confront the risks of decoupling, and North Korea will attempt to reunify South Korea through the threat and/or use of nuclear weapons. Due to continued economic sanctions and the country’s dire economic situation, North Korea’s schedule for completing its minimal deterrence nuclear forces appears to be delayed. Economic sanctions, as a result, should be strictly enforced and need to be reinforced. The United States and South Korea should take the necessary military measures to halt or delay North Korea’s ‘strategic’ nuclear development if it is inevitable. They should plan and implement more effective countermeasures to prevent North Korea from acquiring sufficient minimal deterrence capabilities.

It could be about time for the United States and South Korea to discuss how to make a local or on-site nuclear balance on or near the Korean Peninsula. For the onsite nuclear balance, there are two possible options: South Korea’s nuclear weapons development or the US’s deployment of its nuclear weapons on or near the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned in the Introduction section, several scholars and security experts in the United States have begun to discuss these two options. Needless to say, these two options are extremely risky, but they may be indispensable to deter North Korea—the most aggressive nuclear state. The current situation could be too serious for the United States and South Korea to rule out any options.

For instance, if the United States decides to deploy its nuclear weapons around the Korean Peninsula or in the western Pacific region and share them with regional allies, as the United States does with its European allies, the effect of the US extended deterrence could be exponentially enhanced. Through the nuclear sharing system, South Korea can demonstrate its nuclear option in the name of self-defence, and North Korea cannot help but recognise the enhanced credibility of the US extended deterrence. Through joint consultations and decision-making with its allies, including South Korea, the United States could mitigate its risk of nuclear war. That is why, following the failure of denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea, some US strategists advocated for the establishment of a NATO-style nuclear sharing system in Northeast Asia (Hagel et al., 2021; Kort et al., 2019, p. 78; Robert, 2020).