Abstract
Why do states falter in implementing policies despite having systemic incentives and inclinations towards those policies? For structural realists, such accounts of state behaviour remain a persistent anomaly. In Subcontinental Drift, Rajesh Basrur draws upon neo-classical realism to explain this anomaly in Indian state behaviour by showing how domestic political processes affect foreign policy decision-making that leads to suboptimal outcomes.
Basrur’s central concern is to explain the gap between India’s foreign policy aims and its actual choices, which he terms as ‘policy drifts’. Policy drifts are defined as slow and aimless movements deviating from the expected paths. These drifts are identified by examining the irregularities between the policy prescription and the actual process of policy actions. He argues that policy drift occurs due to two factors: the material distribution of domestic political power (power deficit) and leadership willingness (or lack of it) to meet political responsibility and accountability (responsibility deficit). Further, the drifts are characterised into two types: involuntary and voluntary. Involuntary drift occurs when policymakers do not have substantial control over the levers of policymaking due to the fragmented nature of domestic political power. On the other hand, voluntary drift occurs when policymakers have substantial control over policymaking but fail to make decisive policy decisions, thus abdicating political responsibility.
After providing a theoretical account, Basrur, over the next four chapters, outlines the empirical case studies to explain the policy drift in India’s foreign policy. The first two cases focus on the India–US nuclear agreement and India–Sri Lanka relations during the latter’s civil war. Both of these cases are identified by the author as examples of an ‘involuntary policy drift’ caused by material factors—specifically the fragmentation of domestic political power, which allowed regional parties to have excessive influence in the policymaking process. The India–US nuclear agreement got mired in domestic politics due to opposition by nuclear bureaucracy and opposition parties. Specifically, the major opposition party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), opposed the deal without having any reservation for it but for tactical reasons to dislodge the government. Similarly, in the case of Sri Lanka, New Delhi’s actions were constrained due to the resistance from the regional parties in Tamil Nadu that supported the national government in Delhi.
The next two case studies, India’s nuclear strategy and its counter-terrorism policies, are examples of what the author considers to be ‘voluntary policy drift’. In these cases, Basrur raises two questions. First, why are policymakers unwilling to implement policies they have the power to enact? Second, why is this unwillingness sustained? He shows that there is a doctrinal ambiguity in India’s nuclear doctrine that displays elements of both minimal and maximal deterrence, despite adopting a minimal deterrence framework and a lack of willingness to address these concerns. This doctrinal ambiguity not only persists but also sustains itself because of inadequate political costs, and the procurement of new quality weapons elevates India’s status as a major power. Finally, in examining India’s policy towards cross-border terrorism and specifically focussing on state response and preparedness to the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, Basrur notes that India’s policy was both inadequate and ineffective as various actors failed to shoulder responsibilities appropriately. In both these cases, Basrur locates the unwillingness and sustenance of failed policy to the lack of political costs and the government’s ability to divert accountability to different agents—military bureaucracy in the case of nuclear doctrine and Pakistan in the case of cross-border terrorism.
While theoretically deft, empirically rich and innovative, the central argument that the material distribution of power determines the nature of drift needs further scrutiny. The author differentiates between voluntary and involuntary drift, based on whether policymakers have sufficient control over decision-making. Since all four cases are located in a period when a coalition government held power in Delhi, power deficit alone does not determine voluntary or involuntary drift, nor does it indicate insufficient control over policymaking. Despite the fragmented nature of power till 2014, India had seen continuity in its open economic policy. Similarly, the cases of voluntary drift highlight that policymakers can have sufficient control over a range of policies irrespective of domestic power differentials.
The delay in the India–US nuclear deal from the bureaucratic opposition could have still occurred during a majority government. The bureaucratic resistance, to safeguard its organisational interests, can occur irrespective of domestic power differentials, leading to a policy drift. One could further ask, whether organisational interests, as an independent variable, could play a role in determining the nature of policy drift. Do organisational interests of nuclear bureaucracy incentivise them to keep nuclear doctrine ambiguous, which simultaneously allows it to bolster its nuclear arsenal and keep intact the image of India as a ‘nuclear-restrained’ power?
Similarly, in the case of India–Sri Lanka relations, the central government was constrained to follow the preferred policy due to resistance by Tamil parties. However, even the majority governments in Delhi have struggled to pursue their preferred policies when there are overlapping ethnic concerns or asymmetric interests between the border states and the central government, be it either West Bengal or Tamil Nadu. Hence, is the fragmentation of political power sufficient to explain policy drift as Basrur argues, or should it be located within the broader centre–state relations? Could the inclusion of organisational interests and federal relations allow for a better characterisation of policy drifts?
Further, we see two different outcomes in the cases of involuntary policy drift. While the India–US nuclear deal reached its optimal outcome, India’s Sri Lanka policy was subpar. Despite similar power differentials, what explains the variations in the outcome? Basrur explains this using the cost-benefit model, arguing significant cost for the India–US deal not going through and the lack of such cost for the latter. However, such cost and benefit analyses are post facto explanations. During the decision-making process, these calculations are not based on objective empirics. How is the fall of domestic government, the possibility in both cases if coalition partners withdrew, costlier in one than in the other? While power deficit limits the course of actions, it does not exhaust them, as seen during the optimal outcome of the nuclear deal. The question here is why policymakers engage in risky behaviour—in the case of Manmohan Singh, the risk of going out of power—despite the domestic power deficit. Basrur’s explanation in cases of involuntary drift relies heavily on structural constraints without giving creative leeway to agents. Could a possible alternative explanation be located in a status variable, where a quest for higher status allows policymakers to engage in risky behaviour whereas risk-averse strategies are followed if policies are agnostic to status demands?
Overall, the Subcontinental Drift is a commendable theoretical work on India’s foreign policy, a field criticised for producing non-theoretical work. Basrur uses neo-classical realism to explain how domestic factors affect foreign policy decision-making processes. The book’s novelty lies in its classification of policy drift that afflicts India’s foreign policy and has led to inconsistencies in policymaking. The chapter on nuclear strategy standalone makes an important contribution by explaining doctrinal ambiguity, which has largely remained unobserved and unexplained. Another novel contribution is to show how political leaders continue to abdicate responsibility, which is also currently manifested in Modi’s China policy and its handling of the Manipur crisis.