Abstract
This article attempts to analyze the impact of current international and regional dynamics on Qatar’s foreign policy during Arab Spring with a special focus on the period from 2011 to 2013 coincided with former Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s leadership. Firstly, this study intends to comprehend Qatar’s inconsistencies and contradictions both in domestic and foreign policy by giving importance to the leading concern of Qatar, namely, the regime survival, and its visible reflections on Qatar’s regional and domestic stance. Subsequently, the article focuses on explaining the shifting position of Qatar toward Arab Spring in a different way, that is, through the concept of state-led change and the reasons behind how a tiny and monarchic country could adopt seemingly active role along with democratic discourse, albeit selective and conditional, toward the people’s uprisings between 2011 and 2013.
Introduction
Through the unprecedented popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya in the Middle East, a region that is generally defined as troubled and conflict-ridden, it seems that both autocratic regimes and new arguably democratic governments in Tunisia and Libya will face serious internal and external challenges. This will probably make the Middle East and, by extension, social developments across the Arab countries somewhat unpredictable and even complicated. Therefore, it is difficult to predict how the so-called and incomplete Arab Spring will alter the economic, political and social positions of the people and states of the Middle East, as it is primarily a social phenomenon that includes many intangible factors. In fact, what remains uncertain is as to whether Arab Spring could really make a radical change or end up with strengthening existing autocratic structures. In other words, Arab Street’s 1 hopeful resistance to decades of economic, social, political, and cultural repression exercised by entrenched autocracies involves several worst-case scenarios and backlashes as illustrated by military coup in Egypt in July 2013, ongoing internal war in Syria and the internal conflict in Libya. And, however, it also includes promising cases as exemplified by various democratic openings in Tunisia.
In this sense, some predictions can presently be suggested about the region. First, each ruler in the region, irrespective of whether he/she is a monarch, an autocrat or a ‘democrat’, must primarily consider the potential perceptions and feelings of his/her people. Although this is not a sufficient condition for the development of functional democracies in a region long governed by autocracies, it is nonetheless a necessary step. The growing influence of the populace can mean that rulers need to initiate various economic, social, and cultural reforms to ward off political pressure and opposition from restless segments of their societies and to please them. However, it is still unclear that these apparently democratic developments can bring about a radical transformation of the embedded governmental system of the region, that is, one-person rule, which were previous prospects stated by some regional and international scholars following the Arab Spring (Valbjorn 2012, pp. 25–35). Otherwise, in the worst-case scenario, they will only have limited effects on the style of rule, which currently does also seem quite likely.
Due to the prevalent uncertainties, one might comprehend the trajectory of this ‘spring’ through a detailed analysis of each country’s special state in the region. Unless the situation is considered in this manner, it is not possible to grasp the seeming sea change in the foreign and domestic policies of a ‘tiny’ and ‘welfare’ country, namely, Qatar. 2 Shortly after the beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar, which has followed a balanced and relatively independent foreign policy since 1995 coup d’état, has sided with several opposition movements throughout the region that advance legitimate demands, such as human rights and freedom of speech. Moreover, with encouragement from its Western allies, Doha has begun to provide a range of military and financial support to certain opposition movements, especially Islamic ones, in defiance of threats issued by the autocratic rulers of those countries. Although it is hardly reflected in domestic policy, 3 such democratic discourse in foreign policy of Qatar has encouraged many scholars to produce studies to ascertain the reasons for this duality.
Some scholars view this course in the Qatari foreign policy as an echo of its Western-oriented policy. Others claim that Qatar attempts to benefit from the emerging power configuration in the Middle East in order to increase its regional leverage by using its links with Islamic groups, that is, the Muslim Brotherhood. Although these and other interpretations have shed some light on the extent of Qatar’s current path, some points need to be clarified to understand Qatar’s seemingly daring position during the Arab Spring (Steinberg 2012). Hence, subsequent discussion aims to seek the leading motives, particularly the regime survival, behind rapid state-led changes in Qatar reflected presently in ‘new’ foreign policy during Arab Spring. Viewed in this light, certain questions need to be answered before arriving at a coherent analysis of Qatar’s stance toward the Arab Spring between 2011 and 2013. Why and how does ‘a tiny monarchy’ support a substantial number of popular movements in the region at the expense of losing its economic, political, and military ties with the existing establishments, that is, autocratic rules in the Middle East?
What does Qatar or its ruling family expects to gain by adhering to this assertive and aggressive foreign policy? What dynamics, domestic or international, have had a significant effect on this apparently drastic change in its foreign policy? In what context do these seemingly contradictory policy choices in Doha actually serve the same purpose? That is, how is it possible for it to discursively pursue a pro-democratic and liberal policy while simultaneously being politically monarchical and conservative in its Gulf and domestic politics? This article seeks to answer these questions. After providing some information on domestic reforms since 1995, the first section attempts to interpret Qatar’s overtures to these uprisings and the assistance it provided to opposition groups during 2011 and 2013 coinciding with the active and aggressive foreign policy stance under Emir Al-Thani. The second and third sections attempt to provide some details related to the connections between its active foreign policy and the ruling family’s efforts in retaining power. The final section aims to probe Qatar’s assumed selective, conditional and ‘contradictory’ position concerning democratic demands in Bahrain by analyzing differences in its policies toward certain countries and its domestic policy.
Changes in Qatar’s Foreign and Domestic Policy Dynamics since 1995
In early 1995, Qatar experienced a soft and bloodless palace coup in which the then 49-year-old Crown Prince Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani overthrew his father, Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani, after gathering sufficient domestic power. Prominent scholars have considered this coup a turning point in Doha that improved the international image of a country that, before 1995, was called ‘possibly the most boring place on Earth’. 4 These expectations appeared to be rather notable at a time when the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad, had embarked on an ambitious transformation program that raised hopes in local, international circles regarding the country’s possible transition away from autocratic, one-man rule to a democratic–liberal government. Hamad began by introducing far-reaching political reforms to enhance his credibility in Qatar, especially following an attempted counter-coup, allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia and its supporters within the Al-Thani family. 5 As expected, suspicions concerning Riyadh’s involvement in the coup d’état also led the Emir to take vigorous and potentially hostile actions against Saudi policies. In the absence of adequate support from regional powers and due to the unfriendly behavior of Cairo and Riyadh, the leadership took several significant steps in the direction of modernization and liberalization. 6
In this manner, new Emir contributed to increasing his legitimacy, at least in the eyes of domestic and some international audiences, particularly the Western countries. By the same token, the ruling family abolished the Ministry of Information in March 1998 to enhance freedom of expression. This paved the way for the efficient functioning of the Doha-based Al-Jazeera (The Island) Arabic television founded in November 1996 by the Emir. By taking these steps further, he surprised nearly everyone in the country and the rest of the countries along the Persian Gulf by announcing that he intended to hold general elections for membership in the Central Municipal Council in November 1995 7 and to allow women to both vote and run for seats in the Municipal Council. While no women won seats in the 29-member Municipal Council in the March 1999 elections, those reforms prompted a significant debate about democracy throughout the sheikhdom. Particularly important were the leadership’s promise of a modern constitution and the foundation of an elected national assembly, the Advisory Council (Majilis Al-Shura). This period was labeled as ‘the democracy festival’ by both the local and international media. Nevertheless, whereas the constitution was approved by 98 percent of Qataris on April 23, 2003, the promised elections for the Advisory Council 8 under the constitution have been postponed so far.
Some Qatari officials indicated that the reason for the postponement was linked to differing attitudes of Qatar’s major families regarding the amendments to the present constitution (Lambert 2011, pp. 1–5). Besides these drawbacks, this direction and increased emphasis on democratic and liberal values in Qatar would have both positive and negative ramifications at the regional and domestic levels. In essence, these seemingly democratization-oriented efforts have been achieved at the expense of heavy opposition and estrangement from the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), particularly Saudi Arabia, a country that likely remains displeased with the developments of its once close ally, Qatar. As is commonly stressed, until the 1995 palace coup, Qatari foreign, domestic, and oil policies were considered an echo of those of Saudi Arabia, owing to the numerous social and ideological similarities between the two countries. 9 In other words, despite some border skirmishes, Qatari and Saudi Arabian views and positions were nearly, if not always, similar on both domestic and international issues. This allowed Saudi Arabia to act somewhat freely in defining its regional and domestic policies, as Qatar was generally perceived as supportive of Saudi efforts (Ubi 2009, p. 446).
However, the potential for a democratic transition in Qatar and the leadership’s active, independent approach to foreign policy with respect to regional and international issues indicate a significant break from Saudi-centered policy. Even though the concerns of regional countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are partially valid regarding the new direction in Qatar since 1995, the lack of progress on liberal reforms, continued ‘royal factionalism’ in certain institutions, such as, the Ruling Family Council and the powerful religious establishment and its rather effective role in domestic and foreign policy, have substantially limited the prospects for democratic transformation in Qatar. 10 Indeed, in addition to the reluctance of the ruling family, the Qatari public is not particularly interested in possible change within their country given the electoral participation rate and their limited enthusiasm for democracy, reflected in the near total lack of civil society. Many Qataris place greater emphasis on stability and living in a safe country than on having a democratic but likely destabilized and fragile country. 11 Therefore, Qatar’s power structure, as in other countries in the region, is, to a significant degree, centered on what has been labeled the ‘democracy of bread’. As the most important function of a rentier state, numerous pundits assess this policy as an impediment to democracy. 12
Given the lack of sufficient pressure for liberal–democratic demands from domestic and international players, this liberal discourse in Qatar is not explained domestically in terms of a ‘democratic transition’ or a ‘modernization’ approach as claimed both by some circles. Overall, Qatar’s main goal since its independence in 1971 has been to enhance the security of the regime or the ruling family and to make the necessary state-led adjustments to achieve this end. Qatar attempted to achieve this aim by following pro-Saudi policy and after 1995, the leadership announced the adoption of a different, modern and liberal foreign policy while, if implicitly, retaining strongly its monarchical and religious structure (Gray 2013, pp. 46–53; Kamrava 2013, pp. 69–104). Thus, as a small state, Qatar has merely attempted to address its domestic vulnerabilities and maintain its survival, which is the main concern of nearly all small states.
In light of this, it is far-sighted for Qatar to devise multiple and occasionally, as is the case with the Arab Spring, seemingly inconsistent strategies that are likely to enhance its sovereignty and survivability (Peterson 2006, pp. 733–735). This interpretation may be useful in explaining the alleged duality and inconsistency in Qatar’s foreign policy regarding the Arab Spring. Therefore, both the Doha’s democratic and monarchical attitudes toward the Arab Spring, although contradictory, serve the same strategic purpose that helps Doha simultaneously act in accordance with both Western-democratic and monarchic Gulf States. In brief, on the one hand Doha supports democratic transformation alongside its Western allies in certain countries such as Egypt. On the other hand, it has been a significant follower of the policy of Gulf countries to seek to suppress the pro-democratic, Shia protests against Bahrain’s (Sunni) Wahhabi monarchy. As such, these contradictory policy choices do not work against each other but are generally complementary.
Qatar’s Active and Selective Stance
The pro-democratic uprisings and consequent turmoil in the Arab world during 2011–2013, which began with Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia in late December 2010, have had an unprecedented impact on the geopolitical and geostrategic situations in the region and on the policies of major regional and global players (Ayyob 2012, p. 84). The overthrow of the secularly oriented, autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya by these uprising surprised many scholars, whose studies on the Middle East has focused generally on the durability and stability of these regimes (Gause 2011). Similar movements have also long struggled to topple Syria’s’ Ba’athist and Alawite regime, which has resulted in deadly and bloody fighting between regime and opposition forces. Additionally, while not as large scale or as well armed as those in Syria, demonstrators in other countries have fought for their desired goals of openness, liberty and justice against autocratic governments, particularly in Bahrain. Undoubtedly, these phenomena have revealed new opportunities, obstacles, and threats for regional countries that have forced them to reassess their current regional and international position. Ultimately, each state has perceived the newly emerging geopolitical landscape in the region in a different manner (Wallerstein 2012).
GDP per Capita (in thousands of dollars) Based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): The Top Three Countries and Selected Gulf Countries (GCC)
For instance, from Iran’s perspective, the events in Syria appear to have resulted in a large-scale civil war, which would likely result in the overthrow of Tehran’s close ally in Damascus, in turn diminishing Iran’s regional and internal position. Obviously, these different geopolitical calculations of regional and international players seek to maintain a defining role in the future path of the Middle East in spite of strengthening public’s influence in decision making after the Arab Spring (Valbjorn 2012, pp. 27–30). How such legitimate demands for democracy and partially valid strategic calculations can be reconciled remains a controversial issue. In the context of Doha, the ruling family of Qatar could, without difficulty, presently find the means to resolve that predicament by pursuing the aforementioned seemingly contradictory but nonetheless complementary foreign policy course (Roberts 2012a, pp. 3–4). From the beginning, Qatar has opposed highly autocratic regimes’ harsh responses to democratic demands without raising awkward questions related to these regimes’ types due to its similar style of rule. That is to say, Qatar’s criticisms center on the autocratic regimes’ bloody suppression of pro-democratic uprisings rather than these countries’ regime types. 13
Toward that end, taking a highly visible stand against tyranny without opening its and other regional countries’ regime type to discussion enables Qatar to align its support for the protection of human rights and democratic expression in a manner that resonates with the (Western-led) international community. 14 Thus, by responding to the Arab Spring in this way, Qatar has attempted to discursively pursue a pro-change and democracy-oriented policy in the part of the region that is the most contrary to its internally and politically pro-status quo orientation at the domestic and Gulf levels. With this policy, Doha has attempted to draw attention to different problems in the region such as unemployment, brutality of regime and economic rather than regime type. Accordingly, the Qatari Emir tried to maintain the regime survival by harmonizing its aforementioned geo-political and domestic considerations with emerging regional order in the Middle East through democratic and humanitarian discourse in its foreign policy. This instrumental or contradictory foreign policy can also be observed in Qatar’s support for the strategic player in the region, that is, the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun), and other Islamic groups. 15
As is already known, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist Nour Party in Egypt and even Al-Qaida organization follows the same branch of Islam, namely Salafi Islam (Wahhabi). 16 But this hardly means that they share similar political, social and economic perspective on societal relations and have common stance toward regional affairs as clearly illustrated by increasing divergence between two former allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On the one hand, there are some Salafi groups, such as Al-Qaida, which consider violence appropriate for their political goals. On the other hand, there are other Salafi groups, such as Muslim Brotherhood, generally refusing to use violent methods and instead preferring political approach (Helmich 2008, pp. 112–120). As for Qatar, especially since 1995 it has adopted more pragmatic and moderate form of Wahhabism than narrow, secretive and austere version, as exemplified by its political and economic reforms including women’s right to vote and to run in municipal elections. This stance impacted the relations positively between Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood since both actors seem to have somewhat similar approach toward the interpretation of Islam and in particular regional affairs (Roberts 2012b, pp. 234–239).
However, such common stance between Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood has had some negative reflections on the Saudi–Qatari relations. Having closer relationship with Muslim Brotherhood and adapting moderate approach of Wahhabism could also point out the weakening relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia accepts firm and inflexible version of Wahhabism and perceives Muslim Brotherhood as a possible risk for its regional calculations in Egypt, there has over time emerged some difference between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over certain regional issues. As it became clearer following the coup d’état led by General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi, Saudi Arabia and its Egyptian ally, the Nour Party, did not oppose but even welcomed the military regime and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed and democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi (Khatib 2013, pp. 422–425). Although it could be an over-estimation to claim that different interpretations of Islam determine all relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, it still plays a certain role over their domestic and foreign policy choices. Therefore, Doha welcomed and supported growing role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region after the Arab Spring, which is currently reversing due to Syrian internal war, Libyan internal crisis and coup d’état in Egypt. Saudi Arabia, however, has pursued different policies in order to limit increasing role and impact that Muslim Brotherhood would have over the region through Arab Spring process (Tamamy 2012, pp. 148–151).
In addition to Qatar’s positive stance, there have been some signs indicating the reassessment and reconsideration of the Muslim Brotherhood and its extensions by some western and regional players, which once perceived those groups as a permanent threat to regional stability. With the Arab Spring, the US and Western countries came to see those groups as powerful alternatives to failing autocracies although it seems to change at the moment. Furthermore, they considered their close ally Qatar, having well-established relations with Islamic groups, as a possible bridge country to improve relations with the strategic players in the region (Tabbara 2012). However, Western countries have still maintained a cautious posture to determine whether these Islamic-oriented groups will make the necessary efforts toward more moderate and integrated democratic powers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. 17 Yet, various developments in the period of 2011–2013 indicated that Muslim Brotherhood, a significant part of the political scene in Egypt since its foundation by Hassan El Banna in 1928, has become crucial and most effective Islamic group in the region (Ehrenfeld 2011, pp. 71–74).
Additionally, this largest Sunni movement has spread to nearly all countries in the region, which paved the way for this organization to be a critical player in the wake of the Arab Spring. 18 As a consequence of the increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, Qatar, which formerly relied primarily on autocratic regimes to maintain regime stability and order, attempted to use its links with Islamist groups connected to Muslim Brotherhood. In this way, Doha aims to become a diplomatic power in reshaping the region and thus began supporting protest movements with the exception of those occurring in the Gulf. The Qatari government had already shown notable interest in this respect in the 1990s, when it began offering refuge to Islamists, especially Ikhwan members from across the globe, and gave them an international forum through Al-Jazeera (Roberts 2012b, pp. 36–39; Ulrichsen 2012, pp. 14–16). As a result, Qatar sided with what it regards as the rising trend without questioning whether these groups are determined to keep their promises on democratic reforms in their countries. 19 This current power arrangement seemed to improve Qatar’s influence at the regional and international levels throughout the course of the Arab Spring.
Therefore, it would be difficult to develop plausible conclusions on Qatar’s attitude and the future of the Arab Spring if this significant aspect was underestimated. Not only the power arrangement but also other factors such as Qatar’s substantial natural gas reserves (Dargin 2007, pp. 136–142), media influence (Al-Jazeera) throughout the region, liberal and assertive stance since 1995 contributed to strengthening its ‘niche position’. 20 In this regard, Doha immediately voiced its discomfort with the autocratic regimes due to their harsh measures toward peaceful demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and ultimately Syria to strengthen its partnerships with both western countries and arguably democracy-inclined Islamic groups (Ulrichsen 2012, pp. 13–17). By becoming the ‘voice of pro-democratic demonstrations’ and acting as a go-between between Islamic groups and Western countries, Doha sought to allow these demonstrations to convey their rightful demands, except in Bahrain, to the international public and regional countries. In parallel with this, the ruling family, after the demonstrations resulted in civil wars in Libya and Syria, has supplied military, economic, and political assistance to protesting groups at the risk of a serious reaction from pro-status quo and autocratic powers (Kabalan 2012).
Ultimately, using the state-led adjustment as in the reform process in the 1990s, Qatar is likely seeking to validate its model, conservative Islam with modernity, as a means of achieving its core political goal in this ever-changing area, that is, the survival of the regime. The previous passage implies that much of Qatari diplomacy, including the country’s mediation efforts, is based on a broader survival strategy that is aimed at ensuring the security of the ruling family, namely Al-Thani (Kamrava 2011, p. 556). In fact, states like Qatar have a number of concerns, and hence they adopt certain policies to preserve their domestic and international sovereignty. However, this aspect seems to be far more relevant in the case of Qatar than in other states. From its process of liberalization in the 1990s to its intensified mediation efforts over the past decade, through which Qatar presented itself as a neutral country to conflicting parties, the regime’s prevailing concern has become the regular reinforcement of its security.
Therefore, Qatar’s recently both pro-democratic and to some pro-Islamic stance can hardly be comprehensively analyzed by attributing such periodical adjustments in its foreign policy to the Emir’s predictions on the potential for the region toward a democratic transition following the Arab Spring. This could ignore the regime’s internal and external considerations. Such view could hardly clarify the reasons in detail for the stalled democratic process since 2000 in Qatar and its general lack of a vocal response to the harsh measures taken against mostly Shi’a-organized demonstrations in Bahrain (Friedman 2012, pp. 74–84).
The Puzzle of Bahrain: Is a Shi’a Spring Possible?
The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 33 islands, the largest of which is Bahrain, located 16 kilometers from Saudi Arabia and linked to it by the King Fahd Causeway, which was opened in 1986. Bahrain is rife with sectarian tensions; some reports suggest that as much as 75 percent of the population is Shia (See Table 2). The ruling tribe, the Al Khalifa, originated in the Arabian Peninsula and the members are Sunni Muslims. The Al Khalifa came to power in the eighteenth century, having arrived from Qatar and, with the help of tribal allies from the Peninsula, overthrew the Persian rulers (Andoni 2011; Central Intelligence Agency 2012). This brief background on Bahrain may actually provide numerous explanations for why the Arab Spring fails to incorporate Shias, the second largest group in the region after Sunnis. Neither the GCC countries nor the US or other leading Western countries seek any change in the status quo in this Sunni ruled yet Shia populated country. These countries regard such an outcome as having the potential to alter the regional balance in favor of Shia-governed Iran. This would be the worst consequence of the Arab Spring for the GCC countries and Washington’s long-established regional order (Tudoroiu 2013, pp. 310–317).
Shi’a Demographics in the Middle East
Besides, it would have occurred had the Gulf countries not taken the ‘necessary steps’ in response to developments in Bahrain, all of which were tacitly approved by the US, the GCC countries’ security and stability provider. This small Gulf country hosts the US Fifth Fleet, which is responsible for American naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the East African coast as far south as Kenya (Ayyob 2012, p. 85). Therefore, all Sunni monarchies in Gulf and their strategic partner, the US have exerted political, economic and even military influence in favor of the status quo in Bahrain in opposition to Iran—the sole supporter of the Shia-led, pro-democratic movements in Bahrain. In contrast to their position on other democratic movements, Gulf countries and many Western countries have attempted to maintain the status quo in this oil-rich and gas-producing region (Roberts 2012a, pp. 3–4). It is worth reiterating that revolutions and mass protests ousted some of the region’s longstanding dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen thanks to central support of the GCC and Western countries. However, the implications for pro-democratic uprisings in Gulf countries and in Bahrain are currently complicated and overshadowed by the same regional and international strategic calculations (Mitchell 2012, pp. 32–36).
Therefore, when considering the GCC countries’ confused ensemble of responses displayed in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the concept that immediately comes to mind is that of selective or instrumentalist stance toward people uprisings. Efforts to make their selective policies regarding the Arab Spring more legitimate in the eyes of domestic and international players and emerge unscathed by the Arab Spring have led the GCC countries to exploit an age-old and long-lasting political phenomenon—sectarianism. The sectarian schism between Sunnis and Shi’as, dating back to the Battle of Karbala of 680, have become a key tool of Sunni monarchs and Shi’a Iran to avoid addressing the societal demands of their people, as has been clear during the Arab Spring (Yousefi 2009, pp. 115–120). Qatar is also leading advocate of this policy in the Gulf, as it shares similar concerns of its neighbors regarding the possible ascendancy of Tehran in the region as a result of a would-be Shi’a spring in Bahrain. For those countries, unlike the Arab ones, this alternative spring may ultimately threaten the domestic and regional status quo and the present stability that favors the GCC countries and Qatar. Indeed, the key factor for the foundation of the GCC in 1981 related to preventing the emergence of potential regional powers such as Iran and maintaining the status quo in the Gulf (Hamad 1997, pp. 47–53).
Therefore, following the demonstration by the Shia population against the rule of the Sunni monarchy in Pearl Roundabout in Manama on February 16, 2011, the GCC adopted the additional goal of bringing the Shia demonstrations under control, by military means if necessary (Khatib, 2013, pp. 419–420). As a leading Gulf country, Qatar also seems to agree, albeit implicitly, with the measures applied by the GCC. Therefore, it could be argued that the initial changes in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen and policies followed by other Gulf Countries toward Bahrain were in favor of Qatar. Yet, this situation has presently changed to some extent due to coup d’état in Egypt and Syrian internal war. What is crucial to note is that the return of military rule in Egypt in 2013 and Syrian internal war since 2011 can restrict and even deal a major blow to Qatar’s regional influence and Muslim Brotherhood’s efficiency over the region. In this regard, although anxious over possible changes in the current and fragile balance of power in Manama is still central concern for the Qatari ruling family, it confronts other challenges in the region as well (Khashanah 2014, pp. 5–13, Monier and Ranko 2013, pp. 113–120).
In other words, Doha supported democratic transformation against autocratic regimes in which the emerging powers are expected to be Sunni Islamic groups, namely its allies. On the other hand, it appears to confront the potential collapse of regional order in the Gulf due to the Shia uprising in Bahrain by evoking the aforementioned Shi’a threat (Luomi 2008, pp. 1–61). Doha’s contradictory response to popular demonstrations is even observable in Al-Jazeera broadcasts especially in its English version (Kessler 2012, pp. 47–56). Despite their close linkage with the regime, it should be noted that there are visible differences on the channel’s Arabic and English versions. Al-Jazeera English launched its broadcast in 2006 from Washington, London, and Kuala Lumpur and maintaining its headquarters in Doha and it has carried a global agenda by adopting well-balanced, albeit sometimes critical, tone toward Western countries’ policies over the region. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera Arabic has put particular emphasis on the social and economic problems experienced by the Arab people due to western countries’ policies toward the region, especially the US war against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Alhedaithy 2011, pp. 36–46; Azran 2013, pp. 1295–1298).
Despite these differences, Al-Jazeera TV satellite is suspected of having multiple close ties to the ruling family. The resignation of Al-Jazeera’s General Director, Wadah Khanfar amidst popular Arab revolutions, the network’s rare criticisms of the Qatari government and its alleged financial support for Al-Jazeera have triggered these suspicions (Black, 2011). Even worse, the ruling family appointed Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al-Thani, an executive at Qatar gas and a member of the country’s ruling dynasty, as the new director of Al-Jazeera (Seib 2011). Those events and especially Al-Jazeera English’s arguably one-sided reporting on the upheavals in the region indicate that many of Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts on the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East parallel to some degree of Qatar’s basic approach toward uprisings and upheavals. Given Al-Jazeera English’s lukewarm position toward human rights abuses and Shia protests, and its limited support to democratic demands of populace in Bahrain when compared to especially people movements in the Egypt, these interpretations gain some credibility (Boyce 2013, pp. 371–375).
This situation also seemed to contrast with the channel’s long-term claims on the independence from the Qatar state and its unconditional promotion of democratic demands over the region. In this way, it can be stated that, at least during 2011–2013, in general Al-Jazeera and in particular Al-Jazeera English Channel fulfilled the dual function in terms of regime survival. On the one hand, by advancing its ‘state branding’ 21 on the international stage, Al-Jazeera made a substantial contribution to Doha’s image as a pro-democratic country that respected human rights and freedom during the Arab Spring. On the other hand, though tacitly, Al-Jazeera English seems to dismiss the similar democratic agendas of and demonstrations by Shias in Bahrain probably as it shares Qatar’s very concern on Iranian threat. In conclusion, opposing rarely toward Qatar’s policies, at least during the Arab Spring, English Channel appeared to depict Doha’s seemingly contradictory policies toward popular movements as balanced and acceptable through its somewhat similar position on its broadcasts. 22
Conclusion
Popular demonstrations and subsequent uprisings across the Middle East against the status quo have further illustrated region’s fundamental reality that no country in the region has ever been able to pursue a foreign and domestic policy without at least the tacit support of its society. In other words, public opinion maintains to have a profound importance, albeit differently, in defining the direction of domestic and foreign policy. The reappearance of popular influence in the region during the Arab Spring is one side of the coin, yet there is another less emphasized and oft-dismissed aspect of this phenomenon. Once autocracies fall, it remains unclear whether coalition groups, consisting of liberal, national, secular, and Islamic segments of Libyan, Syrian, Egyptian, and Tunisian societies, in which the Muslim Brotherhood and its wings have considerable weight, can achieve their promised democratic reforms.
At this point, we can see some relevant signs in the case of Tunisia; however, the consensus and conciliation among so-called oppressed segments of Egypt and Syria was crackled. Democratically elected first government and President in Egypt were toppled by a military coup. Furthermore, arguably the prominent model of moderate and democratic Islamist movement has presently failed to govern the country due to some regional and domestic pitfalls. As for Syria, things have become more complicated and troubled than assumed as each group in opposition forces currently fights each other instead of against their declared enemy, Assad regime. As mentioned above, these two cases strain Qatar and its regional role increasingly. For its regional ally, namely Muslim Brotherhood, has been relatively losing its initial strategic, military, domestic, and international support and its earlier achievements especially in Syria, Egypt, and Libya (Awadi 2013, pp. 540–548; Berti and Paris 2014, pp. 25–30).
Another important subject relates to the potential expansion of the ‘spring’ to long ‘otherized’ segments of societies in the region, primarily the oft-discriminated and silenced Shias. In the case of Bahrain, the difficulty of realizing such expectations is clearly understood. Most of the countries in the region, particularly those in the GCC have, after some hesitation, become vocal supporters of ‘democratic transformation’ in certain countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya (Tetreault 2011, pp. 630–636). Yet, they have remained silent and cautious regarding democratic aspirations of Shias in the region and their own people by reviving long-standing fears of a Shia threat and a possible shift in power toward Iran. As many Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia have significant Shia minorities (and they are the majority in Bahrain) who are alleged to have close ties with Iran, the genuine demands of the Shi’a population in Bahrain seem to lack support.
Similar to the reactions of the Gulf countries and to some extent Saudi Arabia, Qatar also remains indifferent to Shi’a demands in Bahrain; furthermore the country has apparently approved of harsh measures of Bahrain designed to hinder popular demonstrations in Manama. More specifically, although Qatar and Saudi Arabia have adopted to some extent different policy options during the Arab Spring, they generally agreed on the need to prevent Shi’a protests from expanding throughout Gulf through the use of military force if necessary. Moreover, similar strategic considerations are not only observable in the case of Bahrain but also in the more assertive and supportive position adopted by the Gulf countries and Qatar throughout the course of the popular upheavals in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The motivations for GCC’s contradictory but nonetheless complementary actions 23 during the Arab Spring involve a number of concerns related to internal and external stability of gulf countries.
Yet, of these concerns, the survival of the regime is the most prominent one. Therefore, for Qatar, the adoption of democratic stances toward some countries and, conversely, a status quo approach toward others serves a central goal, namely regime protection. While neglecting critiques from some circles regarding its ambivalent position, Qatar represents itself externally as a promoter of democracy, which it lacks internally, across the region through the aid of state-led maneuvers. Therefore, Qatar’s swift changes in its foreign policy, which are perceived as contradictory, can be explained through the ruling family’s current monopoly over the state, which, if any threat appears to the regime, allows them to make rapid, state-led adjustments to protect the survival of the establishment.
Footnotes
1.
For Regier and Khalidi,
‘Arab Street’ is associated with volatility and irrationality, as revealed by the contexts of its use in the US written news media. ‘Arab Street’ is also the overwhelmingly predominant means of referring to Arab public opinion in the US media; by contrast, the literal and less freighted term Arab public opinion is surprisingly rare. Thus, the street metaphor carries negative connotations and is extremely widespread. (Regier and Khalidi 2009, pp. 11–29)
2.
The central instrument for welfare and stability in the Gulf and, to some extent, Qatar is these countries’ immense oil resources. Qatar is estimated to have the third largest national reserve of natural gas in the world after Russia and Iran and ranked first in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade in 2006. The vital resources of oil and LNG enabled Qatar to implement numerous social programs, thereby alleviating the probable frustrations of its people with the Qatar administration. Therefore, as a substantial contributor to government revenues (nearly 70 percent), oil and LNG enhance stability and the likelihood of the regime’s survival. Should oil prices fall or, in the worst case, the reserves be depleted, the so-called stability of Qatar would most likely be shaken. For detailed information on Qatar’s rich oil resources and the income they produce (
, pp. 71–81).
3.
Qatar has many similarities with other Gulf or Middle Eastern countries regarding democratic deficits such as freedom of expression, public participation in administrative bodies and the people’s limited influence in domestic and foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Qatar is quite simply an autocratic country despite the introduction of far-reaching ‘political reforms’ (, pp. 11–17).
4.
5.
6.
7.
This advisory body is attached to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture and oversees the work of the nine municipalities in the country. Municipal elections, presently the only Qatari institution in which the members are elected by Qatari citizens, are scheduled for every four years; elections were held in 1999, 2003, and 2007. In 2003, Qatar’s first female candidate was elected to office (Arab News 12 March, 2003).
8.
The present constitution replaced the appointed Consultative Council with a 45-member, largely elected Advisory Council and stipulated that 30 of the members be selected through direct elections. The council has the power to pass laws for the emir’s approval, question ministers, and approve state budgets. Given the past situation in Qatar, these reforms may advance its democratic–liberal position both in the region and internationally (Al-Jazeera November 1, 2011).
9.
Briefly, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are ‘Wahhabi’ in orientation, followers of the conservative religious precepts of the eighteenth century religious scholar, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. However, Qataris, particularly after 1995, are more relaxed than Saudis in their application of the traditional conservative Islamic codes of law. Moreover, in the period following the 1995 coup d’état, the leadership has remained closer to the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam than Saudi one and thus is comfortable initiating a domestic reform process. For detailed information on this subject (, pp. 124–125).
10.
The main task of the Ruling Family Council is ‘to decide on vacancy of the Emir post in case of his death or a disability preventing him from doing his duties’. Thus, as an institution with a theoretically significant role in the country’s political system, in times of family tension or uncertainty, the Family Council can play a potentially important role, thus ensuring the regime’s survival. These articles are completely contrary to the frequently touted democratic advancements in Qatar (, pp. 402–414; Qatari Constitution, Articles 15–16).
11.
According to the results of the Arab Youth Survey from 2008 to 2010, while 68 percent of Qataris considered democracy important in 2008, this share had fallen to 33 percent in 2010. Additionally, participation in Municipal Council elections also fell from 79 percent in 1999 to 38 percent in 2003 due to a lack of confidence in the council’s supposed role (Arab Survey Youth 2008, 2009, 2010, p. 6).
12.
While ‘democracy of bread’ implies a tacit social contract in which the regime provides social and economic welfare in return for political loyalty, complementarily, rents have been defined as ‘the income derived from the gift of nature’ and are thus usually understood to be income accrued from the export of natural resources, especially oil and gas. Then, as in Qatar, all oil-exporting states (pure rentier states) have had the privilege of not needing to tax their populations. This ‘no taxation’ policy is provided in return for ‘no representation’ for the people in the administrative system. Therefore, this system has helped strengthen authoritarianism and has undermined prospects for democratization, especially in the oil monarchies, such as Qatar (, pp. 606–607).
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14.
For instance, while drawing attention to human catastrophe and brutal applications of regime in Syria toward people uprising by emphasizing that ‘the human conscience cannot accept that any person gets killed’, Qatar keep its silence concerning the regime debates among the people and states in the region (Middle East Online February 14, 2012).
15.
Qatar Emir Al-Thani is quoted as saying, ‘We shouldn’t fear Islamic movements, let’s cooperate with them’ (Haaretz December 1, 2011).
16.
Salafism is an older, literal interpretation of Islam from which Wahhabism emerged in the eighteenth century. Wahhabism is the official religion of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism and Salafism, while slightly different, remain closely related. While Saudi Arabia’s harsh Salafist version of Islam (Wahhabism) eschews political life and objects to democracy, the Salafist Nour Party and especially Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became involved in politics eagerly and effectively, capturing most of the votes in the 2001 general elections. The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest formal and organized expression of Islamism or Salafism (; The Economists September 20, 2012).
17.
For Ferry, ‘there is no alternative to recognizing the legitimacy of these movements as evidenced by their results at the polls in Egypt and Tunisia’. He goes on to say, ‘the West should take solace from the way countries like Morocco and Tunisia have adjusted to the coming to power of moderate Islamists and should commit much more systematically to engage with these new regimes’. (, pp. 3–4).
18.
We can identify the Islamic groups with close affinities and similarities to the Muslim Brotherhood as follows: Egypt: founded in 1928 by Hassan El Banna, banned in 1954 and with brief exceptions hounded until the fall of Hosni Mubarak; won 47 percent of assembly seats in the January 2012 elections. Jordan: founded in the 1940s and recognized as a charity in 1946; first invited to join the government in the 1940s. Its parliamentary party, the Islamic Action Front, was established in 1992. Its relationship with the monarchy has deteriorated under King Abdullah. Libya: Formed in 1949 but banned by Colonel Moammar Qaddafi. It announced that it would found a political party in December 2011. Morocco: participated in elections under the Party of Justice and Development in 1998, which heads the current government. Palestinian Territories: Hamas was founded in 1987, won the Palestinian elections in 2006, and wrested absolute control of Gaza a year later. Sudan: Founded in 1954. Its political arm, the National Islamic Front, backed a military coup in 1989 and was rewarded with cabinet posts. Syria: Banned since 1963, membership punishable by death since 1980. It played a role in the uprising in 1982 that culminated in the Hama massacre and continues to operate in exile. Tunisia: Nahda founded in 1981 but banned by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 1992. It won 41 percent of the vote in the 2011 election. For additional details related to the Muslim Brotherhood and its wings in region (The Economist, February 2012).
19.
As is known, Yusuf Al Qaradawi, one of the leading and spiritual figures of Muslim Brotherhood and the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, has taken refuge in Doha since 1995 when President Hosni Mubarak forced him to leave Egypt because of his Islamic agenda. Recently, Qaradawi has some television programs on Al-Jazeera related to Islamic laws and principles. Such developments have proved Qatar’s long interest in Islamic groups, especially Muslim Brotherhood ().
20.
A niche position is crucial in maintaining the survival of many small states. Those states seek to provide a service or commodity that benefits their neighbors, the region, or the broader world. By creating legitimacy in this manner, such states feel increasingly secure in their regions and domestic politics. Qatar has also acted in concert with this policy, especially since 1995, by showing itself to be a trustworthy and reliable partner to both international and regional players (, pp. 742–743).
21.
Besides Al-Jazeera, many factors increase Qatar’s legitimacy and improve its state brand on the international stage, including: liberalization policies in the 1990s, increased women’s participation in elections, international prestige projects such as the 2022 World Cup, an independent foreign policy and a mediation role in the region, its welfare and stability…, etc. Thus, at the beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar boasted a unique combination of characteristics that was rare in the Middle East that paved the way for the country to assume an extraordinary role during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, all of these features mitigate the risk of uprisings in Qatar, as the Qatari population regards its government as being more legitimate thanks to the characteristics of the country emphasized above, and they hesitate to foment possible upheavals in their country. For more detailed information, see The Middle East (, pp. 35–39).
22.
This is not to say Al-Jazeera is the only important channel in the Middle East, yet its influence and ability to broadcast across the region and internationally is greater than that of other stations. Furthermore, Al-Jazeera is the first Arab TV station based on Arab soil that is expressly critical of Arab regimes and governments. As expected, Qatar employed this highly suitable instrument immediately following the popular demonstrations in the region with the aim of showcasing its foreign and domestic policy adjustments (Bahry 2001, pp. 88–99; , pp. 85–90).
23.
Because Qatar is small with respect to population and geography and with two powerful neighbors Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar has always felt obliged to advance its relations with multiple sides, on the one side Saudi Arabia, USA and even Israel, albeit to a lesser extent, and on the other side Iran, Hezbollah and Syria prior to the Arab Spring. Yet, the USA, among others, has a special importance for Qatar in the preservation of the regime’s security in this conflict-ridden region. Therefore, strengthening its economic, political and especially military relations with Washington by hosting a large US air force at Al Udeid near Doha before and after 2003, Qatar have attempted to ensure the security and survival of their regime, which is the defining factor in the direction of Qatar’s policy choices (, pp. 18–20).