Tunisia: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections,2014

Abstract

The 2014 election results and the maturity displayed by principle political parties, especially Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, bodes well for democratization in Tunisia. It remains the only successful story of the Arab Spring but is threatened by terrorist strikes by Islamic State and political violence by local terrorist groups, such as, Ansar al-Sharia. Economic instability too has been a cause of concern. Amidst these challenges that threatened to derail the transition process, the adoption of a new constitution and conduct of free and fair polling for presidential and parliamentary elections have been major achievements. The election results threw a surprise with the secular nationalist Nidaa Tounes emerging as the leading party. Significantly, all the political actors accepted the results, the winners avoided triumphalism while those who lost conceded defeat which indicates the level of faith in the institutionalized process of political transition. Formation of a national unity government after the election indicates the recognition on part of the major political parties of their responsibility in strengthening democratic institutions and to provide good governance.

Keywords

Tunisia elections Arab Spring democratization Arab-Maghreb Islamism Nidaa Tounes Ennahda Islamist terrorism

Developments in Tunisia since the outbreak of the protests in December 2010 triggered by self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in the town of Sidi Bouzaid have taken a different course in comparison to other countries that witnessed Arab Spring protests. In other countries, violence, instability, civil war, and external military intervention dampened the initial enthusiasm for a democratic “spring,” but Tunisia is turning out to be different. Although the economy remains vulnerable, political situation stormy and terror strikes far from contained, election-based transition process raises hope for democratization. Since President Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali hastily fled the country in January 2011, Tunisia conducted three free and peaceful elections, namely, elections to the Constituent Assembly (October 2011), for the parliament (October 2014) and president (November–December 2014), and it has adopted a new constitution. It witnessed a few terrorist attacks mainly on places and sites frequented by foreign tourists including in the city of Sousse in June 2015 when 38 including 30 British tourists were killed. Barring these and a couple of political assassinations, it has largely been free from political violence. It brings to focus the debate on democracy in the Arab world and the Tunisian “exceptionalism.”¹

Another significant aspect was the 2014 parliamentary election in which a liberal secularist, Nidaa Tounes, emerged as the largest party closely trailed by the moderate Islamist Ennahda. It surprised observers and analysts alike because of the spiraling Islamism, including radical and violent extremist versions, gaining hold in the Middle East including in Tunisia that has provided the largest number of foreign fighters in the Syrian civil war.² Notably, Ennahda had won the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections and had led the largely technocratic coalition governments during the transition period. The ascendance of Ennahda and the consequent Islamization raised doubts over democratization in the country. Nevertheless, as the election results were announced, Ennahda conceded defeat, congratulated the winner, and expressed its willingness to play a responsible role in the opposition (Amara & Markey, 2014). For its part, Nidaa Tounes avoided triumphalism and stated its willingness to lead a progressive coalition government though it initially ruled out partnering with the Islamist party (The Guardian, 2014). Such accommodative attitude on the part of the principal forces bode well for democratization of Tunisian polity, but strengthening of the nascent institutions would not be easy.

Any political or social development cannot be devoid of historical evolution. In that respect, many analyses on the events that led to the overthrow of the Ben-Ali regime in January 2011 emphasize the role of existing social and political environment in making of the revolution (Mabrouk, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Wolf, 2013). Murphy (2013) highlights the role of constitutionalism dating back to 1860 when Tunisia became the first Arab country to adopt a constitution. Perkins (2004, 2014) articulates the secular nationalist character of modern Tunisia following Kemalist example³, under charismatic leadership of Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000), who ruled out any role for Islam in the affairs of the state, to the extent that those leaning toward Islamism were prosecuted. The situation did not change under Ben-Ali, who though sought cooperation of Islamists and incorporated religious symbolism to enhance his political legitimacy, could never make peace with Islamism (Sadiki, 2002).

The period leading up to the uprising against Ben-Ali’s regime were marred in political dissatisfaction, though were calm. It revealed the lack of strengthening of political institutions and a lack of democratization despite a façade of a secular republican state. Islamists gained prominence in the post-Arab Spring Tunisia, but it has been argued that their rise is not abrupt and sudden, rather is embodied in the long history of ups and downs in relationship between the state and the Islamists (Allani, 2009). It has been explained by some in terms of prolonged suppression of religious and cultural heritage by the previous regimes and emergence of moderate Islamists led by Rached Ghannouchi (Wolf, 2013). On the contrary, others see the success of Ennahda in terms of its own evolution from a group seeking Islamization of the state to the one focusing on the cultural aspects of Arab-Islamic identity (McCarthy, 2015).

The October 2011 Constituent Assembly election and subsequent political processes with adaptation of a new constitution in January 2014 has largely regarded to have strengthened political institutions, rather than a personality-driven polity that Tunisia had remained since its independence. The 2014 elections and their outcomes give some indications about the direction in which Tunisian polity is evolving. However, in order to understand the elections results and the democratization process, one needs to go back a little into political history of modern Tunisia. While not undermining the significance of the Thawrat al-Karama wa al-Tahrir (Revolution for Dignity and Freedom)⁴, one needs to trace the evolution of the polity to contextualize the recent developments. While tracing the evolution of the polity and the electoral process, it is essential to recognize the maturity displayed by both the Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda which bodes well for possibilities of democratization in Tunisia.

History of Lack of Democratization

The pre-2010 political history of Tunisia can be divided into three broad phases, the colonial period which had witnessed struggle against French rule (1881–1956), the Bourguiba period (1956–1987), and the Ben-Ali period (1987–2011). During the early twentieth century, nationalist movements started to emerge in Tunisia and led to the rise of the Dastur (Constitution) Party (Moore, 1965; Perkins, 2004). A group of young revolutionary nationalists driven by secular nationalist ideology emerged within the party and in 1934, Neo-Dastur was formed under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba who then led the struggle against the French (ibid.). Tunisia gained independence in 1956 and was declared a republic on 25 July 1957, the same day Bourguiba became the first president. Early phase of his presidency witnessed major political, legal, economic, and social developments and the foundation for modern Tunisia was laid. While the initial euphoria continued for a while and Bourguiba remained an undisputed leader, opposition to his policies began in early 1970s particularly from the Islamists who were critical of his secular and anti-Islamic policies.

The opposition was dealt with suppression and the regime continued to appropriate power leading toward an authoritarian and personality-centered rule. Power was confined to the Neo-Dastur, officially the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and any room for plurality in political life was rejected. He strictly followed French ideals of secularism and denounced any use of Islamic symbolism and famously encouraged people to not fast during Ramadan arguing that labor is more important than fasting (Mabrouk, 2012). Although many progressive steps were taken, particularly in the areas of legal reforms and status of women as well as education (Murphy, 1999), his growing authoritarian behavior kept the political institutions weak and did not allow democratization.

The first election was held on 25 March 1956, to choose members of the Constituent Assembly, in which the National Union led by Bourguiba’s Neo-Dastur won all the seats (Table 1). Tunisia adopted a new constitution on 1 June 1959, and on 8 November, general elections were held to choose the president and a 90-member Chamber of Deputies; Bourguiba was elected unopposed, and the Neo-Dastur won all the seats. In 1963, the country was officially declared as a single-party state, thus, ending any scope for multiplicity of political actors. The Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) was declared the only legal party. Although presidential elections were held in 1969 and 1974, the formality of presidential elections was also dispensed with in 1975, when Bourguiba was declared the president for life.

Table 1.

Result for Constituent Assembly Elections, 1956

Date	Electorate	Turnout (in %)	Valid Votes	Distribution of Votes
Date	Electorate	Turnout (in %)	Valid Votes	National Union (in %)	Tunisian Communist Party (in %)	Independents (in %)
25 April 1956	726,168	606,899 (83.6)	605,452	597,763 (98.7)	7,352 (1.2)	235 (0.1)

Source: Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999, p. 918).

The opposition had been suppressed and coerced into submission and only the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) was allowed to function after the 1978 labor union strikes. The Islamists were haunted leading to large-scale arrests and many leaders including Rached Ghannouchi fled into exile. In 1972, a secret Islamic group al-Jamaa al-Islamiya was formed but was soon discovered by the regime. “As the wide network and membership of the organization posed a direct threat to Bourguiba’s state Islam and modernization project, the president decided to openly confront the Islamists, through open suppression and prosecution” (Wolf, 2013, p. 562). While a modern secular state was being built with a focus on education, economy, and gender equality, democracy remained a distant dream. The president appropriated power, coerced any opposition, and dismantled any group that threatened the monopoly of the party on state machinery (Murphy, 1999; Perkins, 2004).

Consolidation of the Authoritarian System under Ben-Ali

Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali came to power through a bloodless coup on 7 November 1987, bringing an end to Bourguiba’s rule. According to Larbi Sadiki, while the change was “welcomed widely by Tunisian amongst all walks of life”, a pertinent question that lingered was “the extent to which a military and security man can reverse the personalization, de-institutionalization and the privatization of the State he inherited” (Sadiki, 2002, p. 60). Indeed, the next 23 years of his rule proved this question to be significant. Initially, he broke from the past to ensure legitimacy but policies of the previous regime were continued particularly in not allowing for political plurality. For example, the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the past regime was replaced with a use of Islamic imageries for striking a chord with the public but in dealing with the Islamists, brutality of previous regime was maintained except for a brief period of reconciliation in 1987–1989 (Allani, 2009).

Human rights record of the regime was poor to say the least, and it could hardly deliver on its promises made at the time of taking over from Bourguiba for democratization and economic prosperity (Sadiki, 2002; Talbi, 2000). It soon transformed to another authoritarian republican regimes in the Arab world, such as, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, and Ali Abduallah Saleh’s Yemen (Lee, 2008). For a while, Ben-Ali courted the Islamists and tried capitalize on the Arab-Islamic heritage of Tunisia but soon discovered that the Islamists are gaining popularity and could threaten his stronghold (McCarthy, 2014). Inheriting the legacy of al-Jamaa al-Islamia, in 1981 Mouvement de Tendance Islamiqiue (MTI) became a major challenge for the regime due to its rising popularity and led to banning of religion-based political parties during the run up to the 1989 parliamentary elections. The MTI rechristened itself as Harkat al-Nahda (Ennahda) and its members participated in the elections winning, according to one account, nearly 18 percent of votes, thereby alarming the regime (Dorraj, 1998; Lee, 2008). Thus, started the suppression of Islamists; hundreds were imprisoned and leaders including Ghannouchi went into exile in Europe (Allani, 2009).

Ennahda continued to operate secretly and gain popularity within the country, its leadership based in London did not lose any opportunity to question the legitimacy of Ben-Ali regime and its human rights records. At the same time, it also moved toward moderation in terms of its call for Islamization of the state toward coexistence with other ideologies and focus on the cultural aspects of Arab-Islamic identity (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). It mainly happened due to the prolonged exposure of its leadership to the multicultural sociopolitical atmosphere in Europe. Ben-Ali on the other hand continued to win elections with overwhelming majority. Though multiparty system was allowed since 1989, the RCD⁵ continued to dominate the political scene. Moreover, the constitution was amended in 2002 to remove the limitation on presidential term, thereby allowing him to run for the 2004 presidential elections. Ben-Ali adopted the policy of addressing the immediate concerns of economic and material prosperity to acquire broad-based support but avoided questions regarding an open and participatory polity (Perkins, 2004). It could not be sustained for long as political discontent and economic stagnation gave vigor to the opposition. The 2008–2009 recession in Europe, with which Tunisia has large-scale trade and commercial relations, further complicated the economic situation and affected tourism industry that substantially contributed to the national GDP (gross domestic product) (Achy, 2011).

In 2010, the GDP growth rate had declined to 3 percent compared to 6 percent in 2006; further inflation (5 percent), unemployment (18 percent), and percentage of people below poverty (16 percent) were rising (World Bank, 2010). While people were facing the brunt of economic hardships and opposition was largely muted due to the repressive regime, Ben-Ali was growing more authoritarian and was confining political power to family exterminating any challenge from within the RCD (Bellin, 1994). On top of it, large-scale corruption and “crony capitalism” were thriving. Many of the ministers and family members of the president and his second wife Leila Trabelsi and her brothers and extended family were accused of involvement in corruption but none were ever prosecuted let alone convicted (Belev, 2001). People started to privately question the state and the judiciary that was failing to act but the regime did not tolerate any criticism or challenges to its policies. Slightest public criticism invited repression, turning Ben-Ali’s Tunisia into a police state (Angrist, 1999). At one time in the late 1990s, more than 8,000 Islamists and thousands of others were incarcerated for political reasons (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2010).

Past Elections

Regular elections took place before the Jasmine Revolution despite the prevailing authoritarian leadership and one-party system (until 1989). The first elections were held in 1956 soon after independence to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly, and the National Union (an alliance of Neo-Dastur and nationalist labor, farmer, and merchant unions) secured 99.8 percent of the valid voted and won all the 98 seats; the voter turnout was very high at 83 percent (Moore, 1965). The Constituent Assembly declared Tunisia a republic in 1957 bringing an end to the Husainid dynasty that had ruled the country since 1705.⁶ Bourguiba had formed a government as Prime Minister after elections and was elected president by the Constituent Assembly in 1959. The new constitution came into force on 1 July 1959, and fresh legislative and presidential elections were held the same year, when Bourguiba was elected unopposed and the Neo-Dastur won all the 90 seats (see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2.

Results for Parliamentary Elections, 1959–1986

Date	Electorate	Turnout (in %)	Valid Votes	Distribution of Votes
Date	Electorate	Turnout (in %)	Valid Votes	Neo-Dastur/PSD (% in brackets)	Tunisian Communist Party or Other Opposition (in %)
November 8, 1959	1,099,577	91.7	1,005,769	1,002,298 (99.7)	3,471 (0.3)
November 8, 1964	1,301,534	96.8	1,255,153	1,255,153 (100)	–
November 2, 1969	1,443,347	94.7	1,350,895	1,350,895 (100)	–
November 3, 1974	1,623,743	96.8	1,571,215	1,571,215 (100)	–
November 4, 1979	1,800,144	81.4	1,409,606	1,409,606 (100)	–
November 1, 1981	2,321,031	84.5	1,941,858	1,859,000 (94.78)	103,127 (5.22)
November 2, 1986	2,622,482	82.94	2,165,057	2,165,057 (100)	–

Source: Nohlen et al. (1999, p. 918) and IPU (2011).

Table 3.

Results for Presidential Elections, 1959–2009

Date	Electorate	Turnout (percent)	Valid Votes	Candidate/s	Share of Votes (in %)
November 8, 1959	1,099,577	–	–	Habib Bourgiba	100
November 8, 1964	1,301,534	–	–	Habib Bourgiba	100
November 2, 1969	1,443,347	99.8	–	Habib Bourgiba	100
November 3, 1974	1,623,743	–	–	Habib Bourgiba	100
April 2, 1989	2,711,925	2,087,028 (76.96)	2,102,351	Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali	100
March 20, 1994	3,150,612	2,989,880 (94.9)	2,987,375	Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali	99
October 24, 1999	3,387,542	3,287,221 (97.09)	–	Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali	99.45
				Mohemed Belhaj Amor	0.31
				Abderrahman Tlili	0.23
October 24, 2004	4,877,905	4,464,337 (91.52)	4,449,558	Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali	94.49
				Mohamed Bouchiha	3.78
				Munir El Béji	0.79
				Mohamed Ali Halouani	0.95
October 25, 2009	5,296,008	4,737,367 (89.45)	4,729,649	Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali	89.62
				Mohamed Bouchiha	5.01
				Ahmed Inoubli	3.80
				Ahmed Brahim	1.57

Source: Nohlen et al. (1999, p. 918) and IPU (2011).

Elections were held in 1964, 1969, and 1974 for the Chamber of Deputies⁷ and president and the Neo-Dastur which was renamed PSD in 1964 continued to win all seats while President Bourguiba continued to be elected unopposed.

In 1975, Bourguiba was proclaimed as president for life, thereby formalizing the one-person rule (Pace, 2000). Tunisia faced some problems due to workers strike in 1978 and a military rebellion in 1980 leading to diplomatic problems with Libya (Stanik, 2003, p. 21). Domestic political turmoil continued leading to a mid-term legislative election in 1981, which again sent PSD members to all the 136 seats in the parliament (Table 2). The early 1980s was marked with political unrest due to economic problems and rising food prices causing “bread riots” in 1983–1984, which attracted global criticism (The New York Times, 1984). In the meantime, some of the opposition groups were recognized as political parties but the subsequent legislative election held in November 1986 gave the same result with the ruling party winning all the seats. Opposition parties had boycotted the election alleging widespread irregularities and mismanagement of government funds (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2011). Political problems continued and in 1987 then Prime Minister Ben-Ali declared Bourguiba to be senile and hence unfit to rule, put him under house arrest, and took over as the president (Delaney, 1987).⁸

Ben-Ali took over with promises for democratization, and to this effect, initiated some measures including release of political prisoners, registration of political parties, and even allowing moderate Islamists to participate in elections as independent candidates. In 1988, he tried “a quasi-constitutional formula for ‘manufacturing consensus’ and building confidence between the regime and selected non-State actors and forces” through the National Pact (Sadiki, 2002, p. 62). Tunisia headed for poll in 1989 which in retrospective can be understood as a referendum for buying support for the new regime. One of the most striking departures from the past was allowing for a multiparty election, but the results did not evoke much confidence in the system. Though some reports suggest that it was free and fair, the elections returned members of the erstwhile PSD, rechristened Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), to all 141 seats in parliament and Ben-Ali was elected President unopposed (IPU, 2011; Zartman, 1989). The newly recognized Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) led by founder Ahmed Mestiri (founded in 1978) emerged as the largest recognized opposition obtaining 3.8 percent of the valid votes. Other recognized parties that contested were Party of People’s Unity (PUP), Unionist Democratic Union (UDU), Progressive Socialist Assembly (RSP), and Leftist Coalition, but none of them could muster much support (Table 4).

Table 4.

Result of Parliamentary Election held on April 2, 1989

Electorate	Turnout (%)	Valid Votes	Distribution of Votes (in %)
Electorate	Turnout (%)	Valid Votes	RCD	MDS	PUP	UDU	Others	Independents
2,711,925	2,073,719 (76.46)	2,041,881	80.06	3.8	0.7	0.4	1.3	13.7

Source: IPU (2011).

Meanwhile, the Islamists emerged as the real opposition and member of Ennahda that was not recognized as a political party contested as independents and secured nearly 18 percent of the 76.6 percent votes cast (ibid.). Hopes created due to the change of regime and the first multiparty election in 1989 did not last long. As pointed out by Sadiki (2002), Tunisia witnessed periodic elections since 1989 and some form of electoral democracy existed but rather than democratization as was promised, Ben-Ali preferred to appropriate power. Emergence of the Islamists as the largest opposition group did not go well with the regime, which resumed its suppression, and members and supporters of Ennahda were persecuted (Allani, 2009; El Amrani & Lindsey, 2011).

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in October 1994, October 1999, October 2004, and October 2009, and members of the opposition MDS won some seats, a departure from the past when all seats went to ruling party. Ben-Ali’s control on the regime though continued to grow, effectively turning Tunisia into a one-party dictatorship. There was hardly any difference between the state and the ruling party and in practice all institutions including executive, legislative, judiciary, and media remained under regime’s control (see Angrist, 1999). Economic hardships for the general public continued to grow, while corruption was rampant and a large number of president’s family members were allegedly involved in cases of financial misappropriation (Bellin, 1994). Crony capitalism was rampant (Murphy, 1999) and any criticism of government policy attracted retribution. Under Ben-Ali Tunisia had turned into a police state and political opposition was reduced to formality (Dorraj, 1998). Incidents, such as, the hunger strike, by journalist Tawfiq bin Brik in April–May 2000 exposed the façade of Ben-Ali’s electoral democracy to the international audience (Sadiki, 2002).

Though opposition had been allowed some political space since the 1989 election, it remained largely symbolic. In the 1994 election, for the first time in Tunisian history, opposition parties won seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Table 5). The number of registered political parties continued to grow but Islamists remained at odds with the regime and could not register a political party as religion-based parties were banned, but participated in elections as independents (Allani, 2009). Later, a large-scale prosecution forced Islamists to go underground and elections were mostly reduced to formality and widespread rigging to favor the regime were alleged by opposition and international observers (Sadiki, 2002).

Table 5.

Results of Parliamentary Elections, 1994–2009

March 20, 1994	Electorate		2,976,366
	Turnout (in %)		2,841,557 (94.9)
	Valid Votes		2,832,871
	Share of Votes (in %; No. of Seats won)	RCD	97.73 (144)
		MDS	1.08 (10)
		UDU	0.32 (3)
		PUP	0.29 (2)
		Others	0.53 (4)
		Independents	0.04 (0)
October 24, 1999	Electorate		3,387,542
	Turnout (%)		3,100,098 (91.5)
	Valid Votes		3,091,062
	No. of Seats	RCD	148
		MDS	13
		PUP	7
		UDU	7
		Renovation Movement	5
		PSL	2
October 24, 2004	Electorate		4,609,237
	Turnout (in %)		4,215,151 (91.45)
	Valid Votes		4,199,846
	Share of Votes (in %; No. of Seats won)	RCD	87.59 (152)
		MDS	4.63 (14)
		PUP	3.64 (11)
		UDU	2.20 (7)
		Ettajdid Movement	1.74 (3)
		PSL	0.60 (2)
October 25, 2009	Electorate		4,974,707
	Turnout (in %)		4,447,388 (89.4)
	Valid Votes		4,438,497
	Share of Votes (in %, No. of Seats Won)	RCD	84.59 (161)
		MDS	4.63 (16)
		PUP	3.39 (12)
		UDU	2.56 (9)
		PSL	2.24 (8)
		Green Party	1.67 (6)
		Ettajdid Movement	0.50 (2)

Source: IPU (2011).

In the words of Michele Angrist, “Despite the appearance of democratising progress, however, Ben-Ali’s reforms have been fundamentally disappointing: in no substantial way has democratic debate, dispersion of political power or a free press emerged in Tunisia” (Angrist, 1999, p. 90). She further observed that press and judicial freedom were largely non-existent and the “ruling party retains a monopoly on the exercise of power while it thwarts the legal opposition from making effective inroads into national political life” (ibid.). Thus, despite the presence of some opposition members in the parliament and the inclusion of technocrats in policy making, the system remained authoritarian without any scope for debate and political plurality.

In the run-up to the popular unrest, Tunisia was under immense sociopolitical and economic strife. Prosecution of Islamists had caused widespread discontent among the masses; political opposition was near negligible as they had been neutralized, either by co-option or through repression. More importantly, the economy was in shambles, the GDP growth rate (3 percent) was on decline, while inflation (5 percent), unemployment (18 percent) and poverty (16 percent) were on the rise, especially in the wake of the recession in Europe. Lack of economic opportunities, rampant corruption, and high rate of unemployment among educated youth had put the country under pressure (Cammett, 2007; Sadiki, 2002; Hibou, 2006; Mabrouk, 2011). Despite these problems, the regime was largely in control and nobody even inside Tunisia had imagined that self-immolation of an agitated vegetable vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in the small town of Sidi Bouzaid will irreversibly transform Tunisia and engulf the entire Arab world.

Revolution for Dignity and Freedom

Tunisia was not only the first but the only country that did not face large-scale violence or has fallen back to an authoritarian regime after the sudden upsurge of mass discontent. Egypt was the other country where an experiment of free and fair election brought a popular government but this did not survive due to spiraling economic discontent, political inexperience, and mismanagement of the new government (Hamid & Wheeler, 2014; Sabry, 2013). In the Tunisian case, economic problems (GDP growth rate languishes at 3 percent, inflation 6 percent, unemployment 17.5 percent in 2014), and political assassinations and terrorist strikes threatened to push the country into a major crisis but the willingness of the transitional technocrat government to accommodate different political forces prevented deterioration.

Notably, Ennahda that led the national unity government after the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections trailed behind the secular Nidaa Tounes in the first parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2014. One of the significant concerns expressed by many Tunisian and international observers was the change in Islamist’s stance to participate in electoral politics in a democratic set-up was tactical, and once in power, they would try to impose the agenda of Islamization of the state (see Wolf, 2013). This proved unfounded at least in the immediate scenario and seems that the moderate Ennahda is ready to coexist within a plural political setup. There can be many reasons attributed to this moderation and political maturity shown by Ennahda leadership; an important factor could be the presence of modernist Islamist debate articulated by scholars, such as, Mohamed Talbi (2000), Mohamed Charfi and others, who in the words of Robert Lee (2008) have created an intellectual response to Islamism that is rooted in the Arab-Islamic ethos of Tunisia.

Nevertheless, the 2011 elections and the process of drafting a new constitution threw up many challenges including issues, such as, the place of Islam in the constitution and state, gender issues, rights of minorities and plurality of political actors and ideas. In the meanwhile, the country witnessed incidents of political violence and rise of radical Islamists demanding complete Islamization of state and putting Sharia as the constitution (Gartenstein-Ross, Moreng & Soucy, 2014). Moreover, economic problems threatened to bring the masses on the boil. All this challenged the Ennahda-led government and threatened to derail the political transition, but the draft constitution was finally adopted by a 200-12 vote on 26 January 2014 (BBC, 2014).

The 2014 constitution resonates some of the ideals of the 1959 constitution, such as, republican civil state, Arab-Islamic identity and sovereignty. The Article 1 of the 2014 constitution reads: “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican” and adds that “This article might not be amended.” The 149 Articles deals with various issues including individual’s rights and freedom (Articles 21 to 49) and women’s rights (Article 46). It places Islam as the state religion but provides for freedom of belief and practices stating: “The State is guardian of religion. It guarantees freedom of conscience and belief, the free exercise of religious practices and the neutrality of mosques and places of worship from all partisan instrumentalisation.” Thus, also eliminating scope of use of mosques as a place for political mobilization, delineating role of religion in public affairs. It makes departure from the previous constitution in terms for scope of plurality of political forces, and it limits the power to amend the core aspects of constitution. It does away with the bicameral legislative system and provides for decentralization of power with provisions for local government (Article 131). It also does away with the presidential form of government with prime minister as the head of government and president as head of state. Significantly, only a Muslim can become president, but no such limit has been put on holding other constitutional posts including the judiciary.

By all standards, the Tunisian constitution has been hailed as the “most progressive” in the Arab world (Murphy, 2014). While it recognizes Islam as the official religion of the state, it does not recognize Tunisia as an Islamic state and allows for freedom of practice and belief, allows for gender equality as well as has checks and balances with respect to the executive (Article 45). It bodes well for Tunisia but the bigger challenge was to tackle the problems of the transition period, most importantly political transition, economic challenges, and controlling the rise of radical Islamism (see Allani, 2013). This is where the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections gained significance.

The 2014 Elections: Issues and Assessment

Political situation though were not marred in violence were neither completely poised. The situation could have been best explained as stormy and marred with confusion and speculations that Tunisia like others might fall into a chaos, particularly after the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi-led Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in June 2013 (see Brody-Barre, 2013; Zemni, 2014). The situation during the run up to the 26 October election for the 217-member House of Representatives and November–December presidential election were tumultuous. Assassinations of two liberal politicians Chokri Belaid (February 2013) and Mohamed Brahmi (July 2013) threatened to destabilize the polity (BBC, 2013; Gall, 2013). Ansar al-Sharia, a local radical Islamist group, was suspected of involvement in these assassination and other incidents of violence and many accused the Ennahda-led caretaker government of going soft in acting against the group. The government finally banned it in August 2013 and listed it as terrorist organization arresting many of its leaders (see Ayari, 2015). In addition, economic problems, particularly high rate of unemployment (17–18 percent) and inflation (5–6 percent) continued unabated. The transition government witnessed change of guard four times since taking over after the fall of Ben-Ali regime, mainly due to failure in handling economic problems.

Amidst political instability and economic challenges, the elections for the newly created House of Representatives took place on 26 October 2014. The Independent High Commission for Elections announced the results on 20 November and declared that the secular Nidaa Tounes has won 85 seats followed by Ennahda that won 69 seats, with other smaller groups winning rest of the seats (Table 6). Once the dust of results settled, efforts at forming a government started. As per the provision of the constitution, the then President Moncef Marzouki invited Nidaa Tounes to form the government, though it fell 24 seats short of a simple majority. Habib Essid’s, who was nominated by the party to form government, made unsuccessful efforts to form a coalition with the Free Patriotic Union that had won 16 seats. Finally, a broad national coalition of all major parties including moderate Islamist Ennahda and left liberal Afek Tounes (eight seats) was formed under Essid’s leadership on 5 February 2015, and the cabinet was approved by the parliament as required by law (Al-Jazeera, 2015a).

Table 6.

Result of Parliamentary Election Held on October 26, 2014

Registered Voters (including expats)		5,236,244
Turnout (in %)		3,579,257 (68.36)
Valid Votes		3,408,207
Percentage share of votes (no. of seats won)	Nidaa Tounes	37.56 (86)
	Ennahda Movement	27.79 (69)
	Free Patriotic Union	4.13 (16)
	Popular Front	3.64 (15)
	Afek Tounes	3.02 (8)
	Congress for the Republic	2.05 (4)
	Democratic Current	1.95 (3)
	Others	NA (13)
	Independents	NA (3)

Source: Independent High Electoral Commission (ISIE), Tunisia (2014a).

The first round of presidential elections was held on 23 November 2014, and witnessed a record number of 28 candidates, of which 5 withdrew in favor of others in the run-up, leaving the contest to 23 candidates. With no one securing an outright victory, a run-off between the two top-placed candidates was held on 21 December in which Beji Caid Essebsi of Nidaa Tounes comfortably beat the incumbent Moncef Marzouki of Congress for the Republic who was supported by Ennahda (Table 7). Essebsi assumed office on 31 December.

Table 7.

Result of Presidential Elections, 2014

Date	Registered Voters	Turnout (in %)	Valid Votes	Candidates	Share of Votes (in %)
First Round 23 November	4,925,606	3,180,131 (64.56)	3,267,569*	Beji Caid Essebsi	39.46
				Moncef Marzouki	33.43
				Hamma Hammami	7.82
				Hechmi Hamdi	5.75
				Slim Riahi	5.55
Run Off 21 December	4,925,606	–	3,110,042*	Beji Caid Essebsi	55.68
Run Off 21 December	4,925,606	–	3,110,042*	Moncef Marzouki	44.32

Source: Independent High Electoral Commission (ISIE), Tunisia (2014b).

Note: *Including expat voters.

The parliamentary and presidential elections threw up many surprises with Nidaa Tounes emerging as a winner, despite it having the remnants of the previous regime. Because it is largely secular nationalist in its ideological leanings, many commentators viewed the elections as a victory for secularism over Islamism (see Gall, 2014; Schemm, 2014; Stratfor, 2014). The results, however, reveal a more complex picture than a simplistic secularist versus Islamist discourse (see Marks, 2014). There could be many reasons for the electorates to go for a nationalist party but most importantly, the disappointments particularly on the economic front toward the previous government appeared to have played a role. Significant for the outside observers and in the context of the debate on democratization in the Middle East is the fact that the elections were free and fair and witnessed a plurality of political forces including nationalists, modernists, leftists, and Islamists. In addition, the conduct of the Islamists who lost and the nationalist who emerged as the leading group was a major departure from the pre-2011 days when the opposition was nothing more than token.

The elections and the coming to power of Nidaa Tounes have not rid Tunisia of its political, economic, and social problems; issues, such as, economic growth, unemployment, women’s rights, religion and state and radical Islam, remain to be addressed appropriately. There are, however, three key issues that gain significance in the context of the 2014 Tunisian elections and democratization debate in the Arab world, namely, multiparty system, Islamist political violence, and lack of military intervention.

The most important aspect of the 2014 elections was the multiplicity of political forces which were vying for voters’ attention. Though Tunisia has followed a multiparty electoral system since 1989 and opposition groups won a few seats in the parliament since 1994, the arrangement was a façade and the polity effectively remained a one-party system. The 2014 constitution ensures multiparty system and Article 35 states: “The freedom to establish political parties, unions, and associations is guaranteed. In their internal charters and activities, political parties, unions and associations must respect the provisions of the Constitution, the law, financial transparency and the rejection of violence.” In the backdrop of prolonged lack of democratization, and marginalization of Islamists, the provision for political organization acquires significance. A highly sensitive issue has been the place of religion in the state and society. Islamists wished to have an Islamic state with Sharia as the law which was contested by liberal and secular groups, who prevailed in the Constituent Assembly debates.

The issue of place of religion in the state and society was deliberated and debated upon in the Constituent Assembly leading to many commentators doubting Ennahda’s commitment to a civil state and political pluralism (Lang, et al., 2014; Ottaway, 2013). A few within Ennahda were of the view that the party should not compromise on implementing Sharia and Islamic state but the leadership preferred to go with majority opinion and agreed for a civil state with Islam as official religion (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). The triumph of secular nationalist Nidaa Tounes shows that a majority of Tunisians favor a civil state. Nevertheless, the rising tide of Islamism and radical Salafism might pose a threat to the nascent polity.

Second, Tunisia also witnessed growing acts of violence since 2011 and much of them are attributed to Islamist groups and ideology. Ansar al-Sharia, a radical Salafi group that was banned in August 2013 was accused of involvement in assassination of Chokri Belaid (February 2013) and Mohamed Brahmi (July 2013) prominent liberal politicians. A number of terrorist strikes, such as, the attack on Bardo National Museum in Tunis on 18 March 2015, when 21 people mostly European tourists and the attack on a beach in the city of Sousse on 26 June 2015, again targeting mainly European tourists were claimed by the Islamic State (earlier known as ISIS or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Indeed, Tunisians comprise the largest nationality fighting for the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in the Syrian and Iraqi theatre (Al-Arabiya, 2014), which underlines the growing popularity of violent Islamism. While terrorism will affect the already volatile economy, it also underscores that radical Islamism has emerged as a major threat. The government has responded with a new tough anti-terror law that has scope for harsh measures including death penalty and lack of access to lawyer for a terror accused, a move that has been criticized by local rights and advocacy groups and international human rights organizations (Al-Jazeera, 2015b).

And three, since the outbreak of popular protest in the Arab world, many countries have fallen into cycle of violence and a major reason in addition to rise of Islamist groups has been the use of military to quell popular demands, especially in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, or Yemen. In all these cases, military has played a major role since the start of Arab Spring protests, but the Tunisian military has refused to be dragged into the affairs of state. The major factor is that historically the military in Tunisia has remained confined to security issues and eschewed from politics. Even though Ben-Ali had a military background and was brought into government by then President Bourguiba because of his effective handling of security problems in the mid-1980s, in general military did not intervene in politics. The trend continued even during the height of protests and the reluctance of the military to come to the rescue of beleaguered leader and to target unarmed civilians eventually forced Ben-Ali to flee the country (Kirkpatrick, 2011). In the run-up to the elections, despite a few incidents of political violence and terror attacks, the military refrained from taking a plunge into politics, not an unlikely scenario given the precedence in other Arab countries. The non-interventionist character of Tunisian military has been an important point of departure in terms of its political evolution, which was maintained despite the tumultuous event of the past 5 years.

Conclusion

Tunisia is at a crucial phase of transition and though the questions regarding sustainability of the political plurality remain, defying the regional trend it is leaning toward democratization. It would nonetheless require strengthening of political institutions including judiciary, freedom of expression, and the idea of coexistence. The most significant aspect of the 2014 elections was the willingness of the political actors to accept the results and not challenge the mandate. Independent and free and fair polling further enhanced the legitimacy of the electoral process. The move by Nidaa Tounes to form a national unity government indicated that the political groups understand the responsibility of strengthening democratic behavior and recognize the need for a collective effort to deal with challenges of improving the economy and fighting terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the transition toward a democratic polity and inclusive society will require constant efforts on part of all the actors. In order to sustain the momentum, Tunisia and its leadership will have to uphold sovereignty of the people and authority of the constitution. In that respect, the 2014 elections can be termed as a small step toward democratization.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This article is a part of the project on ‘Elections and Democratization in the Arab World’ supported by Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and the author acknowledges the support. The author would also like to acknowledge the comments made by anonymous referees that helped to improve the article.

1.

The idea of Arab exceptionalism was propounded by Huntington () in view of the lack of democracy in the region; Tunisian developments so far have defied the perception, thus the term Tunisian exceptionalism.

2.

According to Tunisia’s Ministry of Interior, 2,400 Tunisians are fighting in the Syrian civil war mostly with Islamic State and Nusra Front. See, Al-Arabiya ().

3.

It should be noted that though there were key similarities between Ataturk’s Turkey and Bourgiuba’s Tunisia, there were significant differences both in terms of their background and ascendance to power as well as role of military in politics. Ataturk was a military General and took control of the state after disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, while Bourgiba was a lawyer who rose due to leadership role in popular struggle against French rule. In Turkey, military remained the vanguard of polity till political institutions were strengthened but Tunisian military has largely taken a non-interventionist approach toward politics.

4.

Global media had termed the events as ‘Jasmine Revolution’ but Tunisians, particularly those who participated in the revolution and are hopeful of better governance as well as democratization, refer to it as Thawrat al-Karama wa al-Tahrir; see Mabrouk (2011) and Alvi ().

5.

Ben Ali changed the name of Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) to Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) after coming to power in 1989.

6.

For details, see Moore (1965) and Perkins (2004, ).

7.

The number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies gradually increased from 90 in 1959 to 214 in 2009.

8.

For further reading on the circumstances and political situation leading to the removal of Bourgiba, see Perkins ().

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