Arab Factor as a Part of the Iranian–Israeli Conflict: An Israeli Perspective

Abstract

Arab states, mostly Syria, and non-state organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah have been part of the Iranian–Israeli conflict. Israel stayed outside the civil war in Syria, without supporting the rebels or Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah, which are Iran’s allies, that is, they oppose Israel. In Lebanon, there might be a clash between Israel and Hezbollah, particularly if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear sites. Hamas is also an Iranian partner and an enemy of Israel. Yet the latter tolerates Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip for lack of a better choice.

Keywords

Israel Arabs Iran Hamas Hezbollah

Arab countries play a role in the cold war between two non-Arab states in the Middle East, namely, Israel and Iran. The Arab involvement has to do with their territorial proximity with Israel and the latter has been worried about Iran’s desire to produce nuclear weapons, a threat which could be compared to the danger Israel faced when it had to deal with an Arab coalition in the past. It might attack Iran, if the latter tries to develop nuclear weapons and in response, Iran would use its Arab protégées, mostly the Hezbollah in Lebanon, to strike back, which would lead to a war between Israel and Hezbollah.

In the ongoing civil war in Syria, Iran is backing Bashar al-Assad against the rebels while Israel does not support either side and remains neutral. However, there is a friction between Israel and Iran’s Arab allies inside Syria. The Hamas, an Arab group that controls the Gaza Strip, has ties with Iran but there is also a rift between the two, following the refusal of Hamas to help Iran in Syria. Israel tolerates the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip for lack of a better option. There are therefore different aspects in regard to Israel and Iran’s Arab allies, namely, Hezbollah, Assad, and Hamas. The goal of the article is to examine this Arab factor, as part of the Iranian–Israeli conflict. The focus is on certain aspects of Israel’s national security, not on those of other states such as world powers like the United States and Russia.

Strategic Background

Since 1948, Israel’s national security policy had to do mostly with the Arab countries (Ben-Gurion, 1972; Eilam, 2016; Handel, 1973; Shlaim, 2005; Tal, 1996; Yaniv, 1994). In recent decades, the Arab–Israeli conflict is largely focused on the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians, that is, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Syria is officially an enemy of Israel but since 1982, there was not a military confrontation between the two. Israel, in the last decade, launched several air strikes inside Syria and the most important one was the destruction of Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Other aerial attacks were meant mostly to prevent the delivery of advanced weapons to the Hezbollah. The Assad regime avoided retaliation, fearing an escalation that could have led to a full-fledged war. Assad had to be careful, particularly in recent years as he has been preoccupied in fighting a civil war in his country. Iraq too is in turmoil and it used to send expeditionary forces against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Since 2003, Iraq has been coping with huge domestic problems and hence could not participate in any war against Israel.

Since 1979, there has been peace, although a cold one, between Israel and Egypt. In recent years, the two states have been collaborating against armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula, an Egyptian territory (Aziz, 2013; Sabry, 2015). Jordan too has peace with Israel, since 1994. Those relations are quite chilly although security cooperation between the two states goes on.

Among all the Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were the ones that carried the main burden of the Arab fight against Israel, certainly in the military level. Now all of them either have peace with Israel and/or are completely busy with their internal affairs. The Arab–Israeli conflict, at least in the way it was known for decades, was replaced to a large extent with an Arab–Arab conflict and an Iranian–Israeli conflict, which involves the Arab countries also.

The Iranian–Israeli conflict started in 1979, following the Iranian revolution. Until then, Iran that had a robust relationship with Israel turned into being its nemesis (Bergman, 2007; Hendel & Katz, 2012; Kam, 2004). As part of this struggle, Iran has Arab allies, particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. In Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, Iran’s protégés are non-state organizations and in Syria, Assad is supposed to be the head of a state but he rules only 25 percent of the territory due to the civil war.

Israel and Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the military backbone of the regime. One of its top commanders, Brigadier General Mohsen Kazzemeini, said in early September 2015 that Iran “would continue enhancing its preparedness until it overthrows Israel” (FARS News Agency, 2015). Frequently political and military leaders in Iran expressed their wish to destroy Israel. Most of the Arab states do not recognize Israel but they do not declare their objection to its right to exist, as Iran does. Furthermore, Arab states support the 2002 Arab peace initiative toward ending the Arab–Israeli conflict (Podeh, 2014).

On 30 October 2014, the White House reaffirmed the American commitment to prevent Iran from getting the bomb (The Times of Israel, 2014). Yet, Iran sought to exploit what seemed as a yearning by world powers, that is, the P5 + 1 (i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany) to reach an agreement over its nuclear project (The Economist, 2014). Israel’s Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon said on 24 October 2014 that “we are concerned about the potential deal” (Weymouth, 2014). A month later, Iran and the P5 + 1 postponed, again, the deadline regarding signing an agreement. Israel was pleased since “no deal is better than a bad deal,” as Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said (Winer, 2014). On 14 July 2015, an agreement was signed, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Israel strongly opposed because it was worried that as Iran was allowed to keep its nuclear infrastructure, it could be used to develop a nuclear weapon in the future. This is a major concern for Israel, considering Iran’s hostility toward Israel.

During the era of high intensity wars between Israel and the Arabs (1948–1982), Arabs had advantages such as their superiority in numbers, particularly when Arab states formed a pact. If Iran has the bomb, its regime would not have to spend time and energy in gathering a coalition against Israel. Iran alone, without relying on any other country, could attack and maybe even destroy Israel and hence Iran would be more dangerous to Israel than any Arab coalition ever was.

Arab states like Egypt, Syria, and Jordan absorbed devastating defeats like the June War, 1967 (Michael, 2004; Shimon, 2007). They paid a heavy price but the survival of their regime was not at stake. If Iran has the bomb, then even without starting a war this arsenal would increase Iran’s influence, which could be used to destabilize and bring down Arab regimes like in Jordan. Israel that has peace and security coordination with Jordan, strongly opposes a regime change in Jordan, let alone one that would bring to a pro-Iranian government in power.

Iran is more than a thousand kilometers from Israel but this distance would not make a difference if Iran holds nuclear capability that could be mounted on a surface-to-surface missile capable of reaching Israel. In the same way, Iran could also strike targets deep inside Sunni Arab states. Hence, Iran could be a threat both to Israel and Arab states and Israel, and its former enemies, namely, Sunni Arab states, could collaborate with each other against Iran toward slowing down its nuclear program. If Iran breaches the nuclear agreement then Israel, with Arab assistance, might conduct a raid on Iran’s nuclear sites, particularly if both assume that the United States would not confront Iran.

Israel is believed to have the nuclear capacities (Cohen, 2000, pp. 96–97; Yaniv, 1994, p. 150). For long, Saudi Arabia has been seeking a nuclear-free Middle East toward coercing Israel to give up its nuclear capabilities (Fisher, 2013). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, following Iran’s nuclear ambitions, might also build its own nuclear capacity (McDowall, 2015) which does not serve the Israeli interests.

Iran and Hezbollah

Hezbollah fought Israel in 2006 (Marrero, 2007; Zagdanski, 2007). If Israel carries out a military strike against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, the latter could return a favor through its Arab proxies such as the Hezbollah because of several reasons. One, Israel would be forced to retaliate against Hezbollah and not against Iran. Second, the Hezbollah is an Arab group in Lebanon, an Arab country. Therefore, any Israeli offensive there would help Iran to present its fight against Israel as a struggle in which Iran and Arabs are in the same side. This might assist in increasing Iranian influence in the Arab world. Third, Iran’s military might have difficulties in inflicting Israel a severe blow, especially when the capabilities of the Iranian air force are in decline (Nadimi, 2016). Some of its planes such as the Su–24 might reach all the way to Israel but they could be intercepted by Israeli fighters and antiaircraft batteries. Iran also has several hundred long range surface-to-surface missiles but Hezbollah has much more, about 150,000 short and medium range rockets pointing at Israel (Makovsky, 2016).

Iran could use the Damascus airport and the border between Syria and Lebanon to resupply Hezbollah (Diehl, 2015). The latter relies on its Iranian patron for training, money, weapons, and so on (Nerguizian, 2015). However, Iran might have doubts about the willingness of Hezbollah to risk itself in an all out confrontation against Israel. Iran would also not want a war against Israel to start when such a move does not serve Iranian interest. This has to do with an escalation or a provocation by the Hezbollah as the one that led to the 2006 war, and at a time when Iran did not seek a confrontation.

On 13 August 2015, the IDF published its “strategy” that explains, in general, how the IDF plans to deal with Arab non-state organization such as the Hezbollah. Israel’s sophisticated capabilities in command, control, and intelligence that were tested against Hamas in the war of 2014 would be needed against the Hezbollah too. The IDF would rely on maneuver and massive firepower and hence, another war in Lebanon would be more destructive than the last round in 2006. Hezbollah could target Israeli and objectives Jewish around the world such as diplomats, tourists, and so on as it already did in Bulgaria on 18 July 2012 (Levitt, 2013). This is another option for Iran to retaliate against Israel, with or without starting another front from Lebanon and/or Iran itself.

Assad’s Fight

Eyal Zisser (2015) emphasized how in the beginning of the Syrian Civil War many thought that Bashar al-Assad was about to fall, later on the assessment was that Assad would win, even with a heavy cost. The next stage was the idea that the war in Syria would go on for years to come. By August 2015, Assad’s forces were shrinking and they were “exhausted and tired,” and their morale low. His rivals “demonstrated motivation, determination, persistence, and the capacity to survive.” They enjoyed support from local population and received reinforcements from outside Syria and almost all of them raised “the banner of radical Islam” (Eyal Zisser, 2015, pp. 1–2).

Since the early 1980s, Iran and Syria became allies (Deeb, 2013; Ehteshami & Hinnebusch, 2002). Jubin Goodarzi notes: “Without doubt, one of the most fascinating developments in modern Middle East politics has been the emergence and continuity of the Syrian–Iranian alliance since its formation in 1979” (Goodarzi, 2013, p. 33). In 1982, there was a mutiny in Syria, when Hafez al-Assad was in office. He was strong enough to crash its foes without Iranian help but in recent years Bashar al-Assad became dependent on Iranian aid. In 1982, Iran would have found it difficult to assist Assad because of its own entanglement with the showdown against Iraq, which lasted until 1988. In recent years, in spite of its involvement in confrontations in other Arab countries, the Iranian regime has been invested heavily in helping Assad. Syria’s economy has been in bad shape because of the war and western sanctions and the Syrians suffer from shortage in basic needs, including food, rising prices, and a crippling industry. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also blocked roads from Iraq, which served in sending supply from Iran to Assad (Naylor, 2014). Nevertheless, Iranian and Russian support in the political, economic, and military dimensions saved Assad.

Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967 and the two states clashed with each other in that area until 1974. Since then, the border there was kept quiet and this status quo has been maintained after Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. During the civil war, Assad absorbed harsh international criticism because of war crimes he committed against his population. At some point, Assad could have tried to divert world attention from the civil war by confronting Israel. Furthermore, a clash with Israel might have undermined the effort to topple Assad’s regime. Turkey and Arab states mostly those along the Persian Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which assists the rebels against Assad, would not have liked to be seen as collaborating, let alone fighting with Israel against an Arab state, that is, Syria. Turkey and Arab states might have reduced their activity against Assad, if there was a collision between his forces and Israel. For Assad, such an outcome might have been worth the risk of a clash with Israel. Yet, Assad’s enemies outside Syria might have only avoided public and open moves against him, while continuing with covert ones. After all, since 2011, none of the states that support Assad’s enemies inside Syria has been officially at war against him.

Israel has not been sure if, and when, Assad falls and how much his survival serves its interests, mostly the security ones. Either way, Israel did not intervene in the brutal fight inside Syria and did not help or disrupt Iran’s effort to assist Assad. Israel has been focusing on watching the border in the Golan Heights. That zone, from the Syrian side, has been mostly under the control of armed groups that oppose Assad and therefore, they are against Iran as well. As long as Assad, Iran, or their protégés like Hezbollah do not gain a strong foothold on that border, it would stay like a buffer zone between Israel and Iran and its allies. Israel does not want that the border be transformed like the one along Lebanon, from which attacks could be conducted against Israeli targets in the Golan Heights and in the rest of Israel as well. For several decades, Iran has been using Hezbollah to confront, spy, and provoke Israel from Lebanese borders. Therefore, Israel carried out strikes inside Syria like the one on 18 January 2015, which killed a high ranking commander of the Hezbollah (Marcus, 2015).

Israel’s Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon warned on 26 April 2015 that Israel would not allow Iran to deliver “sophisticated weapons to terror groups” like the Hezbollah (Winer, 2015). This announcement followed reports of an Israeli air bombardment inside Syria. Like the earlier strikes, which occurred since 2013, Israel did not officially take responsibility. During those attacks, Assad avoided dispatching his fighters to intercept Israeli aircraft as he did not want to put them at risk (White, 2014). He knew that in an air-to-air combat, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has a huge edge. Assad could have retaliated with his long range surface-to-surface missiles against Israel’s Arrow anti-missile as they were never tested in a combat. Still, Assad perhaps restrained himself because he did not seek an escalation. A war with Israel would have led, in a matter of days, to the destruction of Assad’s air force and best units, which would have opened the way for his foes inside Syria to annihilate his regime. Israel also did not want to confront Assad and by avoiding inflicting a major blow to Assad’s military Israel served a vital Iranian interest, that is, keeping Assad in power.

On 24 August 2015, Assad said, “If we want to fight Israel, we must first deal with its emissaries in Syria” (The Times of Israel, 2015). It was an attempt, not the first one, by Assad to connect Israel to armed groups, in order to both gather support inside Syria and to present those who assist his enemies as Israel’s allies. Assad, with Iranian aid, could have also hit back without admitting it, by conducting a terror attack against Jewish or Israeli objectives around the world.

Hamas, Iran’s Problematic Proxy

Hamas was created in 1988, when Israel and Iran were already foes, so from the beginning itself, Hamas and Iran had a common enemy. Although Hamas is Sunni and Arab while Iran is mostly Shia and Persian, they ignored that due to their common hatred toward Israel. Since 2007, Hamas became more important to Iran after this Palestinian outfit seized the Gaza Strip. That area served Iran as a base, as the one the Hezbollah created in Lebanon, to carryout rocket attacks against Israel. In previous confrontations between Israel and Hamas, mostly in 2008–2009 and 2014, the population in the Gaza Strip paid a heavy price. Yet, Iran that has been willing to put the Shia Arabs in Lebanon at risk had fewer doubts about doing the same with Sunni Arabs in the Gaza Strip.

Following the civil war in Syria, there has been a rift between Iran and Hamas as the latter refused to support Assad, Iran’s ally. Israel was obviously pleased from that split, especially since it happened without its involvement and Iran and Hamas did not get an excuse to blame Israel and by that to retaliate against it. The dispute between Iran and Hamas went on during the clash between Hamas and Israel in November 2012 while after the 2014 Gaza conflict, Hamas and Iran got closer again (Serjoie, 2014). Hamas desperately needed allies and Iran wanted to increase its grip in the Gaza Strip. Although Iran has another proxy, namely, the Islamic Jihad, it is Hamas that runs that area and it made sense for Iran to tighten its ties with its old partner. The weapons Hamas had acquired over the years, by smuggling or producing them, were based to a large extent on Iran’s aid. Therefore, Israel confronted an Iranian protégé when the relations between Hamas and its Iranian patron were in a low point. Without Iranian backing and assistance, Hamas might have been forced to consider moderating its approach.

Among the people of the Gaza Strip, there was frustration and anger toward Hamas because of economic hardships (Kurz & Brom, 2014). According to the World Bank, “the 2014 war has reduced Gaza’s GDP by about US$460 million. Construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and electricity sectors were hit the most” (The World Bank, 2015). Khalid Meshaal, Hamas’s political bureau chief, claimed on 4 December 2014 that “the Palestinian people no longer have anything to lose” (Rayner, 2014). Yet, Hamas knows it could lose influence and even its rule in the Gaza Strip as its two big neighbors, Israel and Egypt, see Hamas as a threat, and consider it as an Iranian bridgehead in their region. Egypt and/or Israel could seize the Gaza Strip and crush the Hamas but because of the cost of such a move they avoid that, and hence Hamas stays in power.

Israel seeks a balance between the need to renew its deterrence via operational activities that are violent and as short as possible, and the need to minimize any damage to its international status (as a result of the aggressive use of force), as well as preventing a deterioration of the situation and the spread of fighting to other arenas. It also seeks to balance between weakening Hamas by delivering painful military blows, and maintaining it as an effective ruler of the Gaza Strip (Chorev, 2016).

Israel tolerates that Hamas is in command of the Gaza Strip because Hamas is better than the alternatives: anarchy and/or the raise of radical Islamic groups that are more extreme than the Hamas, like those that are affiliated with Al-Qaida or ISIS. Israel and Hamas do not collaborate with each other let alone officially against those outfits. Yet, by not bringing down the Hamas, Israel accepts the Hamas as the ruler of the Gaza Strip, that is, letting the devil you know to neutralize rivals, Hamas and Israel have in common. Israel is ironically not only a kind of “partner” of Hamas but also of Iran as well. The latter, in spite of its disputes with Hamas, rather have this group calling the shots in the Gaza Strip instead of Al–Qaida/ISIS. Iran might want to put the Islamic Jihad in charge of the Gaza Strip but this outfit might not be up for this task. Therefore, it is the interest of Iran and Israel that Hamas should be strong enough to run the Gaza Strip without becoming too independent. The difference is that Iran strives to turn the Gaza Strip into a fire base against Israel while the latter opposes that Hamas would have weapons such as rockets that could strike Israel.

In 2014, Khaled Elgindy claimed that “the inability of Palestinian factions to agree on a common strategy is one reason that we have not yet seen the eruption of a full-blown Palestinian uprising” (Elgindy, 2014). The split among the Palestinians goes on and serves as an obstacle to the peace process since Hamas, like its Iranian partner, rejects talking with Israel.

There is security cooperation between Israel and the PA against the Hamas in the West Bank. Furthermore, the PA could have benefited when the IDF carried out its military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The PA hopes to regain the Gaza Strip yet was not capable and/or willing to assist Israel in replacing the rule by force. The PA therefore has to understand that as long as Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, it encourages Iran to support Hamas, which helps the latter to stay in power. The Arab Peace Initiative “has been an available policy option for more than a decade, yet no Israeli government has embraced it as a viable peace option” (Podeh, 2014, p. 584). The PA also contributed its share to the stalemate and even if there were peace talks, Iran might have tried to sabotage the negotiations by using its proxies like the Hamas.

Conclusion

The Arab factor has been part of the Iranian–Israeli conflict in several ways. The Hezbollah is Iran’s fire base in Lebanon, which might launch thousands of rockets at Israel, particularly if the latter attacks Iran. Hamas and Iran have shaky relations but Hamas’ ideological position toward Israel and its strategic location on the border keep enough common ground for Iran and Hamas to be kind of allies.

Assad has close ties with Iran but due to his domestic weakness, he is more of a burden than an asset, especially in a war against Israel. The ongoing decline of Assad and particularly of his military during the civil war dramatically reduced the odds that Assad joins Iran in a fight against Israel. However, growing tension in the Golan Heights due to incidents resulting from the Syrian Civil War creates a precarious situation. In addition a clash between Israel and Assad and or Hezbollah might occur as a consequence of Israeli air strikes inside Syria, part of Israel’s effort to prevent Assad from supplying the Hezbollah with advanced weapons. Meanwhile, by avoiding any attack on Assad, which could topple him in a matter of days, Israel in an indirect way serves a key Iranian interest.

All in all, some Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, are clearly against Iran, which make those Arabs potential allies of Israel. Other Arabs, like Hezbollah, could assist Iran against Israel. In other cases, there is a certain common ground between Israel and Iran especially in keeping Assad and particularly Hamas in power.

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