Islam and the Question of Confessional Religious Identity: The Islamic State,Apostasy,and the Making of a Theology of Violence

Islam, Confession of Faith, and Dual Hermeneutics

The politics of group identity is often located in people’s perception of what they are (Gutmann, 2003, p. 15). The Islamic State’s conceptualization of a momin and its Manichean opposite, which is the kafir (unbeliever) and its advocacy of a theology of violence to publicly impose that conceptualization on others, is rooted in notions of Marxian class consciousness which considerably drive the group’s members’ perception of what they are. The perception itself is determined by an inward looking metaphysical sense of identity, which is situated in the Cartesian subjectivism that considers the self as being disengaged from the processes of macro-social structuration. Such independence manifests for the IS in its narcissistic conception of itself as a group and the imagery of the other, which subsumes within it everyone who does not adhere to its own ideology.

This kind of self-conception instigates IS toward coercive advocacy of an ideology delineating the dichotomy between belief and unbelief and punishing those who do not fulfill the criteria that govern the group’s notion of a momin. The punishment for non-adherents is takfirism, which is the forceful enforcement of the confession of faith, even amounting to the imposition of death penalty upon them. The conception of the momin and its Manichean opposite the kafir, for the IS, is mediated by its ideology that is embedded in a sectarian Sunni political ontology that defines jihad as a functionalist instrument to confront non-Sunni political groups, especially the Shiite formations in the region of its presence. Such fanaticism on the part of the IS has generated, within Islam, an internal epistemological divide that relates to the interpretation of the term “confession of faith,” which is rooted in the shahada. In addition to this, the question of whether the IS is truly Islamic or un-Islamic has also been subjected to a kind of dual hermeneutics.

This dual hermeneutics can be gauged by the following instance. In a letter written on September 19, 2014 to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic States’ self-declared caliph, around 120 prominent Islamic clerics, jurists, and scholars from across the world incriminated him of tampering with the interpretation of the Qur’anic verse (21:107). ¹

The source for this interpretation goes back to Ibn Taymiyyah, who says in Majmu al-Fatawa (28:270, cited in Open Letter, 2015):

The Prophet said, “I was sent with the sword as a sign of the Final Hour, so that none would be worshipped save God alone, with no partner. My sustenance has been placed under the shadow of my spear. Lowliness and humiliation will come to those who disobey my teachings. Whosoever imitates people is one of them”.

With reference to this, the letter has stated that the phrase with the sword was included for a specific context and condition and by repeating the verse in the spirit of the hadith and overriding the actual verse in the Qur’an, the followers of the IS are mixing the Qur’an and the hadith for their own parochial gains. By doing this, they are equating divine mercy with the sword and mixing the generic with the categorical and the dependent subjectivity with that of the independent objectivity (Open Letter to al-Baghdadi, 2015).

The letter further condemned the bestial practices of naked terror involving acts such as beheading and enslaving of women carried out by the IS as grossly un-Islamic, with no credence in the Qur’an (Open Letter, 2015). However, in spite of such intellectual denouncement of the actions of IS as un-Islamic, the Al-Azhar University of Egypt, a premier center of education in Sunni Islam, with a discreet euphemistic articulation, refrained from dubbing ISIS as an un-Islamic entity. On 11 December 2014, the university affirmed that there are no concrete justifications that could substantiate any claims in favor of making a tangible case for infidelizing the IS. In support of its position, the Al-Azhar stated that Muslims cannot be infidelized merely on the grounds that they are sinners (Ibrahim, 2014). The theological defense that the university provided to corroborate its stance is that any Muslim who has expressed the confession of faith through the shahada cannot be infidelized (Ibrahim, 2014).

This doctrinal tangle and hermeneutic quagmire, emerging out of the epistemologically contradictory positions taken by two groups of Islamic scholars, leaves one with a complex circuitous question: whether the IS is truly Islamic or represents any aberration. On the one hand, the barbaric modus operandi adopted by the Islamic State, which aims at a regressive enforcement of the practices of the medieval era, makes us believe in the position adopted by over hundred scholars that IS does not represent Islam and is, indeed, an aberration. On the other, the decision of the Al-Azhar not to infidelize IS on the ground that its members are practicing Muslims who have expressed their confession of faith through the shahada leads to more serious questions. If the articulation of the confession of shahada by Muslims protects them from being branded as kafirs, then how can the IS practice takfirism and declare the Shias and the Sufis, who have also expressed shahada by reciting the kalima as non-believers? On this count, could the respected ulama (the learned ones), like those in Al-Azhar University, not infidelize IS for questioning the belief of Muslims who have clearly expressed their confession of faith?

As regards the shahada itself, this religious creed involves two facets. First, it must affirm the absolute unity of the transcendent and second, it must affirm the existence of a way of life that reflects this unity and assists mankind to draw near to it. In the context of Islam, this creed is known as la ilaha illa’Llahh (the dual testimony that there is no deity save god) [tawahid] and Muhammadun rasulu’llah (Muhammad is his final messenger) [nubbuwah]. In other words, when one refers to the kalima, one speaks of doctrine and practice. The aforementioned dictions of the shahada that reverberate and metamorphose the lives of Muslims represent a totalized abstraction of the theology of Islam. The first of these two dictions is a testimony that affirms the cosmic integrity of the metaphysical and the other diction is a testimony that shows the path toward that very cosmic unity (Shalabi, 1986, p. 5, 8).

The shahada, then, is an ingenuous declaration of the revelation of the cosmic knowledge emanating from the metaphysical source that manifests as the unity of the divine. This is disseminated to the believers through the messenger of god, the Prophet Muhammad. It also asserts the undisputed authority of one god with whom no other entity of this universe manifests in any form, image, or icon that can be placed in a parallel trajectory. One cannot associate any kind of partnership with the divine, as the notion of any incarnation of god is also totally rejected. The answer of humans to this divine message lies in their honest compliance to the rightful path laid down in the teachings of Islam.

As the universality of cosmic oneness is incontestable, the road, by means of which humans would reach that unity, is also determined by a sense of deontological ethics (Eck, 2005, p. 27). Even if we situate this issue in the perspective of Sunni theology, the question of iman (belief) and kufr (unbelief) is embodied within the doctrinal framework of the shahada. The shahada, in this sense, is the affirmation of a Muslim’s iman and the denial of the monotheistic assertion of the tawhid (unity of god) and rejection of the prophecy of Muhammad amounts to kufr. In accordance with this, irrespective of diverse sectarian ontologies, every Muslim is part of the common monotheistic cosmic imagination, received through the prophecy of Muhammad. Hence, in terms of the foundational canons of confessional religion, which is based on faith and scriptures, the Shias and Sufis, who not only express their confession of faith, but also pray in the direction of the qiblah like other Muslims, also form an integral part of Islam.

In this regard, it must be noted that the very question of belief and unbelief became acute at the end of the period of the righteous caliphs in the seventh century, owing to the rise of the Kharijites, an extremist group that resorted to declare anyone as infidel for everything that they considered to be a sin. The Kharijite conviction insisted that belief should always reflect in amal (action) and hence, the difference between a Muslim and kafir was determined by a person’s tangible action toward the community of the faithful. In response to this, the Murji’ite theologians argued that as the extent of faith cannot be measured, any action of the individuals cannot be considered as a parameter for defining who is a Muslim and who is not. Thus, as the quantitative view of the faith was ruled out, the basic confession of faith became central to the definition of a Muslim. In order to counter the takfiri approach of the Kharijites, the ulama during the Umayyad rule, who were influenced by the Murji’ite theology, also declared that anyone who prayed in the direction of the qibla cannot be branded as an infidel (Goldziher, 1981, pp. 75–76).

Situating the contemporary problematique of defining true Muslims and differentiating them from unbelievers, it has been argued that today, every Muslim, whether deriving his/her religious identity as ascribed, chosen, or declared and whether identifying as a Shia, Sunni, Sufi, or a part of any other sect, all commonly agree upon Islam’s arkanal (five pillars), which are the five fundamental actions that need to be performed by all Muslims irrespective of their sectarian affiliations. These fundamental actions are the two testimonies of shahada (confession of faith), salat (prayer), sawm (fasting during Ramadan), zakat (compulsory benefaction), and the hajj (pilgrimage to the Mecca). Each person is individually responsible for these actions, separate from general ethics and interpersonal relations (Rippin, 2005, p. 104).

As regards the different principles underlying aqida (creed), there are, of course, doctrinal, theological, philosophical, philological, and hermeneutic differences among the Muslim sects. Such differences, however, do not pertain to any scriptural foundations, phenomenology of the message of the prophet of Islam, or the practice of the religion by the sahabah (first generation of Muslims), who were the companions of the prophet. Rather, these differences exist because of the cognitive and intellectual dissonance which forms an ontological part of human mental faculty. For instance, the Shias include in their kalima, “Ali (R.A.) is a friend of god.” They also have jurisprudential differences with the Sunnis in terms of combining the prayers of noon/afternoon and evening/night during hajj and travel and also do not fold hands while performing namaz.

Hence, to engage in the interpretation of Islam as a faith from the perspective of the contemporary world of Muslims implies that one should make a clear differentiation between the functionalist and metaphysical dimension of religion itself and that such a distinction should also be placed in the context of diverse sociohistorical circumstances with which they interact (Nasr, 1987, p. 75). In terms of the anthropology of Islam, the analysis of Lukens-Bull’s may be considered. He says that the truly Islamic interpretation of the religion of Islam is one’s total surrender to the authority of the divine and all believers would consent to this definition. However, the conditions under which believers may differ on the question of interpreting Islam can merely be visible in the distinct definitions that they may frame, in order to describe as to what are the modes by which a believer can surrender to god. In other words, such differences may arise only under the circumstances in which there exist inconsistencies in the understanding of the believers, pertaining to the ways in which an individual can become a true Muslim (Lukens-Bull, 1999, p. 10). In this context, the Qur’an (2:115) itself has stated: “To Allah belongs the East and the West: wither-so-ever ye turn, there is the presence of Allah, for Allah is all-embracing, all-knowing” (Ali, 1999, p. 6).

The IS does not seem to acknowledge this and in its grand narrative of the canons of confessional religion, Shias and Sufis are outside the fold of the prescribed framework of faith. To substantiate upon this, IS attempts to prove its dogmatic religious doctrine by invoking monolithic patterns of ritualistic practices such as the performing of the prayer. One example of this was the infamous killing of three unarmed Muslim truck drivers on a highway in 2013 by Abu Waheeb, who went on to become an IS commander soon after. Waheeb put these men to death, on suspect of their being Shi’a, for the mere reason that they failed to precisely answer his inquiry on the number of rak’ahs (prostrations) to be performed while indulging in prayers through the day. The video of the killings went on to form part of the IS online propaganda (AFP, 2013).

On its part, the method of prayer among Muslims presents itself in multifaceted forms, owing to variations in cultural geographies, linguistic cartographies, sectarian linkages, and everyday experiences of believers across the world. This has largely been the result of the globalization of Muslim communities and Islam’s encounter with modernity, which has engendered structural transformations in the patterns of lived religion that manifests in diversities pertaining to ritualistic practices. These changes may be reflected in the number of times that Muslims perform the prayer, determination of the direction of qibla, and even critical debates on the need to change the designated day for weekly congregation from Friday to Sunday (Rippin, 2005, pp. 260–262). However, the doctrinal rationale of IS overtly emphasizes upon the need to practice such rituals in a manner which according to it are considered as universal. Any discrepancy in this regard for IS would amount to the questioning of the very foundational underpinnings of a Muslim’s confession of faith. Thus, the IS has had an orthopractic vision of Islam as a belief.

The IS clung to its reductionist perspective on Islam, even as the Qur’an clearly warns believers to restrain from coercing fellow Muslims toward declaration of their confessional identity. The Qur’an (2:256) states: “Let there be no compulsion in religion: truth stands clear from error. Whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah, has grasped the most trustworthy hand [which] never breaks” (Ali, 1999, p. 14). Apart from this, the Qur’anic notion of a religious community is founded on the notion of a transcendental and spiritual unity of all Muslims called ummah and not any prescription of the modes of violent assertion of confessional identity based on certain didactic formulations on religion as a performative action. The Qur’an claims that all the Muslims have been created and organized into an organic ensemble of the ummah. It states (2:143) that “Thus have we made of you an Ummah justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations and the Messenger a witness over yourselves” (Ali, 1999, p. 8).

On this basis, it may be stated that all forms of tangentially constructed cleavages among Muslims are based on distinct ritualistic interpretations; diversities of history and tradition; competing sectarian ontologies; the multiple hermeneutics of signs and symbols of the religion and its prophet; and the contradictory theologies of belief and unbelief, and find no roots in the scriptures of Islam. The Qur’anic conception of a unified ummah signifies the metaphysical oneness of all believers, with the prevalent contours of cleavages in the community being mere human innovations. Such a conception entirely negates the validity of the IS actions, which are performed on the pretext that they are directed toward safeguarding pure Islam by contesting all forms of unbelief, indicating that such actions are grossly un-Islamic and do not find any credence in its holy book. Thus, any scriptural defense that has been provided by IS to corroborate its actions, of targeting people on sectarian and religious lines in the name of dealing with kufr, amounts to a hermeneutic distortion and corrupting of the message of the Qur’an.

However, the IS has, throughout its existence, atrociously advocated misplaced notions of the spirit of Islam by misinterpreting the Qur’an. Through distortions, it has turned the concept of kufr against fellow Muslims and attempted to justify its barbaric deeds with the help of the euphemy of the abode of pure Islam. For IS, this notion of pure Islam means the confessional identity of being a Muslim, that is, the declaration of aqida (creed), must correspond with explicitly charted amal (actions) in the community of believers, implying that the believers’ faith must be proven. It is exactly to carry out this very task of differentiating between belief/unbelief and the true Muslim/apostate that IS has claimed to be fighting. In defense of this, IS chief al-Baghdadi has stated:

O’ Muslims! Do not think the war that we are waging is the Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it’s the Muslims’ war altogether. It’s the war of every Muslim in every place and the Islamic State is merely the spearhead in this war. It is but the war of the people of faith against the people of disbelief; so march forth to your war, O’ Muslims (Dabiq, 2015, p. 54).

In this regard, it has been argued that an obsessive devotion to the five pillars of faith itself has rendered Muslims to be detached from the actual spirit of the Qur’anic message and has tended to reduce Islam to become merely a cult (Yunus, 2012).

IS and Its False Definition of Unbelief

To analyzes any doctrinal question in Islam, we need to refer to the Qur’an that has been regarded as a firm basis of undoubted authenticity to understand the essence of the message of Islam (Rodinson, 1996, p. x). Besides, it has also been acknowledged that the Qur’an is a divine script that has been transmitted to humans in the very form in which it was originally revealed to the Prophet and which was methodized and sanctioned by him. The contemporary manifestation of the Qur’an is regarded as the mushaf or the very foundational manuscript, the ontology of which could be attributed to the phenomenological know-how of the Prophet himself (Burton, 1977, pp. 239–240).

On the basis of this, we must understand as to how the Qur’an itself deals with the question of belief and unbelief. The Qur’an (4:94) states:

O’ ye who believe when ye go abroad in the cause of Allah, investigate carefully and say not to anyone who offers you a salutation: thou art not of a believer coveting the perishable goods of this life: with Allah are prophets and spoils abundant. Even thus were ye yourselves before till Allah conferred on you his favours: therefore carefully investigate (Ali, 1999, p. 32).

What the Qur’an indicates here is that until we know the truth, we would not be sure of apostates, heretics, or hypocrites (Popkin, 1979, p. 8). Such an ambiguity prevails because any human intervention at exploring as to who is a true believer and who is an infidel would always be marred by indeterminacy.

Thus, in so far as the question of dealing with non-believers is concerned, the Qur’an explicitly states that it should rest with god and not with humans. The Qur’an (18:29) states: “Say, the truth is from your Lord: let him who will believe and let him who will reject it” (Ali, 1999, p. 107). The verses II: 217, 4:90, 5:54 and 59, 16:108 and 47:25, of the Qur’an condemn apostasy. However, these verses have not canonized any form of a concrete penal consequence that Muslims may have to face, if they become apostates. Such a ruling of the Qur’an holds significance, at least in the context of the mortal life of the material man who is embodied in the temporal world of objective realities (Saeed & Saeed, 2004, p. 57). Meaning that any specific worldly castigation for kufr does not exist there and the handling of the issue of unbelief should rest with the divine authority, to be decided only by him on the day of judgment (Taylor, 1967, p. 199). In this regard, the proponents of the Murji’ite school of Islamic philosophy argued that imparting of judgment on any fellow believers on the question of their faith is not part of the fundamental right of a Muslim. It is only the cosmic authority embodied in the divine self, who has that right and hence, any doctrinal contestations among believers should be postponed to the realm of the post-material world, to be sorted out by god himself (Akyol, 2015).

This phenomenon gains further credence when one notes that no verse of the Qur’an advocates capital punishment for actions that form part of unbelief (Peters & Vries, 1976, p. 14). The Sharia, which is the foundational source of law in Islam, also guarantees freedom of belief and upholds the right of every human to embrace whatever ideas and doctrines they wish, even if those ideas and doctrines conflict with that of the group. On this count, no one may exert pressure to get another to reveal his/her religious beliefs. This is to say that the Sharia clearly prohibits inquisitorial methods (al-Awwa cited in Asad, 2009, pp. 39–40). For the classic Sharia conception, the strength of personal conviction is said to be a matter between the individual and his god or baynahu wa bayna rabbih (Asad, 2009, p. 42).

Overall, the foundational Islamic scriptures and the canonical texts do not call upon Muslims to fight against people in the name of apostasy. On this count, takfirism or the public declaration of someone as a non-believer has no scriptural basis in Islam. Yet, unfortunately, many Islamic scholars consider unbelief as a question of religious decree (Sharfi, 2005, p. 67). In response to such misplaced considerations, it may be stated that the question of belief and unbelief, the use of sectarian ontologies for defining what pure or diluted Islam is all about, and the issue of whether apostates should be punished with death are all part of human inventions. These issues have been instrumentally created through interventions of radical Islamic movements of the classical era like that of the Kharijites, conservative schools of Islamic jurisprudence and theology like the Hanbalis, and classical Islamic philosophies such as Salafism.

The defining traits of the Kharijites were as follows: (a) khuruj (revolt) against the legally sanctioned authority of the state, (b) naming fellow Muslims as takfir (apostates) for crimes or a particular position that nowhere amounts to apostasy in accordance with the strictest definition of the Qur’an, and (c) terrorizing people by engaging in mass violence and destruction or fasad fi’l-Ard (Surkheel, 2015). The Kharijites adhered to a dogmatic notion of Islam and regarded only those as believers who rigorously followed the canons of Islamic religiosity, subsequently apostatizing those who failed to do so (Melchert, 2006, p. 83). Iman (belief) then was to be articulated in terms of objective actions in the community, rather than merely symbolizing it through abstract metaphysical feelings in the heart.

Declaring such members of the community who did not adhere to this notion as non-believers, the Kharijites radicalized the view that such apostates are legitimate targets of Islamic jihad. In this manner, the Kharijites were the first to initiate the debate over the notion of Muslim identity and weave the same into the competing discourse of defining as to who are true Muslims and distinguish them from hypocrites/non-believers. This kind of a divisive role of the Kharijites had a fractious impact on early Muslim society and the influence of this destructive legacy reverberates even in the contemporary age in the form of the refractory deeds of extremist organizations such as the IS (Rippin, 2005, pp. 75–76).

As far as the Hanbali school of Islamic law is concerned, it is considered as deeply conservative and extremely orthodox, when analogized with the other three moderate schools of Shaf’i, Hanafi, and Maliki (An-Nàim, 2007, p. 83). Apart from being a school of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanbalis have also been considered a school of theology and it still holds on to this dual identity. The most fundamental feature of the Hanbalite theology is that they staunchly reject kalam (rational arguments) when dealing with issues which they consider as incontestable religious truths (Watt, 1985, p. 99). The Hanbali jurists and theologians affirm that the real essence of religion lies in the uncritical acceptance of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In this manner, they emphasize on mere reaffirmation of religious dogmas and do not accentuate upon their rationalistic interpretation (Watt, 1985, p. 99).

According to the founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic law, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the correct belief was crucially important. Such a conception pertaining to the precision of belief was governed largely by an orthopractic formulation of the religion of Islam in which the sense of coeval among the believers was primarily predicated upon their basic acceptance of the prescribed codes and laws of Islamic religiosity. These prescriptions had a didactic logic and they underpinned the modes in which believers performed the rituals like prayer. For the Hanbalis, such prescriptions were like carvings on the stone for the believers who should follow them without any hint of deviation (Melchert, 2006, p. 82, 87). Viewed in this regard, Ibn Hanbal can be considered a major proponent of the doctrine that advocates the making of a clear distinction between believers and non-believers, a religious endeavor that is founded upon the paradigms set by the Islamic creed. The Hanbali jurists and theologians also believe in the granting of death penalty to Muslims who do not pray and consider them as apostates (Melchert, 2006, p. 122).

The Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence has had a major influence upon the evolution of a conservative branch of Islamic philosophy and theology. Known as Salafism, this branch of theology holds a profound ontological connection with the ideas of the Hanbali theologian, Ibn Taymiyyah, who profusely depended upon the hadith methodology for his phenomenological interpretations of the Islamic way of life (Melchert, 2006, p. 81). His thoughts have also had a paradigmatic influence upon the philosophy of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the ideologue whose name embodies in it the intellectual substratum of the Wahhabi movement. Taymiyyah has also been regarded by many as the spiritual guru of revolutionary cult in Sunni Islam, owing to which, he has been called the apotheosis of Islamic resurgence and a model to be followed by all revivalists, radical revolutionaries, reformers, and vigilantes in Islam (Sivan, 1985, p. 96). He staunchly opposed the mystical traditions propounded by Sufism and called for a return to the orthodox Islamic beliefs. Based on his puritanical ideas relating to the conduct of Islam, Taymiyyah contends that the actual ontology of government lies in its right for the legitimate use of force.

In a Hobbesian sense, Taymiyyah argues that if men had to live a peaceful life as members of the society and if the society was to remain as an organic ensemble and not be disrupted by the natural egoism of humans generated by their hedonistic pursuits, a government’s coercive apparatus was very crucial. This was a natural necessity and hence, it emerged as an organic process of arrogation that is legitimated by a contract of association. The ruler, thus, had the lawful right to coercively exact political obligation because even an authoritarian ruler was far better than fitna (anarchy) and the total disorganization of society (Hourani, 1983, p. 19). Taymiyyah also affirmed that jihad is as important as prayer or fasting, for the purpose of the formation of a Sharia-based Islamic State. Anyone who offers resistance to this noble cause, in his view, becomes a justifiable candidate for death penalty (Jansen, 1987, p. 392).

Salafis are the followers of Ibn Taymiyyah. They have called for the total jettisoning of historical fiqh and made a case for interpreting Islam from foundational sources. Advocating the need for doing away with what they regard as the divisiveness of the four major Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, they contend that the followers of Islam must be allowed to access and interpret the original scripts and apply the hermeneutic deductions derived out of them as the guiding light for their lives (Reese, 2012, p. 72). Salafis are also Sunnis and ardently critique Shiite tradition and contend that the Shias disregard the companions of the prophet, affirm that they have tampered with the original message of the Qur’an, deny the hadith, and revere the family of the prophet (Zinu, 1998, p. 4).

Salafis also condemn the Sufis on the grounds that they engage in devotion toward graves, celebrate sainthood, and believe in the theology of divine incarnation (Zinu, 1998, p. 4). These practices, for Salafis, constitute gross aberrations of Islam’s puritanical version and symbolize a regression toward pre-Islamic polytheism. Called jahiliyyah in Islamic historiography, this phase was marked by ignorance, barbarism, and a recalcitrant challenge to the absolute authority of god (Kumar, 2015, p. 593). Salafism, thus, regards any ijtihad (innovation) as bid`a (heresy). For the Salafis then, the canons of Islamic religiosity must reflect the foundational messages that are embodied in the Qur’an and the authentic Sunnah (Kumar, 2015, p. 593).

Yet another version of this conservative idea is of the Wahhabis. They are, as afore-stated, inspired by the ideas of al-Wahhab, a follower of Taymiyyah. Trained in accordance with the postulates of the Hanbali school, al-Wahhab’s philosophy is also referred to as neo-Hanbalite theology. The rigor and vitality imparted to Hanbalism by Taymiyyah is regarded as the major impetus toward the dawning of the Wahhabi movement (Watt, 1985, p. 146). The key goal of the Wahhabi movement was to convoke believers through their missionary endeavors to a precise comprehension of tawhid. By doing this, they aspired to revive the premedieval purity of the practices of Islam, cleansing it from alien non-Islamic beliefs and customs (Knysh, 2004, pp. 6–7).

In the twentieth century, Salafism’s radical overtones can be located in the ideas of three Islamic neo-fundamentalists, Hassan al-Banna, the progenitor of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Mawlana Mawdudi, the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, and Sayyid Qutb, whose radical philosophy embodies a fusion of the ideas of al-Banna and Mawdudi. All the three ideologues referred to the fundamental sources of Islam and attempted to identify the ways in which contemporary Islam should deal with the challenges posed by modernity. Al-Banna stated that there existed a deep-felt necessity for the revival of foundational principles and postulates that determine the broad contours of the practice of pure Islam. This is an exigency for him, if the process of creating a symphony between the materialist structuration of the modern life and the logic of higher ethical ideals embedded in the transcendental epistemology of deen (the Islamic way of life) has to be initiated. Such a process of reconciliation, for al-Banna, is the ultimate antecedent toward achieving the goal of total Islamization of this world (al-Banna, 1992, p. 92). He further upheld the view that armed jihad must be treated as a deontological commitment on the part of an individual which was to be followed as a compulsory duty by all Muslims.

Al-Banna contends that jihad would permeate and disseminate into all parts of the globe in a manner that modern values like secularism and individualism had descended from the West to the Muslim world. Considering the decadent state of Islamic societies in his times as the result of its encounter with modernity, al-Banna accords that decadence to the dislodging of the Muslim ummah from its Qur’anic roots (Carle, 2011, p. 60). He also preached that the existence of Islam does not assume proper meaning if it remains a mere subjective belief system in the hearts of its followers. Rather, the objectification of this metaphysical faith in a Sharia-based Islamic State is an imperative for the teleological realization of the primordial moral abstractions inherent in the ontology of Islam, which have been sermonized in an exemplary manner by its prophet (Carle, 2011, p. 60).

As regards Mawlana Mawdudi, it may be noted that his ideas on the location and relevance of jihad in Islamic thought have factored deeply in shaping the tone and texture of contemporary radical Islam. His defense of the role and significance of jihad is substantiated by his indulgence in a rigorous textual hermeneutics of the Qur’an. According to him, on account of the failure of all forms of persuasion done through years of teaching, the prophet had to resort to coercive methods. After this, the power of his sword eradicated all kinds of evil and mischief. It also purified hearts by extirpating all the dirt and darkness of the soul.

By the use of the sword, the prophet also succeeded in removing the ignorance that had enveloped the people of Arabia and injected a fresh source of knowledge in their minds. This endeavor of the prophet also acted as a medication and cured them to get rid of their arrogance. Such arrogance had prevented people from coming out of the darkness of ignorance and to embrace the light of truth. Owing to this, the prophet was able to transform these people into individuals with the highest degree of humility (Mawdudi, 1998, p. 10).

For Mawdudi, the primary objective of jihad in Islam remained to purge all traces of un-Islamic rule from this earth and facilitate the setting up of a Sharia-based Islamic State. The rule of such a state should not be confined to a parochial conception of fixity of political territoriality. Rather, through a universal Islamic revolution, the authority of Islam should be expanded globally. Thus, for Mawdudi, the cartographic imagination of the dominion of Islam was based on a grand cosmopolitan vision of a linearly arranged monolithic world, with the precepts of Islam being the supreme force of government, in an earth devoid of any synthetically constructed countenance of spatial anthropology (Mawdudi, 1998, p. 10).

Sayyid Qutb has been recognized widely as the ideological antecedent of militant jihad and has been elevated to the adored status of a martyr who dedicated himself to the cause of contemporary Islamic revivalism (Esposito, 2002, p. 8). Every jihadi movement that is located in Sunni political ontology owes its radical ideas to the intellectual legacy of Qutb (Armstrong, 2000, p. 170). Similar to Taymiyyah, Qutb’s imagery of Muslim societies is delineated in terms of a Manichean divide between two diametrically opposite camps which are inhabited by good believers on the one hand and the bad believers on the other. Good believers on the righteous side of this Manichean divide are ones devoted to god’s rule, while bad believers on the negative side of this divide disrespect divine commandments and belong to the party of Satan. For Qutb, there existed only these two extremes and there was nothing called as a middle ground (Esposito, 2002, pp. 58–59). According to him, Islam cannot exist in those lands where a Sharia-based Islamic rule is not established as a dominant system of government. Such a place is not dar-ul-Islam (the abode of Islam) where Islam is practiced as deen (Qutb, 1978, p. 239).

Qutb further stated that the Qur’an should not only be the foundational source for determining the meaning of religious life, but also to delineate the principles of government, political life, economic activities, and all other dimensions of human existence (Qutb, 1978, pp. 32–33). He further states that the establishment of an Islamic government is a sacred imperative and hence, there is no alternative that can substitute it. In other words, an Islamic government should be established under any circumstance, even if it had to be done by the use of force. The only space in this world that could be designated as dar-ul-Islam is that particular place where a Sharia-based Islamic State is established. For Qutb, only those laws are legitimate which are framed according to the Sharia, as the definition of authority was merely divine and government was based on consensus and consultation among Muslims. All other parts of this world, for Qutb, were dar-ul-Harb (the zone of conflict) (Qutb, 1978, p. 221). Armed struggle manifest in the doctrine of jihad was the only means through which such an idea of a new Islamic order could be actualized. Since this struggle was a kind of divinely ordained endeavor for Qutb, those Muslims who declined to participate in this struggle were to be declared as the enemies of god. They had to be named as apostates, who deserved to be excommunicated as takfir and killing them in a war along with other enemies of god was fully justified (Esposito, 2002, pp. 60–61).

The most apparent and comprehensive articulation of the notion of this new jihad may be found in the ideas of Muhammad al-Farag, who drew upon the thoughts of Taymiyyah, al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Qutb. Farag argued that the situational compulsions leading to the decadent state of Muslim societies were engendered by those Muslims who had misled the community to believe that the proper form of jihad was that of the nonviolent one. Islam’s revival then, for Farag, could only be possible if the true meaning of jihad is retrieved (Jansen, 1986, p. 161). He further affirms that jihad as the fundamental duty in the cause of god and a primary instrument for the promotion of religion has been completely neglected and undermined by the learned ulama of Islam in this age. Hence, to revive its real essence, it has to be elevated to the status of the sixth pillar of Islam. Farag also states that polytheism from this world can be completely eradicated only through the coercive power of jihad (Jansen, 1986, p. 161).

As regards Muslim societies, Farag further stated that the major diseases that have plagued them are unbelief and apostasy. For him, the present rulers of Muslim states are not pure Muslims. They merely bear Muslim names and engage in superficial practice of Islamic rituals like fasting and prayer. On this count, they are apostates (Jansen, 1986, p. 161). The punishment for such apostates, in Farag’s view, is the snatching away of all rights including even their right to live. The putridity of the system in which such apostate rulers are governing is so deep that nonviolent methods, in no manner, would help in the accomplishment of these goals. What is the solution then, for Farag? The remedy for such entropy lies in the establishment of an Islamic State and the only antidote, according to Farag, here was militant jihad (Jansen, 1986, p. 193).

It is the ideology and philosophical traditions like these which are now being reinvented by the present-day apostles of the neo-Kharijite, neo-Wahhabi, and neo-Hanbali ideologues, philosophers, and jurists to serve their political interests. This has made way for groups like the IS to validate their barbaric acts of terror on the pretext that they are following the scriptural and liturgical traditions of the religion of Islam. Armed with such divisive ideologies, ISIS has attempted at accomplishing its goals by dividing the Muslim society on sectarian lines and engaged in killing people in the name of fighting unbelief. Through the use of the takfiri method, IS has attempted to project the religion of Islam as an instrument of terror. By doing this, it seeks to portray religion as what philosopher Bertrand Russell called the genealogy of horror, an instrument of savagery and to a considerable extent, a source for fomenting fear of an obscure entity (Russell, 2009, p. 577). The phenomenon of the divine cosmic self and that of the religion which is being framed by IS through such barbaric modes parallels what Russell designated as the idea of god and faith, in the manner of their articulation under oriental despotisms. Such notions of religion and the divine, according to Russell, do not get qualified to be acceptable to men having any hint of free will and rational choice. It, hence, falls below the sense of self respect of such individuals (Russell, 2009, p. 577).

The IS has done this even as the Qur’an and the prophet, Muhammad, preached Islam to be a flexible religion, which perfectly suits the temperament of people, rather than making it full of restrictions, hardships, and burdens. In the Qur’an, god has been projected as the apotheosis of compassion and kindness and not as a brute tyrant who is unforgiving of apostates, heretics, hypocrites, blasphemers, or polytheists, as it is being portrayed by the IS. God has been shown as placing means to put an end to all fears and troubles of human life, so that individuals can practice their religion with minimum difficulties (Yahya, 2004, p. 11).

Contrary to this, IS has violated the true essence of the Qur’an by projecting it as a code of violence and a kind of script that symbolizes the Kantian defense of death penalty. By viewing the Qur’an as a constitutional law sanctioning death penalty for crimes like apostasy, ISIS has justified its theology of violence, based on an apology in favor of public discourse on religion that revolves around themes pertaining to confessional religious identity. Here, we may consider Adam Seligman’s argument that the inability to make sense of faith on the foundations of critical enquiry always leads to pure fideism. It means, on one hand, that religion emerges to be a belief which rests only on faith and on the other, it hinges on a kind of moderated doubt (Seligman, 2004, p. 125). More significantly, to talk of capital punishment on the question of belief and unbelief in the age of cosmopolitan democratic, polyethnic, multireligious, and racially plural nation states, based on a one-dimensional interpretation of a particular faith, is anachronistic. Such acts of extremist organizations like ISIS render religious claims to be dubbed, in the Durkheimian sense, as a mere hallucination of unenlightened minds that are holding on to their ignorance (Durkheim, 1995, p. 17).

Most crucially, since we are living in a modern public space in which secularization has led to the privatization of religion, the claims of religion toward having a sole custody over eternal metaphysical realities have been circumscribed to the private sphere, considerably obliterating such assertions from the domain of the shared public space. The intellectual ground for such a transformation was initially laid down by John Locke. He affirmed that as religion occupied the subjective realm of individuals’ beliefs, religious conformity cannot be ensured by way of coercive imposition of dogma on their thinking and imagination, mainly because the ontology of belief cannot be entirely regulated by the whims of the human will (Seligman, 2004, p. 125). In accordance with this, any violent imposition of belief on others will amount to barbarism and atavistic behavior. This is exactly what the IS, despite eroding, has been doing. Through takfiri methods of determining the borderline between belief and unbelief, it has not only corrupted the spirit of tolerance and eclecticism that Islam signifies, but also seeks to metamorphose the Muslim societies into a sort of dystopia.

Conclusion

The question of belief and unbelief for the IS has been tied up to a kind of soteriological epistemology of religion. In this perspective, Islam, in the vision of IS, is not only the manifestation of the final message of god, but also embodies the esoteric truth pertaining to the apocalypse. In accordance with this view, IS itself is the agent that would lead toward the fruition of the eschatological prognostication pertaining to the end of the world and hence, its declaration of the caliphate and a bid to establish pure Islam is a kind of teleological culmination of this prediction. Armed jihad then, for IS, assumes a kind of deontological significance and it becomes an action that has to be performed by all Muslims to purify their religion from apostasy as the world is heading toward qayamat (the day of judgment). The code of conduct that determines this ideology of jihad is the divine laws embedded in the Sharia and the IS seeks to keep it uncorrupted from any rational human interpretation till the world reaches the stage of ma’ad (resurrection). The IS holds a dogmatic position on these ideas and by doing so, reduces the divine message of the Qur’an, transmitted through the metaphysical faculty of the prophet, Muhammad, into a hermetic doctrine.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

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