The Role of Systemic and Leadership Factors in Influencing Malaysia’s Joint Military Involvementin the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen,2015–2018

Introduction

Malaysia’s relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have been evolving since the former’s independence in 1957 until the present. The pattern of the relations, initially bound to narrow diplomatic and traditional religious linkages, has expanded into other fields of interactions. During the 1960s–1970s, bilateral relations were mostly one-way communication where Malaysia needed KSA’s diplomatic recognition for the newly formed state called “Federation of Malaysia” on 16 September 1963. As a new country, Malaysia received substantial financial assistance from KSA to finance its socioeconomic projects. Apart from this, with Malaysia being a Muslim-majority country, KSA is important for fulfilling religious obligations such as Hajj (pilgrimage) and the center for religious education (Idris, 2015).

Nonetheless, from the 1980s onwards, particularly when Tun Dr. Mahathir (1981–2003) was the fourth Prime Minister, the degree of Malaysia–Saudi Arabia relations had developed from one-way to two-way communication. Under Mahathir, Malaysia had ceased to receive KSA’s financial assistance, and instead, both had undertaken various joint socioeconomic projects and investment ventures. This was partly due to KSA’s acknowledgment of Malaysia as one of the most rapidly developing nations (Idris, 2015). Under the sixth Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Razak (2009–2018), Malaysia’s relations with KSA had moved a step further when both countries were involved in a few joint military training exercises in Saudi Arabia. However, it became controversial when the Barisan Nasional (BN)-led government, under Najib, agreed to deploy Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) through an operation called Ops Yemen II to help KSA in its military operations in Yemen. In more ways than one, the involvement of Malaysia in Ops Yemen II can be considered unprecedented in the sense that it appears to be going against the country’s neutrality and non-alignment approach, especially in dealing with other country’s domestic matters.

Hence, this study’s main objective is to critically analyze why and how the Malaysian government, under Najib, decided to send MAF to participate in the KSA-led military operations. By using the foreign policy framework of developing countries, this study examines (a) the background of the Yemen civil war, which brought about KSA-led military intervention, (b) how the Malaysian government made a contentious decision pertaining to the Ops Yemen II, and (c) the reasons why Malaysia agreed to join KSA-led military operations despite its Non-Alignment Policy.

The Yemen Civil War and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-led Military Intervention

The Arab Spring, portrayed as the people’s voice to form a new democratic government, refers to a series of intense political revolutions in the Middle East in the 2010s that first began in Tunisia. Most of the time, it had resulted in often rapid, forceful, and violent attempts to change the government in a number of the Arab countries, including Yemen. While it was a success in Tunisia, it turned to be a failure in Yemen. The handover of leadership from President Ali Abdullah Saleh to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in 2011 to start a new chapter for the country had instead plunged the country into chaos, not to mention one of the worst humanitarian crises ever (Amnesty International, 2015; BBC News, 2020; Keşvelioğlu, 2018).

President Hadi was first entrusted to peacefully facilitate the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that consisted of several factions that included the Southern Separatist Movement and the Houthis. It was internationally supervised by the “Ten Group” that comprised of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, and China, as well as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and a European Union delegation. The primary objectives of NDC were (a) to draft a new constitution of Yemen and (b) to hold a national election. NDC, however, crumbled under various intense pressures. In 2014, as the negotiation process stalled, the Houthis took advantage of the unstable situation to take over Sana’a, the capital city of Yemen and effectively removed President Hadi from power (Schmitz, 2014).

In 2015, President Hadi fled Yemen and sought refuge in KSA and requested the latter’s support to restore his government and retake the capital from the Houthis. Upon President Hadi’s request, KSA and its coalitions comprising Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, UAE, and Qatar (which left the coalition in June 2017) began to launch airstrikes and sent ground troops to Yemen between March and August 2015. The USA, the UK, and France provided arms and logistical and intelligence support (BBC News, 2020; Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; Dijkstal, 2019; Preve, 2020).

At the onset of the Yemeni military operation, KSA officials estimated that it would last only a few weeks (BBC News, 2020). However, the conflict continues until the present. It has become more complicated as many parties have been drawn into it, including the southern separatist movement or The Southern Transitional Council (STC). There had been a few peace negotiations, including the Stockholm Agreement 2018 and the Riyadh Agreement 2019, but all came to no avail. The situation had become worse when STC announced its self-rule in southern Yemen in April 2020 (Al-Jazeera, 2020).

For some analysts, KSA and its coalition have misread and underestimated the nature of the conflict in Yemen (Feierstein, 2019; Schmitz, 2014). With KSA making the most of Yemen conflict-related decisions, it gave too much of a focus on the threat of the Houthis. In reality, Yemen has been plagued by tribal conflicts and regime rivalries since the 1960s, including the North and South Yemen conflict. The fact is that the unification of Yemen, that is, between North and South Yemen, in 1990 was so fragile that it was just waiting to break apart again (Hill, 2017). The Arab Spring had inevitably re-instigated the conflict, and the military intervention marshaled by the KSA-led coalition proved to be a disastrous approach. Far from resolving it, KSA has escalated the conflict. It is no longer a conflict between the Houthis and the KSA-led coalitions, but it is more about the re-emergence of the old tussle between North and South Yemen or between the government of Hadi known as “Internationally Registered Government” (IRG) and STC as a whole. The temporary relocation of Hadi’s government from Sana’a to Aden has reignited the old conflict, with the Southerners now demanding autonomy under unified Yemen or an independent state based on the pre-1990 borders (Al-Hamdani & Lackner, 2020). With hindsight, the conflict management in Yemen is in dire need of a more comprehensive and wide-ranging approach than a military solution. As Malaysia had been indirectly and militarily involved in the KSA-led operation in Yemen, a critical analysis is necessary to understand the nature of such an involvement.

Malaysia’s Yemen Evacuation Operations

When the civil war began in Yemen, Malaysia, under the BN-led government, decided to evacuate several Malaysians, mostly students based in Yemen. Two evacuation operations were launched: Ops Yemen I and Ops Yemen II. Ops Yemen I began on 6 April 2015 involving 26 officers, 16 rank-and-file troops, and two C130 aircrafts to Riyadh. The first evacuation went smoothly, and 763 Malaysians were flown home from Yemen. It was considered a success as it was largely attributed to the nature of the Ops Yemen I itself, which was strictly to take Malaysians out of the war-torn country (Abdul Hamid, 2018; Sivanandam et al., 2018). It is interesting to note that, before Ops Yemen I, the government had initiated many preemptive evacuation operations. The earliest operations took place in March 2011 when 33 Malaysian students were evacuated because of worsening of the political situation in Yemen (Habib, 2011).

After completing Ops Yemen I on 11 June 2015, the BN-led government launched Ops Yemen II. It consisted of 27 officers and 62 rank-and-file troops and it was slightly different, as MAF was stationed in KSA based on a rotational basis for every 3 months that lasted about 3 years. MAF left KSA in September 2018. Defense Minister, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein categorically stated that the nature of Ops Yemen II was similar to Ops Yemen I. It was strictly meant for training exercises, evacuation, and disaster relief. However, the 3-year-long commitment of MAF and its involvement in KSA’s military exercises in 2016 along with other 19 countries had raised many eyebrows (Free Malaysia Today, 2017; Malay Mail, 2019; Official Portal Malaysian Armed Forces Headquarters (MAFHQ), 2016; Sivanandam et al., 2018).

Following MAF’s presence in KSA, allegedly playing a part in the ongoing Yemen Crisis, a contentious debate in Malaysia ensued. Through its President Brig Gen (Rtd) Mohamed Arshad Raji, the National Patriotic Association (NPA) began to question the nature of MAF’s presence in KSA openly. Although the purpose was mainly to participate in evacuation and disaster exercises, as mentioned earlier, NPA wanted the government to clarify under whose authority the government deployed MAF personnel abroad. It also demanded further clarifications on several outstanding issues such as the nature of Malaysia’s military agreements with KSA, the question of the approval status of the Jawatankuasa Panglima-Panglima (Generals Committee—JPP), and the financial obligation (Free Malaysia Today, 2017). The debate gained more traction and attention when the opposition parties, NGOs, and media took over the issue (Malay Mail, 2019; Palansamy, 2017; Today Online, 2018; Ulrichsen & Cafeiro, 2018).

The obscurity surrounding Ops Yemen II was finally made public when the then BN-government lost the 14th General Election (GE-14) to the opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH) in 2018. During the Parliament hearings in December 2018, former PH Deputy Defense Minister Liew Chin Tong revealed that Ops Yemen II assisted KSA military operations in Yemen, and that it was executed without the cabinet’s approval. In all, MAF was involved in 12 missions to transport explosives, spare parts, bullets, and other equipment that belonged to the KSA-led coalition within the Kingdom’s territory. MAF, however, was not involved in combat operations. In short, their role was restricted to providing logistical support to KSA Army. The total cost of Ops Yemen II was RM14.6 million (US$3.5 million approximately), with roughly RM1.5 million (US$360,000 approximately) in operational costs for each 3-month rotation (Sivanandam et al., 2018; Tan et al., 2018).

Upon winning GE-14 in May 2018, the PH-led government decided to withdraw MAF from KSA in September the same year. The PH-led government defended the decision stating that it was made in accordance with Malaysia’s Non-Alignment Policy. Moreover, it was not part of the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), of which Malaysia has been an active contributing member since 1960. More importantly, under the PH-led government, the Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu warned that Malaysia risked being indirectly dragged deeper into the Yemen conflict, more so since MAF was already stationed there (Malay Mail, 2019; Unit Komunikasi Strategik Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia, 2018). Taking all these into account, besides the lack of literature deliberating such involvement, this study seeks to analyze the factors that led the then BN-led government to send MAF to KSA despite its own Non-Alignment policy as well as for not being part of UNPKO. This study critically examines this issue based on the role of systemic and leadership factors, within the foreign policy framework, in influencing Malaysia’s decision to join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen during 2015–2018.

Conceptual Framework: Foreign Policy of Developing Countries

Foreign Policy is an important tool for every state to respond to certain issues or enhance state relations in the international system. Foreign policy can be defined as an abstract expression of relations between political entities, and it provides a platform for organized groups (states) to interact and interrelate with each other (Leira, 2019). There are, at least, two fundamental elements of foreign policy. The first is national objectives to be achieved, and the second is the means (resources) for achieving them. Both interact closely and become the perennial subject of statecraft. Thus, for some scholars, the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is the same (Adesina, 2017). However, such a foreign policy is indifferent, more so if it is mainly concerned with common practices such as enhancing diplomatic relations and broadening economic cooperation. Thus, foreign policy is certainly different in terms of the capability of great powers to influence and determine the foreign policy direction of small and developing countries (Nye, 2009).

Meanwhile, the most prominent models of foreign policy framework, particularly for developing states, along with the bureaucratic model (Brecher et al., 1969; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997; Snyder et al., 1962), are the preponderant influence of systemic structure, apart from the role of leadership. The systemic structure model dictates how a developing state, like Malaysia and KSA, has to subordinately act to the structure and pressures of the international political system. As realism theory puts it, the structure of the international political system is an anarchic-given world that forces every state to behave like a billiard ball game. In this anarchical world, only the stronger and bigger states will survive, as the famous phrase connotes “the survival of the fittest,” whereas a developing state has to succumb to the anarchical pressure, and it has no autonomous power in determining its foreign policy. This anarchical world was visibly manifested during the intense power rivalries of the Cold War era between the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union, and the post-Cold War era when the USA rose to be the sole hegemonic power without notable and strong challengers like the Soviet Union (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Dougherty & Pfaltzgrabb, 1996; Neack, 2003).

On the contrary, the leadership model espouses every state leader to have negotiating and persuasive power in dealing with certain issues or conflicts vis-à-vis systemic structure (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997; Korany, 1984). This could be linked to a few prominent leaders of developing and middle power countries such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Fidel Castro, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Sukarno where they were capable of maneuvering other states, including the USA and Soviet Union for the sake of their political interests.

For Malaysia, both the systemic pressure and leadership elements have enormously influenced the direction of its foreign policy since its independence in 1957. The systemic pressure has given less room for Malaysia to maneuver against great power rivalries, as demonstrated during the early phase of the Cold War era, where its stance was strictly bound to a pro-West policy. Nevertheless, heading toward the mid-1970s, Tun Razak, the second prime minister, surprised everyone by visiting China in 1974, at the height of the Cold War. Tun Razak’s visit had indirectly shown that Malaysia’s Non-Alignment was a serious driver of its foreign policy. More importantly, it showed that even a leader from a developing state did, to some degree, possess autonomous power and could navigate his or her own country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the systemic pressure of the international system.

From this historic moment, the leadership element, especially during the Tun Dr. Mahathir era (1981–2003), had continued to navigate Malaysia’s foreign policy. Scholars of Malaysia’s foreign policy are inclined to conclude that social constructivism theory could be the best theoretical approach in justifying the behavior and the character of the foreign policy formulation for a developing country like Malaysia (Guy, 2021; Nair, 1997; Saravanamuttu, 2010). This is because the theory allows leaders and government elites to “intersubjectively construct” with other domestic elements to produce the best foreign policy strategies and outputs. That said, the predominant presupposition that steadfastly upholds the systemic pressure (as an exogenous element) as the overriding factor over others in designing foreign policy decision-making has been extensively contested (Saravanamuttu, 2010).

Subsequently, as far as Tun Razak’s visit to China in 1974 is concerned, it was not decided by a single factor, that is, the leadership or domestic factors (economic opportunities) alone. It was rather intersubjectively connected. It was preceded by the visit of US President Richard Nixon to China 2 years earlier. In other words, the leader of the hegemonic state, in this case, the USA, had paved the way for other countries, including Malaysia, which was one of its allies, to have a diplomatic relation with China. Supposing that Nixon’s visit did not take place, it was very likely that Tun Razak would not have made the trip to Beijing. In addition to that, during the mid-1960s, when Malaysia was facing protests from Indonesia and the Philippines over the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman (the first Prime Minister) had broadened Malaysia’s diplomatic relations by touring Afro-Asian countries to secure their supports as well as by signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1967. Tunku had also visited some Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1969 to diversify further Malaysia’s economic partners (Saravanamuttu, 2010, pp. 87–99). In more ways than one, these early non-Western bloc engagements had provided some basic pathways for Tun Razak to introduce the Non-Alignment policy, whose main objective has been to strengthen Malaysia’s position by being friendly with all other countries irrespective of political ideologies.

Based on this assumption, this study admits that Tun Razak’s Non-Alignment policy and his bold visit to China could be regarded as the new era for Malaysia in guiding into becoming one of the developing countries with a big voice in the future. The Non-Alignment policy, along with other drivers, has enabled Malaysia to manage and address global systemic complexities and maintain political stability at a regional and domestic level. This could not be done without Malaysia’s foreign policy incorporating and responding well to the pressures of the systemic structure, leadership influence, and other domestic elements. Certainly, all these essential elements play a part in influencing Malaysia’s foreign policy decision-making, including the BN-led government’s decision to send MAF to Saudi Arabia.

Barisan Nasional Government’s Decision to Send Troops to Saudi Arabia

If Tun Razak had made significant transformations to Malaysia’s foreign policy by shifting from traditionally pro-West to Non-Alignment policy, his son Najib, the sixth Malaysian Premier, also marked another important turning point in the country’s foreign relations. While Tun Razak’s action was commended, Najib’s was hotly debated mostly because Malaysia had never been involved in any military operation overseas outside of the UN’s command or authorization, that is, UNPKO (Salleh, 2017). It certainly had brought about a lot of criticisms against Najib’s leadership and indirectly undermined Malaysia’s Non-Alignment policy at the global stage (Malay Mail, 2019; Malaysiakini, 2018; Today Online, 2018).

The presence of MAF in KSA had posed greater challenges for Najib’s government. Najib needed to justify his action not only to the international audience but also to people at home. Things were not getting any better when the action turned into a heated debate between the BN-led government and the oppositions in parliament. Worse, it had also drawn public chatter, particularly on the financial matter as the military operation implicated public fund (ICCTME Seminar Discussion, 2019; Malaysiakini 2018, 28 June).

In principle, by joining KSA’s military operations, Malaysia contradicted its Non-Alignment policy, more so since this had the high probability of creating misunderstandings on Malaysia’s global stance on the Yemen civil war, especially among Muslim and other Middle Eastern countries. Although BN Defense Minister, Hishamuddin had repeatedly reiterated that the Ops Yemen II was merely for evacuation and humanitarian purposes, as clarified by PH Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu that Malaysian army did not involve in any military attack in 2018, but the Ops Yemen II was heavily criticized for not seeking cabinet approval beforehand (Abdul Hamid, 2018; Al-Jazeera, 2018; Free Malaysia Today, 2017; Malay Mail, 2019; Malaysiakini, 2018). The presence of MAF in KSA for about 3 years had indirectly brought into question Malaysia’s stance in the Middle East conflict. Nonetheless, this decision did not significantly affect Kuala Lumpur’s diplomatic relations with other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries. As far as this is concerned, there was even no specific repercussion between Malaysia and them. Only a handful of Muslim countries publicly opposed the Saudi-led coalition, namely Iran, Qatar, Chad, and Pakistan (Jalal, 2020; Salehi, 2018; Tehran Times, 2018).

In addition, the Saudi-led coalition was fully backed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which disapproved the Houthis’ “illegitimate” takeover of Sanaa. OIC was also convinced that the military coalition would be able to restore the Hadi government and stability in Yemen (Arab News, 2015; OIC, 2018). However, realizing the failure of the coalition, OIC, later welcomed KSA’s recent announcement to end the Yemeni crisis through a comprehensive ceasefire under UN supervision (OIC, 2021). To avoid any further misunderstandings, Malaysia finally withdrew MAF from Riyadh in September 2018 (Interview with Undisclosed Key Informant in Lebanon, October 10, 2019; Malay Mail, 2019). Despite the withdrawals, questions remain outstanding: What were the underlying factors that influenced the BN-led government to send the troops to Riyadh? Using Malaysia’s foreign policy framework, the study argues that the combination of systemic and leadership factors had enormously induced Najib to proceed with such a controversial commitment.

Here, the systemic element refers to the indirect involvement of the USA, the UK, and France at the backdoor of the KSA-led operation mission in Yemen. Such involvement of a hegemonic power in the post-Cold War era strengthens KSA and its allies’ resolve to crush the Houthis. The USA and its allies had provided technical and logistical assistance by arming and providing support to the KSA-led coalition (The Editorial Board, 2018; Wintour, 2019). In fact, the USA had been there years earlier. While distributing military aid to the Yemeni government, the USA has been conducting surveillance on the operating forces of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, otherwise known as AQAP, after 11 September 2001 terror attacks (Congressional Research Service, 2020; Gibbons-Neff, 2017; Terrill, 2011). Among others, the US military’s involvement in Yemen began after the series of attacks by Al-Qaeda on the USS Cole in October 2000 in Aden, which culminated with AQAP’s attack on the US Embassy in Sanaa in September 2008. Following these attacks, the US military has actively contained the AQAP operations from 2009 until the present. This includes training and equipping Yemeni counter-terrorism units. However, due to the Yemeni government’s inability to crush AQAP, it inevitably allowed the USA to launch airstrikes against the AQAP’s strategic locations. This AQAP containment subsequently led the USA to provide logistical support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen (BBC News, 2019; Difo, 2010; Johnsen, 2011; Northedge, 2013).

Meanwhile, the USA’s assistance to KSA can also be associated with their early interactions starting with the key meeting between President Roosevelt and King Abdul-Aziz aboard the Cruiser USS Quincy in 1945. This meeting, among others, cleared the way for both countries to strengthen their relations, including in security cooperation. Since then, the USA and KSA have been involved in a series of military exercises under the command of the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia from 1977 until the present (US Central Command, 2020). Furthermore, by granting access for the US army to be stationed in the country during the Gulf War in 1990–1991, KSA had further consolidated their joint military commitments (Otterman, 2005). Recently, under President Donald Trump and King Salman, through his Crown Prince Mohammed, KSA had purchased more advanced weaponry from the USA to bolster its security and military competency (Gould, 2019). Against the backdrop of the US systemic security guarantee, KSA and its coalition members had since intensified their attacks on the Houthis to force the Zaidiyyah Shiite sect to surrender and hand the government back to Hadi.

However, the constant attacks by KSA and its coalition had so far failed to topple the Houthis. If anything, it is the KSA-led coalition that is feeling mounting international pressure to end the military operations. Worse, it had inflicted the worst humanitarian disaster for the Yemeni people. On another note, looking at Houthi’s ability to withstand the attacks from the KSA-led coalition, one could safely attribute it to the Iranian support (Jalal, 2020). Although the Iranian involvement in this conflict remains covert, a few conceivable indicators could prove the close affiliation between the Houthis and the Iranian government, such as the Zaidiyyah Houthis being part of the Shi’a religious brotherhood, Iran’s recognition of the legitimacy of the Houthi government as opposed to the broader international community (Jalal, 2020; Kendall, 2017), the role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Hezbollah trainers to assist the Houthis, and the delivery of Iranian-linked weapon to Yemen (Feierstein, 2017; Jalal, 2020; Kendall, 2017).

In spite of these, other details could serve as a rebuttal of the Iranian support toward the Houthis; for instance, the UN Report of 2017 clarified that there was no sufficient evidence to confirm any direct large-scale supply of arms from Iran (Kendall, 2017); instead, the arms supply could have come from Russia, black markets, or entities inside Iran acting independently of the Iranian government. Other instances include the Houthis’ ignorance of Tehran’s advice not to take over Sana’a city in 2014 and their refusal of embracing the Iranian Shi’a ideology of the Twelve Imams, as they practiced the Zaidiyya teachings. In addition to that, the majority of Muslims in Yemen are followers of the Shafiite-Sunni School (Kendall, 2017; The World Factbook—CIA, 2021).

Furthermore, the behavior of the Houthis, who were seen not only close to Iran but also to the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whom they later killed, signified the pragmatic approach of the Houthis in ensuring their political survival to remain intact during this crisis (Kendall, 2017). In many ways, the most misread note is the common understanding of the root of the conflict, which overwhelmingly focused on the Sunni–Shiite rivalry. The fact is that the root of the conflict could be traced back to the 2004 clash between the northern group (led in part by the Houthis family) and southern tribes due to the discrimination against the northerners after the Yemeni unification in 1990. This northern–southern conflict reached its peak again during the Arab Spring in 2011, during which the Houthis took advantage of the deteriorating situation to topple the Hadi government (Orkaby, 2017).

Putting all these into perspective, it can be deduced that there is indeed a close interaction between the Houthis and Iran. However, their interactions were rather pragmatic as both needed one another to stamp their own political agendas (Kendall, 2017). As regards the Houthis, they were overwhelmed in all aspects of the conflict by the KSA-led coalition. Thus, any help would be considered a huge relief, which could prolong the Houthis’ objectives. Meanwhile, although many viewed the Iranian government’s reactions in the conflict in Yemen as a desire to provoke and threaten the Saudi-led coalition, Tehran stood to play its winning card by becoming the savior of the Yemen people by pressuring the Saudi government to end the military campaign and opt for a political solution as the best mechanism to reinstate political stability in the country (Feierstein, 2017; Kendall, 2017; Tehran Times, 2020).

On the same note, the US Congress had been pushing for the Trump administration to halt the US military assistance as it had further aggravated the humanitarian condition in Yemen. Nonetheless, Trump refused to heed the call of the Congress, insisting that the military support would be continued to achieve at least three chief objectives: (a) to protect the lives of 80,000 Americans who had been residing in Yemen for many years, most of whom were permanent US residents with visas as well as expatriates like business groups, journalists, US NGOs, and others (Farooq, 2020; Khazan, 2013; US Embassy in Yemen, 2015) (b) to counterweigh the Iranian backing on the Houthis, and (c) to curb the terrorist groups of AQAP and the Islamic State in the war-ravaged country (Riechmann, 2019).

For Malaysia, USA’s hegemonic influence in Yemen did not create any hindrances to the execution of Ops Yemen II. Technically, it would even secure the evacuation mission, similar to the success Ops Yemen I had shown, but this did not indicate Malaysia’s outright approval of the USA’s indirect support for KSA-led military intervention to end the Yemen civil war. From the BN-led government’s point of view, a political solution was still the only way to bring stability to Yemen, and peace talks should remain a top priority. In January 2018, BN Defense Minister, Hishammuddin argued:

We are of the view that the humanitarian situation will only continue to deteriorate in the absence of a peace agreement that leads to a durable solution to the war. As a coalition of like-minded nations, only we have the power and the means to end this crisis. Funding alone will not reverse the fortunes of millions of people in Yemen. Only a cessation of hostilities and a political settlement can bring about a permanent end to the conflict and the suffering of the Yemeni people. (Malay Mail, 2018)

Although the systemic structure provides no hurdles for the Malaysia involvement, the leadership element is still the most significant impetus that enticed the BN-led government to commit to KSA-led military operation in the Middle East region. This, in fact, can be closely associated with the efforts of the Malaysian leaders. Malaysia’s first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj (1957–1970) first laid the “personal affiliation” foundation to actively interact in the international political system. Under Tunku’s leadership, Malaysia had initiated diplomatic relations with KSA by opening an Embassy in Riyadh in 1964. The first ruler of the Kingdom to visit Malaysia was King Faisal (1964–1975) in 1970, who later nominated Tunku Abdul Rahman to be the first Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or earlier known as Organization of Islamic Conference. One might wonder why Tunku was appointed ahead of President Soekarno of Indonesia, which had the largest Muslim population in the world. This can be partly attributable to Soekarno’s good relations with the Soviet Union-Communist bloc, whereas both Tunku and King Faisal belonged in the opposite camp, that is, the US-democratic bloc (Idris, 2015).

Since then, the relations between the two countries have become more intact, and under Najib’s leadership, both countries had ventured beyond traditional diplomatic and socioeconomic areas with the addition of security–military cooperation on the table (Official Portal Malaysian Armed Forces Headquarters (MAFHQ), 2016; Xinhuanet, 2017). The visit of King Salman to Malaysia in February 2017 had set a higher level of interaction. Not only did King Salman the third Saudi ruler visit Malaysia (King Faisal in June 1970 and King Abdullah in January 2006), but the visit had also opened up more opportunities to enhance socioeconomic joint ventures, to promote global peace, as well as to tone down critiques against Najib’s administration, which was accused of being heavily depending on China’s monies (Kumar, 2017; Saat, 2017). Following the Saudi ruler’s visit, Najib boasted that the country had benefitted in four major aspects: (a) Kingdom’s preparedness to increase three-fold the scholarships for Malaysian students to pursue studies in Saudi Arabia, (b) to add the quota for Hajj and build two Malaysian Hajj pilgrim centers in Mecca and Medina, (c) to successfully secure an investment amounting to RM31.08 billion (US$7 billion) from Saudi Arabian petroleum company, Saudi Aramco in the Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development (RAPID), in Pengerang, Johor (Malay Mail, 2017), and (d) to set up the King Salman Centre for International Peace (KSCIP) in Kuala Lumpur (later shut down by the PH-led government in 2018 with its functions taken over by the Malaysian Institute of Defense and Security or MIDAS) (Al-Jazeera, 2018).

Furthermore, in illustrating how close the personal relationship was between Najib and King Salman, the former took a personal selfie with the latter and posted it online on his Twitter. The posting had garnered a lot of likes from Najib’s followers (Today Online, 2017). However, this personal selfie could not be linked with the BN government’s decision to join the Saudi-led coalition. Yet, it could be considered as one of the ways to show the degree of a close personal relationship between the two leaders. In the meantime, the issue of “personal donation” RM2.6 billion from KSA in 2013, as claimed by Najib, was the climax of the relationship between the two leaderships. It topped all the previous interactions by other Malaysian leaders with KSA. As Najib put it, the donation was credited into his personal account before GE-13 and was considered a gift from KSA (Abdul Karim, 2018; Malaysia Today, 2019; Rohman, 2018; Saat, 2017). Subsequently to silence all the critiques, RM2.03 billion of the donations (less than the original amount due to rate exchange differences) were later returned to KSA (Abdul Karim, 2018; Malaysia Today, 2019; Rohman, 2018).

However, on 29 July 2020, the court disapproved Najib’s claims, and this issue is in the process of retrial as Najib has pursued an appeal to the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court’s verdict (Singh, 2020; Yatim, 2021). Although the donation issue is contentious, it is sufficient for this study to conclude that it had somewhat influenced the then BN government’s decision to join the KSA-led coalition in Yemen. Certainly, at this point, it is not possible to directly link the donation with Malaysia’s entry into the KSA-led coalition as it occurred 2 years before the Ops Yemen I & II. However, it has been a tradition for Malaysia to receive financial assistance from KSA, mainly from the Saudi Fund Development (SFD), to develop its socioeconomic projects since the Tunku Abdul Rahman era. Such financial assistance had anyway changed into financial and project investments during Tun Mahathir’s reign (Idris, 2015). All else being considered, this study argues that Najib’s BN-government’s entry into the KSA-led coalition could be considered as a gesture of appreciation to the financial generosity of KSA to Malaysia over the years. Besides, the nature of Malaysia’s involvement in the Ops Yemen operation was merely driven by a humanitarian-evacuation basis, although it turned out a bit differently in Ops Yemen II.

One way or the other, under Najib’s tenure (2009–2018), not only were Malaysia’s relations with KSA growing strong, but its relations with the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, mainly the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, were also reaching new heights (Giorgio & Theodore, 2017; Guy, 2021; Ulrichsen & Cafeiro, 2018). Economically speaking, such close relations were important for Malaysia as it needed to diversify its economic sources by exploring new, particularly the Middle Eastern, markets (Ulrichsen & Cafeiro, 2018). Moreover, this is also in line with the aspiration of Najib in his keynote address at the 8th Heads of Mission Conference in 2014 to actively bring Malaysia forward as the middle power state at the international arena when he stated: “…we must embrace our position as one of the region’s middle powers…As a middle power, that means playing a greater part in Asia, and helping Asia play a greater part in the world…” (Razak, 2014). In other words, it was high time that Malaysia stepped up and put itself at the forefront, among other things, by championing the rights and welfare of small and developing states vis-à-vis great powers’ pressure.

Despite the paramount significance of systemic and leadership elements, as aforementioned and being a developing country, Malaysia’s foreign policy and the related decision-making are indeed evolving in perpetuity with all the essential elements going through constant, constructive intersubjectivity process among themselves. The elements of systemic leadership and other domestic factors are instrumental in Malaysia’s foreign policy. Although both systemic and leadership elements seem overwhelmingly dominant in determining Malaysia’s participation in the KSA-led coalition, due to domestic opposition and pressures, which indirectly contributed to the defeat of BN in the GE-14, Malaysia eventually had to withdraw its troops from KSA. This exemplifies how all these elements equally and constructively navigate the direction of the Malaysian foreign policy decision-making in the years to come.

Conclusion

The cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign Policy has dramatically shifted from being pro-Western to Non-Alignment Policy under Prime Minister Tun Razak. Since then, this policy has guided Malaysia away from interfering with any country’s domestic affairs or crisis. Nevertheless, under Najib, the BN-led government had made a controversial decision by sending troops to join the KSA-led coalition in its fight against the Houthis rebels in Yemen. Although the main objectives of the involvement were to evacuate Malaysians in Yemen on humanitarian purposes, certain quarters argued that not only did such an involvement serve as a clear sign of support for the KSA-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, but it also went against Malaysia’s Non-Alignment Policy. This, in the long term, could jeopardize Malaysia’s global reputation, especially among the developing and Third World countries. Up to a qualified extent, the long presence of MAF in KSA in Ops Yemen II could entail a much deeper and closer involvement in the Yemen conflict. It went beyond just evacuation and humanitarian purposes, especially when one considers that mission was not even part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

By and large, the decision made by the BN-led government was influenced by the systemic structure and the leadership elements. The systemic structure mainly refers to USA’s role in providing logistical support for KSA and its coalition, which indirectly paved the way for Malaysia to carry out its evacuation-humanitarian operations. The leadership element can be drawn from the close relations between Najib and King Salman, which eventually brought the Saudi ruler to visit Malaysia and simultaneously announced the KSA’s huge investment in various socioeconomic projects in Malaysia. Up to some degree, a closer look at Malaysia’s involvement in KSA reveals a consistent theme—as far as the international system goes—that Malaysia and KSA (and the US) are and have always been in the same camp. In short, they are allies with close relations. Ultimately, the dominance of systemic structure and leadership elements is constant; it continues to constructively influence intersubjective interactions with other domestic factors, namely the pressure of the opposition parties, NGOs, and the public, which finally overturned the contentious decision to station MAF in KSA. Inevitably, all of the essential elements of Malaysia’s foreign policy and its decision-making have constructively interacted with each other to produce a balanced and comprehensive policy needed to deal with all complexities in the international political system.