Business as Usual? The Post-Brexit Impacts on UK and UAE Relations

Introduction

Although lacking the pomp and spectacle of state visits and consequently often flying under the public interest radar, official engagements are nonetheless a useful tool for measuring areas of mutual interest. Personal visits are more than just an exchange of ideas. The December 2020 visit to the United Kingdom of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, is a good example of where the borders of collaboration can be drawn. What is unsurprising to see is the usual common ground found in the twin pillars of security and trade. Security was emphasized through an ongoing commitment to a future partnership, a heightened strategic dialogue between the two, a combined commitment to multilateral institutions and the necessity of a rules-based international order (Prime Minister’s Office, UK, 2020). Cooperation on trade included a similar level of ambition with a dizzying list of “trade and investment, research and development, climate change, and strengthening both economies, including cooperation across priority areas such as life sciences, healthcare, future technologies and digital innovation, renewable energy, space, infrastructure, education, tourism, food security, and financial and professional services” (Prime Minister’s Office, UK, 2020).

Such dialogue took place against the backdrop of Brexit and frenetic negotiations to reach a deal before the 31 December deadline. On that date, the transitional period ended, culminating in the UK leaving both the Single European Market and the Custom’s Union, with the real effects unfurling in 2021 and beyond. Occurring on the same day as the Crown Prince’s UK visit, the EU Commission President at the European Council meeting in Brussels spoke of “new beginnings for old friends” (BBC News, 2020). With the UK redefining its relationship with neighbors and non-neighbors alike, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement might well apply to a UK policy marked by a desire to reinvigorate collaboration with historic partners, of which the UAE is an obvious candidate. With established linkages between the two states, the UK redefining its role in Europe and beyond, and a UAE with both a newly revived interventionist foreign policy and a vision for galvanizing a knowledge economy, an examination of this relationship is pertinent.

Brexit has caused a paradigmatic shift and seems to be dominated by two competing discourses: internationalism versus isolationism. “Global Britain” has been most recently operationalized through an integrated government review announced under the title “Global Britain in a Competitive Age” in March 2021. As the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated in the report, “[h]aving left the European Union, the UK has started a new chapter in our history. We will be open to the world, free to tread our own path, blessed with a global network of friends and partners, and with the opportunity to forge new and deeper relationships” (HM Government, 2021, p. 2). This ambitious internationalist approach links prosperity, adaptability, and international burden-sharing with the specific tools of defense and spending commitment, science and technology supremacy, global leadership within diplomacy and development, soft power dominance, cyber power prestige and being a world leader in tackling climate change. By contrast, in a speech given to the Fabian Society in January 2021, the leader of the Labor Party and Opposition underscored the “isolate Britain” role nurtured by the Prime Minister and argued, “Boris Johnson has left us isolated and alienated from our allies, but I know Labour can rebuild both parts of that bridge: working closely with a new US President, building a strong relationship with Europe, and making Britain—once again—a moral force for good in the world” (Starmer, 2021). The national vulnerability is a culmination of several factors: the UK wedded unhealthily to the Trump doctrine of anti-multilateralism, a disinterest in alliance building and a country shorn of the values associated with being a major contributor to addressing crises such as global human rights and climate change.

Curiously, both discourses are predicated on the agreement that the UK operates as a global actor. Similarly, both are underscored by an appeal to certain values, which defines how the UK interacts with other states. Additionally, this socialization, reflective of national interests and the need to find common interests with others, makes the post-Brexit period noteworthy. More specifically, an inquiry into the UK–UAE dynamic is valuable for three reasons. Firstly, Brexit is not the only catalyst for change. The UAE itself has been shifting from traditional diplomatic and soft power to more smart power usage (Al Ketbi, 2020). Labeled as a “regional powerhouse” (Gardner, 2020), its established norm of noninterference has given way to several assertive actions impacting Libya, Somalia, and most notably Yemen, as well as the recent Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel. As such, both the UK and the UAE are undergoing a period of flux that makes examining the impacts of these changes germane.

Secondly, the Middle East, one might argue, has always exacted a planetary pull with greater powers vying for influence within the region. In an international system dominated by the activities of large states, rising powers such as the UAE are important transitional actors. Although the key focus in the literature has been that of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), a focus on rising global powers ignores how rising regional powers such as the UAE are instrumental in shaping their backyard even if their international reach is less. Finally, the UK–UAE dynamic can be classified as a “special relationship” (Al Qassemi, 2010). Special relationships can be defined as “…durable and exclusive bilateral relations between autonomous polities that are based on mutual expectations of preferential treatment by its members and outsiders as well as regular entanglement of some (external) governance functions” (Harnisch, 2017). As such, special relationships help frame how interests between the protagonists align and where the limits of the affiliation extend. This patterning of cooperation consequently gives a level of insight into the identity of both states and offers clues as to how they may behave towards others. In short, a focus on special relationships shines a light on the broader regional and global undercurrents playing out.

This article continues as follows. Three main issue areas are overviewed. Each is accompanied by evidence of policy areas based on patterns of agreement and revealing boundaries to further progression. This is because the political space is also marked by competitors that impact the UK–UAE rapport by redirecting relations and resources elsewhere. The issue areas have been grouped into military and defense, trade and technology, and culture and society. The article concludes with a discussion on whether or not the most likely scenario is a relationship strengthened or weakened in the post-Brexit cycle.

Military and Defense

UK–UAE defense links certainly do seem lowkey. A recent Congressional Research Service report reveals that from 2000 to 2019, the top five arms suppliers to the UAE were the United States (52.7%), France (25.8%), Russia (5%), Italy (2.5%), and Spain (1.8%) (Thomas et al., 2020, p. 26). The UAE Embassy in the United States highlights several flashpoints which clearly frame foreign policy. Regional strategies include providing allied forces with access to ports and territory as well as the implementation of counterterrorist measures; supporting the government of Yemen; providing assistance to Syria and its neighbors concerning the refugee crisis; commitments and support to the Iraqi government, Egypt, and Afghanistan; and supporting the United Nations Security Council resolution to bar sensitive materials and technologies to Iran (UAE Embassy in Washington DC, 2021). The UK is merely one more piece of the “international community” jigsaw. Unsurprisingly, Emirati regional and global associations are dominated unambiguously by Saudi Arabia and the United States, respectively.

However, one way of structuring security cooperation dates back a few years earlier. It is important as it lays out the framework of how current developments have been grounded. Even reinvigorated relations frequently build on established historical interactions to appeal to stability and continuity. Regarding a return to the East of Suez, the phrase historically used to discuss British political involvement beyond the European theatre, two scholars in 2013 highlighted the following:

The military intends to build up a strong shadow presence around the Gulf; not an evident imperial-style footprint, but a smart presence with facilities, defense agreements, rotation of training, transit and jumping-off points for forces that aim to be more adaptable and agile as they face the post-Afghanistan years from 2014. (Stansfield & Kelly, 2013, p. 1)

Two observations are relevant concerning these nontraditional forms of military cooperation. Firstly, although military resources are associated with the hard power capabilities of states, soft power security arrangements seem to define the relationship between the UAE and the UK. As such, the focus is not just on the “bricks and mortar” resources one associates with military apparatus and hardware. It is also about solidifying what has been labeled “military diplomacy,” “defense diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” which are instrumental in building a foundation on which further networks become embedded (Ebitz, 2019).

In addition, soft power military linkages create interoperability between the military units of countries, provide cultural exchange and enable the expansion of each nation’s capabilities (Ebitz, 2019). Examples include joint training exercises (The National, 2017), meetings between the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (MENA Report, 2018a) and the hosting of the UAE–UK Taskforce dealing with cooperation in security, defense, and counterterrorism issues among others (UAE Government News, 2018). The origins and motivations of such under-the-radar linkages are not new. For example, Yates and Rossiter (2021, pp. 149–150) argue that domestic considerations and intraparty politics can be important galvanizers of foreign policy decision-making. The 1971 decision to send a British Military Advisory Team to the newly independent UAE, they contend, was motivated by a desire by the then Conservative government to stymie criticism of a perceived cut-and-run policy from its overseas obligations (Yates & Rossiter, 2021, p. 149). This is echoed in Brexit’s intra-European ruptures, which have reinvigorated an extra-European focus and helped forge the “global Britain” emphasis.

Secondly, and to utilize an example, Houbara is an instance of knowledge-building cooperation. The company is the product of a UAE–UK Joint Venture between the Middle East General Enterprises, a diversified Holding Company covering a range of business sectors, and QinetiQ, a British multinational defense technology company. Houbara enables local customers to access technology and engineering security solutions. It also prepares and trains the UAE military and develops necessary skills. Its CEO has recently stated:

The UK has a long and profound relationship with the UAE, one that has always been underpinned by a solid mutual commitment to defense and security. Where I think the UK has a real interest in the UAE is around the area of sharing and developing knowledge. The UK remains a leading powerhouse for research and development in diverse fields, including defense and security. (Allen, 2020)

One of the few studies of knowledge management within defense organizations privileges the roles of organizational learning, leadership, information technology, and training and development (Korsakiene et al., 2018, p. 411). Indeed, the National Agenda for the UAE for 2021 is focused on the development of the country as a competitive knowledge economy and includes commitments to the transitioning to a knowledge-based economy, the promotion of innovation and research, strengthening regulations in crucial sectors, and the support for high value-adding sectors (Prime Minister’s Office, UAE, 2018). The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi has stated that “[the Emirati] military doctrine is basically reliant on equipping our personnel with knowledge” (Ardemagni, 2020). In a 2012 Vision Statement for the Presidential Guard, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan highlighted a range of technical-military practices and cultural performances essential to Emirati military development, including more selective recruitment, more advanced training, better command and control systems, and the expansion of a leadership culture (cited in Yates, 2020, pp. 307–308).

Additionally, Yates (2020, p. 308) highlights three important aspects to how the UAE is building an effective military force: sending Emiratis to Western military institutions, expanding operational experience, and using the know-how of foreign military professionals. Interestingly, the number of Emiratis attending UK military institutions has fluctuated from approximately 200 in 1971 to a measly seven in 1994, which has since been reversed by the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the UAE sending more soldiers to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst than any other country (Roberts, 2020, p. 324). Subsequently, the second reflection concerning military diplomacy relates to how UK–UAE security arrangements are underpinned by nonmaterial factors and consequently framed by developing a common military innovation culture.

The impact of Brexit has a dual outcome. In one sense, it’s business as usual. However, this means a UK concerted effort to ensure that EU withdrawal does not rupture preexisting security arrangements with the UAE and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. The links between the UK and UAE regarding defense issues have not been historically shaped through the UK’s membership of the EU. The EU members and institutions, through the 1999 Common Security and Defense Policy, have been involved in several foreign military and civilian missions. However, EU membership does not prohibit bilateral defense agreements with nonmembers. As such, the Defense Cooperation Agreement “sets out arrangements for cooperation and represents Britain’s largest defense commitment outside NATO” (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2019). Originally, the 1971 UK withdrawal from the region precipitated the need for the United States to be courted as the UAE’s major strategic partner. However, regional fears such as the Arab Spring, deepening worries over Iran and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the UAE to diversify its security arrangements and engage in military spread betting. As such, Brexit engenders mutual interest. From the UK position, closer contacts with the Emirates mollify some of the fallout of instability stemming from its extra-European path and help solidify the “global Britain” image, at least within security. From the UAE perspective, Brexit machinations have provided an opening to reinvigorate a historical linkage that fits well into the rise of regional threats and the globally connected vision of the Emirati state.

The second outcome is the increasing preponderance of military diplomacy, aligned to UK-based military technology, training, and research. As one scholar has highlighted, the UAE has linked military training and leadership to nation-branding and the country’s global image:

Rather than promoting wide-scale institution-building alongside its partners, the UAE’s military training cooperation aims to enhance its geopolitical position by shaping stabilization through incremental and adaptable steps. This will ultimately allow the UAE to become an influential actor and to gain leverage beyond its immediate areas of influence while also maintaining commitment to the stabilization framework it claims to support. For Emirati leadership, military training cooperation is also about international image and nation-branding. (Ardemagni, 2020)

Therefore, soft military power is more likely to define post-Brexit security arrangements between the two states. Direct military action raises legitimate concerns and risks tarnishing the national image abroad. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is particularly pertinent, with the Council on Foreign Relations estimating 24 million citizens in need of assistance, 100,000 fatalities and four million displaced since 2015 within the country (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021). The UK itself has faced criticism for its controversial support for the coalition as it has been “a major donor to humanitarian efforts in Yemen, but has also benefited from arms sales to its long-standing strategic partner, Saudi Arabia” (Jalal, 2020). In the UAE, however, as already mentioned, defense contracts are important, but sales are low. As such, “military diplomacy,” at least from the UK perspective, may be as much about strategic necessity as it is about strategic culture.

Trade and Technology

The global COVID-19 pandemic has caused an unparalleled disruption to world trade. The trading relationship between the UK and the UAE naturally operates against this global economic dip. However, at least in the early post-Brexit period, UK–UAE trade seems robust. The Department for International Trade figures states that the UAE is the UK’s 13th largest export market, with 5,000 UK companies doing business there, totaling approximately £10 billion (Department of International Trade, 2018). Outside of Europe, the UAE is the fifth largest destination for British exports after the USA, Japan, China, and Hong Kong. Citing the British Business Group, reciprocal trade reached £18.2 billion in 2019 and is expected to rise to £25 billion by 2022 (Buller, 2020b). According to the UK HM Trade Commissioner for the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the UAE receives 48 percent of the UK exports to the Gulf (WAM, 2018). The buzzword is, somewhat unsurprisingly, “opportunity.” That Brexit forges an increase in an extra-European presence that would naturally include expanding trade in goods and services.

Technology is, of course, not specific to trade. It feeds into other policy areas, such as security, environment, and education. However, one way to frame some changes in the trading relationship is through the spillover effect, originally articulated within neo-functionalism in its capacity to explain integration. Broadly speaking, present integration is a function of past integrating practices, and therefore present cooperation is also a product of past cooperative performances. The theory is based on the logic that functional problems in some areas, such as security, can only be resolved through the integration of further tasks, which get extended to the entire economy (Niemann et al., 2019, pp. 48–49). In short, cooperation in one area begets cooperation in others. One might argue that the history of the two states, first and foremost, was grounded in the security dimension.

Despite continued British military involvement after 1971 (see, e.g., Yates, 2020, p. 200), Emirati independence also brought economic linkages, creating a commodity-based trading pattern and giving way to a service/technology orientation. As Baroness Fairhead, Minister of State for Trade and Export Promotion announced in 2018:

If we look at the way UAE is moving, it shows that you have been very significantly supported by oil and gas. But now you are diversifying and you want to grow much more in education, life sciences and you want to use new technologies in order to make the existing oil and gas wealth more efficient, utilizing AI, machine learning, looking at cleaning forms of energy and different forms of mobility, including autonomous vehicles. (MENA Report, 2018b)

One fundamental aspect of the technologization of the UK–UAE dynamic is how the practice is linked to state identity. The UAE is not simply restructuring its economy to apportion a higher status to innovation and technology industries. Instead, the policy operates at a much broader national level and is indicative of a state that is cultivating a developmental/innovation/“green” identity, despite oil exports continuing to account for 30 percent of GDP. Various projects underscore this national identity rebrand.

The UAE government website provides a long list of innovation projects, including Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City, Dubai Science Park, Mohammed bin Rashid Solar Park, Arab Institution for Science and Technology in Sharjah, Technology and Innovation Center in Ras Al Khaimah, the Dubai Museum of the Future among other innovation-based schemes, awards, and programs (The United Arab Emirates’ Government portal, 2020). Part of the drive for developing the innovation economy comes, of course, from outside. Ideas may be organic, but their application necessitates foreign involvement, which, of course, is central to the UAE’s economy, infrastructure and hub status. As Mansoor Abulhoul, the UAE Ambassador to the UK, stated in a newspaper article in 2020:

The UAE is a leader in developments such as artificial intelligence, biopharma and digitized healthcare—including its state-of-the-art COVID-19 response, clean energy and innovations in automation…. As a tech trailblazer in Europe, the UK is an ideal partner for moving forward on new innovations. Whether that looks like knowledge-sharing or favorable technology commerce agreements, this is likely to be forefront of future cooperation. (Buller, 2020a)

Both countries are seeking to position themselves as “green” entities. The UK has significant experience in wind energy and other Greentech, and the UAE is looking to extricate itself from fossil fuel dependency by foraying into renewable alternatives. Such collaboration can be found in recent developments such as the US$1 billion UAE–UK Sovereign Investment Partnership (SIP) focusing on energy transition and infrastructure (MENA Report, 2021). As the British Ambassador to the UAE, Patrick Moody, mentioned: “The UK’s thriving renewable energy sector has the expertise and practical know-how to harness the UAE’s abundant renewable resources and futuristic sustainability vision. I see great potential for collaboration between the UK and the UAE” (Buller, 2021a).

It is perhaps also important to highlight the limitations of such narratives. The “beyond oil” paradigm will be difficult for a fossil-fuel-dependent state like the UAE to concretize, at least in the short term. As one writer and researcher on sustainable cities noted: “one wonders how powerful it would be if the kingdom went all-in on sustainability” (Flint, 2020). Rather than revolutionary strides, incremental steps might be necessary, limiting whatever post-carbon contributions states like the UK can make. What will spur the technological drive of further economic cooperation is the potential of a bilateral trade deal.

However, part of the conundrum for the UK concerns the possibility of a GCC-wide free trade deal. Even though multilateral agreements are harder, lengthier, and more prone to dilution than bilateral agreements, the GCC has few free trade arrangements with other states. Instead, the GCC countries share a common market and a customs union. As a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area Agreement (GAFTA), the UAE has access to other countries in the MENA region, and it also has a Free Trade Agreement with the European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) and trade agreements with Singapore and New Zealand.

The UK’s ability to strike a deal with the GCC has two aspects. The first concerns the relationship over the EU-GCC talks about a Free Trade Area originally started in 1988 and stalled since 2008. Some analysts have highlighted human rights concerns as the reason for the breakdown in negotiations (Vagneur-Jones, 2017, p. 9), while others have highlighted that although human rights and democracy are headline grabbers, such issues can be resolved through diplomatic bargaining (Hashmi et al., 2014, p. 117). A UK trade agreement with the GCC will naturally have to take certain human rights issues off the table, which will certainly cripple British soft power elsewhere. The second issue concerning a UK-GCC trade deal relates to the UK’s comparatively privileged status within the region. For many years, the UK has maintained a more consistent dialogue with the GCC than EU members, which has created greater convergence of views and policies (Koch, 2020, p. 5).

Additionally, “the competitive business approach of all EU member states is likely to prevail, meaning that bilateralism rather than multilateralism will remain the predominant framework when it comes to European economic ties to the GCC states” (Koch, 2020, p. 5). The most recent update concerning a UK-GCC trade deal is occurring against the backdrop of almost 70 trade deals, some with provisional applications and others with full ratification, with the most recent being agreed with New Zealand in October 2021. British trade pursuits must give way to necessity and, of course, places the GCC in a strong bargaining position.

Concerning trade and technology, all indicators point to their increase. Spillover effects, the “fanning out” of technology into a multitude of areas, and the established business and economic links all suggest that increased interdependence is the norm. As the Director-General of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry mentioned: “[t]he Chamber is providing all possible incentives to ensure a business-friendly environment in the Emirate by following best international practices and adopting state-of-the-art-technology for all companies and individuals working in the UAE capital” (WAM, 2018). Two caveats will indicate whether this pattern continues. The first is whether or not the UK can continue to have a leading role in contributing to the UAE’s innovation identity. Technological prowess must be coupled to the UAE’s national vision for the mutual benefits of collaboration to resonate. Additionally, geopolitical bargaining is also wrapped up in trade. For example, in 2012, the UAE threatened to block arms deals from the UK-based BAE Systems company, stop investment and cut intelligence collaboration, if the then Prime Minister David Cameron did not more robustly counter Muslim Brotherhood influence (Ramesh, 2015). Carrots and sticks are well-established tools of statecraft. Additionally, economic and political independence from the EU no longer shields the UK from a multilateralist umbrella and instead bares all its successes and failures. Such is the price of unilateralism.

The second is the need for a trade deal. As an EU member state, the UK would be naturally stymied by the stalled EU-GCC trade negotiations. However, its mercantilist reinvention is also grounded on its trade deals with other states, which, of course, impact the trade deal outcomes with the GCC and any bilateral agreements with the UAE. A post-Brexit trade and technology relationship is also conditioned by a post-pandemic world that still appears distant at the time of writing. The health of UK trade deals with others and the post-pandemic global economic recovery or slump, will certainly define the UK–UAE economic relationship of the future.

Culture and Society

Cultural and societal issues have traditionally lost out in the hierarchy of “high versus low politics.” Security issues have understandably always been precedent when focusing on the well-being and safety of the state. However, two aspects are pertinent concerning this and subsequently help explain developments between the UK and UAE. The first is how global norms have undergone a dramatic shift. Although far from supplanting state security, human security has become a global focus. Stemming from the 1994 United Nations Development Program, human security has sought to bring about a minimum quality of life for people. As one United Nations body highlights, human security “means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, cited in Brauch, 2009, p. 965). Low politics has effectively molded into high politics.

Secondly, states invest heavily in cultural diplomacy due to nation branding and promotion. As one policy advisor has highlighted, in a world of customers and competitors, the profiles and reputation of countries are of increasing importance: “countries with powerful and positive reputations spend less to achieve more, while those with weak or negative reputations spend more to achieve less. In short, countries with a good image trade at a premium; those without trade at a discount” (Belbagi, 2018).

The 2020 Global Soft Power Index, utilizing data on business and trade, governance, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communication, education and science, and people and values, has the UK 3rd and the UAE 18th (Global Soft Power Index, 2020). Subsequently, the UK has an advantage in this area. However, its cultural capital, at least by some, will be noticeably weakened by its withdrawal from the EU. One specialist in European cultural diplomacy unsurprisingly highlights how Brexit has caused a negative impact on funding for UK arts, the reduction in artistic collaborations, nonparticipation in Creative Europe, an EU program for the cultural and creative sectors, and a hard-hitting “artistic hiatus” (Faucher, 2020). Once again, as cultural links weaken within Europe, the UK is more motivated to “fill the gap” by selling itself further afar. The UAE has two branding visions going on. Through the Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing, Dubai shifted its national image to the “glamorous metropolis,” with an image branded from scratch, and reflected in the surging tourist numbers that, at least before the pandemic, were destined to be 20 million by 2020 (Zeineddine, 2017, p. 592). Abu Dhabi sought to culturalize its image via a “travelers welcome” brand echoed in international events such as the Formula One and renowned museums such as the Louvre (Zeineddine, 2017, pp. 592–593).

Concerning UK–UAE cultural linkages, the slogan appears collaboration. As Philip Parham, the then UK ambassador to the UAE, mentioned in relation to the UK/UAE 2017 Year of Creative Collaboration:

Behind me was the [Sheikh Zayed] mosque, beautifully decorated with mosaics designed by the British artist Kevin Dean. In front of me was this incredibly memorable new [war memorial] monument, designed by the British artist Idris Khan and to my left was the [Sheikh Zayed] bridge, designed by the British architect, Zaha Hadid. (Leech, 2017)

It is also noteworthy to stress how political shifts stimulate social and educational opportunities. For example, in February 2021, based on the Abraham Accords, the UAE Al-Ittihad newspaper and the UK-based The Jewish Chronicle published a front-page to celebrate the Jewish holiday of Purim: an ancient festival celebrating the saving of Jewish people from a Persian massacre (Al Kaabi, 2021). As the chief editor of the Emirati newspaper, wrote: “We congratulate our friends in Israel on the anniversary of Purim which symbolizes in their hearts the triumph of the will and the will to triumph, the triumph of good over evil, hope over despair, life over death” (Al Kaabi, 2021).

Tourism and education are also dominant features. As one recent The National (2019) editorial mentions, “[s]ome 400,000 UAE visitors are expected on UK streets in 2019 alone. After Americans, they are the highest-spending and longest-staying tourists in Britain.” The first half of 2019 saw 586,000 UK visitors to Dubai alone, the third-highest number behind Saudi Arabia and India (Khaleej Times, 2019). The global rupture caused by COVID-19 has caused such numbers to plummet, but both countries remain attractive to the other’s holidaymakers. Similarly, the springing up of UK-based universities is noticeable with the University of Middlesex, Heriot-Watt University, Alliance Manchester Business School, London Business School Dubai, University of Birmingham, and University of Strathclyde all establishing campuses. Indeed, student intake in the UAE may well be encouraged to offset the losses incurred by the coronavirus (Buller, 2021b), and such agreements between UK universities are most certainly set to expand.

Of course, all countries effectively advertise their identities abroad, and there might not seem particularly unique concerning the cultural bonds between the two. However, two aspects are worth stressing. The first concerns how cultural capital feeds into and contributes to human capital. As one figure from the Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Festival clarified:

Every single project has a British partner and a UAE-based partner and all of them have been developed to meet the needs of both…. It’s about looking at how all of these projects, the vast majority of which have dedicated education, skills and capacity-building elements linked to them, can help to equip the next generation of Emiratis with skills that will be useful to them in the UAE. (Leech, 2017)

Cultural and societal links are not, therefore, predicated principally on the sharing of knowledge. The links are wedded to the production of a skill set that creates a deeper sense of permanency and productivity. Secondly, the relationship is framed within a pattern of reciprocal interdependence; a partnership of equals rather than a hierarchy. Perhaps current flows of cultural exchange have to labor under the historical shadow of colonialism. Perhaps this is why soft power potential and cultural diplomacy tread so carefully. The onus is on the mutual benefits of nation branding, which, provided such undertakings stay aligned to cultural investment, are set to continue.

Conclusion

States sometimes find themselves in a paradox. History, somewhat unsurprisingly, matters. With the ripples of a Brexit-oriented flux, the highlighting of historical stasis over change, stability over uncertainty, is certainly invoked to construct international relations. There is a need to frame alliances and linkages as solid. But Brexit also functions as a critical juncture that produces reinvention. This change is necessary to configure the UK as a state transitioning, which, of course, is what its decision to leave the European Union is about. Perhaps the puzzle is best viewed as a “shared future” springboarding off the back of a “shared past.” Change in the international system is not new. However, concerning the three issue areas discussed in this article—military and defense, trade and technology, and culture and society—three scenarios are perhaps worth reiterating.

The first refers to the “global Britain” mantra. The somewhat unique position the UK holds with regard to the Gulf region and the UAE, in particular, will continue to operate robustly. Security cooperation will endure as it is based on common regional threats and crises, notably Iran. Technologically driven trade will create more interdependencies within a broader range of industries, and cultural and educational opportunities will flourish as the UAE, concerning its pursuit of establishing a knowledge economy, is logically expected to embrace these trends. There are several developments which might weaken the relationship. Within the political sphere, the UK and UAE may have more than a mere diplomatic spat. Tensions, of course, have occurred, as they do with all states. Domestically, the issue of UK arms sales to the region is contentious, and the unwillingness of the UK government to link arms sales to human rights issues has been open to much criticism. Human rights issues have been a source of disagreement between EU and GCC states.

Additionally, the arrest of a British doctoral student in Dubai on charges of spying produced friction between the two countries. In 2018, lobbying by the then UK Foreign Secretary produced an eventual pardon, but questions over the UK–UAE relationship were certainly raised. Internationally, an assertive UAE seeking a regional hegemon status can be seen as destabilizing. Military actions have been accompanied by humanitarian crises. Moreover, Emirati activity in southern Yemen and the Horn of Africa shows influence outside of Saudi authority and frames the UAE as no longer functioning as a “little brother” but working toward its own geostrategic interests (McEniry, 2018). Regional rivalries also play out with regard to Turkey and Qatar, particularly in relation to Libya and Somalia, respectively. Even common threats are not always dealt with in the same way.

The UK is a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iran nuclear deal, but the UAE has been more hawkish with the UAE Ambassador to the United States writing: “the Iran we have long known—hostile, expansionist, violent—is alive and well, and as dangerous as ever” (Al Otaiba, 2016) one year after the original agreement. An intra-GCC conflict, more than the 2017–2021 Qatar diplomatic crisis, would test UK–UAE relations concerning the UK’s connections with other states within the bloc. Even economic issues may lead to a freeze in relations. As the former Middle East Envoy Tony Blair, also a consultant to the Abu Dhabi government, mentioned about Israel and the Emirates: “[t]he single most important thing to realize about all of this is that it's not just about security. The conversation was about the region, how it's developing, the economy, culture” (Kahana, 2020). Economic and cultural disagreements may well be less combustible than political crises, but they may take the form of reverse neo-functionalism that a quarrel in one area might lead to broader antagonisms in others.

The second scenario for UK–UAE relations incorporates competition. The core of the “global Britain” outcome is not conditioned solely by UK drive but by its competitors. As one academic opined, “London realizes that competition for GCC influence and markets with the United States, China, Russia and its former partners in the EU will be tough” (Obeid, 2020). It is difficult to see the UK warding off involvement from such dominant powers unilaterally. China, in particular, has been actively involved in globalizing its presence in both hard and soft power categories. The United States has long since been the foremost military presence in the Gulf, with the UK possibly seen by some as “piggybacking.” The prospect is of the UK sinking from being “one of few” to “one of many.” The scenario can be framed by this “regressive Britain” possibility. Historical ties are important for countries, but they do not eclipse contemporary needs. The UAE has few Free Trade Agreements, but whether or not its negotiations with the European Union, most notably, but also with the BRICS countries as well as Japan, South Korea, Argentina, Pakistan, and Turkey, are successful and become ratified could well have the effect of squeezing out UK connections. Similarly, relations with European members can still influence the UK’s ability to project itself into extra-European regions. Conflict with the EU over fishing rights and the Northern Irish border, as have recently occurred, tend to refocus the UK’s attentions and raise issues over the unresolved conundrum it faces: how to be a successful non-EU member within a Europe being defined more through its EU membership?

The final scenario is whether Brexit converts to an “isolate Britain.” With Scottish independence becoming more of a reality and the crippling impact of an economic lockdown due to the pandemic, domestic issues may become the overriding focus rather than foreign policy. Somewhat ironically, an excessive focus on Brexit ever since the 2016 national referendum has, according to one journalist, caused national issues such as social care reform, internet safety, crime, and the impacts of an aging population on public services to be ignored (Blitz, 2019). Citizen demands, voiced through electoral choices, will inevitably prioritize such national issues, and the post-pandemic recovery may also limit any bold projects or agreements abroad. Paradoxically, an isolationist UK will tend to configure international concerns under a more austere obligation toward national interests. The 2021 Global Risks Report (World Economic Forum, 2021) highlights the top three risks surveyed in three different categories: clear and present dangers (short-term risks of 0–2 years): infectious diseases, livelihood crises, and extreme weather events; knock-on effects (medium-term risks of 3–5 years): asset bubble burst, IT infrastructure breakdown, and price instability; and existential threats (long-term 5–10 years): weapons of mass destruction, state collapse, and biodiversity loss. It is difficult to see how such threats can be dealt with via a flourishing of bilateralism rather than the much-needed large-scale action funneled through global institutions. As such, even an “isolate Britain” scenario, when national priorities necessitate self-help, can logically lead to multilateralism.

Multicausality always makes prediction difficult. But the fact is that UK–UAE machinations do not exist in a vacuum, and the relationship is subject to a myriad of influences that can strengthen and weaken their bonds. Perhaps the real fear, a no-deal Brexit, has subsided sufficiently to enable both states to move on. Perhaps too, the UK still finds itself in the position of extricating itself from an almost national obsession and its new footing, with the UAE and GCC states, is steadily being found. Finally, if independence is to be privileged, it might benefit the UK–UAE bond’ not WWWUK-EAU bond for the UK to be able to articulate clearly its policy toward Gulf members rather than merely shadowing United States foreign policy. As one former UK Ambassador to the UAE wrote in a newspaper column, “[i]f Britain is to be any kind of player on the global stage, then it should take its Gulf friends more seriously” (Harris, 2017).