A Crossroad Between Reformulating the Power-sharing System and Federalism for Lebanon

Introduction

Lebanon has recently completed its 100 years of existence in a confluence of crises, virtually signaling that its end as a political entity is closer than ever. Some might think a century is a long time for a failed experiment to construct a nation. Interestingly, the system chosen at that time was consociationalism based on a power-sharing political mechanism to guarantee religious freedom at the regional level. Ironically, some argue that this system is precisely leading the state entity to its demise. Lebanon is one more element within the complex system represented by the Middle East. Indeed, it suffers from the same problems that hit the other regional states. Problems such as contested sovereignty and identities, and poor governance would be simultaneously found in the Lebanese scenario, forming a vicious circle from which it is almost impossible to get out (Cook, 2020, pp. 42–43). It will continue to face the problems heading into the future.

Lebanon cannot afford to waste more time working on maintaining a consociational system that seems to be not functional anymore. The tyranny of the majority cannot prevail since the Lebanese have confessional groups that not only have a different identity but are committed to achieving different political goals. The different “national role conceptions” (NRCs) existing in Lebanese foreign policy could be mentioned to prove the latter. In this regard, when speaking of federalism as a form of political organization, it represents an extremely controversial and loaded term, meaning different things to different actors (Palermo & Somigli, 2023). The role of national concepts includes “the policymakers’ definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform continuingly in the international system or subordinate regional systems” (Holsti, 1970, p. 246). The problem is the need for more consensus among the different elites to decide, in a consensual manner, the geostrategies most conducive to the protection and defense of the alleged general interest. The latter would be determined by the structure of the state’s political organization.

The existing contested NRCs enable external powers to influence Lebanese confessional groups by manipulating identity groups (Mabon, 2023, p. 147). In this case, the debate on the federal proposal or the partition of Lebanon would not escape such manipulation. Regrettably, the fact that the elites of the main confessional communities do not share the same NRCs results in divergent perceptions of issues, threats, and the external projection of the Lebanese state. Matters such as the management of Syrian refugees or the strategy of active neutrality proposed by the Maronite patriarch have revealed that the goal of establishing a consensual foreign policy is unattainable. Therefore, it is crucial to consider this disparity of NRCs among Lebanese elites to understand why one of the fundamental pillars of any federal system, such as a common foreign policy, would not be feasible for the Lebanese case study.

The current situation demands different strategies involving a new political system or order. Among the alternatives to overcome the political deadlock, federal proposal, decentralization of power, and finally, the partition of the Lebanese into different ministates are the most commented on. Hence, federal proposals garner greater momentum than alternative options amid the prospect of political transition. Indeed, it could be contended that a de facto federal system is emerging, attributable in part to the central government’s limited control. Each confessional community’s laws on personal status facilitate the subjective mobilization of community members in political terms (Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 3). In addition, each confessional community enjoys clear dominance over certain geographical areas due to the civil war. Therefore, such a federal system would rest on territorial control and security factors, where militias emerge to provide security for their communities.

Lebanon’s demise as a state entity cannot be ruled out because of its current existential crisis, which is precisely based on the survival of Lebanon’s political identity. In this sense, the East versus West dilemma re-emerged in Lebanon, but in a different context. Identity politics in a region of exclusivist ideologies has worsened in Lebanon’s sociopolitical crisis. Therefore, it is important to review the impact of the NRCs on Lebanese foreign policy approaches. Regrettably, a plurality of different national conceptions regarding the role that Lebanon could and should play in regional and international concerts differs so much that it makes it almost impossible to think of the mere existence of a foreign-to-use policy. In this vein is the recent “active neutrality strategy.” ¹ The Maronite Patriarch presents a clear example of the problem of the incompatibility of strategic agendas and contested NRCs (Raï, 2020).

Some might argue that Hezbollah’s objective is to establish a new agreement, potentially sponsored by Iran, aimed at ensuring its dominance. According to journalist Salim Badaoui, this matter could ultimately lead to Lebanon’s demise (Kéchichian, 2020a). Indeed, it can be assumed that Israel will never accept the idea of seeing Lebanon in Hezbollah’s hands. Therefore, the options seem clear for Lebanon to consolidate itself as a democratic sovereign state or succumb to paramilitary anarchy (Alamuddin, 2021). As a matter of fact, and for the first time, the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Gen. Joseph Aoun, stated that “the army is compact and its dissolution means the end of the (Lebanese) entity” (Houssari, 2021). Likewise, he harshly criticized the behavior of political officials due to passivity in dealing with the political deadlock. He claimed that the LAF had been used for political purposes and the promotion of a campaign to distort the reputation of the martial entity (Cortés & Kéchichian, 2021).

Persistent governance deficiencies and the prevailing political stalemate necessitate focusing on the existing consociational system. The first thing to address is the application of semi-consociationalism, where the requirements of proportionality and segmental autonomy would be met but not the grand coalition and the powers veto criteria. The question to tackle is whether this segmental/territorial autonomy, which provides an exclusive sphere of governance to each group to regulate its affairs without the intervention of the central authorities in areas of crucial importance to those minorities, will take the form of federalism or whether it will lead to forms of non-territorial autonomy (Aboultaif, 2019, p. 110).

Lebanon must face the dilemma posed by the request for state authority. It is also forced to deal with the gap between consolidating a shared national identity and protecting sociopolitical pluralism that demands its pseudo-democratic character (Bahout, 2016). It must especially be obliged to deal with the triumph of “communitocracy” as a new form of governance that served more than the interests of the people, as it catered to the whims of confessional communities that made up the Lebanese mosaic (Salamey, 2017, pp. 81–112). Although the Lebanese speak the same language and share many cultural and social traditions, the weakening of the central government, its inability to resolve the many crises, and the deep differences over Lebanon’s regional positioning favor the withdrawal of communities and create fertile ground for the resurgence of the federalist debate. The article argues that the most suitable option to overcome the current stalemate relies not on federalism or partition but on modifying the existing power-sharing system. The persistent issues arising from implementing semi-consociationalism are highlighted to argue that restoring a fully developed consociational system would enable Lebanon to regain its political stability and order, better equipping it to confront future challenges. Observers may witness the initial stages of the final phase in the evolution of Lebanon’s political structure and its associated governance paradigm. Initially, Lebanon transitioned from a multicultural society to a multiethnic state system. Presently, the governing elites are compelled to devise a new framework, which may manifest as a federalist arrangement under optimal circumstances or partition in a less favorable scenario. Therefore, the issue of semi-consociationalism and triumph of “communitocracy,” prevailing hegemonic position of Hezbollah, excessive use of vetoes, and the existing monopoly of representation within each confessional community demand a new approach in terms of the political form and political order to avoid the abyss.

The validity of the argument in this article regarding the effectiveness of the power-sharing system relies on the capacity to demonstrate a strong internal consistency among sources. The analysis triangulates various sources through multiple means. To begin with, semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from different political parties and confessional groups. In addition, the methodology entails case study analysis, theoretical frameworks, and a historical review complemented by qualitative research methods to examine discourses, media interactions, and political decisions. This methodological approach offers a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter under consideration.

The article first delineates the main reasons behind the failure of the power-sharing system, emphasizing its capacity to heal. Second, it interrogates whether the federal proposal is going to succeed or not. Finally, it addresses the problem of semi-consociationalism to promote its full functionality.

Why Did the Power-sharing System Fail?

For decades, the Lebanese consociation system has been an example of praise from the international community. The formula of coexistence between different confessional communities has typically been a source of praise for the country of cedars (McGarry, 2019). Thus, Pope John Paul II (1989) said, “Lebanon is more than a country; it is a message of freedom and an example of pluralism for East and West” (p. 1). Despite all these praises, Lebanon has regressed in every aspect due to the remarkably complex situation it is currently experiencing.

The consociational state that supposedly rests on ensuring stability has ceased to function. Like any political system, the absence of updates has rendered it outdated and perilous to the country’s sustainability. As Haddad points out, Lebanese consociationalism has failed in its task of providing an adequate functional and stable public institutional system (Haddad, 2009), even though the consociational state has guaranteed not only a balance of power between the different elites (Christian and Muslim) but also the implementation of a careful internal division based on certain ethnic, religious, or even linguistic lines so that a sufficiently strong group could not be formed that could subdue and control others (Kéchichian, 2020a, p. 3).

However, at present, what is being observed is the imposition of one community over the others. The Shiite community, represented by Hezbollah and Amal, is attempting to dismantle the consociational system to establish a new political order under their dominance. Hezbollah and its allies have proposed an alleged solution in which the current system is abolished and replaced by a “secular unitary” system. In such a scenario, no other than Hezbollah would expand its hegemony over all the devices in the state. Besides provoking some opposition among the other communities, this claim to dominance has also generated resentment (Fukuyama, 2018). As a result, this sense of resentment, provoked by the imposition of one community being recognized by the rest as hegemonic, is undermining the interconfessional balance of power, as well as the mechanisms of power-sharing and the consociational system.

In this context, Hezbollah’s position is difficult to understand because, on the one hand, it seems willing to allow certain levels of decentralization. On the other hand, it presents itself in favor of creating a strong central state. This unclear position determines the future of any proposal due to its hegemonic position in the political landscape. The fact that it already presents itself overtly against federalism or partition can be understood as a sign not to expect the materialization of either of those options. Therefore, how is it possible to think about how the federal proposal works when this non-state actor is influencing the foreign policy agenda and national security dossier? Indeed, although Lebanese share common attributes, they still do not agree on certain basic political and social freedoms, which can only be preserved through a new political pact. The options for this new political pact are the federal option, the increased political decentralization option, and the partition option. The question that must be tackled next is whether the federal or partition option will be possible when hegemonic formations at the moment, such as Hezbollah, have openly stated that they reject both options out of the box.

Another aspect to consider is that the discussion involves distinct options. The core disparities between federalism and consociational regimes do not hinge solely on territorial organization. Consociationalism pertains to the character of a regime, whereas federalism pertains to the structure of a polity. Furthermore, while federalism encompasses governmental structures and procedures, consociationalism is primarily concerned with procedural aspects alone (Elazar, 1985, p. 17). There could be a risk of not only abuses concerning the imposition of certain civil liberties but the implementation of ethnic cleansing can be recorded at worst. The federal and decentralization proposals are not magical formulas that will solve all of Lebanon’s problems. Opting for a federal formula could lead to a scenario where active or positive neutrality could be effective. On paper, this strategy would disassociate entities from the federation that do not wish to participate in or be involved in armed confrontation or war. This argument is one of the most interesting to understand the total opposition to this proposal by the Shia community.

What is happening in Lebanon nowadays is a sort of de-consociationalism incited by the proliferation of populist policies to respond to certain external challenges. The impact of such external shocks has been noticed in four different areas (electoral, parliamentary, and executive arena, as well as interest group/state relations) (Helms & Willumsen, 2019). The shift from consociational to centripetal democracy that has occurred during the last few years could, therefore, be regarded as the result of a shift from consociational to centripetal democracy. The latter is marked by “a highly fragmented party system (…); a highly polarized party system with large ideological divides between the major parties on the left and right; (…) a segmented society; and (…) expressly competitive-conflictual elite behavior between political camps, thereby hindering compromise” (Vatter, 2016, p. 62). Therefore, this type of democracy would promote partisan modes of political representation in the context of multifaceted electoral and direct democratic voting opportunities (Lacey, 2017). What is taking place through an intersectarian game of alliances is the so-called “vote pooling,” which occurs “when political leaders seek support outside their group to win elections, and voters exchange votes across group boundaries” (Bogaards, 2019, p. 520). Therefore, proportional representations undermine consociational power-sharing and open the door to establishing electoral and political dominance (Bogaards, 2019, p. 525).

The corporate consociation system is at a kind of crossroads since it cannot be developed to achieve its objective of giving rise to the consolidation of the Lebanese democratic system. The dynamics are quite negative as they present a power balance among communities that makes the policy look under the prism of the zero-sum game. Paralysis and inaction are the most suitable for these communities to avoid compromising their position or collective interests in the Lebanese mosaic. The most plausible result of this dynamic is entrenching consociationalism, where ethnicity should be predetermined in institutions as a prerequisite to changing group identities. In addition, the political over-representation of certain communities, such as Christians (Nagle, 2015), reinforces the “ethnurgy” as a process of politicization of cultural identities, which was defined by Theodor Hanf (1995) as “the process of politicization of groups that combines economic, political and cultural approaches for mobilization in communities defined by ethnic markers” (Hanf, 1995, p. 45). Thus, political mobilization based on ethnic factors becomes essential to overcome the alienation process which pursuits the general interest. The problem is that the power-sharing mechanism that has been weaved consists of a series of dynamics of dependence that have been institutionalizing sectarian identity as one of the central elements of the relationship between the state and society (Makdisi, 2000; Salibi, 1989).

Another factor explaining the failure of the power-sharing mechanism in Lebanon is the necessity for the federal proposal to address a wide array of risk factors. These factors could undermine the federal model’s potential implementation and its likely short-lived existence. Among these factors is the need for more momentum to implement specific political and legal reforms. Implementing the federal proposal would necessitate democratic and political maturity, which the country currently lacks. The impact of the absence of necessary legal and political reforms to extricate Lebanon from its predicament has been further aggravated by the erosion of democratic norms and the intensification of autocratization processes that have become evident. Lebanon could indeed be affected by what is referred to as the “third wave of autocratization,” characterized by a “substantial de facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy” (Luhrmann & Lindgerb, 2019). For the Lebanese case, we could mention that the erosion of democratic factors can be labeled as backsliding, defined as “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that an existing sustain democracy” (Bermeo, 2016).

The question that must be raised is whether one can explain the differences between the democratization process in a consociational democracy like Lebanon’s and a liberal democracy. How is it possible to think about the realization of decentralization and democratization when certain domestic elements and factors would be playing against those processes? In other words, how can two contradictory features fit in a democratization process, even in a consociational democracy? This issue is pertinent since Hezbollah, the Shiite formation perceives itself as an integral part of the Wilayat al-Faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which is presented as a system of governance that guides the action and attitude of and which aims to prioritize the figure of the cleric over that of the state itself) and foresees the establishment of said system in Lebanon (Abdul Hussain, 2009; Khatib, 2021). Given this ambitious agenda, is it possible to talk about the democratization process when contemplated as a process of theocratization, where the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih justifies the clerical guardianship of the state? Moreover, is it possible to follow that jurisdiction when it is based precisely on the denial of popular sovereignty and the consideration of citizens as subjects, especially when the Lebanese consociational democracy is neither free of sectarian aspects nor is it based on ethno-religious considerations? Hence, is it conceivable to discuss democratization when the objective of this framework is to establish an Islamic State where the populace plays no role or cannot confer legitimacy upon a ruler or withdraw it from them? (Milani, 2016, p. 58).

Even shari’a would become a pliant tool in the hands of the faqih, as the new concept of the absolute rule of the faqih (Wilayat al-Faqih) meant that even principles of the faith, as well as the rules of shari’a, could be suspended by the supreme leader, if he should deem it expedient. Hezbollah must deal with the big inconsistency of the way of life they promote based on the rule of the faqih, which does not fit at all anymore. That is why any attempt at impending political and legal reforms in Lebanon is translated ipso facto in increasing the defection regarding its social capital (Milani, 2016, p. 60).

Another element that could be used to understand the failure of power-sharing and the difficulty of implementing the federal proposal would rest on the tripartite formula—“People-Army-Resistance”—followed not only by Hezbollah but by its main ally, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). This formula needs to address the role of the state. Wayna el-Dawleh (where is the government?) has become one of the most commonly used expressions among the Lebanese amid the crisis gripping the country. How can federalism or democratization process be discussed when the fundamental institutional and state-building efforts required to realize this democratization process are disregarded?

As can be observed, the lack of trust among the different confessional elites has made consociationalism and power-sharing mechanism not only lose strength as a dynamizing element of democratic consolidation but has sabotaged any attempt at development in this area (Cortés & Kairouz, 2023). Sectarian leaders have more than exploited the weakness of state institutions to promote a bargaining dynamic that has, in the end, increased the dysfunctionality of the shared power mechanism. The informal elite-level bargaining has triumphed over the consociational proposal. This triumph has brought about a new type of governance called “communitocracy,” which refers to a governance system where policies are designed to serve more than the interests of the people, the interests of the confessional communities that make up the system (Salamey, 2017, p. 85).

Why is the Federal Proposal Going to Fail?

It is worth noting that around 40% of the world’s population has adopted the federal system, and what distinguishes them is efficient governance, stability, economics, and prosperity. “Federalism” comes from the Latin word “foedus,” which denotes the beginning of a process that leads to the union of two or more political entities. The essence of federalism, as a form of political organization, lies in its function as a mechanism to structure a state wherein two or more governments are responsible for exercising authority over the same group of individuals within the same geographic area (Montani, 2017). It does mean “a division of sovereignty between two levels of government” (Law, 2013, p. 95). Therefore, federalism could be an appropriate way of managing the diversity of Lebanon, and it could present an interesting option for overcoming the political and social gridlock. However, whether certain assumptions will work for the Lebanese case study is still being determined. For instance, the federal proposal could facilitate the fair and balanced sharing of resources, allocating the largest shares accordingly. However, certain facts and practices would contradict this ideal distribution.

Alfred Riachi, a federalist, believes that the political system based on the division of political and administrative functions between Christians and Muslims (with Christian presidents, armies, and central banks holding the preeminence) is centralized and hybrid (Khalifeh, 2020). With the growth and expansion of sectarianism and calls for separatism in the region, it is no surprise to see how federalism is returning as the main topic in Lebanon. This latter remains an incomplete project. They were focusing here on the primary matter of the viability of potential federalism in Lebanon. The calls for federalism these days are not new. During the Civil War in the 1980s, while a demarcation of lines was drawn between many different Lebanese areas and districts according to confessional criteria, federalism began to flourish in Lebanon. Militias that carried out military operations in the country’s regions were dissolved. However, they preserved their role as political parties or became part of the state. Once the civil war was over, parties except Hizballah started to hand in their weapons, and suddenly, the borders opened. That was an outcome of a political compromise sponsored by the international community.

A federalist system in Lebanon would generate multiple ministates with a potential for conflicts and lengthy discrepancy. However, the political system based on the arrangements of the Taif Accord of 1989 seems like the old one and needs to be more viable since the balance of power has leaned in favor of some parties at the expense of others. Therefore, the freedom and openness that distinguish Lebanon are diminishing daily. Economic and social difficulties could be a real chance and a calling to amend the political system, but who can guarantee that a federal state will safeguard reform? Isn’t it better to keep a central unified modern state by adopting a decentralization that would suit Lebanese society? A modern state should guarantee a non-differentiation between citizens concerning their confessional affiliations. It is imperative to move toward democratic and fiscal decentralization. This step could have prevented us from falling into the trap of a federation of warlords governing vertically, thus creating a highly centralized state (Edde, 2023).

A federal governance model might exacerbate existing conflict that would lead to opposing the formation of a strong nation. The Lebanese communities or confessions are divided into several issues. Some of them are in favor of secularism and even laicism. Another part imagines a strong state with a strong army, while others believe the military apparatus parallel to the state could create the strength of Lebanon. While a new generation at the forefront of the 17 October uprising (Thawra) does not want to walk down the aisle of their parents or live in the residue of the past, a similar generation keeps regenerating itself with no vision and is attached to the old system (Cortés, 2022). How would a federal system work when the foreign policy agenda and national security file within the state are monitored and inspected by an armed group?

In this vein, while some Lebanese believe partition of Lebanon with a federal system would provide confessions a certain degree of autonomy and liberation of overlap from the others, partition would also accentuate the differences between confession and social groups. While some think they could freely administer their ministates or confessions, any community in Lebanon that feels stronger than the others would scratch and try to obliterate the others so it could set aside any form of independence or autonomy. Likewise, it can be argued that it is unlikely that such a vision of a religiously divided Lebanon will receive unanimous approval, especially since almost one-quarter of Christians live in mixed areas alongside Muslims.

The federal proposal will raise more questions than answers. For instance, what would keep these new ministers from going into a regional conflict and turning the new Lebanon once more into a battlefield? What would forbid these new federal ministates from deepening division in Lebanese society, which would clear the path for more regional and international interference? How would the federal districts be divided? Would they be along sectarian lines? What happens to the mixed areas that include Christian and Muslim inhabitants? How would the newly demarcated states coexist? Suppose the central state has tense relations with external players and a state of war with others. Would the same relations apply to the different federal states, or might a state get to choose to normalize ties with Israel, for example, while the other throws rockets at it and calls for the liberation of Palestine? At the economic level, will those federal states be viable? Do some of them have privileged advantages like a port and airport, and do others not? What about the industry, tourism, and agriculture? (Rayess, 2020).

Within this amalgam of questions, the one related to the different religious authorities’ roles should be highlighted. As Kéchichian points out, “could clerics afford a transfer of populations and would they accommodate Shi‘ah partners for the most harmonious relationship possible—that is, to apply the aysh al-mushtaraq that everyone enjoyed—if Hizballah insisted on its inequitable terms?” (Kéchichian, 2020b, p. 8). Most likely, the religious authorities will do their best to block any progress in such a direction. Apart from the clergy, another issue that will represent a challenge is related to the shape of the federal state for the Lebanese case study, which could be presented as follows. It would respond to a federal geographic-sectarian system comprising six cantons equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Three of these cantons would have a Muslim majority, such as the cantons of Dahieh, South Lebanon, and North Bekaa (Shiite); Beirut, Iqlim el Kharroub, Saida, North Lebanon, and West Bekaa (Sunnite); Chouf, Rachaiya, and Hasbaiyya (Druze). The other three cantons would be the North, Jbeil and Kessrouane; Metn, East Beirut, and al Chouf would have a greater Christian. In this way, following the demographic and confessional results, no canton would have a sectarian population mix greater than 15%. Hence, evaluating whether a federal proposal rooted in confessional considerations would conclusively address Lebanon’s issues is crucial. It would, therefore, be essential to determine whether such a federal proposal based on the confessional factor would resolve Lebanon’s problems or if it would exacerbate existing sectarian divisions.

Several challenges must be addressed to ensure the success of the federal proposal in Lebanon. The first one is related to the autonomy of the Cedar country. Lebanon needs to guarantee its dissociation from the current regional turmoil. The second obstacle is the need for more consensus among the most important confessional communities in the Lebanese mosaic. For the federal proposal to succeed, some consensus is needed on foreign policy options. As previously demonstrated, there needs to be more consensus in the case at hand, but distinct para-diplomats with sectarian agendas that undermine Lebanon’s foreign relations exist. Therefore, for the federal proposal to succeed, respect for the active neutrality strategy proposed by Patriarch Maronite must be ensured a priori. Recovering the essence of the National Pact of “No East, No West” is vital in ensuring Lebanon’s dissociation from any crisis or armed conflict likely to increase mistrust among different confessional communities.

In this regard, it would be worth noting the impact that the Christian nationalist movement is having that would bet on isolating the country, promoting a religious nationalism that allows them, on the one hand, to guarantee their self-determination and, on the other, national cultural and political dominance. They would aim to procure “the control of territory, population, and state power without aiming at secession.” Consequently, if the present conditions do not change, the Christian community will not see its political domination or self-determination guaranteed because of the domination of Hezbollah (Felsch, 2018, p. 19), which results in a considerable reduction in the standards of freedom and democracy in every sense, thereby suppressing the aspirations for freedom within the Christian community. The response to this process results in manipulation by the FPM of the priorities of the foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migrants has focused its efforts on the naturalization policy of part of the Lebanese (mainly Christian) diaspora to increase the confessional democratic weight of the Christian community (Felsch, 2018, p. 32).

Another factor that could explain why federalism cannot work is that Lebanon needs to meet the criteria for having a common foreign policy. Communitocratic politics, as Imad Salamey describes it, is an “[…] effective agency for collective action in inter-communitarian power struggle […] a code of conduct that facilitates inter-communitarian competition and consensus throughout the politics of power-sharing” (Salamey, 2017, p. 19). In other words, it is a form of political legitimacy based on an agreement between communities. A system in which the individual’s main loyalty is to the community he belongs to and identifies himself with rather than to the state. A “communitocracy,” therefore, is a political system captured by sectarian elites of various communities that undermine the state’s authority and seek to maximize their particular interests and share power at the expense of the national one. Here, certain parties propose the federal system since it could replace or compensate the representation of the confessional system by recognizing the diversity and social differences in Lebanon. The same parties believe a federal system would prevent a dominant confessional group and regional actors’ proxies. They also think secularism cannot be implemented without adopting a federal system.

This system requires a balance so every confession or community feels safe and equal to others. Once one of these communities behaves as the strongest, others would be negatively affected, troubled, and unsettled. That would lead to the insulation of communities or some of them. It could also lead to a slow state decomposition and impose a foreign intervention that carries on a disturbance or even upheaval between communities. Once the state is weak, the turmoil is bigger. So, no community has the right to overtake the central government, and no community can exist without the legitimacy and shelter adduced by the state.

Regarding the call for adopting a “unitary secular” system, it will never be implemented while a community or more could dominate and rule the country. Therefore, even if a secular system were deemed appropriate and advantageous for Lebanon, it would need to be implemented in a delicate balance, ensuring that no single community could assert hegemony over others. A secular system could potentially dismantle Lebanon’s multicultural fabric, leading to chaos.

Another argument against the success of the federal proposal is related to the governance that the new federal entities will implement in their respective territories once the federation is settled. Most likely, the same elites will reassure their dominance, and in doing so, it is important to remember that a decrease in human and civil rights could become a temporary rule or practice to be observed. Therefore, the level of authoritarianism will undermine and contradict the basic principles and values of what Lebanon represents. The problem for the Lebanese case is that such a federal proposal would likely accentuate the authoritarian traits already existing in each federal entity. How could the federal proposal protect and promote citizens’ freedom when each leader of each federated entity would implement even stronger control over existing human and material resources in that geographical area? The requirements of consensus and cross-sectoral engagement would be diminished. The balance between today’s sectarian elites would allow for greater movement maneuvers for citizens (Young, 2015).

While differences over foreign policy were the issue of Lebanese leaders since the birth of Lebanon as an independent state, and the mutual fears among the confessions led to the National Pact between Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, which embodied a verbal compromise based on a “No East, No West,” a simple understanding to describe certain neutrality refraining Christians to seek protection from the West Muslims to call for Arab unity, the Pact was not continually functional and collapsed due to the failed attempt of building a local consensus on foreign policy. Federalism is only possible if it requires a national consensus on foreign policy, which does not exist. Let us imagine how the federated regions would be allocated. Would it be on sectarian criteria? Then what to do with mixed regions? What would be different in a federal system if foreign policy were still the issue of multiple parties and confessions? Could we give the prerogatives to ministates to control their international relations? So, federalism will never have a chance in such deep divisions in Lebanon. Not even neutrality could bring together the multiple confessions. Furthermore, how these ministates could be viable at the economic level? Lebanon has only one airport and one functional port. What about agriculture and industry?

Rather than adopting a federal system, Lebanon should adopt a system of accountable states controlled by checks and balances. The first step is determining how to build a national identity in Lebanon before any action or process. In the end, Lebanon will continue to lend itself to creative experimentation with some form of community-based federalism that does not lead to separatist autonomy sought by a confessional community or to the tyranny of a Shia majority (Malik, 2008). Either way, the federal proposal should be understood as something other than a form of partitioning. It should be understood as quite the opposite. It is a way to unite the state through a political structure recognizing its various components (Young, 2015).

How to Overcome the Problem of Semi-consociationalism?

The theory of consociationalism was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s to address and transition certain divided European societies from instability to stability (Norris, 2008, p. 23). The framework of this theory has been stretched to encompass other countries, like Lebanon. The father and master of this theory is Arend Lijphart (Norris, 2008, pp. 23–24), who stated that “in a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population. Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). Although there is certainly more to consociational leadership than is commonly perceived, this should serve as an incentive to carefully explore the effective potential of consociational regimes rather than providing a convenient excuse to ignore them (Bogaards et al., 2019, p. 348). Bearing in mind the important role displayed by Elites, the theory of consociationalism has sparked an interesting academic debate where scholars bet for liberal consociationalism while others prefer corporatist consociationalism (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007).

Sisk states that power-sharing systems aim at accommodating a democratic competition and not discarding it within the appropriate borderline (Sisk, 1996, p. 33). Power-sharing regimes give elites importance in decision-making. This kind of organization most applies to plural societies (Norris, 2008, p. 23). In the establishment of divided societies, the leaders of each key faction are guaranteed participation in national or regional government. That would urge politicians to work together with rivals and moderate their demands, in addition to giving rise to leaders of communities to promote conciliation among their supporters (Norris, 2008, p. 25). Once the leaders of the communities are within the legislature and the government to guarantee their interests and concerns, this would make distinct communities feel that “their voice counts” (Norris, 2008, p. 26).

In this debate, Lebanon is increasingly significant as a case study, as it has become the optimal setting to test the fundamental assumptions of consociationalism, particularly regarding the democratic qualities of power-sharing. The critics have focused, on the one hand, on the type of negotiation among the elites of various subcultures and refer to the element of secrecy and summit diplomacy as opposing to participatory democracy (O’Leary, 2013, p. 37). For instance, if the information about the compromises was announced publicly or leaked, it could fuel tensions and deepen divisions among rival segments (O’Leary, 2013). On the other hand, the anticompetitive characteristics of consociational politics, coupled with the lack of opposition in grand coalition governments, are significant. This argument was based on the idea that the role of the opposition is impossible due to the principle of inclusion in a power-sharing democracy (O’Leary, 2013).

Lebanon has a partial-fledged consociational system but a semi-consociational one. Lebanon’s semi-consociational system meets proportionality requirements but lacks a grand coalition and veto authority. ² The said system would be characterized by the “concentration of executive powers in the presidential or prime ministerial office, the presence of a communal hegemon in the system with the ability to subordinate other groups, and finally communal control of the armed forces” (Aboultaif, 2019, p. 109).

Cooperation among the elites was also one of the main features of postwar Lebanon, translated through the formation of grand coalition governments at the executive level. Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, grand coalition governments have prevailed in practice and spirit. Only two cabinets were not considered grand coalitions among the governments formed during this time (2005–2020). The first is Mikati’s government in 2011 because it was missing major parties, such as the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement (Aboultaif, 2019, p. 145). Similarly, Diab’s government in 2020 needed more participation from major political parties. ³ These governments were considered to be a deviation from the principles of consociationalism.

While the Taif Accord effectively halted the war, internal peace remains precarious and vulnerable to internal or external factors that may trigger violence under favorable circumstances. Nevertheless, Taif could have contributed more significantly to achieving lasting peace if the implementation of reforms and the political behavior of the elite had been appropriate and aligned with a postwar transition strategy capable of renewing the social contract between the state and society. Thus, the problem in Lebanon is embodied not in the Taif agreement itself but in the ruling elites, who have successfully detached the agreement from its spirit and deviated from its consociational practices through manipulating institutions and reforms.

Another essential device observed in the executive is the mutual veto. According to the Taif accord, the legal quorum for Council meetings requires the presence of two-thirds of the number of ministers (Lebanese National Authorities, 1989). For governmental decisions, the Taif document demanded that in the cabinet, decisions are reached by consensus, and in case of failure, by majority vote not to immobilize the system; as for critical questions ⁴ facing the country, if no consensus was reached among the ministers, a majority of two-thirds is required. That said, political veto exists in running the country’s affairs within the cabinet since an absolute majority must make critical decisions. This veto can be used by any cultural group that disagrees on a certain issue or believes that its interests are in danger. This can be done either by refraining from joining the session (the quorum will not be reached) or forcing a new bargain on the discussed political topic (in case the required votes to pass a decision are not reached).

In this sense, it is necessary to address the fate of the technocratic government that lasted less than 8 months (January 21 to August 10, 2020). Despite the initial optimism surrounding the government composed of purportedly independent figures and experts, this optimism quickly dissipated as connections between these ministers and the primary political–religious elites became apparent. Of 30 members in the cabinet, eight would be in the pocket of the Free Patriotic Movement political party. Be that as it may, a new political experiment that supposedly satisfied the opposition movement should be started. An experiment cooked up by the old elite to meet their needs and guarantee the status quo’s permanence. The technocratic government began to carry out its functions with empty promises of content and wishful thinking that immediately went up in smoke. The issue was not solely attributed to members of that cabinet being answerable to their political patrons but rather to the exclusion of half of the political forces comprising the Lebanese political-confessional mosaic. Despite adherence to proportionality and segmental autonomy criteria, entities like the Lebanese Forces, Kataeb, Progressive Socialist Party, and Future Movement did not participate in said cabinet.

Consequently, we face a situation where the cabinet resembles the March 8 coalition. The absence of any member from the other major coalition of parties, such as March 14, did not pose any problem for one of the most emblematic figures of the old guard of the Lebanese political elite, namely the current Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Mr Nabih Berry. Therefore, such a technocratic government would only respect the criterion of the ceremonial grand coalition with veto powers.

Regarding the latter, it must be mentioned that the main religious confessions were represented in said executive but left out half of the political forces that represented these confessional communities. Mainly striking is the case of the Christian community, where the political party led by the son-in-law of General Michel Aoun, Gebran Bassil, came to control up to eight cabinet members. The other Christian political party that participated was Marada, which had two ministers. Therefore, political parties like the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb should have been included. The Druze community was also divided in that the Progressive Socialist Party of the emblematic Kamal Jumblat did not participate in said cabinet. However, its main opponent within the Druze community, the Liberal Democratic Party led by Prince Talal Arslan, did. As a result, there is a type of hegemonic bloc that would precisely squander the mechanism that seeks to avoid the emergence of hegemonic blocs in such fragmented societies. The president of the republic, representing the Maronite community, was tremendously strengthened, and this strengthening was reflected, in part, in the Christian community itself.

The final element of a semi-confessional system pertains to the community oversight exerted over the Lebanese Army. There has been observable alignment between the Lebanese Army and the narrative Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement propagated. It can be mentioned that part of the Lebanese population lost confidence in the martial institution when, on May 21, 2024, General Joseph Aoun asked his companions to confront the successive violations committed by the Israeli enemy concerning Lebanese sovereignty. The problem did not lie in this fair request but rather that it used Hezbollah’s “people-army-resistance” formula, which has been rejected by at least half of the Lebanese and that a former commander and head of state, General Michel Suleiman, had declared null and void in May 2014. In this way, he clarified his support for the corrupt political elite, perhaps thinking about his future political career (Aboultaif, 2019, p. 109).

The current semi-consociational system allows traditional elites to imprison the state and institutions, perpetuating a form of political clientelism camouflaged as a false democratic pretense that conceals corporate consociationalism. The idea is to continue enjoying what has come to be called political feudalism, where the main elites have inherited political positions. Due to this political clientelism, a low-level priority has been given. It continues to be given both to the consolidation of the national sphere and the necessary political, legal, and economic reforms, such as those that are committed to economic development, the fight against corruption, public accountability and the rule of law, among others, to unleash the full potential that the country of cedars has (Salamey, 2009, p. 84). Without facing the challenges provided by semi-consociationalism, the partition alternative could get certain traction. Undoubtedly, this option represents a tougher, more painful, and controversial scenario. This option goes hand in hand with the changes made regarding the role of national conceptions that require us to ask ourselves again about the pretext of “mutual coexistence” (al ’aysh al mushtarak). How is it possible to feed that chimera when facts and political will point to the opposite?

Considering the complex situation that Lebanon is currently facing, the partition plan no longer appears to be a chimera. ⁵ Indeed, as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera pointed out, “partition should remain a last resort, but, regrettably, we still live in a world where it is sometimes necessary” (Mearsheimer & Van Evera, 1985, p. 21). Without any doubt, the level of controversy and polemic will reach its peak sooner or later. What cannot be denied is the potential that this partition plan can represent for the future of Lebanon and the Middle East. Consistently with this, partition could present a positive impact in terms of Lebanon’s ethnic security dilemma because it could easily be solved with a segregationist proposal that can change the game among the Lebanese.

Why keep living a lie? This question would be based not only on the failure of consociational democracy but on the loss of faith in the formula of mutual coexistence. Hezbollah’s excessive dominance and the lack of consolidation of national identity and a strong and united state opens the door to other political options, from the federation, regional decentralization, and finally, partitioning. Why reject the partition option when the Lebanese, Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims have rejected mutual coexistence? A century is a considerable time for a failed experiment in nation-building (Kéchichian, 2020a, p. 5). Therefore, the doors to the partition option are more open than ever despite the lack of political courage to address that option. This option may avoid repeating past mistakes and resolve Lebanese’s lack of consensus regarding certain political and social freedoms that, as Kéchichian points out, can only be preserved through a new political pact. The recent call for a constitutional convention by the Shia community to negotiate a new power-sharing accord presents a good opportunity to consider the partition option as a last resort.

In our analysis, the definition of partition provided by Chaim Kaufmann will be followed, defining partition as “separation jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under the pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party” (Kaufmann, 1998, p. 125). In this sense, the consensus required among the Elites will be difficult to achieve. The intervention of the third party could work only on the Christian side in a case where the Christian minority is at risk of being eliminated. The odds of this scenario are too small to be taken into consideration.

Conclusion

The article began assessing the reasons that could explain why the power-sharing mechanism is not working properly. Suppose one assumes that federalism is the perfect solution to the ongoing crisis. How do we pretend to launch a new political order when the country cannot even show an independent foreign policy due to different roles of national conceptions? This article drew on an established theoretical framework related to consociationalism, federalism, and partition. The article thus sought to provide both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the field. The hope is that the article sparks further theoretical reflection on consociational democracy and governance in fragmented societies, especially concerning comparing consociational models, populism in foreign policy analysis, and the effectiveness of political mechanisms. Additionally, in the Middle East region, further research is required regarding significant elements such as the impact of institutional change, citizen participation, and the challenges for their implementation.

As far as it has been proved, only time will tell whether the power-sharing mechanism finally succumbs to the siren songs of federalism. As it has been demonstrated, the latter does not represent the ideal solution in the short term for too many reasons. As it has been shown, federalism cannot end the problem of sectarianism but rather exacerbates it by creating more fragmentation and division when the union is most needed. Given the inconveniences and obstacles the federal option presents, more questions still need to be answered. However, the results of this study demonstrate an emerging consensus advocating for decentralization as the optimal model for Lebanon. For instance, this could involve expanding the authorities of municipalities or establishing elected councils of Muhafaza that are responsible for the management of district development.

In conclusion, in Lebanon, the call for federalism comes earlier and without passing through the needed phases of state-building. It requires a new national dialogue that will likely happen soon and where the federal proposal will be exonerated for being too divisive. In this vein, the political elite would do whatever it takes not to change the existing system because they will most likely lose part of their power of influence. Traditional political forces will reject any proposal that involves the emergence of new actors. Therefore, the mutual coexistence system, led by a traditional elite, still needs to be prepared and mature enough to tackle such a decisive step. Their interests have been linked for decades to the traditionally centralized government. Given the pros and cons provided by the federal option, it can be argued that for the future of Lebanon as a sui generis statal entity, it is more doable to reform the system to solve the problem of semi-consociationalism rather than take the path of a general and total change of the political system and political structure because it does not have, nowadays, the political consensus not only to discuss federal or partitions options but to implement them.