Abstract
On December 28, 2025, demonstrations erupted in multiple cities across Iran over rising food prices, inflation, and the ongoing economic crisis. The protests began with the Bazaaris (merchants and shopkeepers) in Tehran’s Bazar-e Bozorg (Grand Market) and spread to marketplaces in other cities. Soon, students and youths, too, joined the demonstrations on different university campuses, leading to widespread protests. As the unrest spread, the government took security measures and began hauling up protestors in Tehran and other places. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Basij militia was mobilized to contain the protests. Several cases of violent confrontation between demonstrators and members of the Basij were reported across Iran on December 31, leading to increased security measures and the imposition of a nationwide shutdown.
As the situation continued to remain tense, with intensifying demonstrations and several cases of violence and rioting being reported, the government started a crackdown, imposed a nationwide internet blackout, and warned the protesters against using violence. President Masoud Pezeshkian urged the demonstrators to end the protests and promised to meet their demands, but it did not placate the angry youth. As the situation continued to escalate, the Iranian authorities warned demonstrators against spreading chaos. They blamed foreign powers, the USA and Israel, for fueling unrest, funding protests, and arming the demonstrators. By the first week of 2026, reports of detention, arrests, and deaths of demonstrators and security personnel began to circulate through social media. Some of the protesters were seen shouting anti-regime slogans.
On January 2, President Donald Trump warned Iran against killing “peaceful protestors,” saying that the USA “will come to their rescue.” Trump wrote on social media: “We are locked and loaded and ready to go,” underlining the possibility of a US military intervention in Iran. The following day, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei retorted that Iran “will not yield to the enemy pressure” and “rioters must be put in their place.” Strikes, demonstrations, and protests, nonetheless, continued, and, as on January 7, the protests reportedly spread to over 100 cities across the 31 provinces, including several university campuses. It prompted the Iranian authorities to cut the telephone lines and impose an internet blackout in an attempt to end the protests. Reports of the killing of several protesters and security forces began to circulate through various sources outside Iran by January 10, leading to speculations of a US response. Government-aligned media showed images of several large pro-government protests in Tehran and other cities on January 12. By mid-January, the number of reported casualties increased to 3,500, with nearly 10,000 protesters reported under arrest.
While the protests and demonstrations continued, the war of words between Trump and Iranian leaders also continued. On January 14, Trump, during a media interaction in the Oval Office, said that he had been briefed about the Iranian authorities ceasing the planned executions of the protesters. By January 21, Iranian authorities announced that the protests had ended, although allegations of a widespread and violent crackdown continued to spread across international media. While the internet and media blackout in Iran continued, conflicting reports of the number of casualties emerged in the international media, with some sources underlining that over 20,000 were killed. In contrast, the official Iranian sources put the number of deaths at over 3,000. On January 26, the US authorities announced that they are sending military reinforcements to the Persian Gulf and that the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier has entered the Middle East. On January 28, Trump again warned Iran through a social media post, saying Iran should “come to the table” and “negotiate a fair and equitable deal.” Further saying that Iran should accept the idea of “no nuclear weapons,” threatening that “time is running out for the regime to make a deal.”
The escalating tensions between the USA and Iran, and an increasing possibility of a US military intervention, underline the explosive nature of Middle Eastern politics. It has led several regional countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to announce that they will not allow their airspace to be used for attacking Iran as a cautionary measure against getting entangled in a US–Iran war. The fear of another military confrontation in the Middle East has put the region on tenterhooks, with fears of a prolonged conflict in case Iran continues to insist on having a deal on its terms and President Trump follows up on his threats of the use of force. Israel has long contemplated a regime change in Iran through external intervention, and the situation has become even more pronounced since the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas. Although no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the planning and execution of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has come to light, Israel has blamed Iran for aiding and supporting Hamas, thus being partly responsible for the October 7 attacks.
While the situation in and around Iran remains volatile, the Middle East faces other problems as well. Growing differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen have increased tensions between the two Arab Gulf neighbors, causing concern among regional and international actors. In the backdrop of the prevailing fragility in international affairs caused by the actions of President Trump and his unpredictability, and given the significance of regional stability in the Persian Gulf for energy security and connectivity, the concern over another potential war in the Middle East has heightened fears of its economic, political, environmental, and geopolitical fallouts on the world.
The second issue of 2026 carries six articles and four book reviews. The articles include one that examines the ideological transformation in English-Arabic translation of political news, and another that analyzes Kuwait’s relations with East and West Germany during 1960–1990. The third article focuses on the economic crisis in Lebanon, and the fourth examines identity and power in Türkiye–EU relations. The final two articles focus on unconventional political participation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the Hamas attack of October 7, respectively. Over to the issue!