The Elephant in the Room: Accumulation by Dispossession and Lebanon’s Neoliberal Crisis

The Sectarian Paradigm

In academic discourse, the dominant “sectarian paradigm” asserts that Lebanon’s underdevelopment and its recurring socio-political and economic crises, including the 2019 collapse, are deeply rooted in its entrenched sectarian power-sharing system (Assi, 2020). This framework views sectarianism not as a cultural inevitability but as a structural remnant of underdevelopment—a legacy of the Ottoman millet system that obstructs the formation of modern, efficient capitalist institutions within a liberal democratic framework (Cakal, 2020). The millet system was subsequently assimilated, modernized, and formalized into a power-sharing, religiously sectarian system, evolving into a consociational liberal democracy during the French mandate period from 1918 to 1946. It has continued to the present day, albeit in different configurations (Aoun & Zahar, 2017). This assertion emphasizes a political analysis of Lebanon’s ongoing economic mismanagement, corruption, and bureaucratic inefficiency (Baytiyeh, 2019). Proponents of this paradigm contend that the precedence given to collective rights over individual rights, which manifested during the tenure of the First Republic from 1920 to 1975, alongside the tumultuous interim period of civil war from 1975 to 1990 and persisting since the inception of the Ta’if peace accord in 1989–1990 heralding Lebanon’s current Second Republic, has unequivocally undermined the state’s ability to establish a cohesive and pragmatic economic framework (Collard, 2019).

This paradigm asserts that Lebanon’s economic and social crises stem directly from sectarianism and the structural instability that it produces in its power-sharing institutions, both of which are legacies of Ottoman and French colonial rule. These colonial foundations entrenched a sectarian institutional framework that continues to support strong communal loyalties and perpetuate clientelism, which dominates how the Lebanese state operates (Cammett, 2014). In this view, sectarianism is not merely a social characteristic but the principal mechanism driving zero-sum competition between religious sects over limited state power and economic resources (Salloukh, 2019). As a result of the Ta’if Agreement, which ended the 1975–1989 civil war in Lebanon, institutionalized sectarianism became further entrenched, perpetuating injustice, fostering corruption, and creating systemic economic inefficiency, culminating in the 2019 financial collapse (Leenders, 2012, p. 233; Salloukh et al., 2015). The paradigm historically presented and maintained by many popular organizations posits that secularizing society and establishing a civil state grounded in a robustly secular constitution is the only viable solution (Baun, 2020). Since the French Mandate, the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) have been the most vocal advocates of secularism, arguing that the implementation of a secular political system, regardless of its democratic form, is essential to resolving Lebanon’s enduring political and economic dysfunctions (Farha 2019). In the contemporary period, civil society actors—primarily from the educated middle and professional classes—are leading the way by championing this vision and promoting a secular republican system rooted in liberal democratic principles, national identity, and citizenship rights (Yonker, 2021).

While the paradigm effectively underscores the role of sectarianism and consociationalism in Lebanon’s political and economic dysfunction, it ultimately fails to address the complexity of the country’s recurring socio-economic crises (Moore, 1987). By centering political sectarianism as the primary cause of Lebanon’s political–economic collapse, the framework overlooks deeper structural issues, including entrenched inequality, class analysis, neoliberal economic consequences, institutional fragility, and external geopolitical pressures (Malley, 2018). This narrow focus renders the paradigm ill-equipped to interpret the 2019 widespread protests, which were driven not by sectarian loyalties but by widespread socio-economic grievances that transcended religious and political divisions. Indeed, the uprising marked a significant departure from traditional sectarian politics, with a cross-sectarian movement mobilizing around demands for economic justice and systemic reform (Khattab, 2022). In this context, the paradigm’s proposed shift toward a secular republican model, while potentially constructive, lacks the analytical depth and practical tools to address the broader, multidimensional roots of Lebanon’s unrest. It fails to capture the grassroots nature of the uprising and the economic desperation that fueled it, highlighting a critical gap in its explanatory power and the need for a comprehensive solution.

While the sectarian paradigm locates the roots of Lebanon’s crisis in internal identity-based fragmentation, it overlooks the broader geopolitical entanglements that shape domestic dynamics. The externalist paradigm that this article will address in the following section fills this gap by shifting the analytical lens outward, arguing that Lebanon’s crises are not merely homegrown but deeply connected to regional and international power dynamics (Deets, 2023). This perspective introduces a geopolitical dimension that complements and complicates the sectarian narrative, emphasizing the need for a more inclusive approach to understanding Lebanon’s crises (Majed & Salman, 2019).

The Externalist Paradigm

The “Externalist Paradigm” offers a critical analytical framework for comprehending Lebanon’s persistent socio-political and economic instability. It underscores the role of geopolitics and external interventions, making Lebanon’s strategic location a key factor. The country’s proximity to Israel and its hosting of a significant Palestinian refugee population make it a hotbed for regional and international power struggles (Khalaf, 2002). Ghassan Tuéni, in A War for Others, articulates this paradigm by attributing Lebanon’s recurrent crises, especially the 1975 Civil War, to foreign interference driven by competing geopolitical agendas. He argues that Lebanon’s sectarian political system and unresolved regional conflicts, notably the Palestinian issue, invite sustained external manipulation (Tuéni, 1985). These regional actors, such as Syria, Israel, Iran, the Gulf States, and Turkey, along with Western powers—most prominently the USA—have consistently exploited Lebanon’s internal socio-religious divisions to serve their strategic interests (Kisirwoni, 1980). According to this paradigmatic focus, this phenomenon lies at the core of Lebanon’s post-independence crises, manifesting in key historical episodes, including the 1958 Civil War and the 1975–1989 civil conflict (Zahar, 2005).

Following the 1975 Civil War, scholars within the externalist paradigm argue that Lebanon’s identity-based politics and consociational system—reinvigorated and institutionalized by the 1989 Taif Agreement—have rendered the country increasingly vulnerable to external manipulation (Najem, 2012). The externalists emphasized the urgent need for a centralized state that has a monopoly on the use of force to strengthen national unity and restrict foreign interference. However, between 1989 and 2005, Syria, with the support of the regional powers, maintained a dominant military and political presence in Lebanon, often in coordination with Iran and in collaboration with the Lebanese Shiite community, primarily represented by Hezbollah. Many analysts contend that the influence of Syria and Iran significantly shaped Lebanon’s foreign policy during this period (El-Hokayem, 2007). After Syria’s withdrawal and the onset of its internal conflict, Iran’s influence deepened, with Hezbollah consolidating its hegemony and aligning Lebanon’s strategic posture more closely with Iranian regional interests (Shabb, 2022). This alignment deepened sectarian polarization in Lebanon, particularly between Sunni communities supported by Gulf States and the USA and Shiite communities aligned with Iran (Abdo, 2017). These divisions further diminished the Lebanese state’s autonomy as external actors exerted influence through sectarian networks. Consequently, key international partners—especially the Gulf States and the USA—withdrew political and financial support, significantly worsening the 2019 financial crisis, if not causing it (Assi, 2020).

Hezbollah adopted and amplified the externalist narrative in response to the 2019 anti-government protests, framing Lebanon’s financial crisis as the result of foreign economic interference, particularly by the USA and Saudi Arabia. According to this narrative, these actors deliberately engineered the situation to undermine an otherwise stable financial system and to weaken Iranian and Hezbollah influence in Lebanon (Alferez, 2019). Hezbollah’s media outlets explicitly blamed the USA and Saudi Arabia for orchestrating the economic collapse, thereby reinforcing the externalist interpretation of Lebanon’s broader political and financial breakdown (Daoud, 2021). While cuts in the USA and Gulf funding exacerbated Lebanon’s economic collapse, this explanation does not account for the October 2019 uprising. The externalist paradigm frames crises as products of foreign interference, yet the protests were unprecedented in their cross-sectarian, class-based character. They focused on domestic grievances: corruption, elite capture, and systemic inequality. Demonstrators rallied under slogans such as “All of them means all of them,” demanding accountability, redistribution, and an end to sectarian patronage (Cherqaoui, 2024). These claims directly targeted Lebanon’s internal political economy rather than external actors, revealing the limits of externalist frameworks and underscoring the need for approaches that address structural contradictions within Lebanon’s capitalist model.

Although the externalist paradigm differs from the sectarian paradigm in its diagnosis of Lebanon’s crises—specifically by not challenging the politico-sectarian consensus underlying the democratic social contract—both paradigms agree on the necessity of a centralized state that monopolizes the use of force to strengthen national unity and limit foreign interference. However, the externalist approach overemphasizes geopolitical dynamics while underestimating the internal agency and structural contradictions of Lebanese society. Crucially, it fails to explain the spontaneous, cross-sectarian class mobilization of the 2019 uprising, which brought together Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and others in a unified, secular front. This movement directly challenged both entrenched sectarian elites, including the government and Hezbollah, and external influences, particularly Iran’s role in Lebanon. This united multi-sectarian mass mobilization challenges the external paradigm’s analysis that Lebanon’s crises are solely driven by external forces manipulating a divided and sectarian Lebanese society. Instead, it highlights the need to analyze the role of Lebanon’s entrenched liberal capitalist model and the class antagonisms it creates, which not only facilitates external intervention but also perpetuates systemic instability (Hussain, 1990). Thus, this paradigm effectively absolves the Lebanese liberal state of any responsibility for the 2019 socio-political and economic collapse, placing the blame instead, following Ghassan Tuéni’s narrative, squarely on external actors.

Despite their differing emphases, both the sectarian and externalist paradigms share a key oversight: they overlook the structural economic foundations of Lebanon’s crisis. The “Merchant Republic paradigm,” a theoretical framework that highlights Lebanon’s historical commitment to liberal economic governance and the political economy of elite-driven economic growth, aims to fill this gap. This paradigm contends that diverging from Lebanon’s liberal economic structure, heavily influenced by the merchant class of the early twentieth century and marked by minimal state intervention, has played a significant role in the country’s current crisis.

The Merchant Republic Paradigm

In contrast to the socio-political analyses articulated in earlier paradigms, the third paradigm, known as the “Merchant Republic,” posits that commentators should understand Lebanon’s 2019 financial meltdown in the context of its departure from its historically fundamental dedication to a liberal economy constitutionally shielded from political interference (Gates, 1998). Indeed, the 1926 constitution and its 2004 revision, particularly in Section F of the Preamble, explicitly state that Lebanon’s economic system is free, guaranteeing individual initiative and private ownership. Thus, despite Lebanon’s sectarianism and tumultuous socio-political history, its liberal economic regime has demonstrated resilience, owing to its relative success in securing autonomy from internal sectarian politics and external geopolitical considerations (Barhouche, 2024). It is asserted that despite significant political upheavals, including the challenges posed by the 1958 and the 1975–1989 civil wars, which exacerbated internal political, social, religious, and communal conflicts, along with external interference in Lebanon, the foundational traits of Lebanon’s liberal economy were shielded and have not only persisted but also expanded (Makdisi, 2004, p. 4). Furthermore, unlike the previous two paradigms, the merchant paradigm holds that what is commonly perceived as political sectarianism in Lebanon is not a structural flaw in the country’s socio-political system. Instead, it is a constructive innovation—an institutional framework that, as Pope John Paul II eloquently affirmed, makes Lebanon “more than a country, it is a message of freedom and an example of pluralism for East and West” (Speech of Pope John Paul II, 1997), fostering peaceful coexistence among its 18 officially recognized confessional communities.

According to this paradigm, Lebanon’s historical economic resilience amid persistent socio-political crises is attributed to the steadfast commitment of its sectarian political elite to maintaining an autonomous space for liberalism to thrive, primarily insulated from political interference. This commitment, deeply ingrained since the country’s establishment in 1920, advocates for separating the economy from politics. Both political elites and the general populace are seen as adherents to this ideology, which emphasizes minimal government intervention in economic affairs and promotes free-market principles (Gates, 1998). Lebanon’s liberal economic model, although constrained by a political system entrenched in sectarianism, clientelism, external interference, and pervasive corruption, has demonstrated notable resilience. It has not only endured over time but has also evolved and expanded, persisting—and arguably flourishing—through various institutional and informal manifestations (Cammett & Issar, 2010; Haidar & Diwan, 2019). A liberal market economy is therefore recognized as the primary force for modernization. Indeed, Lebanon has the oldest liberal market system in the Arab region, consistently favoring liberal economic policies since its independence. This underscores how Lebanon’s economic identity has been shaped by minimal state intervention, openness to trade, and a strong commitment to private enterprise, even amid political instability and sectarian fragmentation (Gaspard, 2003, p. 17).

The Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, introduced a new constitution aimed at reforming the pre-war sectarian power-sharing model more equitably. However, it ultimately strengthened an elite consensus and solidified Lebanon’s liberal economic systems. After the Taif Agreement, this project became closely linked with the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who led the Lebanese government from 1992 to 2000 and again from 2004 to 2005. Hariri promoted reforms aimed at entrenching and transforming Lebanon’s capitalist political economy, aligning it with neoliberal globalization. His efforts to move Lebanon away from its pre-Taif welfare-capitalist model toward a form of globalized capitalism known as neoliberalism were significant. However, the lines between political and economic power grew increasingly blurred (Traboulsi, 2014).

From the perspective of the Merchant Republic paradigm, Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s economic reform agenda is often portrayed as a commendable attempt to modernize Lebanon’s post-war liberal economy (Bollens, 2012). However, these reforms have been widely criticized for entrenching political interventionism and crony capitalism. Rather than fostering inclusive growth, these reforms facilitated systematic corruption of politically connected cronies, amounting, in effect, to the institutionalized expropriation of both state and citizen assets (Diwan et al., 2019). The “actually existing neoliberalism” brought about by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s financial architecture in Lebanon is seen as masking systemic corruption and laying the groundwork for Lebanon’s eventual economic collapse (Peck et al., 2018).

As a result, the 2019 financial collapse, from the perspective of the Merchant Republic paradigm, is not attributed to its sectarian political system, which implicitly presented itself as a model of Christian–Muslim relations, or external intervention, but instead to the excessive extra-economic political and legal manipulation of Lebanon’s liberal market economy by entrenched elites (Hager, 2017). This interference severely undermined the country’s progressive pre-civil war liberal economic model (Daher, 2022). According to an IMF report, the government’s efforts to address persistent budget deficits and soaring public debt, which exceeded 155% of GDP by the end of 2019, highlight the detrimental effects of politically driven cronyism (IMF, 2019b). Thus, this paradigm views Lebanon’s financial crisis and the failure of its capitalist economy as products of the Lebanese state’s political intervention, which exacerbates corrupt economic governance (Nizameddin, 2006). This governance is intertwined with clientelism, insufficient oversight, and a disregard for public interests. The proposed solution advocates for a return to the pre-war arrangement that sought to insulate economic governance from political interference. By minimizing the influence of political elites over economic decision-making, this analytical approach aims to restore the autonomy of Lebanon’s market system and re-establish a more effective and credible free-market model, offering hope for Lebanon’s future.

The Merchant Republic paradigm provides essential insights into Lebanon’s historical political economy by highlighting its commitment to liberalism and the separation of economic activity from political interference. Although this framework did foster significant growth in banking and services before 1975, it also deepened regional and class inequalities within the country (Nasr, 1978). Furthermore, while this paradigm celebrates liberalism as a historically successful wealth-generating model in Lebanon during the pre-1975 period, it systematically conceals the mass migration of impoverished populations toward the urban periphery—what has been termed the “misery belt”—that formed around Beirut and persisted even at the height of this purported economic prosperity (Yassin, 2012). Indeed, while wealth and development were heavily concentrated in urban centers, particularly Beirut, rural areas in the north and south remained marginalized, underdeveloped, and excluded from the benefits of this so-called economic expansion (Leenders, 2004). Moreover, the paradigm fails to account for the broader structural contradictions in the post-1992 capitalist order by attributing Lebanon’s financial collapse primarily to political intervention. Specifically, it ignores the key differences between liberalism and neoliberalism. While liberalism traditionally focuses on individual freedoms, the rule of law, and limited government involvement in the economy, neoliberalism is a more aggressive form of market fundamentalism that advocates deregulation, privatization, and a reduction in the state’s role in social welfare. As such, this often leads to greater inequality and the concentration of power among elites, weakening liberal institutions and increasing socio-economic gaps (Ali, 2024).

While the Merchant Republic paradigm highlights Lebanon’s liberal economic legacy, it often romanticizes pre-war capitalism and neglects the global dependency structures. The anti-imperialist/anti-colonial paradigm reorients the analysis by situating Lebanon’s crises within the broader historical context of imperialism and global capitalist exploitation.

The Anti-imperialist/Anti-colonial Paradigm

The anti-imperialist/anti-colonial paradigm, a significant advancement in critical frameworks, transcends sectarian divisions and foreign interventions. It is rooted in Marxist-inspired theories of imperialism, particularly those of Rosa Luxemburg (Luxemburg, 2003), V.I. Lenin (Lenin, 2015), and later theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (Frank, 1967), Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 2011), and Samir Amin (Samoff, 1978). This paradigm integrates a complex array of historical and theoretical analyses, challenging dominant interpretations and providing a historically grounded critique essential for understanding the structural roots of Lebanon’s contemporary crises.

This framework locates Lebanon’s persistent economic dysfunctions—including the 2019 financial collapse—within the broader historical context of Western colonialism and imperialism. These forces established a global financial system that extracted resources from the colonized periphery to enrich the colonial core (Marei, 2012). Central to this analysis is the critique of the French colonial project, which, through the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920, institutionalized a dependent economic structure dominated by an emerging comprador class and a sectarian political system modeled on the Ottoman Millet framework (Firro, 2002). The Lebanese comprador class is best exemplified by its most influential political–economic architect, Michel Chiha (1891–1954), a banker, politician, and ideologue who played a foundational role in shaping Lebanon’s liberal economic vision during the French Mandate and early independence period (Hartman & Olsaretti, 2003). This legacy entrenched a sectarian, oligarchic elite aligned with French interests, laying the foundation for Lebanon’s limited autonomy and structural instability within a Western-dependent capitalist system (Traboulsi, 2012). While the three theoretical frameworks discussed above have contributed to our understanding of Lebanon’s socio-political landscape, Marxist scholars offer a distinct critique rooted in historical materialism. Although they acknowledge the analytical contributions of these perspectives, they argue that such approaches disproportionately privilege superstructural dimensions—namely, liberal freedoms, geopolitical strategy, and discourses of identity politics and sectarianism—at the expense of underlying material and structural determinants. This focus, they contend, obscures the material contradictions at the heart of Lebanon’s political economy: entrenched class divisions, a comprador bourgeoisie aligned with global capital, and structural dependency on Western capitalism. From an orthodox Marxist perspective, these paradigms confuse cause and effect. The anti-imperialist/anti-colonial paradigm, by contrast, interprets Lebanon’s recurring socio-political crisis as an expression of deeper material realities—class struggle, capitalist exploitation, and the enduring legacy of colonial domination (Amel, 2020).

Building on Mahdi Amel’s, often referred to as the Arab Gramsci (Frontline, 2014), anti-colonial Marxist intellectual and political activist, critique of the “Merchant Republic” narrative—and its romanticization of pre-war liberalization and its post-1975-1990 civil war reimposition—through structural analysis. Accordingly, it is liberal capitalism—rather than sectarianism or external interference—that is identified as the principal driver of Lebanon’s protracted political and financial crises (Safieddine, 2021). From this framework, the liberal model—premised on a purported separation between economics and politics—was not neutral but a deliberately constructed system maintained by a foreign-dependent comprador merchant bourgeoisie masquerading as a national bourgeoisie. These intermediaries facilitated the enrichment of a narrow elite who functioned as distributors of Western industrial goods, thereby obstructing the development of a sovereign national industrial base (Hakim, 2019; Kardahji, 2015; Nasr, 1978). This alliance between Western-based industrial manufacturers and the Lebanese comprador class entrenched an economy centered on banking, tourism, and imports, systematically obstructing the development of a productive industrial base—an essential prerequisite for genuine modernization, economic transformation, and equitable wealth distribution (Wakim, 2021). Instead of fostering distributive justice, the model reinforced structural dependency, exacerbated socio-economic inequality, and deepened Lebanon’s peripheral integration into the global capitalist system (Baumann, 2016). As Amel forcefully argued, any economic formation rooted in colonial or neocolonial relations is inherently incapable of producing autonomous development. Overcoming this condition requires a revolutionary rupture that dismantles colonial dependencies and reorients the economy toward a socialist trajectory grounded in sovereignty, industrial production, and social justice (Amel, 2020).

In this light, Lebanon’s recurring crises, including the 1975–1990 civil war and the 2019 financial meltdown, are reframed as outcomes of the structural contradictions of Lebanese liberalism. These crises are not merely sectarian or geopolitical, as conventional paradigms posit, but the result of opposing anti-colonial, national, and class struggles. The civil war of 1975–1990, in particular, is reframed as a conflict between a cross-sectarian comprador elite entrenched in finance, banking, and commerce, and a coalition of the exploited poor and marginalized classes. These subaltern groups, mobilized by emerging cross-sectarian leftist movements since the 1960s, have sought to dismantle the colonial economic order and continue to challenge its domestic custodians. This interpretation positions the civil war that began in 1975 as a struggle over Lebanon’s economic sovereignty—a contest between an extractive, dependent model of accumulation and a vision of autonomous, productive development rooted in national liberation and social justice. It aligns with the insistence that class struggle in colonized societies is inseparable from the fight against sectarianism, imperialist structures, and their local manifestations (Fakhoury, 2019). Thus, the anti-colonial paradigm calls for radical political transformation: dismantling the sectarian power-sharing system and replacing liberalism with a centralized social democratic state dedicated to a robust welfare regime that promotes citizenship, a more equitable distribution of resources, and social justice (El Baba, 2024).

Lebanon’s Post-Taif Political Economy Through the Lens of ABD

To illustrate how ABD operates within Lebanon’s neoliberal trajectory, this section starts by briefly examining three emblematic cases. Each case highlights distinct mechanisms—legal, financial, and fiscal—through which elite accumulation and systemic dispossession have been institutionalized since the Taif Agreement.

The first case is the Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut by Solidere (1994–), which transferred roughly 150 hectares of prime land into a private joint-stock company, displacing residents and concentrating property rights among elite shareholders—an archetypal example of legalized ABD under the guise of urban renewal (Fawaz, 2014; Fawaz & Serhan, 2020; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; Makdisi, 1997). The second example is the Central Bank’s so-called Financial Engineering (2016–2019), where liquidity operations and interest arbitrage enriched commercial banks while socializing losses, culminating in deposit freezes ($82 billion) and a 98% currency depreciation—described by the World Bank as one of the biggest “Ponzi finance” scheme in history (World Bank, 2022). The third involves Fiscal/Tax Regimes and Subsidies (2002–2019), where regressive VAT (23.6% of tax revenue) and captured subsidies (fuel/medicine) shifted burdens onto lower-income households while enabling the very few at the expense of the many (Coady et al., 2015; Salti & Chaaban, 2010). These cases underscore how legality can and does operationalize dispossession within a neoliberal framework.

In the broad and ongoing discussion on neoliberalism, Lebanon remains a largely understudied case, especially when viewed through David Harvey’s theory of ABD. Unlike the extensive theorization of neoliberalism, its specific mechanisms and manifestations in Lebanon’s post-Taif political economy have not been thoroughly examined. This section offers new insights by applying Harvey’s ABD framework to Lebanon, providing a fresh analytical perspective that transcends traditional narratives of sectarianism and corruption. By emphasizing ABD as a key process of elite accumulation and systemic dispossession, this theoretical shift not only addresses a significant gap in the literature but also enhances our understanding of how neoliberalism functions in the Global South, particularly in countries like Lebanon, through legal, institutional, and financial means of expropriation. In doing so, it repositions Lebanon within global debates on neoliberal restructuring and State capture.

Neoliberalism, characterized by complexity and ongoing scholarly discourse, engenders various perspectives and occasionally conflicting viewpoints. This dynamic and evolving field of study, with diverse schools of thought and approaches among proponents and adversaries, contributes to the nuanced dialogue surrounding neoliberalism (Plehwe et al., 2007). Despite these divergent points of view, whether positive, negative, or somewhere in between, a consensus emerges among supporters and critics alike that neoliberal ideology has a hegemonic influence in our contemporary world, shaping politics, international relations, the international political economy, and the trajectory of globalization (Springer et al., 2016). This acknowledgment highlights the pervasive and interconnected presence of globalized neoliberalism across various domains and regions worldwide, serving as a focal point for scholarly inquiry and debate (Cahill et al., 2018). While we recognize the importance of engaging with the multiple interpretations of neoliberalism, this article neither has the space nor the intention to delve into those debates. That said, we must acknowledge the significance of interrogating neoliberalism and its effects, particularly in the context of Lebanon (Connell & Dados, 2014). In this regard, we follow Harvey’s theoretical deconstruction of neoliberalism and its accompanying ABD, which we believe offers the most pertinent and compelling framework for understanding contemporary, globalized, and globalizing neoliberalism, including its effects in Lebanon.

As previously discussed, Harvey’s significant theoretical contribution to the analysis of neoliberalism lies primarily in advancing the ABD framework as the central feature of capital accumulation in the neoliberal era. He derives this term from Karl Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, which refers to the historical process by which pre-capitalist modes of production were transformed into capitalist ones, often through violent dispossession (1990, pp. 873–875). He furthermore develops Rosa Luxemburg’s interpretation of this process as a continuous and constitutive aspect of capitalist expansion in her discussions on the relationship between the center and periphery of capitalism (2003). Harvey, however, redefines primitive accumulation as ABD to move away from viewing it as a primitive or original process, and instead emphasizes, beyond Luxemburg, its continuous nature at both the center and the periphery (Harvey, 2003, p. 137). This dispossession has persisted and repeatedly reemerged throughout capitalism’s development to the present, driven by a lack of investment opportunities for over-accumulated capital (2003, pp. 137–182).

Building on the above, Harvey argues that neoliberal restructuring leads to a contradictory social dynamic. On one side, it consolidates the power of a non-productive elite (Harvey, 2005). On the other side, these same processes trigger widespread resistance as affected populations mobilize against the loss of social welfare, inequality, labor rights, and democratic accountability. In these contradictory dynamics, he identifies the potential for transformative alternatives as grassroots and opposition movements express social justice visions that challenge the dominance of neoliberal rationality and aim to reclaim democratic control over economic life (Harvey, 2005, 2010). While the most explicit resistance to neoliberalism came from the Zapatista movement in 1994, which advocated for humanity and against neoliberal policies, this trend has been repeated throughout the neoliberalized world economy. This counterforce has since become a worldwide movement, spanning the USA, Europe, Latin America, Africa (Almeida & Martín, 2022; Prempeh, 2017), and the Middle East, as seen in cases in Egypt and Tunisia (Pfeifer, 2016). It promotes popular self-awareness and resistance to neoliberalism, focusing on policies of dispossession. These resistances aim to re-empower individuals and communities, making them feel part of a larger social justice movement. We argue that the pattern of resistance since 2003, culminating in the mass uprising in Lebanon in 2019, follows a similar trend (Khattab, 2022).

While Harvey’s ABD framework has attracted considerable attention in global urban and political-economy scholarship, its application in the Lebanese context remains surprisingly limited. In these cases, the focus has mainly been on Harvey’s concepts of spatial fix and urban gentrification (Harvey, 2006). Some studies emphasize Harvey’s theories to understand how sectarianism and neoliberalism in Lebanon have created a unique form of deep-rooted corruption (Salloukh et al., 2015), often ignoring the broader political, economic, and legal aspects of ABD (Deets, 2023). Only a few underdeveloped applications of the ABD framework aimed to fill this gap (Riachi, 2023, p. 66; Zbeeb, 2023, p. 37). In some instances, Harvey’s ABD theories are mentioned briefly, with notable contributions (Hourani, 2014; Leenders, 2012; Traboulsi, 2014). However, two works stand out: one by Hannes Baumann and one by Lara Khattab. In “Citizen Hariri: Lebanon’s Neoliberal Reconstruction,” Baumann explicitly—yet selectively—uses Harvey’s ideas, defining neoliberalism as a free-market orthodoxy and a political project aimed at reasserting class power through mechanisms such as privatization, financialization, and the erosion of labor rights, all supported by a strong State (Baumann, 2016, p. 86). Lara Khattab adapts Harvey’s theories to analyze Lebanon’s protest movements during this period, which arose from the contradictions of a neoliberal sectarian system in which economic insecurity and sectarian governance fueled grassroots mobilization but also limited its transformative potential (Khattab, 2022).

While these works (Khattab and Baumann) make an essential contribution to academic discussions of Lebanon’s post-1992 political economy through their extensive engagement with Harvey’s neoliberal framework, it is noteworthy that they focus on corruption and do not fully utilize the conceptual tool of ABD. However, according to Harvey, ABD, rather than corruption, the central idea in his analysis of how contemporary neoliberalism affects gentrification, cities, urban spaces, and inequality, as well as the upward redistribution of wealth through the capture of the state and the legalization of upward wealth transfer. Unlike corruption, ABD operates through legal and institutional mechanisms and is a form of dispossession sanctioned by the state and enforced through its coercive apparatus, enabling the legal transfer of public or communal assets into private hands under the guise of economic freedom. The omission of ABD as a central analytical tool in Harvey’s architecture of neoliberalism is significant because ABD frequently escapes scrutiny, despite functioning as a systemic and legalized form of theft (Leenders, 2012). It is, in effect, the “elephant in the room” of neoliberal restructuring—pervasive, normalized, and yet largely unaddressed in mainstream economic diagnoses of neoliberalism (Peck, 2010).

From Harveyan standpoint, ABD is not only a consequence but also a driving force behind the mechanisms of elite accumulation under neoliberalism and the force behind resistance to neoliberalism (Harvey, 2003, pp. 145–149; Harvey, 2005), which he defines as “a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19). Accordingly, ABD should be regarded as a central conceptual research tool in any case study of neoliberal adoption, including Lebanon in the post-Taif era.

Lebanon’s post-war political economy exemplifies the adoption of neoliberalism accompanied by ABD. Indeed, by all accounts, Rafik Hariri’s ascent to power in 1993, although not achieved through a violent seizure of the State, marked the successful onset of a deliberate and illiberal neoliberal transformation of Lebanon’s economy (Baumann, 2016, p. 19). Under the banner of national reconstruction, Prime Minister Rafic Hariri systematically and successfully staffed state institutions and the bureaucracy with hand-picked, neoliberal-oriented technocrats, replacing the older liberal generation of pre-1992 technocratic leaders (Hourani, 2015). These new appointees played a central role in reorienting Lebanon’s legal and economic frameworks to facilitate elite wealth accumulation through aggressive financialization of the market (Baumann, 2016, p. 89). Due to space constraints, this article focuses on the theoretical and historical aspects of the ABD rather than empirical evidence from Lebanon’s post-Taif period. However, future work should include case studies on privatization, financialization, and elite-driven urban redevelopment that support these theoretical claims and enhance our understanding of neoliberal restructuring in Lebanon (Deets, 2023).

To inform future empirical research on ABD in Lebanon, it would be helpful to examine specific cases, such as the expropriation practices that highlight key forms of legalized ABD in Lebanon following the 1993 neoliberal shift. A notable example is Solidere’s urban redevelopment, in which roughly 150 hectares of downtown Beirut were expropriated and transferred to a private real estate firm, displacing thousands of residents and concentrating property ownership among elite stakeholders (Krijnen, 2018, p. 105; Makdisi, 2004). This project alone generated billions in real estate value while marginalizing local communities (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; Wehbe, 2012, p. 88). This pseudo-privatization logic extended to utilities and waste management. For instance, Lebanon spent an estimated $180 million annually on municipal waste services by 2018, while environmental degradation costs reached $200 million—resources captured through monopolistic contracts benefiting politically connected firms (AbiYaghi et al., 2017; Jamali, 2003, p. 418). Similar rent-extraction patterns occurred in telecommunications and electricity sectors. In the financial sphere, the central bank’s financial engineering operations—described by the World Bank as a “legalized Ponzi scheme”—resulted in frozen deposits of approximately $82 billion by 2021 and a 98% currency depreciation since 2019, enriching commercial banks while deepening national insolvency (World Bank, 2022). Tax reforms and subsidy structures reinforced regressive fiscal policies: VAT accounted for 23.6% of total tax revenue and 5.1% of GDP by 2004, disproportionately burdening lower-income households (Salti & Chaaban, 2010, pp. 3–4).

Meanwhile, subsidies for fuel and medicine—estimated at $1.5 billion annually—were captured by import cartels and politically connected actors (Coady et al., 2015). Together, these measures created a legalized ABD system that transferred billions of dollars to a narrow financial elite while maintaining sectarian and clientelist structures. This fusion of neoliberal and sectarian logics illustrates that Lebanon’s post-war economic order was not a neutral market reform but a deliberate political project designed to sustain authoritarian bargains. Rather than creating new value, Lebanon’s neoliberal state deepened inequality and worsened poverty (Assouad, 2023; Makdissi et al., 2025). It ultimately led to the country’s financial collapse and the subsequent political uprising “aimed at reclaiming the state as a vehicle for social justice” (Harvey, 2005, p. 159). In this context, Lebanon’s economic failure and the ensuing mass popular uprising were not accidental but structurally inevitable. Therefore, in addition to the insights from the paradigms of sectarianism, externalism, merchant republicanism, and anti-colonialism, an analysis of Lebanon’s socio-political and economic contradictions requires a critical paradigmatic shift that recognizes the domestication of neoliberalism as a central element of its framework. Moreover, we argue that it is essential to apply the theoretical tool of ABD to go beyond corruption and better understand the complex ways it manifests in Lebanon and how it ultimately led to the 2019 financial crisis. Understanding these dynamics is essential not only for contextualizing Lebanon’s ongoing crises but also for contributing to a more nuanced global critique of neoliberalism and its localized manifestation.

The application of Harvey’s theory of ABD to Lebanon’s post-war political economy constitutes an original and necessary intervention in both Lebanese studies and the broader scholarship on global neoliberalism. This approach refocuses research on elite-driven privatization, financialization, and legal expropriation as structural features of a neoliberal project designed to redistribute wealth upward under the guise of economic reform. It challenges dominant paradigms that frame Lebanon’s crisis as uniquely sectarian or mismanaged, instead situating it within a global pattern of neoliberal transformation characterized by legalized dispossession. Recognizing ABD as a driving force in Lebanon’s economic collapse not only deepens the understanding of the country’s trajectory but also opens new avenues for comparative research on dispossession and resistance strategies across similarly affected regions.