Biden and the JCPOA Revival: Of Distrust,Domestic Politics,and Leadership

Introduction

The long, intractable, and fraught relations between the USA and Iran seemed to have turned a new leaf in 2015 with the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the USA, Russia, China, France, the UK, and Germany (P5+1). The JCPOA aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for relief from international sanctions, giving Iran access to international energy markets and unfreezing its assets in the West. To ensure compliance, Iran also accepted the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving the IAEA inspectors continuous access to its nuclear sites. Supporters of the deal believed that it would “prevent a revival of Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” thereby reducing the chances of conflict between Iran and its regional rivals, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia (Robinson, 2023).

The JCPOA was the result of years of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, made more difficult by the fact that the two countries have had no diplomatic relations since 1979. Negotiations began in secret in 2012, when President Barack Obama sent Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, to Oman to meet with Vice-President Biden and Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to discuss a nuclear deal with Iran’s representatives (Sullivan quoted in Hughes, 2025). These secret negotiations then transitioned into public negotiations led by Wendy Sherman, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Though the deal was the result of joint efforts by the rest of the P5 and Germany, the USA played the most important role. In unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, reinstating and even expanding sanctions, President Donald Trump changed the political and strategic context in which any future US President could engage Iran.

As a senator and later as Vice-President, Joe Biden had a history of advocating engagement with Iran and supporting the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran. During the 2020 campaign, as a presidential candidate, he promised to re-enter the JCPOA. However, despite several rounds of talks, his administration’s attempts to re-enter the agreement failed. Although it has been argued that the failure of the Biden administration’s policy may stem from tactical errors or Iran’s “maximalist” demands, one must examine the interplay among structural factors, domestic politics, and leadership choices in both countries. This article employs the theoretical frameworks of trust and reputation in international relations, two-level games, and leadership styles. It combines historical context, policy analysis, and process tracing of diplomatic interactions during 2021 and 2022 to emphasize the structural and domestic political constraints that led to failure in reviving the JCPOA despite Biden’s diplomatic efforts.

Biden’s Contribution to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action During the Obama Administration

As President Barack Obama announced the Iran nuclear deal on July 14, 2015, Vice-President Joe Biden stood at his side, perhaps a nod to his long-running engagement in foreign policy, particularly the USA’s Iran policy. While Biden had not played a major role in the negotiations leading up to the deal, he had long advocated for better relations with Iran, even as a Senator. In March 2002, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had delivered a speech at the American-Iranian Council calling for improved relations, as this would be “in the naked self-interest of the United States and, I would presume to suggest, Iran’s interest as well” (Biden, 2002). In 2007, Biden voted against a Senate resolution to label Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist group, saying he did not want President Bush to use it to justify a war with Iran. He opposed military force to stop Iran’s nuclear program. At one point, his support for diplomatic relations with Iran was so strong that a critic referred to him as “Tehran’s favorite senator” (quoted in Toosi, 2021a). In 2008, again as Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he advocated for better relations with Iran and establishing a diplomatic presence there, arguing that this “would increase our knowledge of the forces at work inside Iran. It would give us a stronger diplomatic hand to play, and it would decrease the chances of miscalculation” (Biden, 2008). Obama and Biden converged in their efforts to engage with Iran, though both were willing to impose sanctions to compel Iran to negotiate with the USA (Toosi, 2021b).

It was through Biden’s first foreign policy speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009 that the Obama administration formally announced its willingness to talk to Iran: “We’ll be willing to talk to Iran and to offer a very clear choice: Continue down the current course and there will be continued pressure and isolation; abandon the illicit nuclear program and your support for terrorism, and there will be meaningful incentives” (Biden, 2009). Though Biden did not play a direct role in the negotiations with Iran, he was kept informed about the negotiations and was often called on by the Obama administration to “raise concerns about the political palatability of the moves under consideration” (Toosi, 2021b).

In May 2009, the US Congress passed a law giving itself 60 days to review the deal. After the deal was announced, Republicans tried to push through a resolution disapproving of the deal. So, the Obama administration had to scramble to secure Congressional support to prevent the resolution from passing. This is where Biden’s long years in the Senate proved helpful. Biden reached out to his former colleagues on the Hill and spoke to members of the Jewish community who feared that the deal would threaten Israel’s security, insisting that the deal would make both the USA and Israel safer. He even went personally to Capitol Hill to talk to the Democrats (Mimms & National Journal, 2015). He reassured those unconvinced on lifting the arms embargo on Iran, explaining there are “alternative ways for us to prevent the Iranians from engaging in the sale of conventional arms in the region” (French & Everett, 2015). So, it was partly due to his efforts that the Republican resolution was not passed. Thus, Biden had a seminal role in the Obama administration’s Iran policy, especially in ensuring that there were no obstacles from the US Congress. This experience strengthened Biden’s conviction that diplomacy with Iran, along with effective engagement with Congress and international partners, could deliver tangible benefits for nonproliferation. It also influenced his handling of Iran as president, in which he adopted a cautious, process-oriented approach, balancing engagement with Iran against domestic and regional considerations.

Trump’s Withdrawal from the Deal

The Democrats lost the 2016 Presidential elections to Donald Trump, who unilaterally rescinded the deal in May 2018. He re-imposed sanctions, added more, and launched a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran. After the USA withdrew from the deal, many countries imported oil from Iran under US waivers, and Iran continued to abide by its commitments (Robinson, 2023). But after a year, on May 2, 2019, the USA ended the waivers, effectively ending Iran’s oil exports (Bollino et al., 2019). In response, in May, Iran again started building its nuclear capabilities by enriching uranium, contravening the clauses of the JCPOA (Arms Control Association, 2021; Bollino et al., 2019).

By 2020, Iran started moving away from its nuclear pledges, after several attacks on its interests like the targeted killing of Commander of IRGC’s Quds Force, General Qasem Soleimani, by the USA, the destruction of a centrifuge production center at Natanz, and the assassination of a prominent nuclear scientist (the latter two attributed to Israel). On December 2, 2020, Iran’s parliament passed a law titled the ‘Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests,’ approved by the Guardian Council the following day, which led to a substantial boost in uranium enrichment at Fordow and increasingly limited the IAEA’s ability to inspect its facilities (National Iranian American Council, 2020). Trump’s withdrawal from the deal and his “maximum pressure” policy caused significant damage to US credibility and amplified the already-existing distrust of the USA within the Iranian regime, making it adopt a more hardline approach. Moreover, his policies prompted further countermeasures by Iran, such as refusing to comply with certain provisions of the JCPOA and adopting the “maximum resistance” stance (Tang & Pan, 2022, pp. 190, 193; Nuruzzaman, 2020, p. 571). Trump’s policies had an impact on Iranian domestic politics as well, with Iranian Conservatives becoming stronger as Trump’s withdrawal from the deal “undermined the reputations of the ‘doves’ and ‘reformers’ in Iran who promoted more cooperative relations with the United States” (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 193). The pressure from sanctions was successfully converted into internal political cohesion by the Iranian regime (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 193). Thus, Trump’s withdrawal from the deal was a disruptive intervening variable that increased the trust deficit between Iran and the USA.

Candidate Biden and His Iran Policy

During the 2020 Presidential election campaign, Biden, the Democratic nominee, promised to reinstate the 2015 Iran deal and reduce tensions with Iran, provided Iran complied with the JCPOA. In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations during the campaign, Biden referred to Iran as a “destabilizing actor in the Middle East” that should “never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). He criticized Trump for withdrawing from the deal, arguing that Trump’s

reckless actions have produced a deep crisis in transatlantic relations and pushed China and Russia closer to Iran. As a result, the United States, rather than Iran, has been isolated. Predictably, Iran has restarted its nuclear program and become more aggressive, moving the region closer to another disastrous war. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019)

As tensions between the USA and Iran escalated in June 2019 over Iran shooting down an American drone, Biden referred to Trump’s Iran strategy as a self-inflicted disaster, arguing that by “walking away from diplomacy, Trump has made military conflict more likely” (Forgey, 2019). He said that as President, he would rejoin the deal, as this “would provide a critical down payment to re-establish US credibility, signaling to the world that America’s word and international commitments once again mean something” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Writing for CNN, candidate Biden argued that instead of restoring deterrence, Trump had emboldened Iran and “repeatedly brought America to the brink of a new” war (Biden, 2020). He offered Iran “a credible path back to diplomacy” while assuring that he would work with Israel to ensure its security and would “continue to use targeted sanctions against Iran’s human rights abuses, its support for terrorism and ballistic missile program” (Biden, 2020). Essentially, the Democratic nominee’s position was that if Iran was willing to comply with the JCPOA fully, the USA would do the same; the JCPOA would then become “the basis for a longer and stronger agreement,” and “follow-on agreements” would be negotiated to “cover other areas of concern, including Iran’s ballistic missile program” (Price, 2021). Biden defeated Trump in the 2020 elections and became the 46th President of the USA.

Biden’s Diplomatic Strategy to Revive the Deal

From the beginning, President Biden was clear that his foreign policy would be very different from Trump’s, and that once elected, he would repair America’s “alliances and engage with the world once again” (Cox, 2022, p. 151). He chose experienced people in his cabinet to carry forward this vision. He selected Antony Blinken as his Secretary of State. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Blinken echoed Biden’s campaign comments, suggesting that the new administration wanted a “longer and stronger agreement” with Iran while also addressing its missile program and “destabilizing activities” (Blinken, 2021a). Biden appointed Rob Malley, the former lead American negotiator for the 2015 nuclear talks with Iran, as his Special Envoy for Iran. Malley had helped negotiate the Iran nuclear deal as part of the Obama Administration. He was seen as a supporter of reaching out to Iran. In a Foreign Affairs article, Malley had suggested that Obama had been too “gradualist” in his approach to the Iran deal, which is why it had failed (2019). So, he was seen as being soft on Iran. However, from the very beginning, there was opposition from Congress to any compromise with Iran. For instance, during Blinken’s confirmation hearing, incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez said: “Now, I understand the Biden administration is interested in returning to a diplomatic path, which I support, but I fear returning to the JCPOA without concrete efforts to address Iran’s other dangerous and destabilizing activity would be insufficient” (Elsea et al., 2021).

Contrary to his promises as the Democrat candidate, Biden did not, in the initial days of his Presidency, do anything to ease its sanctions on Iran or offer humanitarian aid as it dealt with a devastating COVID-19 pandemic (Axelrod, 2020). But back-channel diplomacy to initiate talks seems to have started, as later developments prove. Figures within his administration like Sullivan and Blinken were worried that sending COVID-19 relief to Iran would antagonize key votes in Congress as well as Israel and the Gulf states, which have historically been opposed to any concessions to Iran (Hirsh, 2021). The other major debate was whether to return to the original JCPOA first or to push for a broader deal, including nonnuclear aspects such as imposing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program from the outset (Toosi, 2021c). Malley and Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer were reportedly in favor of more inducements to Iran to return to the table (Doran & Badran, 2021). But Sullivan and Blinken’s views prevailed on this issue. The Biden administration promised to “lengthen and strengthen” the deal to include “Iran’s destabilizing regional behavior and ballistic missile development and proliferation,” in a bid to mollify Democratic critics of the JCPOA (Hirsh, 2021). However, critics who wanted to stabilize relations with Iran suggested that by taking a hard line, the Biden administration had “reawakened old fears in Tehran dating back decades that Washington will always renege on a deal and end up demonizing Iran” (Hirsh, 2021).

Meanwhile, in January 2021, Iran started the process of enriching uranium to 20%, above the limits set in the 2015 nuclear deal, to put pressure on the Biden administration (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 194). In the same month, Iran imposed sanctions on Donald Trump, Mike Pompeo, and eight others who had allegedly played a role in the killing of Soleimani and sought their arrest through Interpol. The USA and Iran faced several conflictual situations around this time, particularly in Syria and Yemen, as well as in the maritime theater around the Persian Gulf, including attacks on Israeli vessels and reprisals from Israel. These attacks, as well as Iran’s nuclear escalation, “left Biden no space to even partially roll back sanctions as a means of signaling seriousness in his intended break from his predecessor’s policy” (International Crisis Group, 2022a, p. 21).

In the meantime, on February 15, 2021, reeling from the COVID-19 crisis, Iran informed the IAEA that it would suspend the implementation of voluntary transparency measures envisaged in the JCPOA from February 23 if the sanctions were not lifted. This meant that Biden had very little time to attempt to salvage the nuclear deal. So, on February 18, the Biden administration announced it was rescinding the Trump administration’s “snapback sanctions” on Iran, announced in September 2020. It stated that the USA had accepted an invitation from the European Union (EU) to meet with the P5+1 countries to outline a diplomatic way forward on Iran and to have a meeting of the P5+1 countries with Iran (Nada, 2023). The USA also lifted travel sanctions on UN-based Iranian diplomats, which had allowed them to travel only between their residences, their offices, and the UN office. In addition to this, the USA revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of the Houthis, an Iranian proxy. Jake Sullivan’s press releases did not mention Iran while referring to a rocket attack on a US military base in northern Iraq, nor did the State Department press release on Houthi attacks on Yemen mention Iran (Dubowitz & Taleblu, 2021). The USA did not oppose a $5 billion International Monetary Fund loan to Iran. These measures, though politically risky for Biden, were meant to kick-start talks with Iran. Biden repeated the offer to restarting talks and cooperating with the USA’s partners during his remarks at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, 2021. In his address to the UN-sponsored Conference on Disarmament on February 22, Secretary Blinken reiterated the same promise (USIP, 2021). While the Biden administration’s overtures were welcomed by the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany), who urged Iran to join informal negotiations, Russia and China stated that the first step should be for the USA to rejoin the JCPOA and then move forward with talks (Motevalli et al., 2021).

Iran reacted without enthusiasm to the US offer of talks and demanded that all the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration between 2018 and 2021 should be lifted as a precondition to roll back its violations of the 2015 nuclear deal and to start talks in the P5+1 format, thus adopting a maximalist approach (Nada, 2023). Iran’s stance was that as the USA had been the one to withdraw from the JCPOA, Washington should be the first to act by rejoining the deal; once this was done, Iran would roll back on its uranium enrichment activities, which were in violation of the JCPOA (Shahla & Sykes, 2021). The Iranian position seems to have been driven by fears that the USA would again fail to uphold its diplomatic assurances, as Trump did. The US position was that the sanctions imposed by Trump could only be removed after Iran reversed its violations of the 2015 deal. So, the disagreement was over the sequence; that is, who would take the first step. Though the USA was disappointed with the Iranian response to its proposals, it did not give up hope of engaging in meaningful diplomacy with Iran (Mousavian & Mahmoudieh, 2021).

The USA now put the onus on Iran to restart the talks. Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 2021 that “the ball is in their court to see if they are serious about re-engaging or not” (Blinken, 2021b). In the same month, according to a report in Politico, the Biden administration floated a new proposal asking Iran to halt some of its nuclear activities, like work on “advanced centrifuges and the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity,” in return for “some relief from US economic sanctions” (Toosi, 2021b). The new proposal was prompted by the upcoming Iranian presidential elections in June and the expiry of an agreement with the IAEA, which had prevented Iran from curbing the IAEA’s access to its nuclear facilities. But Iran again rejected this proposal.

By March 2021, however, the IAEA had convinced Iran to allow some inspections of its nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, Biden was under attack from his critics in Congress who wanted him to broaden the nuclear deal to check Iran’s ballistic missile program and its backing for proxy militias in the Middle East (Jakes, 2021). Earlier, in February, some Democrats in the Senate initiated a bill to ensure that the USA would lead international efforts to “strengthen the restrictions Iran’s ballistic missile program and counter the proliferation of such technology to other countries and actors…after such time that all sides return to their commitments” under the nuclear deal, though they supported restarting nuclear diplomacy with Iran (Markey et al., 2021, pp. 7–8). Blinken even had to reassure members of the US House of Representatives during a hearing in June that the USA would not make concessions just to initiate a meeting with Iran and that Iran would be in full compliance with the deal or on a negotiated path to full compliance before any relief from sanctions (Jakes, 2021). The Biden administration was also constrained by the Democrats’ slim majority in Congress (both Republicans and Democrats had 50 senators each, with Vice-President Kamala Harris having the casting vote in the Senate, while the Democrats had a slim majority at 222 seats in the House of Representatives), which made it “risk-averse about foreign policy, lest controversy in that domain jeopardize Biden’s domestic agenda amid a pandemic-induced socioeconomic crisis” (International Crisis Group, 2022a, p. 20). For Iran, Washington’s hesitation to offer any meaningful sanctions relief was seen as “a sign of bad faith” (International Crisis Group, 2022a, p. 21). Iran emphasized the peaceful character of its nuclear program and the use of nuclear technology as a representation of its scientific success and national sovereignty. However, Iran’s gradual increase in enrichment capacity and its use of nuclear advances as a bargaining chip indicate a strategic approach. Iran’s decision-making process on the nuclear issue is highly centralized around the office of the Supreme Leader, who sets the red lines and provides major policy direction. His long-standing distrust of US intentions, based on a bitter history and the collapse of the JCPOA, contributed to a negotiating strategy that aimed at maximum sanctions relief and strong guarantees before reining in Iran’s nuclear advances. This strategy constrained Iranian negotiators and reduced their flexibility on issues such as the IRGC’s designation (Tabatabai, 2020).

The Vienna Talks

Back-channel conversations between the two countries led to negotiations among Iran, the E3, Russia, and China (the Joint Commission) to revive the deal in Vienna in April 2021. Though an American delegation led by Malley was in Vienna at the same time, it did not participate in direct talks, as Iran insisted on the removal of sanctions before any direct talks. It was reported that at these talks, the Iranians rejected a US offer to release $1 billion in Iranian funds frozen in South Korea in return for stopping 20% uranium enrichment (Motamedi, 2021a). One of the key demands made by Iran during these talks with the Joint Commission was that the USA should verifiably withdraw all sanctions, including those removed as part of the JCPOA and later reimposed by Donald Trump, as well as all new sanctions and all the sanctions imposed using “non-nuclear excuses” (Motamedi, 2021b). These sanctions had been imposed by Trump under “human rights” and “terrorism” clauses to make it more difficult for Biden to return to the JCPOA. He had even designated the IRGC, the Iranian central bank, the Ministry of Oil, and the National Iranian Oil Company as FTOs (Wintour, 2021). The US stance was that nonnuclear sanctions need not be lifted, since the Biden administration itself had sanctioned some individuals for human rights abuses. Moreover, Biden was under pressure from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress not to give in on this issue; for example, Senator Joe Manchin said that the IRGC is and remains a terrorist organization (Liechtenstein & Toosi, 2022). This contributed to the radicalization of the internal debate in Iran and its subsequent negotiating position (Rad, 2021).

The USA and Iran agreed, through intermediaries, to establish two working groups to bring Iran and the USA back into compliance with the JCPOA. One would explore how to get the USA back into the deal by lifting the sanctions imposed or reimposed after it withdrew in May 2018, while the other would examine how to get Iran back into compliance with the limitations on nuclear enrichment and stockpiles of enriched uranium under the deal. The USA wanted a staged, step-by-step agreement so that both sides could verify that the other side was carrying out its commitments. As Robert Malley said: “I think what we can essentially rule out are the maximalist demands that the United States do everything first and only in turn would Iran then act; I don’t think anyone is under the impression that that would be a viable proposal” (Rad, 2021). The Vienna talks ended after six rounds following the election of Ebrahim Raisi, seen as an anti-West hardliner, as Iran’s president in June 2021. It must be noted that, having won on a platform of self-reliance, Raisi’s government was constrained by the need to sustain “tough diplomacy to appease nationalism and anti-US sentiment in Iran” (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 204). In June, there were airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria by the US forces. By July, the Biden administration was weighing ways to more strictly enforce and expand US sanctions against key Iranian trade partners like China and the UAE if the negotiations stumbled (International Crisis Group, 2022a, p. 11). In August, the IAEA stated that Iran’s enrichment of uranium was almost weapons-grade, and Mossad even said that Iran might have violated the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 194). At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei described Biden as a “predatory wolf” who was no different from his predecessor and criticized the “shameless” behavior of the USA on Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal, saying it had behaved as if it was Iran, and not the USA, which had left the accord (Motamedi, 2021c). Ayatollah Khamenei earlier made another demand: the USA should provide a guarantee that it would never again walk away from the pact like Trump did (Sanger et al., 2021). This again indicated that the Iranians were unlikely to adopt a flexible approach during negotiations.

However, indirect talks resumed in Vienna in November 2021. But by then, Iran had “enriched Uranium to 60 percent, produced enriched uranium metal, which could be used to build the core of a nuclear bomb, installed and used advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium,” thus decreasing its breakout time to three weeks while also reducing cooperation with the IAEA by refusing to allow it to reinstall cameras at its Karaj nuclear facility (Nada, 2021). The USA, on its part, wanted the IAEA to censure Iran if it continued to deny access to the facility.

At this round of talks, Iran sought a guarantee from the US that it would not withdraw from the deal or reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2018 (Arms Control Association, 2021). These talks again broke off on December 17, only to resume on the 27th. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian suggested an “acceptable” joint text had been agreed for discussion, which included sanctions and nuclear issues (quoted in Motamedi, 2021d). Iran also insisted that it should be allowed to export crude oil. In December, Iran agreed to let the IAEA reinstall cameras at Karaj. The talks restarted in January 2022 after a short break. The major stumbling block this time was the US designation of the IRGC as a FTO in 2019. The USA was initially willing to remove the FTO designation in return for Iran agreeing to stop targeting Americans in the region and not retaliating against American officials responsible for decisions like killing IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani (Liechtenstein & Toosi, 2022). But Iran refused to make any such concessions.

In February 2022, Biden again tried to resuscitate indirect negotiations by restoring “sanctions waivers” (which had been withdrawn by Trump) for Russian, Chinese, and European companies, allowing them to carry out nonproliferation work at Iranian nuclear sites. The idea behind the waivers was to gradually build trust with Iran and to facilitate technical discussions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Tehran’s response was tepid. Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian stated that the US steps on lifting sanctions were “good but not enough,” though he admitted that it could translate into goodwill for the Americans (quoted in Al Jazeera, 2022). The Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Shamkhani, reacted on Twitter, stating that “Iran’s legal right to continue research and development and to maintain its peaceful nuclear capabilities and achievements, along with its security against supported evils, cannot be restricted by any agreement” (Al Jazeera, 2022). The announcement of the sanction waiver was not welcomed by the hawks in the Republican Party either, who accused the Biden administration of giving concessions without securing any commitments from Iran. For instance, “Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), an American think-tank that supports sanctions on Iran, said the US should not support any level of Iranian nuclear activity” (Al Jazeera, 2022). The US State Department consequently had to issue a statement clarifying that the sanctions waiver did not signify sanctions relief for Iran and that the waivers were subject to Iran’s returning to its obligations under the JCPOA. It further clarified that the waivers were meant to enable China, Russia, and the EU to “address growing nuclear non-proliferation and safety risks in Iran” (Al Jazeera, 2022).

By March 2022, the main stumbling block in the talks was Russia’s insistence that sanctions imposed on it after its invasion of Ukraine should not affect its trade with Iran, though this was resolved as it became evident that Iran wanted a deal. By this time, the deal seemed imminent. In fact, from March, Biden had been trying to coerce the Iranians into a compromise by unveiling new sanctions targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program and its oil and petrochemical trade while also suggesting that Iran’s nuclear program could be targeted militarily as a last resort and stepping up cooperation with allies against drone and maritime threats from Iran (International Crisis Group, 2022b, p. 14). On March 14, 2022, 49 Republican Senators, including Mitch McConnell, Mitt Romney, and Jim Inhofe, issued a statement saying they would not support the revived JCPOA, as it would weaken sanctions and reduce restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, thus increasing domestic pressure on Biden. Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia during its invasion of Ukraine complicated matters (Thomas, 2025). Influential Republican Senator Ted Cruz stated that “the Biden administration wants to sanction Putin on the one hand while simultaneously giving him a financial lifeline through the Iran deal on the other,” he said, before pledging to work to stop that from happening (Shaw, 2022).

Moreover, as Eldar Mamedov (2023) argued:

by refusing…to engage with its critics and the broader public on the agreement’s benefits to the U.S. and global security, it has allowed the notion that the JCPOA was some kind of reward for Iran, rather than a deal that strictly curbed Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, to become conventional wisdom.

This is why the administration did not receive much domestic support for reviving the deal. By the end of April, the status of the IRGC had become the deal breaker. In May, the USA sanctioned Iran’s Quds Force for allegedly participating in a Russian-backed oil smuggling and money laundering network (Reuters, 2022). Even at this time, Robert Malley was seeking bipartisan support, stating at a Senate hearing that “we are much better off with one that enjoys as much bipartisan support as possible” (Malley, 2022). More sanctions were imposed in June, targeting foreign and Iranian firms for enabling the sale of Iranian petrochemicals. These actions were meant to pressure Iran to return to talks for a deal. Indirect talks between the two countries in Doha in June also did not lead to any breakthrough, with Malley describing them as “more than a little bit of a wasted occasion” (quoted in Malley, 2022, p. 13). The US position had hardened by this time as Biden came under domestic pressure from both Republicans and Democrats not to budge on the IRGC issue.

Democrat Senator Joe Manchin wrote a letter to Blinken saying, “… let me be clear. The IRGC is a terrorist organization” (Liechtenstein & Toosi, 2022). Moreover, after news about Biden’s initial willingness to delist the IRGC came out in March, Israel had begun to put pressure on the USA. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid issued a joint statement, saying they “found it hard to believe that the IRGC’s designation will be removed in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans,” arguing, “We believe the U.S. will not abandon its closest allies in exchange for empty promises from terrorists” (quoted in International Crisis Group, 2022b, p. 12). This, along with criticism from influential members of Congress, led the Biden administration to rule out delisting the IRGC. In July 2022, there were reports that the USA and Israel were trying to build a security alliance with Arab states, connecting their air defense systems to fight against Iranian drone and missile attacks, to which Iran reacted negatively (Yaakoubi et al., 2022). By this time, support for the deal among Iranians had come down, with polls showing that less than half expected it to be restored and about two in three believing that “even if a new agreement were to be reached, the United States is unlikely to ultimately fulfil its obligations,” and less than a quarter feeling that “Iran should show flexibility to get the deal restored” (Voxnations, 2022).

Indirect talks resumed in August 2022 with the EU tabling the final text of the deal. Iran proposed changes to the text to include sanctions relief in the future as well (Davenport, 2022), which the Biden administration rejected, as it could not legally hold future administrations to its promises. Moreover, Tehran insisted that a probe into its past nuclear activities by the IAEA should be stopped, a demand not acceptable either to the USA or the EU, as this would infringe on the IAEA’s mandate. At the same time, Israel put pressure on the USA to walk away from the negotiations, as it did not guarantee that Iran would not become a nuclear state. In August, several Israeli political elites, including the Prime Minister, urged the USA not to go ahead with the talks (Tharoor, 2022). The US mid-term elections were imminent by this time, making it difficult for Biden to make politically risky agreements. The E3 were also unhappy with Iran’s attitude by this time. So, the talks stalled again. By October 2022, the USA made it clear that nuclear talks with Iran were not its focus, and Blinken stated that Iran continued to “inject extraneous issues” into JCPOA talks; “And as long as they continue to do that, there is no possibility, no prospect for an agreement” (Nada, 2023). In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian accused the USA of being “in a rush to reach an agreement” and “fanning the flames” of protests in the aftermath of the death of Mahsa Amini to put pressure on Iran and vowed not to make any concessions (Nada, 2023). The talks were thus effectively dead by October 2022, and with this ended Biden’s hopes of restoring the JCPOA.

Leadership traits and preferences also played a major role in the negotiations. Biden’s long-standing engagement in foreign policy and his role in securing the JCPOA’s approval by Congress led to a tendency toward multilateral engagement and restrained, risk-averse diplomacy. This translated into an aversion to offer unilateral sanctions relief or make bold symbolic statements to Tehran. Moreover, he was under pressure from Congress and allies not to give Iran concessions. Moreover, the perception of Biden as a weak President and his lack of charisma added to the problems. In fact, his approval ratings were in the 40s for much of his Presidency (De Pinto et al., 2025). On his part, Khamenei remained highly suspicious of US intentions and alert against any policies that could be interpreted as a surrender to the USA. The Trump administration’s withdrawal had strengthened his suspicions about US trustworthiness and hardened his insistence on guarantees, comprehensive sanctions relief, and protection of the IRGC for the security of his own regime. Thus, Biden’s caution and Khamenei’s distrust amplified the sequencing disputes and made it difficult for Washington and Tehran to find mutually acceptable compromises.

A quick comparison of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations reveals some key areas of continuity and contrast. Though both Obama and Biden believed in diplomacy to rein in Iran’s nuclear program, Obama engaged in diplomacy when his leverage was high, party discipline was strong, and US domestic politics was less polarized. Trump rejected diplomacy as a means of constraint, preferring coercion and unilateralism, and he had the advantage of a Republican base mostly supportive of his hardline approach. However, Biden had to engage in diplomacy in a post-withdrawal scenario characterized by intense skepticism, a lack of credibility, and an extremely polarized Congress, with bipartisan opposition to reviving the deal. Biden, therefore, was faced with a paradox: he wanted to pursue Obama’s goals but was constrained by his inheritance of the post-withdrawal loss of US credibility and, consequently, a weaker bargaining position with Iran.

Conclusion

Biden’s approach toward Iran was indicative of his liberal internationalist stance, which prioritized multilateralism and coordination with other powers to address global problems. He attempted to complete Obama’s project for a stable Middle East that would require little American intervention. However, despite his efforts, the deal could not be revived for a variety of reasons, even though there were several rounds of indirect negotiations between the USA and Iran. First and foremost, Biden could not bridge the trust deficit between the two countries, amplified by the loss of US credibility after it withdrew from the JCPOA under Trump. The format of the talks themselves, that is, indirect talks, was a problem because both countries had to depend on European officials to convey their messages. Also, after he became President, the Biden administration took longer than expected to reach out to Iran. The concern in Iran about the USA’s real “intentions, which Tehran presumed involved regime change regardless of who was in power in Washington, barred the Iranians from appreciating the Biden administration’s efforts to scale back America’s involvement in the Middle East in part by fixing problems with Iran” (Keynoush, 2022, p. 45).

Third, domestic politics in both countries were not conducive to any sort of compromise on each country’s red lines. Biden faced a deeply polarized polity in the USA; he had a slim majority in the Senate and a majority in the House of Representatives until the mid-term, when the Democrats lost their majority in the House, though they retained control of the Senate. The popular perception of Biden as a weak President did not help his cause. In Iran, Raisi’s election only strengthened the hardliners. Both countries adopted maximalist positions, fearing that a compromise would be too politically risky. Fourth, Iran’s escalation of nuclear activities during the talks made it difficult to reach a deal. Fifth, several external factors played a role. Israel put pressure on Biden not to compromise. The USA’s other allies in the Middle East were also worried about the US reaching out to Iran. Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine by supplying equipment to it, its continued backing of Hamas even in the wake of the October 7 attacks on Israel, and support to the Houthis and Hezbollah led to more sanctions on it, muddying the waters further.

In October 2023, the Biden administration announced new sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs. Further, Washington and Tehran had disagreements over issues related to rejoining the deal, including the IRGC’s designation as a terrorist organization and the sequencing of steps to conclude the deal (Robinson, 2023). Thus, Biden’s inability to revive the JCPOA despite his best efforts was a function of domestic politics in both Tehran and Washington, the trust deficit between the two countries, as well as external factors like pressure from allies and Iran’s involvement in several conflicts in the Middle East and in Ukraine.

Although Joe Biden’s effort to revive the JCPOA may, in retrospect, seem unsurprising, this article shows why such a result was structurally embedded, and not just contingent. By contextualizing the Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts within the framework of the USA’s post-Trump credibility loss, congressional polarization, and Iran’s shift to a more hardline position, this analysis challenges work that emphasizes only the role of tactical mistakes and a lack of determination on Biden’s part. Biden’s failure was the result of structural credibility problems that were reflected after Trump’s withdrawal. Therefore, this article illustrates that even an administration with such a high level of personal commitment to diplomacy was severely hampered in exercising executive agencies. Thus, this highlights the important role of domestic political fragmentation and alliance management in creating obstacles to diplomatic engagement. Further, it contributes to the assessment of Biden’s foreign policy legacy, suggesting that the Biden administration’s commitment to liberal internationalism and multilateralism was circumscribed not only by external adversaries but also by the inherited policy damage of Trump 1.0 and domestic politics.